Tafsir of Al-Hijr 15:29

(So when I have fashioned him): That is, I have performed upon him that by which he becomes balanced, moderate, and prepared for the effusion of the spirit. It is said: I have formed him with human features and the human creation.

(And breathed into him of My spirit): "Breathing" (nafk) in convention is the passage of air from the mouth or elsewhere into a cavity of a body fit to hold it and be filled by it. What is intended here is a representation of the effusion of that which causes actual life onto the matter prepared to receive it; there is no literal breathing.

The Proof of Islam (Al-Ghazali) said: He used the metaphor of "breathing," which is the cause for the igniting of the wick of the recipient (the clay)—which has undergone successive stages until it became balanced, leveled, and fully prepared—with the light of the spirit, just as it is the cause for igniting firewood, for example, with fire, by way of its result and its cause—namely, that ignition. A cause may be used figuratively to refer to the benefit resulting from it, even if the resulting action is not in the form of the action from which it is derived.

Furthermore, this spirit—in his view, and in the view of a group of investigators—is not a body that resides in the body as water resides in a vessel, nor is it an accident that resides in the heart or the brain as blackness resides in a black object or knowledge in the learned. Rather, it is an abstract substance that is neither inside the body nor outside it, neither connected to it nor separated from it. They have several proofs for this:

The First Proof: That a human being can perceive universal concepts, and this is done by the imprinting of the forms of what is perceived upon the perceiver. If the locus of those forms were a body, it would either be indivisible or divisible. The first is impossible because the indivisible part of a body is a point-like extremity, and a point cannot be a locus for intellectual forms. This is because it is not conceivable for such a point to possess a "temperament" that would allow its state of readiness for reception to vary. Instead, if it were capable of receiving the aforementioned forms, that acceptance would have to be permanent; and if so, the received object would be permanently present, because the active, separate principles are universal in their effusion and only become specified by the differing states of the recipients. If the recipient were fully prepared, the received object would necessarily exist. In that case, all bodies possessing points would be rational, and the body would have to remain rational after death, as the locus of the forms remains in its state of readiness, which is not the case. The second is also impossible, for that which resides in a divisible entity is itself divisible, which would imply that the form itself is perpetually divided, and that is impossible for reasons established among them.

The Second Proof: What the Shaykh (Avicenna) relied upon—claiming it to be his most excellent proof in this chapter—is that we are able to conceive of our own selves, and whoever conceives of a self possesses the quiddity of that self. If we possess the quiddity of our selves, it is either because our attachment to our self is due to another form equal to it which obtains within it, or it is not, but rather because the self itself is present to itself. The first is impossible because it leads to the gathering of two equals. Thus, the second is confirmed; and whatever has its essence present to itself is self-subsistent. Therefore, the rational power—which is the spirit and the rational soul—is self-subsistent, whereas every body or corporeal entity is not self-subsistent. Most of his students have raised objections, and he has responded to them.

The Third Proof: What Plato relied upon is that we imagine forms that have no existence externally, and we distinguish between them and others. These forms are existential matters, and their locus cannot be corporeal, for the totality of our body is, in relation to our imagined matters, a small amount of a large quantity. How, then, can vast forms correspond to small dimensions? It cannot be said that some of these forms correspond to our bodies and others to the air surrounding us, since the air is not part of our bodies, nor is it an instrument for our souls in their actions, as is apparent. Therefore, the locus of these forms is something non-corporeal, and that is the rational soul.

The Fourth Proof: If the locus of perceptions were a corporeal thing, it would be possible for knowledge to exist in one part of that body and ignorance in another; thus, the single entity would be both knowing and ignorant of a single thing at one and the same time.

The Fifth Proof: If the spirit were imprinted in a body, such as the heart or the brain, it would either always conceive of that body, or not conceive of it at all, or conceive of it at one time and not another. All these possibilities are invalid; therefore, the claim of its imprinting is invalid. The explanation of this is: the spirit's conception of that body is either because the instrument is present before it, or because another form of that instrument is obtained by it. If it is the first, then if the spirit is capable of perceiving that instrument and perceiving the very fact of its proximity to it, then as long as the instrument is proximate, the spirit must conceive of it, so it would be in a state of permanent perception of that instrument. And if it were impossible for the spirit to perceive the instrument, it would have to never perceive it. It is evident that if the spirit’s conception of that instrument were due to proximity, it would have to conceive of it always or not conceive of it at all, and both divisions are false. As for if its conception of it were due to obtaining another form of it, then if the spirit were in that instrument and the second form were obtained within it, the second form of the instrument would also be residing in the instrument—for that which resides in what resides in a thing is itself residing in that thing—which would necessitate the gathering of two equals. If the spirit were not in that state, but rather abstract, that is what is desired. He also brought other proofs.

