Tafsir of Al-Isra 17:15

"Whoever is guided is only guided for his own self" – this is a summary of what preceded regarding the Quran being a guide "to that which is most upright," and the requirement for deeds to belong to their doers. That is, whoever receives guidance through its guidance, acts upon the rulings contained within it, and desists from what it has forbidden, the benefit of that guidance returns to his own self and does not cross over to anyone else who has not been guided.

"And whoever goes astray" – from that to which it guides him – "only goes astray to his own detriment." That is, the burden of his misguidance is upon himself, not upon anyone who did not partake in it, such that it would be possible for the act to be separated from its doer.

"And no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another" – this is an emphasis for the second clause. That is, no soul bearing a burden shall carry the burden of another soul, so that the second soul could be free of its own burden, for the necessary connection between the worker and his work is established. This emphasis was restricted to the second clause to cut off empty hopes, as they used to claim that if they were not on the truth, the responsibility lay upon their ancestors whom they imitated. It is narrated from Ibn Abbas that this was revealed regarding Al-Walid ibn al-Mughirah when he said, "Disbelieve in Muhammad (peace be upon him) and I will take upon myself your burdens."

This verse is not contradicted by the Almighty’s saying, "Whoever intercedes for a good cause will have a share therefrom, and whoever intercedes for an evil cause will have a corresponding burden," or His saying, "That they may bear their own burdens in full on the Day of Resurrection, and some of the burdens of those whom they misguide without knowledge." This is because one bearing the burden of another, or benefiting from their good deed and being harmed by their evil deed, is in reality benefiting from one’s own good deed and being harmed by one’s own evil deed. The recompense for the good and evil performed by the worker is inherently attached to him; the one who intercedes only receives the recompense for his intercession, not the recompense for the original good or evil. Likewise, the recompense for misguidance is limited to those who go astray; what the misguiders bear is only the recompense for the act of misguidance, not the recompense for the misguidance itself. This is what the Sheikh al-Islam said.

Because of this verse, Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) challenged the authenticity of the report from Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them both) that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "The deceased is punished by the weeping of his family." She argued that this implies a person being held accountable for the crime of another, which contradicts what the verse declares. It has been answered that the Hadith is understood as applying when the deceased has instructed this [weeping] in his will; thus, that punishment is of the category of the recompense for misguidance. Others said the "deceased" refers to the one in the throes of death (metaphorically), and the "punishment" refers to the agony in this world—that the dying person is pained by his family's weeping for him, so they should not weep.

Because of this verse, a group of the ancient jurists also prohibited the payment of blood money by the 'Aqilah (the paternal relatives), as it entails holding a person accountable for the act of another. It was answered that this is an obligation falling upon them by way of initiation; otherwise, the one who erred is not held accountable for that act [itself], so how could another be held accountable for it?

Al-Jubba'i used this verse to argue that the children of the polytheists are not punished, otherwise they would be held accountable for the sins of their fathers, which contradicts the apparent meaning of the verse. Some claimed it was revealed regarding them, but that is not correct. Yes, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr narrated in al-Tamhid with a weak chain from Aisha, who said: "Khadijah asked the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) about the children of the polytheists, and he said: 'They are with their fathers.' Then she asked him after that, and he said: 'Allah the Almighty knows best what they would have done.' Then she asked him after Islam had become established, and 'No bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another' was revealed, so he said: 'They are upon the Fitra (natural disposition),' or he said: 'They are in Paradise.'"

The issue is a matter of disagreement, and there are several schools of thought. The majority said: They are in the Fire, following their fathers. They supported this with what Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi narrated in Nawadir al-Usul from Aisha, who said: "I asked the Prophet (peace be upon him) about the children of the Muslims, where are they? He said: 'In Paradise.' I asked him about the children of the polytheists, where are they? He said: 'In the Fire.' I said: 'O Messenger of Allah, they did not attain [the age of] deeds, and the pens were not set running against them.' He said: 'Your Lord knows best what they would have done. By Him in Whose hand is my soul, if you wished, I could make you hear their wailing in the Fire.'" In this is the fact that this report has been weakened by Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, so it cannot be used as an argument. Yes, it is authentic that he (peace be upon him) was asked about the children of the polytheists and said: "Allah the Almighty knows best what they would have done," and it contains no explicit statement that they are in the Fire. The truth of his words "Allah the Almighty knows best what they would have done" applies whether they reached [adulthood] or did not reach it, and obligation (religious accountability) only occurs upon reaching puberty.

