Tafsir of Al-Kahf 18:82

(And as for the wall) – the well-known one – (it belonged to two orphan boys) – it is said: they were Asram and Sarim – (young, whose father had died). This is the apparent meaning, as the orphancy of a human being is established by the death of the father. In the Hadith, "There is no orphancy after puberty." Ibn Atiyyah said: It is possible they were adults, and they were described as such out of compassion for them, but it is clear that this is very far-fetched.

(In the city) – this is the village mentioned previously. Perhaps it was referred to as a "city" here to show a kind of importance attributed to it due to the importance of the two orphans it contained, and because of their father, who was one of its inhabitants and was a righteous man. Since the preceding discourse was on a different track, it was referred to there as "the village."

(And beneath it was a treasure for them) – buried wealth consisting of gold and silver, as extracted by Al-Bukhari in his Tarikh, Al-Tirmidhi, and Al-Hakim, who authenticated it from the Hadith of Abu Darda. This is what Ikrimah and Qatadah stated. The word kanz (treasure) is originally an infinitive, then it was used to mean the passive participle.

Al-Raghib said: Kanz is placing wealth one part upon another and guarding it. Its root is from "I stored (kanaztu) the dates in the container." The interpretation of kanz as mentioned was considered problematic, as the apparent meaning is that the one who buried it was their father, given the implication of "for them." This is because it could not be theirs unless it was an inheritance or they had extracted it themselves, and the latter is negated; thus, the former is confirmed. He was described as righteous, which conflicts with what has been stated regarding the condemnation of a kaniz (one who treasures). The answer is that what is condemned is wealth from which the rights (obligations) are not fulfilled; in fact, according to those who acknowledge the concept of implied meaning (mafhum), it is not called a kanz in Islamic law if the rights have been paid, as indicated by the Hadith, "Any wealth whose Zakat is not paid is a kanz." The Prophet (peace be upon him) was in the position of stating legal rulings, not linguistic concepts, as those were known to the listeners. Nothing concerning the mafhum of the linguistic meaning is intended here regarding the extraction or lack thereof. The description of righteousness is evidence that it was not from the condemned kanz.

Those who say that kanz is absolutely forbidden claim that it was not forbidden in the laws of those before us, and they argue based on what Al-Tabarani extracted from Abu Darda regarding this verse: "Treasures were made lawful for them and spoils were forbidden to them; and spoils were made lawful for us and treasures were forbidden to us." Abd al-Razzaq, Ibn al-Mundhir, and Ibn Abi Hatim extracted something similar from Qatadah, containing: "Let not a man wonder and say, 'What is the status of the kanz? It was lawful for those before us and forbidden to us,' for Allah, the Exalted, makes lawful of His command what He wills and forbids what He wills. These are the Sunan and the obligatory duties; they are lawful for one nation and forbidden for another."

Al-Hakim extracted and authenticated from Ibn Abbas that he said: "It was not gold or silver, but it was scrolls of knowledge." This was also narrated from Ibn Jubayr. Ibn Marduyah extracted from the Hadith of Ali (may Allah honor his face) in a marfu' (elevated) manner, and Al-Bazzar from Abu Dharr likewise, and Al-Khara'iti from Ibn Abbas in a mawquf (stopped) manner, that it was a tablet of gold inscribed with: "I wonder at one who believes in destiny, how does he grieve? I wonder at one who believes in provision, how does he struggle? I wonder at one who believes in death, how does he rejoice? I wonder at one who believes in the Reckoning, how does he act heedlessly? I wonder at one who knows the world and its vicissitudes for its inhabitants, how does he find comfort in it? There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him)."

In a narration of Ata from Ibn Abbas, it is written on one of its sides: "In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I wonder..." and on the other side: "I am Allah, there is no god but I alone, no partner have I. I created good and evil, so blessed is he whom I created for good and caused it to flow through his hands, and woe to him whom I created for evil and caused it to flow through his hands." Some combined these by saying that the kanz refers to all of this, based on the fact that it is, in general, buried wealth, and all the mentioned items are wealth that was buried, though each narration was limited to one of them. The objection to this is that, despite its remoteness, the apparent statement of Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with both) denies it was gold or silver.

