Tafsir of Al-Kahf 18:12

"Then We awakened them" (i.e., We roused them and stirred them from their sleep), "so that We might know which of the two factions" (i.e., which of them. They are those who said, "We have stayed a day or part of a day," and those who said, "Your Lord is most knowing of how long you remained").

It has been said: "the two factions" are the youths who assumed the shortness of their stay, and the second are the people of the city, during whose era the youths were awakened, and who possessed the record of their absence. Ibn ‘Atiyyah claimed that this is the view of the majority of exegetes. From Ibn ‘Abbas, it is narrated that one of the two factions is the youths, and the other is the kings who held the rule of the city one after another. From Mujahid: the two factions are the people of the Cave; a faction among them are believers, and a faction are disbelievers. Al-Farra’ said: the two factions are two groups of believers who lived in their time and differed regarding the duration of their stay. Al-Suddi said: the two factions are disbelievers, and the intent by them are the Jews and the Christians who taught the Quraysh to ask the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) about the People of the Cave. Ibn Harb said: the two factions are Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) and the creation, similar to His saying: "Are you more knowing or is Allah?" This is the primary view, because the 'al' (definite article) in "al-hizbayn" (the two factions) is for reference, and there is no prior reference to others but those mentioned.

"better able to calculate" (i.e., to compute/reckon). It is a past tense verb, and its subject is a pronoun (referring to "ay" - which). This was chosen by al-Farisi, al-Zamakhshari, and Ibn ‘Atiyyah. The "ma" in His saying: "for what they stayed" is a verbal particle (masdariyyah), and the prepositional phrase is a fronted circumstantial qualifier (hal) for His saying: "an 'amadan" (a duration/term), which is the object of "ahsa" (calculated).

An amad, according to al-Raghib, is a duration that has a limit. The difference between it and zaman (time) is that amad is spoken of with consideration to its end point, unlike zaman, which is general in both its inception and its end. For this reason, some said: mada and amad are close in meaning, and it is not a noun for the end point such that its application to the duration would be metaphorical—as the "end" (ghayah) is applied to it in their saying: "beginning of the end and its conclusion." That is, to know which of them better calculated the duration existing for their stay.

The intent of "calculating it" is to determine it in terms of its discrete quantity, which is incidental to it by virtue of its division into years, and its reaching, from that aspect, the levels of numbers. This is suggested to you by the fact that the duration refers to the years that have passed, not the calculation of it in terms of its intrinsic continuous quantity, for that is not called "calculation." It has been said that applying amad to the duration is metaphorical, and its literal meaning is the limit of the duration. It is permissible to intend that by estimating a genitive construction, i.e., "so that we might know which of them better determined the limit of the time of their stay." Even without it, this is so, for "staying" refers to the continuous existence corresponding to the aforementioned time. By virtue of the extension incidental to it because of that, it has an amad and a limit inevitably. However, the intent is not what constitutes the limit and end of that continuous existence in terms of its continuous quantity incidental to it by its correspondence to time, which is the moment of their awakening from sleep—for knowing it from that aspect is not hidden from anyone, and it is not called "calculation"—but rather in terms of its discrete quantity, which is incidental to it by virtue of its occurrence in time, which it corresponds to, as it divides into years and reaches a specific level of numbers.

The difference between this and the previous is that what the calculation relates to in the former case is the duration itself divided into years, which is a total of three hundred and nine years. In the latter case, it is the conclusion of that duration divided into years, meaning the three hundred and ninth year. The relation of calculation to the amad in the first sense is apparent, while its relation to it in the second sense is by virtue of its organization of the number levels beneath it and its inclusion of them.

You know that the apparent wording of al-Raghib—which is the same in language—dictates that amad is literal for duration, and that its application to the "limit" is metaphorical. Thus, attempting to justify the intent of "limit" here with what was mentioned is an affectation that is not needed if the "ma" is considered a verbal particle (masdariyyah). Indeed, it would be needed if it were considered a relative pronoun (mawsulah) with its implicit referent omitted from the relative clause—i.e., "so that we might know which of them better calculated a duration existing for that which they stayed," meaning the time they stayed in it. It is said that "ma labithu" is in the position of a reason (maf'ul lahu), and the "lam" of causation was brought because it is not a pure verbal noun nor is it simultaneous. But this is not considered strong. It is also said that the "lam" is an augment, and "ma" is a relative pronoun, and it is the object with its referent omitted, meaning "calculated what they stayed," where the intent is the time they stayed. On this view, amadan is a specification (tamyiz) for the relation, clarifying the ambiguity in the object's relation, and it is transferred from the object; its origin is "calculated the duration of the time they stayed." The claim that it cannot be a specification of the relation because it must be transferred from the subject, and that is impossible here, is invalid, because the "must-be" is subject to refutation. What is established in the recognized works, such as the commentaries of at-Tashil and others, is that it can be transferred from the object, like "we caused the earth to gush forth with springs," just as it can be transferred from the subject, like "Zayd poured with sweat." If it were made a specification, it would not be a specification for a single word, and no one has ever claimed that transference is a condition for it at all.