The two Sheikhs, the authors of the Sunan, and others narrated from Ibn Abbas, who said: Al-Sa'b ibn Juthama told me, "I said: 'O Messenger of Allah, we strike the children of the polytheists in night raids.' He said: 'They are of them.'" To the opponents, this is understood as meaning they are of them in terms of worldly rulings, such as enslavement.

A group refrained from taking a definitive stance on them, among whom is Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with him). It is said: Among them are those who will enter Paradise and those who will enter the Fire, based on what Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi narrated in al-Nawadir from Abdullah ibn Shaddad: A man came to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) and asked him about the children of the polytheists who died young. He lowered his head for a while, then said: "Where is the questioner?" He said: "Here I am, O Messenger of Allah." He said: "When Allah the Almighty judges between the people of Paradise and the Fire, and no one is left except them, they will cry out: 'O Lord, Your messengers did not come to us, and we knew nothing.' So He will send to them a messenger—and Allah knows best what they would have done—who will say: 'I am the messenger of your Lord to you.' So they will depart and follow him until they reach the Fire. He will say: 'Allah the Almighty commands you to plunge into it.' A group of them will plunge into it, and then they will emerge from where their companions do not perceive, and they will be placed among the foremost brought near. Then the messenger will come to them and say: 'Allah the Almighty commands you to plunge into the Fire.' Another group will plunge into it, then they will emerge from where they are not perceived, and they will be placed among the companions of the right. Then the messenger will come and say: 'Allah the Almighty commands you to plunge into the Fire.' They will say: 'Our Lord, we have no strength for Your punishment.' So he will order them, their forelocks and feet will be gathered, and they will be thrown into the Fire."

The verifiers (researchers) maintained that they are among the people of Paradise, and this is the correct view. They support this with several things, including this verse, as you heard regarding Al-Jubba'i, and the Hadith of Ibrahim the Friend (peace be upon him) when the Prophet (peace be upon him) saw him in Paradise with the children of the people around him. They asked: "O Messenger of Allah, [are they] the children of the polytheists too?" (Narrated by Al-Bukhari). Another is what Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi narrated in al-Nawadir and Ibn 'Abd al-Barr from Anas, who said: "We asked the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) about the children of the polytheists, and he said: 'They are the servants of the people of Paradise.'"

Another is the coming verse, as it indicates that there is no punishment before religious obligation, and obligation does not apply to a newborn. This is required by the statement of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him): "until he reaches puberty." No one has differed on the fact that the children of the Muslims are in Paradise, except for some who are not to be reckoned with, for they hesitated because of the Hadith of Aisha: "A boy from the Ansar died, and I said: 'Glad tidings to him, he is a bird from the birds of Paradise, he did not do evil and did not reach it.' The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 'Or other than that, O Aisha! For Allah created people for Paradise, whom He created for it while they were in the loins of their fathers, and He created people for the Fire, whom He created for it while they were in the loins of their fathers.'" The scholars answered this by saying that perhaps he (peace be upon him) forbade her from being hasty in judging without having definitive proof, just as he rebuked Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas for his statement, "Give [this gift to] him, for I see him as a believer." He said: "Or a Muslim?" (Hadith). It is also possible that he (peace be upon him) said that before he knew that the children of the Muslims were in Paradise. When he knew, he said what he said in the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "No Muslim whose three children die before they reach the age of puberty but that Allah the Almighty will cause him to enter Paradise by His grace and mercy toward them," and other such Hadiths.