The Imam (Razi) mentioned twelve proofs in Al-Mabahith, including what has been mentioned, and spoke at length in wounding and refining them. He relied on a different matter to prove this, saying: "That upon which we rely is to say: Every rational being finds within himself that he is the one who was present before. His identity is either a body, or something subsisting in a body, or neither of the two. The first is false, for a human may be aware of his identity while being oblivious to all his apparent and hidden limbs. The second is also false, because corporeal parts are constantly decomposing and changing, as the causes of dissolution from external and internal heat, and psychic and bodily movements, do not distinguish one part from another. The body is composed of composite members, which are composed of simple members like flesh and bone; every part of the flesh is like another in readiness for decomposition. Since the parts are all equal in that, the ratio of the dissolvents to each part is the same as its ratio to another part; therefore, the onset of decomposition in one is not more deserving than in another. Thus, it is established that the identity of the human is not a body, and it is not something subsisting in a body—for that which subsists in it must change when it changes, due to the impossibility of the transfer of accidents. It would then follow that the human would not find himself to be the one who existed before. Since this knowledge is intuitive, we know that the human identity is neither a body nor in need of one. It is an abstract substance, which is what is sought. It does not follow that other animals possess this substance, for even if we know that they are aware of their own identities, they do not know of themselves that they are the same as those who existed before."

One can also argue for this matter by saying that we have demonstrated that the perceiver of all types of perceptions for all perceived objects is one thing in the human soul. We say: that perceiver is either a body, or subsisting in one, or not. The first is patently false, for a body, insofar as it is a body, cannot be a perceiver. The second is also false, because that attribute would either subsist in all parts of the body or in some to the exclusion of others. The first is false, otherwise every part of the body would be seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking, and reasoning, which is not the case. It is also false to say that some members possess the power of perceiving all these things, because it would follow that there is one member in the body that is hearing, seeing, imagining, thinking, and reasoning, and we do not find that in ourselves. By this, the corruption of the claim that "perhaps the power perceiving all perceptions subsists in a subtle body confined to some of the members" is also revealed, because it is obvious that we do not find in our bodies a place containing this subtle body that is hearing, seeing, imagining, thinking, and reasoning. No one can say: "Grant that you do not know this place, but that does not prove its non-existence," for we say: We have demonstrated that we are the ones who hear, see, imagine, think, and reason. If some body, whether it were a part of the body or confined to a part of it, were described by the power related to all these perceptions, then our reality and identity would be nothing but that body. If we did not know it, we would not know the reality of ourselves, which is false. Thus, it is established that the one described by the power perceiving all perceptions is not a body at all, nor is it subsisting in one; it is an abstract substance, which is what is sought.

Those who go toward abstractness mentioned that it is related to the body like the relation of a lover, by an innate and inspirational love, to the beloved, to the point that this attachment is not severed as long as the body is prepared to be attached to it; rather, the attachment of the spirit is much stronger than this, being an attachment of management and administration. Its addition to His pronoun (the Almighty) in the verse is because He, glory be to Him, created it without an intermediary that acts as an origin or matter, or for the sake of honor.

The Proof of Islam was asked about this and said: "If the sun were to speak and say, 'I have effused upon the earth from my light,' it would be truthful. The meaning of the attribution is that the light obtained by the earth is of the same genus as the sun’s light in some respect, even if it is in the utmost degree of weakness relative to it." You have known that the spirit is transcendent above direction and place, and it has the power to know all things, and that is a semblance and a connection, which is why it is singled out for attribution. This semblance is not for corporeal things at all.