It is permissible on this estimate for "ma" to be a verbal particle, but that is far-fetched. The claim that the "lam" is an augment here is weak because it is not typically augmented in such contexts. Al-Zajjaj and al-Tabrizi chose for "ahsa" to be an elative verb (af'al tafdil), because it corresponds to what occurs in all the other noble verses, such as "which of them is best in deed," "which of them is nearest to you in benefit," and others that are countless. Also, because its being a past tense verb implies that the goal of the resurrection is the knowledge of a calculation that preceded the resurrection, not a calculation that followed it, which is not the case. It was objected to, firstly, that forming an elative from a verb beyond the simple triliteral is not analogical; what has come of it is anomalous. It was answered that there are three schools of thought regarding building an elative from such verbs: total permission, which is the apparent view of Sibawayh; total prohibition, treating what has occurred as anomalous, which is the view of Abu 'Ali; and distinguishing between cases where the hamzah is for transitivity—in which case it is not allowed for others—and when it is not, in which case it is allowed (this is the choice of Ibn 'Usfur). Perhaps both are of the view of total permission like Sibawayh, or the distinction like Ibn 'Usfur, and the hamzah in "ahsa" is not for transitivity. Secondly, that amadan, if it were the object, then if it is with an implicit [object], it would lead to what they sought to avoid. And if it is the object of "labithu," the meaning is not sound, because the calculation is for the duration of the stay and its term, not the staying in the term. It is said: "Let it be like your saying 'which of you is better at calculating his fasting in the month,' meaning the days of his fasting." The meaning would be: "which of them is better at calculating the days or hours of the stay in the duration," intending the entire period. Regarding the objection that this makes the indefiniteness of amadan difficult, and the excuse that they were not knowledgeable of its determination—a day, a month, or a year—therefore it was indefinite... this as a question about hours, days, or months is not sound, because it is known that it is the duration of the time of staying, so it should be defined by genitive or reference, and the uncertainty remains. Abu Hayyan justified its accusative case by the dropping of a preposition, meaning it is in the sense of "duration," and the origin is "for what they stayed of duration." Amadan would be an explanation for what was ambiguous in the word "ma," like His saying: "Whatever verse We abrogate... whatever mercy Allah opens to the people." When the preposition was dropped, the verb reached it, and it is as you see. The prohibition of the elative from taking an object was refuted by stating that this is the view of the Basrans, not the Kufans, so perhaps the two Imams followed the Kufan school. The truth is that the one who holds that "ahsa" is an elative makes "amadan" a specification, and it acts upon the specification according to the correct view. The saying that the specification must be transferred from the subject has already been clarified. Thirdly, that the assumption of the implication that the goal of the resurrection is the knowledge of a calculation preceding it is rejected, for the past tense form is based on the state of narration; it is hardly imagined from that the aforementioned implication. Fourthly, that it would require that the basis of calculation be realized in both factions, except that some are better and some are lower, whereas that is not the case. In al-Kashf, it states that the view of al-Zajjaj is not to be rejected, though what al-Zamakhshari favored is more worthy of choice in wording and meaning. As for the first, it is apparent. As for the second, it is because Allah (Ta'ala) narrated their questioning among themselves, and it is regarding one who is knowledgeable, not the most knowledgeable, and others are more entitled to it. Understand this. "Ay" is an interrogative subject, and what follows it is its predicate, and it has suspended "na'lam" from acting [on its object], as is the case with interrogative particles in such a position.

Both possibilities are permissible: that "ahsa" is a past tense verb, and that it is an elative. It is permissible to consider "ay" as a relative pronoun; in al-Bahr, if we say that "ahsa" is an elative, it is permissible for "ay" to be a relative pronoun built upon the school of Sibawayh, because of the existence of the condition for building it: that "ay" be in a genitive construction with its head of the relative clause omitted. The estimation is: "So that we might know the group that is better at calculating what they stayed, for an amad, from those who did not calculate." And if it were a past tense verb, that would be impossible, because it would not have omitted the head of the relative clause, for the verb along with its subject would be the relative clause, so it is not permissible to build it because the condition of the completion of the condition—omitting the head of the clause—is missed.