The Judge said: The verse indicates that the burden (sin) is not from the act of Allah the Almighty, for if it were so, it would be impossible for the servant to be held accountable for it, just as he is not held accountable for the burden of another. Furthermore, the burden would have to be absent entirely, because the "bearer" is only described as such if he is a free agent who could have avoided it; for this reason, a child is not described as such. You know that this only stands against the Jabriyyah (determinists), not against the majority who say "no compulsion and no total delegation."

"And We would not punish" – this is a clarification of the divine providence following the clarification that the effects of guidance and misguidance are exclusive to their doers, that the guided one is not deprived of the fruits of his guidance, and that no soul is held accountable for the crime of another. That is: It was not valid and it was not upright for Us, rather it was impossible within Our custom based on perfect wisdom, or it was not in Our past judgment and decree, that We would punish anyone with any type of punishment—whether in this world or the next—for doing or leaving something, whether it was foundational or peripheral, until We send to him a messenger who guides to the truth, warns against misguidance, establishes proofs, and institutes the Laws. Or [it means] until We send a messenger, even if his call does not reach him—regarding which there is a disagreement, as you will see, God willing. This is the ultimate limit for the invalidity of the occurrence of punishment at its predetermined time because it does not occur absolutely. How could it? Punishment in the afterlife is impossible to occur immediately after the sending [of a messenger], and it does not occur except after the realization of what warrants it, namely immorality and disobedience. Do you not see the people of Noah (peace be upon him), how the punishment that befell them was delayed for about a thousand years?

The Mu'tazilah, who claim obligation based on the condition of abandoning the mandatory, argued that since they do not permit forgiveness, obligation is negated before the mission [of a messenger] due to the absence of its consequent. The gist of it is that if [the obligation] were rational, it would be established before the mission, and there is no doubt that rational people would abandon the obligations at that time, which would mean they would be punished before it, which is false by the verse. This was challenged by saying that it only holds if "punishment" is meant to include both worldly and afterlife punishment, as pointed out, but what is appropriate for what follows is that it means the punishment of total annihilation in this world. The absence of worldly punishment before the mission does not necessitate the absence of the obligation, because the consequent of obligation for them is afterlife punishment.

It was answered—after conceding that what is appropriate for what follows is to mean worldly punishment—that since the verse indicates it is not fitting for His wisdom to deliver the lesser punishment for abandoning an obligation before the warning of a messenger's mission, its indication of the non-delivery of the greater punishment for abandoning it before that is more appropriate.

Al-Isfahani, in his commentary on al-Mahsul, posed several points against those who used the verse to negate rational obligation before the mission. First, that "messenger" here means the intellect. Second, that we concede "messenger" means the sent prophet, but the verse indicates the negation of punishment for [the act of] direct commission before the mission, which does not necessitate the negation of absolute punishment. Third, that we concede that, but the verse contains no indication of negating punishment before it for all sins. Fourth, that we concede the indication, but the negation of accountability does not necessitate the absence of entitlement, as it is possible for accountability to lapse due to forgiveness.

He then answered the first by saying that the reality of a messenger is the sent prophet, and the primary meaning in speech is the literal one. Regarding the second, he said that great people have the habit of expressing the negation of absolute punishment by negating the [act of] direct commission. Regarding the third, [he answered] with what we pointed out: that the estimate of the speech is "We would not punish anyone," and this necessitates the negation of the punishment of every person, which is what is desired, because the opponent does not claim otherwise. Regarding the fourth, [he answered] that the verse indicates the negation of punishment before the mission, and its negation before it, apparently, indicates the absence of obligation before it. So, whoever claims that the obligation is established and that there has been an oversight by forgiveness, it is upon them to provide evidence.

You know that if the reasoning is coercive (ilzami), as many have said, the fourth point does not apply at all, because the Mu'tazilah do not permit forgiveness for someone who abandons a rational obligation, and we have pointed that out. Yes, Al-Maraghi said in his commentary on Minhaj al-Usul by the Judge: There is no need to make the argument coercive; rather, it is permissible to complete it even under the assumption that forgiveness is permitted, by saying: The occurrence of punishment, even if it were not a necessary consequence of obligation, the lack of security from its occurrence is necessarily a consequence of it, because punishment for abandoning the obligation is permissible for us, even if it is not obligatory. This consequent—meaning the lack of security—is negated by the verse's indication of its non-occurrence, so the antecedent is negated.

