Tafsir of Yusuf 12:41

Then, after establishing the truth and clarifying it for them to the extent of his vast knowledge, he [Yusuf, peace be upon him] began to inform them of what they had asked him to interpret. Because this was a new subject distinct from what had preceded, he separated it by repeating the address, saying:

"O my two fellow prisoners! As for one of you..." He intended the cupbearer—and he did not designate him explicitly out of confidence in the clarity of the interpretation, alongside the observance of good companionship—"...he will serve his lord wine." It is narrated that he said to him: "What you saw of the vine and its excellence is the King and the excellence of your status with him; as for the three branches, they are three days that will pass in prison, then you will be released and return to your former position."

It has been recited: fayasqī (he will provide drink), with a damma on the yā’ and the verb form based on the active voice derived from asqā. The author of al-Lawāmi‘ says: It is said saqā and asqā with the same meaning. In the seven canonical recitations, it is recited nasqīkum and nusqīkum with the fatha and the damma. The well-known convention is that saqāhu means he handed him something to drink, while asqāhu means he provided the means for him to drink. Some have attributed the damma on the yā’ to ‘Ikrimah and al-Jahdari, and some mention that ‘Ikrimah recited fayusqā in the passive voice, with the rā’ followed by a yā’ and the rā’ being kasra. The intended meaning is "that by which he is given drink," acting as a second object for yusqā, while the first object is the pronoun acting as a deputy for the subject returning to "one of you." The word khamran (wine) in this case is in the accusative as a specifier (tamyīz).

"And as for the other..." Who is the baker: "...he will be crucified, and the birds will eat from his head." It is narrated that he said to him: "What you saw of the three baskets are three days that will pass, then you will be released and crucified."

"The matter about which you both inquire is decreed." (Meaning: That which your state will conclude with and which your dreams signify: the salvation of one of you and the destruction of the other.)

The meaning of their istiftā’ (inquiry) regarding it is their asking him about it. A group, including al-Hakim—who authenticated it—narrated from Ibn Mas‘ud (may Allah be pleased with him) that he said: The two companions of Yusuf did not see anything; they merely conspired to test his knowledge. When he interpreted their dreams, they said: "We were only joking, we saw nothing." He (peace be upon him) said: "The matter is decreed," etc. He means: The interpretation has taken place.

It has been said: The intended meaning of "the matter" is that for which they were accused; in this case, the speech contains an elliptical genitive, meaning "the consequence of that." Some investigators have held that what is meant is the two dreams themselves, rejecting the idea that it refers to the final outcome of their state. He said: Because an inquiry (istiftā’) only pertains to an event, not its ruling. It is said, "He asked the jurist about the event," meaning he sought the clarification of its ruling, but it is not said, "He asked him about its ruling." Similarly with the act of iftā’ (giving a legal opinion): it is said, "He gave a ruling on such-and-such an incident," but not, "He gave a ruling on its ruling." Among the evidence for this is the Almighty’s saying: "O assembly, give me a ruling (aftūnī) regarding my dream." The meaning of asking for a ruling on the dream is their request for its interpretation by their saying: "Inform us of its interpretation." He expressed the dreams as "the matter" and the request for interpretation as "inquiry" to magnify the gravity of the affair and elevate its status, for inquiry is only for complex occurrences with ambiguous rulings. The choice of the imperfect tense implies they were in the state of seeking an inquiry until he concluded the interpretation. The attribution of "decree" to it, despite it being a matter of their future state, is because it is, in reality, identical to that outcome; it merely appeared in the realm of similitude in that form. As for his singular use of "the matter" despite their two dreams, it follows how they unified it in their saying: "Inform us of its interpretation." It does not mean the matter for which they were accused and imprisoned—the poisoning of the King—for they did not ask him about that, nor was it the form of his answer, but rather the form of their final outcome and consequence. Reflect on this.

This is countered by the view that there is no obstacle to "the matter" referring to the outcome, as suggested by the apparent attribution of the decree to it. Many have held this view, and the "in" (in fī) is treated as causal, similar to the Prophet’s saying: "A woman entered the Fire because of (fī) a cat." The meaning of "inquiry" regarding it would be "inquiry because of it," i.e., seeking the clarification of the ruling of the two dreams on its account. They only sought that to know their state and the conclusion of their affair.

If you refuse that, what prevents "the matter" from being the inquiry, even if inquiry is only for events? The events here are the two dreams, because there is an identity between "the matter" and those events—as the aforementioned person claimed, using it to justify attributing the decree to the matter in the sense he carried it, even though it is a condition of their future state. He cannot claim the validity of considering identity when attributing the decree while denying its validity when concerning the istiftā’, for once identity is considered between two things, it is arbitrary to claim the validity of attributing the conditions of one to the other while denying the inverse, without any evidence—to deny this is stubbornness.

What many have held is more weighted, as it avoids "taking off one’s shoes before reaching the water," as is not hidden to one who intends the Kaaba of fairness. What he mentioned in explaining the invalidity of interpreting "the matter" as that for which they were accused and imprisoned is not free from concern, especially since it was a subtle reproach against the author of al-Kashshāf. According to what al-Tibi said, he meant nothing by "the matter" but the consequence. Yes, the beginning of his speech is apparent in what he mentioned, and the matter therein is easy. Perhaps the reason for the command to reflect on the speech of this investigator is the totality of what we have mentioned. So reflect.

Furthermore, this news, just as it is likely to be a rebuttal to them as has come in the reports, is also likely to be a verification of his interpretation and an affirmation of it. It is not an objection to the first view that there was no motive for the cupbearer to deny it, for we say: even if they were lying in that, it is possible it was to spare the feelings of his companion, the baker. It has been stated in some reports that the one who denied it was the baker; in that case, the matter is clear. This has been used as evidence for the famous principle that a dream occurs as it is interpreted; hence it is said: "The dream is upon the wing of a bird; if it is narrated, it occurs."