Tafsir of Al-Hijr 15:60

Regarding His, the Exalted’s, saying: "Except his wife", according to Jar Allah [al-Zamakhshari], this is—under both interpretations—an exception from the genitive pronoun in li-munajjiyahum (We will save them). He did not permit it to be an "exception from an exception" in anything. He said: Because that [exception from an exception] only occurs where the judgment (ruling) is unified, such as the statement of the absolute [divorcer]: "You are divorced three times, except two, except one," or the statement of one who acknowledges a debt to someone for ten dirhams, "except three, except one dirham." Here, however, the two judgments differ, for "the family of Lot" is linked to arsalna (We sent) or to mujrimīn (criminals), while "except his wife" is linked to munajjiyahum (We will save them); so how can it be an exception from an exception? He concluded.

It might be imagined that if "sending" (irsal) is meant as "destruction," then there is no difference, since the meaning would be: "Except the family of Lot, we did not destroy them," which is synonymous with "We will save them," thus becoming an exception from an exception according to one of the two interpretations. The author of al-Taqrib responded to this by saying that the condition for the aforementioned exception is that no multiple phrasing capable of being a source of exception should intervene between the two exceptions; here, munajjiyahum has intervened. If one said, "Except the family of Lot, except his wife," that would be permissible. This was countered by the claim that this does not resolve the dilemma, because the reason for its prohibition in that case is the existence of an intervening factor, not the difference in judgments, so there is no basis for expressing it as such. In al-Kashf, it is stated that the intent of "unity of judgment" is unity in person and number, so the objection does not stand that "sending" (if meaning destruction) and His, the Exalted’s, saying, "We will save them," and His, the Exalted’s, saying, "Except the family of Lot," are one in meaning. Therefore, the exception is from the first in meaning. The condition of unity is required because a connected [exception], like its namesake, does not permit the intervention of a sentence between the staff and its bark, and likewise for the disconnected [exception]. Thereby, the state of the aforementioned becomes clear, with complete clarity.

It also contains: If you say, "Why does the exception not return to both [sentences]?" I would say: Because the exception is linked to an independent sentence, and the disagreement is over its return to two sentences or more, not to one sentence and a part of a previous one. Furthermore, the meaning differs in that regard, and the place of disagreement is in coordinated sentences, not in those disconnected from one another. He concluded. The matter is as he mentioned regarding the determination of the place of disagreement. The issue is one that few grammarians have addressed, and there are several schools of thought regarding it.

The first [view] is the most correct, and it is the view of Ibn Malik: that the exception returns to the whole unless evidence arises for intending a part, as in His, the Exalted’s, saying: "And those who accuse their wives..." (the verse), for "except those who..." returns to their corruption and the non-acceptance of their testimony, excluding the lashing, due to the evidence. The difference in the agent (‘amil) does not matter, because that is based on the idea that illa (except) itself is the agent.

The second [view] is that it returns to the whole if the whole was intended for a single purpose, such as: "I have restricted my house to my paternal uncles, endowed my garden to my maternal uncles, and dedicated my watering-place to my neighbors, unless they travel; otherwise, it is for the others." It is only for the latter if [the intents are distinct], such as: "Honor the scholars, restrict your house to your relatives, and emancipate your slaves, except the corrupt among them."

The third [view] is: If the coordination is with wa (and), it returns to the whole; if with fa (then) or thumma (then subsequently), it returns to the latter. Ibn al-Hajib holds this view.

The fourth [view] is that it is specific to the latter. Abu Hayyan chose this.

The fifth [view] is: If the agent is unified, it is for the whole; if the agent differs, it is for the latter, as it is impossible to apply differing [agents] to a single exception. Al-Bahba is of this view, and it is based on the fact that the agent of the exception is the preceding verbs, not illa.

Some of their words suggest that if the exception were made from "the family of Lot," it would necessitate that his wife be neither destroyed nor a criminal. This is a gross misapprehension, because the exception from "the family of Lot," if we argue for it, is based on the judgment of them being saved and not destroyed, or being free from criminality and [having] righteousness. Thus, the wife is judged as being destroyed or a criminal. You are guided to this by what al-Radi mentioned regarding cases where exceptions are multiplied and it is possible to except each successor from its predecessor, such as: "The Meccans came to me, except the Quraysh, except the Banu Hashim, except the Banu ‘Aqil." He said: In the affirmative case, it is not permissible in every odd [exception] except to use the accusative case of exception (nasb), because it is from an affirmative, and the analogy is that in every even [exception], substitution (badal) and the accusative case of exception are permissible, because it is from a non-affirmative and the source of the exception is mentioned. The discourse on odd and even in non-affirmative is the reverse of this, and this is based on the view held by the majority that an exception from a negation is an affirmation, and from an affirmation is a negation, contrary to al-Kisa'i, who said: The excepted is a matter about which the denial or affirmation of the judgment is silent, and there is no indication in the speech of either of those. The inference of affirmation in the Word of Oneness is [derived] from the custom of the Shari'a. Just as a dispute occurred regarding this issue among the grammarians, it occurred among the mujtahid Imams, and the verification of that is in its proper place.