This was refuted: firstly, by denying that the lack of security from punishment is a consequence of abandoning the obligation absolutely; rather, it is the lack of security when the non-occurrence of punishment is not certain due to another proof. As for secondly, the negation of the lack of security is indeed by the verse, because before its revelation, punishment was permissible, and there is no doubt its negation is through forgiveness, because the meaning of forgiveness is the absence of punishment, and the verse indicates that. Thus, the proof did not reach completion under the assumption that forgiveness is permitted.

It is said: We make the consequent the permissibility of punishment, so the proof is completed, because the permissibility of forgiveness does not negate the permissibility of punishment. This was refuted by saying that the implication—that "if obligation were established before the Law, the abandoner of the obligation would be punished"—even if conceded at that time, the falsehood of the consequent is denied because the verse only indicates the negation of the occurrence of punishment, not the negation of its permissibility. Yet, in the meaning of "We would not punish," there is what you have heard, and it indicates the negation of permissibility. This construction is frequently used for that, such as the Almighty’s saying: "And We were not unjust, and We were not playful," and others. If the negation of occurrence were meant, it would have been said, "And We do not punish until We send a messenger."

The Imam weakened the reasoning from the verse by saying that if rational obligation were not established, religious obligation would not be established at all. This is false, so that [reasoning] is false. He said: The statement of the implication is from several aspects. One of them is: If the Lawgiver comes, claims to be a prophet from Allah the Almighty, and displays a miracle, must the listener listen to his words and reflect on his miracle, or is it not required? If it is not required, then the claim of prophethood is invalidated. If it is required, then is it required by the Law or by the intellect? Then rational obligation is established. And if it is required by the Law, that is false, because that Lawgiver is either that claimant or another. The first is false, because the gist of the speech returns to that man saying: "The proof that my words must be accepted is that I say my words must be accepted," and this is proving something by itself. If it were another, the speech about him would be like the first, and either a circle or an infinite regress would be necessitated, and both are impossible.

Second: When the Law comes and makes some acts obligatory and prohibits others, there is no meaning to obligation and prohibition except that He says: "If you leave such-and-such or do such-and-such, I will punish you." We say: Either it is required by the intellect or by hearing. If it is required by the intellect, then that is the intended goal. If it is required by hearing, the meaning of obligation is not established except due to the arrangement of punishment upon it. In that case, the first division returns, and infinite regress is necessitated, which is impossible.

Third: It is the school of the Sunnis that it is permissible for Allah the Almighty to forgive the punishment for abandoning the obligation. If that is so, the essence of obligation is obtained with the absence of punishment. So it remains only to be said: The essence of obligation is only established due to the existence of fear of punishment, and this fear is obtained by the intellect alone. So it is established that the essence of obligation is only obtained due to this fear, and this fear is obtained by the intellect alone. It is necessitated to say: Obligation is obtained by the intellect alone. If they say "The essence of obligation is only established due to the existence of blame," we say: When He forgives, the blame is dropped. Thus, the essence of obligation is only established due to the existence of fear of blame, and that is obtained by the intellect alone. It is established by these aspects that rational obligation cannot be refuted.

Al-'Abbadi countered this by saying it is possible to answer the first by saying that when he displays a miracle regarding his claim that he is a messenger, his truthfulness is established, as is established in its place, so his words must be accepted regarding everything he tells of Allah the Almighty, without necessitating the danger of proving something by itself, or a circle, or an infinite regress. Even if the establishment of what he informed of is by the Law, it means its establishment is by the information from Allah the Almighty, given by one whose messengership has been established by a miracle. The gist of the speech is not that he says: "The proof that my words must be accepted is that I say my words must be accepted" until what is necessitated is necessitated; rather, the gist is that he says: "My words must be accepted because it has been established that I am a messenger of Allah, so my truthfulness and belief in me in everything I claim is required." There is nothing of the previous dangers in this.