No one may say: "In transcending the spirit from place, there is a description of it with an attribute of God (the Almighty), indeed, with the most specific of His attributes." This would necessitate a lack of distinction. They have said: "Just as it is impossible for two bodies to gather in one place, it is impossible for two things to gather that are not in a place." This is because it was only impossible for two bodies to gather in a place because if they gathered, one would not be distinguished from the other. Similarly, if two things existed, each of which was not in a place, distinction and differentiation between them would not occur. That is why they said: "Two blacknesses do not gather in one locus," to the point that it was said: "Two equals are like two opposites." We say: Distinction is not limited to place; it can be by two bodies in two places, by time—like two blacknesses in one substance in two times—and by definition and reality, like different accidents in one locus, such as taste, color, cold, and moisture in one body. Each of them is distinguished from the other by its essence, not by place or time. Such is knowledge, will, and power; each is also distinguished by its essence, even if all belong to one thing. If different accidents of varying realities can be conceived in one locus, then it is more appropriate that things of different realities in their essences can be conceived in a non-place. The state of existence being "not in a place" being the most specific attribute of the Almighty is in the realm of prohibition; rather, the most specific is that He, glory be to Him, is the Qayyum (Self-Subsisting), meaning He exists by His own essence, and everything else subsists by Him, and that He, blessed and exalted be He, exists by His own essence, and everything else exists not by its own essence. Indeed, things have nothing from their own essences but non-existence; they only have existence from others by way of loan, whereas existence for Him, glory be to Him, is essential, not on loan. Therefore, Qayyumiyyah (Self-Subsistence) belongs to none but God, the Exalted and Majestic.

This which they have said regarding the abstraction of the spirit is contrary to what the majority of the Sunnis hold. Shaykh Abd al-Ra'uf al-Manawi said: "All sects have waded into the abyss of discourse regarding the spirit, but they have achieved nothing of value and returned with no profit. There are more than a thousand sayings about it, and according to Ibn Jama’ah, there is not a single correct saying among them; rather, they are all analogical arguments and intellectual conjectures." The majority of the Sunnis hold that it is a subtle body, differing from bodies in quiddity and attribute, acting in the body, residing in it like the residing of oil in an olive or fire in coal, and it is referred to as "I" and "you." Imam al-Haramayn went toward this. Al-Laqani said: "The majority of the theologians hold that it is a body, differing in quiddity from the body from which the limbs are generated, luminous, heavenly, light, living by its essence, permeating the substance of the limbs, flowing in it like the flow of rosewater in a rose or fire in coal, to which no change or dissolution reaches; its remaining in the limbs is life, and its separation from them to the world of spirits is death."

Some claimed that the human is this tangible structure and his spirit is an accident subsisting in it. Some late contemporaries attributed this to the majority of theologians and made the impossibility of the unity of the "before" a proof for invalidating the servant being the creator of his actions. The Imam in his Tafsir refuted this claim and approved of what we have transmitted from the majority, saying: "They said it is not permissible for the human to be an expression for this tangible structure, because its parts are always in withering, growth, increase, decrease, completion, and dissolution. There is no doubt that the human, as he is, is a remaining entity from the beginning of his life to its end, and that which is not remaining is other than that which is remaining. Thus, that which is referred to by everyone when they say 'I' must be different from this structure." Then they differed as to what it is that is referred to by "I," and the sayings regarding it are many. The most sound of them, in summary, is that they are corporeal parts flowing in this structure like the flow of water in a rose or oil in sesame.

Then, the investigators among them said that the bodies which remain from the beginning of life to the end differ in quiddity from what the structure is composed of, and they are living by their essence, perceiving by their essence, and luminous by their essence. When they mix with it and permeate it, it becomes illuminated by their light and moved by their movement. It is always in dissolution, decomposition, and change, while those parts, due to their difference from it in quiddity, remain in their state. When it decays, they separate from it to the world of Holiness if they were happy, or the world of calamities if they were wretched. From this, the invalidity of the inference of the spirit’s abstraction by invalidating the human as the tangible structure is known, as the author of Al-Hayakil implies, according to what the words of his commentator, Al-Jalal, indicate. He said in the second haykal: "You are never oblivious of your self, but there is no part of your body that you do not forget at times, and the whole is only perceived through its parts. If you were this totality, your consciousness of your self would not persist with its forgetting; thus, you are behind this body." Al-Jalal said: "The soul is not a body at all," because the ultimate result of that is to prove that the soul is behind this body, not to prove that it is abstract, due to the possibility that it is a subtle body, as you have known.

