Is a general oath (yamin) binding based on a specific private intention?

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If a person swears an oath using general wording but intends a specific meaning, the oath is judged according to that specific intention. This principle applies to examples such as swearing not to perform Ghusl tonight while intending only the major ritual impurity (Janabah), swearing not to approach the bed while intending only sexual intercourse, swearing divorce upon marrying while intending a specific woman, or swearing not to eat bread while intending only wheat bread. For rulings in a court of law, there are two differing narrations regarding whether this private intention is accepted. One narration, supported by Imam Ahmad concerning Zihar (the oath stating 'you are to me as the back of my mother' if he approaches his wife's bed), suggests that if the external action occurs but the specific intent was absent (e.g., the wife only stood near the bed, not intending intercourse), the oath is not incurred. This view holds that the specific context or cause ('sabab') of the oath indicates the specific intent and substitutes for intention when intent is absent, thereby restricting the general wording to the context of the cause.