Al-Zuhri read "li-ya'lama" (so that He might know) with a ya, attributing the action to Him (Ta'ala) by way of turning (iltifat). In any case, knowledge is the goal of the resurrection, and it is not to be taken literally, otherwise the verse would be a proof for Hisham regarding what he claims—Allah is exalted above that with a great exaltation. It is said that it is a goal by making it a metaphor for "manifestation and distinction." It is also said that the intent is that "Our knowledge" relates in a present, corresponding relation, not a future relation, as in His saying: "So that We may know who follows the Messenger from those who turn back on their heels." Some prominent scholars objected to this, saying that the resurrection of this faction did not result in their dividing into "calculators" and "non-calculators" such that the knowledge would relate to them in a present way, or for the sake of manifestation and distinction, and that any of that could be strung into the thread of a goal—the way the changing of the Qibla resulted in the division of people into followers and turn-backs, thus making the present knowledge and the manifestation regarding each of the two groups correct. Rather, what resulted from that was their division into "those estimating with a non-accurate estimation" and "those delegating knowledge to Allah (Azza wa Jalla)," and there is no calculation in any of that at all. Then he said: If that is made a goal by interpreting the noble text as "execution" based on making knowledge an expression for "testing"—a metaphor by applying the name of the effect to the cause—then it is not a necessity of testing that the action being tested results from the one tested, for it might be to show his inability to perform it, according to the custom of the challenging obligations, like His saying: "Then bring it from the West." This is what is meant here. So the meaning is: "We awakened them to deal with them as one who tests them: 'Which of them better calculated the duration of their stay?'—whereupon their inability is shown to them, and they delegate that to the All-Knowing, the All-Aware, and they learn their state and what Allah (Ta'ala) did for them in preserving their bodies, so they increase in certainty of His complete power and knowledge, and gain insight into the matter of the resurrection." This would be a grace for the believers of their time and a clear sign for the disbelievers among them. It sufficed here from those glorious goals with its beginning that issued from Him (Subhanahu), and in what will follow, if Allah (Ta'ala) wills, on what issued from them regarding the questioning leading to it. This is better than portraying the analogy by saying "We awakened them as the awakening of one who wants to know," for the intent might be imagined to require the realization of the intended, and the forbidden consequence returns; therefore, one turns to making the "intent of knowledge" an expression for "testing." So, test and choose.

Al-Khafaji countered this by saying that what he mentioned, despite its affectation and lack of benefit, is not upright, because true testing is not conceivable from One who has encompassed everything in knowledge. Wherever it occurred, they made it a metaphor for knowledge or what results from it; therefore, he was ultimately forced to return to what he denied. He chose to make "knowledge" a metonymy for the appearance of their matter, so that the hearts of the believers might be reassured by the increase of faith, and the argument of the deniers be cut off. And the knowledge of Allah (Ta'ala)—since the intent of its reality is impossible in His Book—is made a metonymy for some of its necessary consequences appropriate to its position. The appropriate thing here is what was mentioned. Then he said: "The knowledge was linked to the disagreement in its duration—i.e., what is understood from 'which of the two factions better calculated the duration of their stay'—because it is more conducive to its manifestation and stronger for its spread." In al-Kashf, there is a justification for what is in al-Kashshaf: he intended that the knowledge is a metaphor for distinction and manifestation, as if it were said: "So that We may manifest and distinguish for them the one who knows the duration of what they stayed, and let him see who among them knows this, for it is not permissible that it be one of them, as they are divided between 'delegators' and 'inaccurate estimators'." The difference between what is in al-Kashf and what al-Khafaji mentioned is not hidden from the insightful, and what is in al-Kashf is less burdensome than it. The portrayal of the analogy by saying "We awakened them as the awakening of one who wants to know" is better in my view than the first portrayal, and the aforementioned misconception is something hardly to be given attention, so ponder deeply. It was read "li-yu'lama" (passive: so that it might be known), originating from the information, and that is explained by the agent being a pronoun for Him (Ta'ala), and the first object is omitted because the meaning indicates it. "Ay al-hizbayn," etc., from the subject and predicate, are in the position of the second and third objects of "na'lam." The estimation is "So that Allah might make the people know which of the two factions, etc." And if the knowledge is taken as "epistemological," the clause is in the position of the second object only, and that is apparent. It was read "li-yu'lama" (passive), and it is explained by the deputy agent being omitted, i.e., "so that the people might know." The clause thereafter is either in the position of two objects or one object, as you have heard. Some said that the clause is the deputy agent, which is a Kufan school of thought. In al-Bahr: the Basrans do not permit the clause to be an agent or a deputy agent, while the Kufans have two schools: one is that it is permissible to attribute to the clause absolutely, and the second is that it is not permissible unless the predicate is something that can be suspended. The investigation of this is in its place.