Al-Qadi claimed that the view of most theologians is that the spirit is an accident and that it is life. Professor Abu Ishaq chose this and did not mind the necessity of the subsistence of an accident by an accident. This claimant objected to the saying of "corporeality" by saying: "If it were a body, motion and rest would be permissible for it like other bodies, and it would follow that everything would be spirits, and the spirit would have to have another spirit ad infinitum." The answer to this is that what is mentioned would only follow if the body were a spirit because it is a body, which is not the case; for it is only a spirit due to a meaning that God, the Exalted, specialized it with. You have known that the one who says "corporeality" says: "It is living by its essence," so no infinite regress is necessary. Between it and the body, in his view, there is a relationship according to a subtle vapor referred to as the "animal spirit." He defined it in Al-Hayakil as "a subtle, vaporous body generated from the subtleties of the humors, arising from the left cavity of the heart, and propagating in the body after acquiring the luminous power from the rational soul." Were it not for its subtlety, it would not flow, and it is the mount for the soul’s actions; whenever it is severed, its actions are severed. Some said it is the balance of the temperament of the heart’s blood.

The matter regarding this is simple. Some investigators went toward the view that "spirit" refers to the spirit which was mentioned as being a subtle body flowing in the body—and this is other than the "animal spirit"—and to a noble, Lordly matter that has an illumination upon that subtle body. Perhaps that is the cause for the life of the spirit in the first sense, and its perception and luminosity. It is referred to as the "command-spirit" (al-ruh al-amri), and this is what is intended by the "spirit" in His saying, “They ask you about the spirit,” (17:85). They often refer to the spirit in the first sense as the "human soul" (al-nafs al-insaniyyah), and to it in the second sense as the "rational soul" (al-nafs al-natiqah). The one about which it is said: "It is an abstract substance, not a body nor corporeal, neither connected nor separated, neither inside the world nor outside it, and it is a light from the lights of God, the Exalted, subsisting in no place from God, the Almighty—its rising is from Him and its setting is toward Him, the Exalted"—is the spirit in this sense.

They differed as to whether its creation (coming into existence) is before the bodies or after them. The Proof of Islam said: "The truth is that the spirits came into existence when the body was prepared for reception, just as the image in a mirror comes into existence with the occurrence of polishing, even if the possessor of the image existed prior to the polisher." Aristotle and his followers among the philosophers also said this, and they argued for it by saying that if they existed before the bodies, they would either be one or many. In the first case, they would either multiply upon attachment to the body or not. If they did not multiply, the one spirit would be the spirit for every body; if so, what one person knew, all would know, and what one was ignorant of, all would be ignorant of, which is impossible. If they multiplied, it would necessitate the division of that which has no volume, which is also impossible. In the second case, each one must be distinguished from the other, either by quiddity, its necessities, or its accidents. The first two are impossible because spirits are united in species, and things that are one in species are equal in all their essentials and their necessities. As for accidents, their occurrence is due to matter, which here is the body; before it, there is no matter, so there cannot be differing accidents.

After the Proof of Islam presented the argument in this manner, it was said to him: "What do you say regarding the report that God, the Exalted, created the spirits before the bodies by two thousand years, and his saying, peace and blessings be upon him: 'I was the first of the prophets in creation and the last of them in mission, and I was a prophet while Adam was between water and clay'?" He, may God the Exalted have mercy on him, said: "Yes, this indicates in its outward sense the precedence of the spirit’s existence over the body, but the state of outward meanings is light due to the wideness of the gate of interpretation (ta’wil). They have said: The definitive proof cannot be averted by the outward meaning; rather, the outward meaning is interpreted for its sake, just as in the outward texts of the Book and the Sunnah regarding God, the Exalted, which contradict what the definitive proof indicates. In that case, it is said: Perhaps what is intended by 'spirits' in the first report is the angels, peace be upon them, and by 'bodies' the bodies of the world—the Throne, the Footstool, the heavens, and the like. If you contemplate the greatness of these bodies, you would scarcely bring to mind human bodies, nor would you understand them from the absolute word 'bodies.' The ratio of human spirits to the spirits of the angels, peace be upon them, is like the ratio of their bodies to the bodies of the world. If the gate of knowing the spirits of the angels were opened for you, you would see human spirits like a lamp lit from a great fire that covered the world, and that fire is the last spirit of the spirits of the angels."