Ibn al-Munir chose the view that "the family of Lot" is an exception from "a criminal people," in that it is a disconnected exception. He said: It is more appropriate and possible, because excepting them from a pronoun returning to "a people who are denying" involves distance, in that the position of an exception is to extract what would have entered the judgment of the first. Here, entry is impossible with the indefiniteness. For this reason, you do not find an indefinite [noun] from which an exception is made except in the context of negation, because it then generalizes, so entry is realized if not for the exception. Thus, "I saw a people except Zayd" is not good, whereas "I did not see anyone except Zayd" is good. He concluded. This was refuted by stating that this is not like "I saw a people except Zayd," but rather of the category of "I saw a people who did wrong, except Zayd," for the attribute specifies them and makes them as if they were restricted. It is said in Ham' al-Hawami': One does not except from an indefinite in an affirmative [sentence] if it does not yield a benefit. Thus, one does not say: "A people came except a man," nor "Men stood except Zayd," due to the lack of benefit. If it provides a benefit, it is permissible, such as: "And he stayed among them a thousand years less fifty years," and "Men who were in your house stood, except one man," given that the intent by "the people" is the people of the town, as he explicitly stated in another verse, so they are in a restricted sense. The precise scholar narrated from al-Sakkaki that he explicitly stated at the end of the inquiry of evidence in his book that an exception from a non-restricted collective is permissible metaphorically, although some of the legal theorists also permitted the exception from an indefinite in an affirmative and stated it absolutely. Yes, what is explicitly stated in many books of grammar is like what is in al-Ham'.

Some claimed that the exception should be from the explicit noun and the pronoun, and [should be] disconnected. They justified this by saying that the pronoun in the attribute is the very thing described, restricted by the attribute. Jalal al-Suyuti mentioned that some scholars raised this along with several questions, in prose and poetry, to al-Kamal ibn al-Humam, and he did not mention that he answered them. The answer to what he claimed here has already been alluded to. As for the answer to the rest of what he found problematic and asked al-Kamal about, seeing the question itself is sufficient, for it is something to be wondered at. Hence, al-Shihab said: I think that Ibn al-Humam only remained silent about answering that because of the clarity of its refutation, and because it should not emanate from one who is adorned with the adornment of virtue. Yes, after all the calculations, what flows to the mind is that the exception is from the explicit noun. However, al-Radi [says] that if two or more things are gathered, both being suitable to be excepted from, there is a detail: Either they differ in meaning or not. If they differ and it is possible to share in that exception without distance, they share in it, such as: "A father and a son did not show kindness, except Zayd," meaning Zayd is a kind father and a kind son. If there is no sharing, such as: "A son did not favor a father, except Zayd," or it is distant, such as: "One did not strike anyone, except Zayd" (since the actor usually differs from the object), we look: If the entry of the excepted into one of them is determined, without the other, it is an exception from it, whether it is adjacent or not, such as: "A guardian did not ransom a prophet, except ‘Ali (may Allah honor his face)." If his entry into each of them is possible, and the excepted follows them both, it is from the latter, such as: "A son did not favor a father, except Zayd." Likewise, "A father did not favor a son, except Zayd," because its allocation to the nearest is more appropriate, since its return to both is impossible. If it precedes them both, if one of them is nominative in wording or meaning, the exception is from it, because its rank is after the verb, so it is as if the exception is adjacent to it afterwards, such as: "He did not favor except Zayd, a father [or] a son." If neither is nominative, the first is more appropriate due to its proximity, such as: "I did not favor except Zayd, one [person] over another," and an agent is estimated for the latter. If it is between them, the first is more deserving of it, because the origin of the excepted is its delay from the source of the exception, such as: "A son did not favor, I [the subject], except Zayd," and an agent is also estimated for the latter. If they do not differ in meaning, they share in it even if the two agents in them differ, such as: "One did not strike and did not kill, except Khalid," because the actor of "killed" is the pronoun of "one." He concluded.