The Master of the Scholars stated in the commentary on al-Waqif that the Law is established and following is required simply by the claim of messengership with the presence of a miracle and the ability of the recipient (rational person) to reflect, even if he does not reflect. He mentioned that at that time, it is not permissible for the legally responsible person to request a delay, and if he requested a delay, it is not required to grant it, because the habit has flowed toward necessitating knowledge following the reflection which he is capable of. It is known that simply by the claim of messengership with what was mentioned, obligation is established by his informing—which is the establishment of the Law, because the meaning of establishment by it is establishment by informing from Allah the Almighty, truly or by rule. On this basis, the dilemma he mentioned by saying "because that Lawgiver is either..." does not apply.

Regarding the second: The obligation of avoiding punishment is not a matter foreign to the obligation of such-and-such until the dilemma he mentioned applies; rather, it is the obligation of such-and-such itself or its consequent, so its obligation is by its obligation, and the mentioned dilemma does not apply.

Regarding the third: If he meant by his saying "the essence of the duty is only established due to the existence of fear of punishment" that the realization of the duty in the external world by performing it is due to the existence of fear, then the discussion is not on that. Furthermore, we do not concede that performing the duty is dependent on the existence of fear. If he meant that the realization of the obligation of the duty—meaning the attachment of its obligation to the legally responsible person, which is the immediate religious responsibility—is dependent on the existence of the mentioned fear, then that is denied, as is evident. Reflect on this.

You know that the reasoning from the verse, under the assumption of its completeness, is not exclusive to the Mu'tazilah, but one of the two parties of the Hanafis among the Sunnis shares it with them: the Maturidiyyah and the general scholars of Samarkand. Although they did not say like the Mu'tazilah that the intellect is the ruler of the "good" and "evil" which they all established, they said: The intellect is an instrument for knowledge of them, so Allah creates it following the intellect's reflection in a correct manner. They made faith in Allah and His glorification obligatory and forbade attributing anything heinous to Him, the Almighty. It is narrated from Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with him) that he said: "If Allah had not sent a messenger, it would still have been obligatory for the creation to know Him."

Many of their scholars explicitly stated that the intellect is one of the proofs of Allah and that it is obligatory to use it as a proof before the arrival of the Law. They argued for this with what Allah the Almighty informed about Ibrahim (peace be upon him) in his statement to his father and his people: "Indeed, I see you and your people in clear misguidance," as he said that and did not say "It was revealed to me," based on his reasoning from the stars and knowledge of Allah through them, and he made it a proof against his people. Likewise, all the messengers argued with their people using rational proofs, as indicated by the Almighty’s saying: "Their messengers said: 'Is there doubt about Allah, the Creator of the heavens and the earth?'" and by the Almighty’s saying: "And whoever invokes with Allah another deity for which he has no proof..." where He did not say "after it was revealed to him or the call reached him." And by His statement, the Almighty, reporting on the people of the Fire: "And they will say: 'If we had been listening or reasoning, we would not have been among the companions of the Blaze,'" where He reported that they became in the Fire for leaving the utilization of hearing and intellect.

[The counter-argument] is that if they had utilized their intellects in knowing the crafts before the arrival of the Law, they would not have been in the Fire, and that the textual proofs were not proofs except by rational deduction, and that the miracle after the call is not known except by a rational proof, and the signs of the souls and the horizons are more indicative of the Creator than the miracle's indication that it is from Allah the Almighty. Since the intellect was sufficient for knowing the miracle, it was by way of priority sufficient for knowing Allah the Almighty. And that inviting all the disbelievers to the religion of Islam is obligatory upon the Ummah, and it is known that the atheists (Dahriyyah) are not argued against with the speech of Allah and His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him); so nothing remains but the proofs of the intellects, among other things.

In this case, it is said to them: If it were obligatory for the creation to know Allah the Almighty and believe in Him before the mission of a messenger, then the punishment of the disbeliever before it would be necessitated, for He informed that He does not forgive associating partners with Him. Yet, He negated punishment in the verse, so there is no obligation—by necessity of the negation of the antecedent due to the negation of the consequent, in the manner done with the Mu'tazilah.