As for his saying, peace be upon him: "I was the first of the prophets in creation," the "creation" here is in the sense of predestination, not bringing into existence, for he, may God the Exalted bless him and grant him peace, before he was born, was not a created existing being. But the ends are prior in predestination and posterior in existence. This is the meaning of the philosopher's saying: "The first of thought is the last of action." For example, the perfect house is the first of things in the view of the architect in terms of predestination and the last of them in existence. What precedes its existence, such as brick-making and the like, is a means to it and is intended for its sake. Since the purpose of the creation of humans is their attainment of the happiness of nearness to the Divine Presence, and they could not attain that except by the teaching of the prophets, peace be upon them, prophethood was intended; and the intended is its perfection and end, not its beginning. The preparation of its beginning is a means to that, and its perfection is through him, may God bless him and grant him peace; therefore, he was first in predestination and last in existence. His saying, peace be upon him: "I was a prophet while Adam was between water and clay," is an indication of this also—that He, the Exalted, did not will the creation of Adam except to extract the pure from his progeny, and He continued to refine them gradually until the perfection of purity was reached. This is only understood if one knows that a house, for example, has two existences: an existence in the mind of the architect such that he is as if looking at its image, and an existence outside the mind caused by the first existence; it is inevitably prior to it.

In that case, it is said: God, the Exalted, predestines first, then brings into existence according to the predestination second. Predestination is inscribed in the Preserved Tablet just as the architect’s predestination is inscribed first on a board or parchment; the house then becomes existing in the perfection of its image as a kind of existence that becomes a cause for the real existence. Just as this image is inscribed on the board of the architect by means of a pen, and the pen runs according to knowledge—or rather, knowledge drives it—so the predestination of the images of Divine matters is inscribed first in the Preserved Tablet by means of the Divine Pen, and the Pen runs according to the preceding, eternal Knowledge. The Tablet refers to an existing entity capable of bearing the impression of images, and the Pen refers to an existing entity from which the images effuse onto the Tablet. It is not a condition that they be two bodies, and it is not far-fetched that the Pen of God and His Tablet be fitting for His Finger and His Hand; all that is befitting His Divine Essence and transcendent above the reality of corporeality. It is sometimes said: they are two spiritual substances, one of which is a learner—the Tablet—and the other a teacher—the Pen. This has been pointed to by His saying, the Exalted: “Taught by the Pen” (96:4). When you have understood the meaning of existence, our Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, existed before according to the first meaning of them, not the second.

Arguments were raised against the inference from several aspects, some following the view of the philosophers who also use this for proof, and others having no specificity to their view. The first: Why is it not permissible to say that they were one before the bodies and then multiplied? And do not say: "If the whole were one and divisible, its unity would be connectivity, so it would be a body," for we say: It is granted that everything whose unity is connectivity is a divisible one, but we do not grant that everything divisible is one whose unity is connectivity, because a universal affirmative does not convert as itself.

Second: We grant that they were many, but why do you say that each must be specialized with a distinguishing attribute? Because if the distinction were for specialization with something, that thing would also be distinguished from other than it, so it would either be distinguished by what it is distinguished by—leading to circular reasoning—or by a third, leading to an infinite regress. Also, distinction is not specific to one thing itself except after its distinction. If the distinction of a thing from another were by its specialization with a thing, circularity would follow.

Third: We grant that a distinguisher is necessary, but why is it not permissible for it to be by essence? The explanation is what they explained regarding the difference of souls by species.

Fourth: We grant that they are not distinguished by any of the essentials, but why is it not permissible for them to be distinguished by accidents? Your saying: "Their occurrence is due to matter, which here is the body, and there is no body," we say: Why is it not permissible for there to be a body to which it is attached, and before it another, and so on? There is no escape from this except by invalidating reincarnation, so the proof for the occurrence of spirits depends on that invalidation. Yet the sages built that on "occurrence," saying after finishing its proof: "If the occurrence of the soul is established, there must be a cause for its occurrence, and that is the occurrence of the body. When the body occurs and a soul is attached to it by way of reincarnation, and it is established that the occurrence of the soul is a cause for another soul to occur from the separate principles, then the gathering of two souls in one body follows, and circular reasoning occurs."

Fifth: We grant no attachment to a body before, but why is it not permissible for them to be described with an accident by which they were distinguished, and then every accident is due to another, ad infinitum?