Ibn Malik asserted that if two things precede, for example, and each is suitable to be excepted from, the exception is from the latter, and he stated it absolutely. So, let that be contemplated alongside our current [discussion]. Al-Qadi al-Baydawi said: That it is [an instance of] disconnection, it is permissible to make "except his wife" an exception from "the family of Lot" or from the pronoun of "We will save them." Under connection, it is by designating the second due to the difference in the two judgments, unless the sentence "We will save them" is made parenthetical. He concluded. His disagreement with what was narrated from al-Zamakhshari is manifest, as he [al-Zamakhshari] permitted the exception from the excepted in disconnection and prohibited it absolutely in connection, and as he established the difference of the two judgments in connection, which al-Zamakhshari also asserted absolutely, explaining the difference of the two judgments as explained in al-Zamakhshari’s speech. Our master Siraj al-Din did not approve of that and said: The intent of the "two judgments" is the judgment provided by way of excepting the second from the first—which, under the assumption of connection, is the criminality of the wife—and the judgment intended to be provided, which is the judgment of her destruction. He explained the unity of this intended judgment with the judgment provided by the exception under the assumption of disconnection as being that, under that assumption, illa is in the sense of "but" (lakin), and "We will save them" is a predicate for it, fixed for the family, so the judgment resulting from the exception from it is exactly the judgment intended to be provided. It is said under the assumption of connection and parenthetical [sentence]: Even if the two judgments differ outwardly, yet since the parenthetical sentence is like an explanation of what the first exception requires, it is in meaning as if it were it [the first exception], and the extraction from it becomes like the extraction from it. This is contrary to it being an initiation, for then it would be disconnected from it and would be an answer to an estimated question, and the answer would not be complete without the exception, and it would not be free from objection. Some said in guiding the exception in this way: There are two judgments here, criminality and salvation, so the second—the exception—pulls to itself so that no separation is required, unless it were parenthetical, for there is latitude in it, such that it intervenes between the attribute and what is described. Thus, it is permissible for it to be an exception from "the family of Lot." Hence, al-Radi permitted saying: "Honor the people—and the grammarians are Basrans—except Zayd." It is objected to that [by saying] that the judgment provided by the exception is not the judgment intended by the provision, but remains in its state, and the matter does not need what you have heard, and it is as you have heard. What flows to the mind is what al-Zamakhshari mentioned. In the Shihab glosses, it is [stated] that it is the truth, in knowledge and transmission. As for the first, because the judgment intended for extraction from it is the judgment extracted from the first, and the second is an emergent judgment from interpreting illa as lakin, which is a presumptive matter. As for the second, it is due to what was mentioned in al-Tashil that if the exception is multiplied, the judgment extracted from is the judgment of the first. What indicates this is that if the exception were empty (mufarragh) in this scenario, as if you said: "Nothing remained in the house except the deer; time left nothing of them except a deer hunted from them," it would be mandatory to inflect it according to the first agent, as in your saying: "I do not have except ten, except three." Furthermore, his speech is based on a matter and a conceptual obstacle, not on the impermissibility of intervening with disconnected speech between the excepted and the source of the exception, as was said, even if it were an obstacle as well, as al-Radi explicitly stated. So ponder it. He concluded. Understand that, and Allah, the Exalted, undertakes your guidance.

The two brothers recited li-munajjīhim with light [pronunciation].

"We have determined that she is among those who remain" (60) (i.e., those remaining in the punishment of Allah, the Exalted, as Ibn Abi Hatim narrated from Qatadah, or those remaining with the infidels to perish with them. Its root is from ghubra, which is the remainder of milk in the udder. Abu Bakr from ‘Asim recited qadarna with light [pronunciation]).

The hamza of anna (that) is fractured due to the suspension (ta'liq) of the verb by the existence of the inaugural lam, which holds the beginning of the sentence. It is suspended with anna, even though suspension in the famous view is a property of the verbs of the heart (af'al al-qulub). Al-Zamakhshari said: Due to the verb of determining containing the meaning of "knowing," and for this reason, scholars interpreted Allah, the Exalted’s determination of the actions of the servants as "knowledge." The intent of it containing that is, it is said: the technical meaning; and it is said: the metaphorical [usage] of its meaning, which is as if it is contained within it, because He does not determine except what He knows. The precise scholar mentioned this as a justification for al-Zamakhshari’s speech, then said: This is not of the chapter of including one verb in the meaning of another, such that one might object that it does not benefit al-Zamakhshari due to the persistence of the meanings of both verbs. Yes, it is according to their principle that it is a metonymy for what is known and realized, not a "determined" [in the sense of] "intended." The Judge [al-Baydawi] said: It is permissible to say it was treated as a verb of saying, because determination in the sense of decree is a saying. As for me, I do not deny to Jar Allah that the suspension is due to the inclusion of the meaning of knowledge, but I deny the denial of it being "determined and intended." He concluded. He only denied it because it is I'tizal (Mu'tazilism), which the literal texts reject. Hence, Ibrahim al-Nakha'i said, in what Ibn Abi Hatim narrated from him: "Between me and the Qadariyyah is this verse," and he recited it.

The apparent [meaning] is that this is from the speech of the angels, peace be upon them, and they attributed that to themselves, even though it is the act of Allah, the Exalted, due to their proximity and exclusivity. This is as the secretary of the Sultan says, "We ordered and we decreed such and such," while the one who orders in reality is [the Sultan]. It is said: And its remoteness is not hidden. It is from the speech of Allah, the Exalted, so it does not need interpretation. It is said: It is also not in need of it if determination is meant as knowledge, metaphorically.