Can the number of witnesses or the reputation of their righteousness serve as grounds for preference between two pieces of testimonial evidence?
General Chapter
Al-Mughni
Book of Claims and Evidences
Primary text
One testimonial evidence cannot be preferred over another based on the greater number of witnesses or the widespread reputation of their justice. This view is held by Abu Hanifa and Al-Shafi'i. The basis for preference, according to the dissenting view, stems from the principle that when an individual trusts the more righteous of two informants more, the same principle should apply to testimony, as testimony is a form of report. Furthermore, testimony is considered due to the strong presumption (*ghalabat al-dhann*) regarding the testified matter, and a greater number of witnesses or stronger righteousness increases this presumption.
Supporting text
It is possible to prefer the evidence based on the greater number of witnesses or the righteousness of the witnesses, following the perspective derived from Al-Khiraqi's statement that the blind person follows the one he trusts most among the two. This is the position of Malik, arguing that since one report is preferred based on strength, testimony, being a report, should also be preferred when strengthened.