Imam Al-Razi, after weakening the reasoning from the verse and establishing rational obligation, mentioned two aspects of the verse. First: interpreting "messenger" as the intellect. Second: specifying the general [term] by saying that the intended meaning is "And We would not punish" regarding actions that there is no way to know except by the Law, [which applies] except after the arrival of the Law. Then he said: "What I accept and follow is that the mere intellect is a cause for it being obligatory upon us to do what we benefit from and avoid what we are harmed by, and it is impossible for the intellect to rule over Him, the Almighty, regarding the obligation of an action or the abandonment of an action."

You know what was said regarding interpreting "messenger" as the intellect; it is contrary to the usage of the Holy Quran, and it is made distant by the rebuking of the keepers [of Hell] to the disbelievers with their saying: "Did your messengers not come to you with clear proofs?" and they did not say "Did you not have intellects?" Interpreting "messenger" here as intellect is something that the intellect does not accept. He apologized for the specification by saying that although it is a departure from the literal meaning, it is necessary to resort to it if proof for it exists, and in his claim, it exists.

Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and his followers interpreted the verse as the negation of the punishment of annihilation in this world. These [scholars] went on to say that the people of the interval (Fatrah) are punished for abandoning faith and monotheism. They are everyone who was between two messengers and the first was not sent to them, and they did not reach the second. An-Nawawi relied on the view of their punishment in his commentary on Muslim, saying: "Whoever dies in the interval while in the state the Arabs were on, of idol worship, is in the Fire." This does not contain [the implication of] accountability before the reaching of the call, for the call of Ibrahim and others of the messengers (peace be upon them) had reached them. It appears that An-Nawawi is content for the obligation of faith upon everyone with the reaching of the call of the messengers who came before him, even if he was not sent to him. Thus, there is no contradiction between his ruling that they are people of the interval in the previous sense and his ruling that the call had reached them, contrary to what al-Abi claimed. Yes, the contradiction would only be necessary if he claimed that the messengers who preceded them were sent to them, which is not the case.

Al-Halimi followed this, saying in his Minhaj: If a rational person who is discerning hears a sign of a call that was to Allah the Almighty, and leaves the deduction by his intellect of its truthfulness—and he is a person of deduction and reflection—he would have been turning away from the call and thus committed disbelief. It is unlikely that there exists a person whom the news of none of the messengers reached, due to their great number, the length of the times of their call, the abundance of the number of those who believed in them and followed them, and those who disbelieved in them and opposed them. For news may reach [someone] on the tongue of an opponent just as it reaches on the tongue of a follower. If it were possible that he had never heard of a religion or a prophet's call, or knew that there were those in the world who affirm a deity, we do not see that this happens. His matter is based on the disagreement regarding whether faith is obligatory by the intellect alone or if it is necessary for the transmission to be added. This is explicit in the establishment of the obligation of faith upon everyone after the existence of the call of one of the messengers, even if he was not a messenger to him. Some of them went to extremes in relying on this, to the point of saying: "Whoever the call of one of the messengers (peace be upon them) reached in any way, and he fell short in searching for it, he is a disbeliever among the people of the Fire." So, do not be deceived by the words of many people regarding the salvation of the people of the interval, due to the reports from the Prophet (peace be upon him) that their fathers who passed away in the pre-Islamic era are in the Fire.

The view held by the Ash'arites among the theologians and the fundamentalists, and the Shafi'is among the jurists, is that the people of the interval are not punished, and they spoke broadly regarding that. It is reported that a group of the people of the interval were punished, and it was answered that their Hadiths are solitary (Ahad) and do not contradict the certainty of the non-punishment before the mission. Also, it is permissible that the punishment of those of them whose punishment was reported is due to a specific matter concerning them that warrants that, which Allah and His Messenger (peace be upon him) know, similar to what was said regarding the ruling of disbelief on the boy whom Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) killed despite his youth. It is also said that the punishment of those mentioned in the Hadiths is limited to other [types] of the people of the interval who did not have an excuse, such as idol worship and changing the Laws, as 'Amr ibn Luhayy did. It is not hidden that this does not agree with the broadness of these Imams, nor with the statement that there is no obligation except by the Law. Even if it were possible that those whose punishment was confirmed were followers of him whose Law remained at that time, like 'Isa (peace be upon him), then there would be no problem at all.