Sixth: The counter-argument is that spirits, according to both parties, remain after separation and their distinction is not by quiddity or its necessities, but by accidents. However, the hayulani (material) spirits that have not acquired any accidents, when they separate, have nothing of accidents except that they were attached to bodies. If this amount suffices for distinction to occur, then it should also suffice that they are of such a nature that distinction occurs for them after attachment to distinct bodies. Their saying: "Why is it not permissible for them to be one before and then multiply?" We say: It is not permissible, because everything that is divided must have its part different from the whole, necessarily because a thing with another is not the same as it is without it. If that difference is by quiddity or its necessities, every part must be different from the other by quiddity; thus, those parts would have been distinguished forever and existed before the attachment. So these things now attached to bodies were distinguished before attachment to them. If the difference is not by quiddity or its necessities, the part must be smaller in magnitude than the whole; otherwise, one would not be more deserving of being the part of the other than the reverse. Thus, it is established that everyone divisible must have magnitude. We grant that an abstract entity cannot be divided after its unity, but the specifications (ta'ayyunat) of those parts only occur after the division that occurs after attachment to the body. Thus, the specification of each of those parts is after attachment to the body, so the specification of each of those souls, insofar as it is itself, is occurring; this is what is sought. Their saying: "Why do you say that distinction is not found except upon specialization with an attribute?" We say: It is answered by something like what they mentioned regarding the "individuation of individuation." Their saying: "Why do you say that souls cannot be distinguished by constitutive attributes?" We say: Grant that it is as you say, but we do not know intuitively that every species is predicated of several individuals by necessity; we know that it is not necessary for every human to be different from all people in quiddity. If an individual is found in every species of them, the proof is complete.

Their saying: "This proof is built on invalidating reincarnation," we say: It is not so. For when we find two individuals of the same species, we know that that individuality is not a necessity for that quiddity, because everything that is so, its species would be in its individuality. Since it is not so, we know that its individuality is not among the necessities of its quiddity, so it is due to an external cause. You have known that the cause is matter, and the matter of the soul is the body. Therefore, its specification must be due to attachment to a specific body; it is inevitably unspecified before that body, so it is non-existent before it. Thus, it is revealed that everything whose species is predicated of many in actuality is created (hadith). It is thus clear that once the unity of souls in species is granted, their occurrence necessarily follows, and there is no need to invalidate reincarnation to avoid the aforementioned circular reasoning. As for their saying: "Why is it not permissible for them to be described with an accident," we say: It is not permissible for their distinction to be by that, because the distinction of a specific soul from others is a specific judgment that must have a specific cause, and that cause cannot be residing in it, because that is dependent on its distinction from another. If that distinction were dependent on the residing of that accident, circularity would follow. Therefore, that cause is a matter returning to the recipient; and if the body is not a recipient, there is no distinction. The theologians invalidate what was mentioned by the necessity of infinite regress, which the proof of application invalidates.

As for the counter-argument, the answer to it is that material souls are distinguished from each other, first due to their attachment to the specific recipient, then it follows from the specification of each of them that it has consciousness of its own self. It has been explained that the consciousness of a thing of itself is an additional state over its essence, then that consciousness persists, so the distinction inevitably remains. The bottom line is that distinction must first occur due to another cause so that each of the souls may have consciousness of its own self, and that cause in material souls is their attachment to bodies. As for those before bodies, if they were distinguished, the distinguisher would be other than consciousness so that it might depend on it; it has been explained that there is no distinguisher there, so the attainment of distinction is impossible. The difference is revealed, and God, the Exalted, is the Guide.

The author of Al-Mu'tabar argued for their occurrence by saying that if they existed before bodies, they would either be attached to other bodies or not. The first is false, for it is a claim of reincarnation, and it is false because if our souls were before in another body, we would know now some of the past states and remember that body, which is not the case. The second is likewise, because they would then be idle, and there is no idleness in nature. This is a proof with all its premises very weak, so do not consider it.

A group of ancient philosophers claimed their pre-eternity and brought forward matters for that. First: Everything that occurs must have matter that is a cause for it to become more deserving of existence after it was more deserving of non-existence. If souls were occurring, they would be material, which is not the case. Second: If they were occurring, their occurrence would be for the occurrence of bodies, but past bodies are infinite; therefore, souls now are infinite. But that is impossible because they are capable of increase and decrease, and that which is capable of them is finite; therefore, they are now finite. So the occurrence of bodies is not a cause for their occurrence, so their emanation from their causes is not dependent on the occurrence of a matter; thus, they are pre-eternal. Third: If they were not pre-eternal, they would not be everlasting, since it is established that everything that has a beginning decays. But they are everlasting by consensus; therefore, they are pre-eternal.