Some of those who say they are punished absolutely argued with what Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi narrated in Nawadir al-Usul, Al-Tabarani, and Abu Nu'aym from Mu'adh ibn Jabal from the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), who said: "On the Day of Resurrection, the mentally deficient, the one who died in the interval, and the one who died young will be brought. The mentally deficient will say: 'O Lord, if You had given me intellect, no one to whom You gave intellect would have been happier with his intellect than I.' The one who died in the interval will say: 'O Lord, if a covenant from You had come to me, no one to whom a covenant came from You would have been happier with Your covenant than I.' The one who died young will say: 'O Lord, if You had given me a lifespan, no one to whom You gave a lifespan would have been happier with his lifespan than I.' Then the Lord, blessed and exalted be He, will say to them: 'Go and enter Hell.' If they entered it, it would not have harmed them at all. But then flashes of fire will emerge at them, and they will think that it has annihilated everything Allah the Almighty created. So they will return quickly and say: 'Our Lord, we emerged by Your Might, wanting to enter it, but flashes of fire emerged at us and we thought it had annihilated everything Allah the Almighty created.' Then He will order them a second time, and they will return for that and say the same. Then the Lord, the Almighty, will say: 'I created you according to My knowledge, and to My knowledge you return. O Fire, encompass them.' So the Fire will take them." Some reports imply that among them are those who will be punished and those who will not be punished.

Ahmad, Ibn Rahwayh, Ibn Marduyah, and Al-Bayhaqi narrated from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Four will present their case on the Day of Resurrection: a man who is deaf and hears nothing, a man who is mentally handicapped, a man who is senile, and a man who died in an interval. As for the deaf man, he will say: 'Lord, Islam came and I hear nothing.' As for the handicapped man, he will say: 'Lord, Islam came and the children were pelting me with dung.' As for the senile man, he will say: 'Lord, Islam came and I reason nothing.' As for the one who died in an interval, he will say: 'Lord, no messenger from You came to me.' He, the Almighty, will take their pledges that they will obey Him, then He will send a messenger to them: 'Enter the Fire.' Whoever enters it, it will be coolness and peace for him, and whoever does not enter it will be dragged to it."

Qasim ibn Asbagh, Al-Bazzar, Abu Ya'la, and Ibn 'Abd al-Barr in al-Tamhid narrated from Anas that the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "On the Day of Resurrection, four will be brought: the newborn, the mentally ill, the one who died in the interval, and the senile, elderly person. All of them will speak with their argument. The Lord, blessed and exalted be He, will say to a neck of the Fire: 'Emerge.' And He will say to them: 'I used to send My servants as messengers from among themselves, and I am My own messenger to you.' He will say to them: 'Enter this.' Those for whom wretchedness was written will say: 'O Lord, would we enter it while we were fleeing from it?' As for those for whom happiness was written, they will proceed and plunge into it. Then the Lord, the Almighty, will say: 'You have seen Me and disobeyed Me; you are even more disbelieving and disobedient to My messengers.' These will enter Paradise, and those [will enter] the Fire." And other such reports. These are used as arguments by those who say the children of the polytheists—and even the children of the believers—are divided. Yet, there is something in the heart regarding their authenticity, even if [Ibn Hajar] said in al-Isabah that they were reported through several chains. Under the assumption of their authenticity, they are opposed by what is more authentic than them.