The answer to them is: If by being "material" it is intended that their occurrence is dependent on the occurrence of the body, then that is the case. If it is intended that they are imprinted in the body, why do you say that if their occurrence were dependent on the occurrence of the body, they must be imprinted in it? Also, one can deny the corruption of the necessity that souls now are infinite, and the premise stating that everything capable of increase and decrease is finite is not among the self-evident truths, as is apparent. Therefore, it is not valid except by proof, and that is not established except in what admits of application, as explained in its place. Their saying: "If they were not pre-eternal, they would not be everlasting" is a proposition for which they have no proof to correct it, so it is not accepted. Furthermore, that souls are united in species is something that a group of theologians has explicitly stated, such as Al-Ghazali and others, and the Shaykh of the philosophers went toward it, although he did not bring a doubt for it, let alone a proof. Others argued with matters.

First: Souls are shared in that they are human souls; if some were separated from others by a constitutive essential with this sharing, composition would follow; thus, they would be corporeal.

Second: We see people shared in the correctness of knowledge of information and in the correctness of acquiring morals; thus, souls are equal in the correctness of their being described by perceptual and motivational actions. That necessitates their being absolutely equal, for we do not conceive of their attributes except as being perceiving and moving by will, and they are equal in those two. Therefore, they are equal in all their intelligible attributes. If they differed after that, their difference would be in unintelligible attributes. If we opened this door, the impossibility of judging the sameness of two things would follow, due to the possibility of their difference in what is unintelligible to us, and that leads to casting doubt on the sameness of equals.

Third: It is explained in its place that if an essence is abstract, it must be rational of its own reality. But the soul of Zayd, for example, is abstract, so it is rational of that. Then it does not conceive except of an essence capable of perception and motivation; therefore, its essence is this amount, and it is shared between it and other souls by the proofs they mentioned in explaining that existence is shared. Thus, the totality of its essence is predicated of other souls, and it is impossible for this shared element to be a constitutive differentia in others, since it is not in need of it in Zayd for a differentia that distinguishes it from others, so it does not need in others a differentia either. For one nature cannot be needy and rich at the same time. Thus, agreement in species is established. These are weak arguments.

As for the first: One can say: Why is it not permissible that these souls, even if they differ in species, are not shared in genus? So that difference does not necessitate their being composite. Sharing in being human souls and the like may be sharing in matters necessary for their substance, not constitutive of them, so they differ in their complete quiddity and share in external necessities, like the sharing of constitutive differentiae for species of one genus in that genus; so composition does not follow. Even if we grant that these attributes are essential, why is it not permissible for souls to be composite in their quiddities while not being corporeal? Blackness and whiteness, for example, are included under a genus, which is color; so each of them is composite, not a corporeal composition. The like is said here, how not, when they have said: "Substance is predicated of soul and body."

As for the second: Its orbit is induction, and it is weakened by two aspects: one, we cannot judge every human as being capable of all perceptions; and two, we cannot judge the soul that we know accepts an attribute as being capable of all attributes, how? And the limitation of attributes is impossible.

As for the third: It necessitates that all separate entities be one species, which is something there is no way to accept. A small group went toward their difference in species, and this is what is considered by the author of Al-Mu'tabar, and he spoke at length on that. The best he relied upon in arguing for it is the difference of people in knowledge, ignorance, strength, weakness, anger, forbearance, and so on. He said: "That is not due to the difference of temperament, for we find two with equal temperaments differing greatly, and vice versa. Also, the soul of the Prophet, peace be upon him, reaches a strength such that it is powerful enough to act in the matter of this world, and it is known that that is not due to a strength of temperament. So that difference is only due to the difference of substances." You know that this is not in reality among the proofs; rather, it is from the weak persuasions, so contemplate all that we have mentioned. A completion of the discussion in this place will come, God the Exalted willing, and it is, by the life of God, long-tailed. In sum, standing upon the reality of the spirit is a difficult matter, and the way to it is thorny. God, the Exalted, has made that one of His greatest signs indicating the majesty of His Essence and the perfection of His attributes. So Glory be to Him, what a majestic God, and what a perfect Lord!

(So fall down before him prostrate): He commanded the angels, peace be upon them, to prostrate to Adam, peace be upon him, by way of greeting and veneration, or to God, the Exalted, while he, peace be upon him, was in the position of the Qiblah, for in him appeared the wonders of the signs of His Power, the Almighty. As Hassan said: "Is he not the first who prayed toward your Qiblah?" He is the most knowledgeable of people regarding the Quran and the Sunnah. In commanding them to "fall down," which is to collapse, is evidence that what is commanded is not merely bending, as was said, but prostration in its customary meaning.