What the heart inclines toward is that the intellect is a proof for knowing the Creator, the Almighty, His oneness, and His transcendence above having children, before the arrival of the Law, due to the previous proofs and others, even if in some of them there is what is said. The sending of messengers and the revealing of books is a mercy from Him, the Almighty, or that it is to clarify the types of worship and legal boundaries that are not attained by the intellects. So it is not valid to object that "if the intellect were a proof, Allah would not have sent a messenger and would have sufficed with it." In answer to this, it is said: Because the matter of the mission and the recompense is something that is difficult to understand with the intellect alone without great reflection—which entails a hardship for which a person is excused and without which there is no faith—Allah the Almighty sent the messengers (peace be upon them) to clarify what completes the religion, not for the knowledge of the Creator itself. For that is attained by the beginnings of the intellects; the camel dung indicates the camel, and the footprint indicates the traveler. Do not the sky with its towers, the earth with its roads, and the seas with their waves indicate the Subtle, the Aware?

Also, Allah the Almighty did not leave us without a messenger from the beginning of the matter to its end, and the proof was established with one [messenger] just as it remained with Muhammad (peace be upon him) until the Day of Resurrection. That does not indicate that the first was not a sufficient proof. Likewise, He, the Almighty, did not leave us with one sign, but He bestowed upon us, glorious is His majesty, repeated signs, and that does not indicate that the single sign was not a sufficient proof.

His saying, the Almighty, reporting the keepers' words to the people of the Fire: "Did your messengers not come to you with clear proofs?" is a rebuke by what is most apparent, and it does not indicate that the other [proof] is not a proof. His saying, the Almighty: "So that the people would not have a proof against Allah after the messengers," is in the sense that they would not have an argument in their claim by saying: "If only You had sent a messenger to us." His saying, the Almighty: "That is because your Lord would not destroy the cities for their injustice while their people were unaware," is understood as the destruction by the punishment of total annihilation in this world for denying the messengers. As for the recompense for disbelief, it is the Fire in the hereafter.

The same can be said for the verse we are currently in, because of the frequency of what He invites to. So, there is no excuse for those who did not know their Lord, the Almighty, among the people of the interval if they were rational, discerning, and capable of reflection and deduction, especially if the call of one of the messengers (peace be upon them) reached them. There is hardly any [person] who did not receive it, as you heard from Al-Halimi. It is said [it existed] in America—which is what is called the "New World"—before it was reached in the approximate thousandth year after the Hijrah by Christopher, known as Columbus, for the people there, according to what reached us at that time, had never heard of a messenger's call at all.

Furthermore, what is understood from the words of the scholars is that the dispute is only regarding the rulings of faith in Allah the Almighty, unlike the peripheral rulings; there is no dispute that they are not established except in the right of someone whom the call of the one to whom he was sent has reached, and this is the apparent meaning. Yes, what the religions agreed upon from the peripheral rulings—is it like faith so that the previous dispute runs in it? It is a matter of contemplation. As for faith in our Prophet (peace be upon him), it is not obligatory upon someone whose call has not reached him, as the intellect has no field in that, as is not hidden to any rational person.

Indeed, the Proof of Islam, Al-Ghazali, said: People after his mission (peace and blessings be upon him) are categories. A category to whom his call did not reach and they never heard of him at all; these are definitively promised Paradise. A category to whom his call reached, the miracle appeared at his hand, and he showed the great morals and noble characteristics, and they did not believe in him—like the disbelievers who are among us—these are definitively destined for the Fire. A category to whom his call (peace and blessings be upon him) reached, and they heard of him, but only as one of us hears of the Dajjal—and far be it from his noble status (peace be upon him) to be that—these I hope for Paradise for, since they did not hear what would make them desire faith in him.

Perhaps the definitiveness of Paradise for the first [category] and the hope for it for the others only occurs if they were believers in Allah the Almighty. As for if they were not like that, they are subject to the disagreement. Then, the issue of the absence of obligation before the arrival of the Law, the reasoning for it from the verse is only fulfilled by those who use it, as Al-Isfahani said, if the goal is to obtain the preponderance of opinion in it. If it is scientific (certain), it cannot be established by probabilistic proofs, and there is a kind of sufficiency for them in it. That is: "And We would not punish and would not reward until We send a messenger." They said: The mention of reward was dispensed with by the mention of its opposite, punishment, and it was not reversed because it is more apparent in realizing the meaning of religious obligation. So contemplate this.