(And their father was righteous) – The apparent meaning is the nearest father who sired them. It is mentioned that his name was Kashih and their mother's name was Dahna. It is said he was the tenth ancestor, and from Jafar al-Sadiq (may Allah be pleased with him) it is narrated that he was the seventh ancestor. Regardless, the verse contains evidence that the righteousness of fathers benefits the children. Ibn Abi Shaybah, Ahmad in Al-Zuhd, and Ibn Abi Hatim extracted from Khaythamah, who said: Jesus (peace be upon him) said, "Blessed are the offspring of the believer, then blessed are they, how they are protected after him," and Khaythamah recited this verse.

Abd ibn Humayd and Ibn al-Mundhir extracted from Wahb saying: "Indeed, Allah, the Exalted, protects a clan of people through the righteous servant." From Al-Hasan ibn Ali (may Allah be pleased with both), it is narrated that he said to one of the Khawarij during a discussion between them regarding how Allah protected the orphans' wealth: "By the righteousness of their father." He said: "My father and grandfather were better than him." The Khariji said: "Allah informed us that you are a contentious people." It is mentioned regarding this man's righteousness that people used to entrust him with deposits, and he would return them exactly as they were deposited. It is narrated that he was a wanderer.

(So your Lord intended) – your Owner and the Disposer of your affairs. In the addition of "Lord" to the pronoun of Moses (peace be upon him) rather than their pronoun is a warning to him of the necessity of complete submission and surrender to His will (Subhanahu), and the obligation to refrain from debating what occurred according to their perspective, from which is sensed the seeking of that which results in the nourishment and management of the body.

(That they should reach their maturity) – it is said: meaning puberty and the perfection of reason. In Al-Sihah, it is strength, and it is between eighteen and thirty. It is a singular that came in the structure of a plural, like Anuk, and has no counterpart. It is said: it is a plural with no singular from its wording, like Asal, Ababil, Abadid, and Madhakir. Sibawayh used to say its singular is Shidd, which is good in meaning because it is said, "The boy reached his shiddat," but its verb is not pluralized as af'al. As for An'um, it is only the plural of Ni'm, from their saying "a day of misery and a day of prosperity." As for the saying of those who stated its singular is Shidd like Kalb and Aklub, or Shidd like Zi'b and Adh'ub, this is purely analogical, just as they say for the singular of Ababil "Abul," based on the analogy of 'Ujul, and it is not something heard from the Arabs.

(And extract their treasure) – from beneath the wall. Had I not erected it, it would have collapsed, and the treasure would have been extracted from beneath it before they were capable of guarding it and benefiting from it. They mentioned that the orphans were unaware of the treasure, and they had a guardian who knew of it, but he was absent. The wall was on the verge of falling; had it fallen, it would have been lost; therefore, he erected it.

(A mercy from your Lord) – this is a maf'ul lahu (an object of cause) for "intended," and "I erected" is the explicit expression in place of the pronoun. It is not a maf'ul lahu for "that they should extract" because of the difference in the agent. Some permitted this due to the lack of a condition for unity (of agents), or they made the verbal noun from the passive construction. He permitted the accusative to be for a state (hal), from the pronoun in "that they should extract," interpreted as "being shown mercy." Al-Zamakhshari said the accusative is because it is an absolute object (maf'ul mutlaq) for "intended," for the intention of that is a mercy from Him (Ta'ala).

An objection was raised that if "Your Lord intended" means "He had mercy," then the mercy is from the Lord inevitably, so what is the benefit in mentioning His statement, "from your Lord"? The same applies if it is a maf'ul lahu. It is said: there is an ellipsis in the speech, and the estimation is "I did what I did as a mercy from your Lord," so it is then a maf'ul lahu based on the intended meaning of "seeking the mercy of your Lord," or it is in the accusative by removal of the preposition. Mercy here means revelation, meaning: by the mercy of your Lord and His revelation; thus, his saying "(And I did not do it of my own command)"—that is, of my own opinion and independent judgment—is a confirmation of that.

(That) – is a reference to what was mentioned of the consequences strung together in the thread of explanation, and the sense of distance it contains is to signal the loftiness of its rank in grandeur.

(The interpretation of that which you could not) – meaning, you could not bear. It is an imperfect tense of ista'a, with a connecting hamza; its origin is istata'a on the measure of istaf'ala, then the ta of ifti'al was deleted for lightness, and the ta, which is the root, remained. Some claimed that the sin is a substitute for the waw being turned into an alif, and the root is ata'a, but there is no need to claim that the deleted letter is the ta which is the radical of the verb, and then the claim that they substituted the ta of ifti'al with a ta because it occurred after the sin. It is also said tastati' by substituting the ta with a ta, and tasti' by deleting the ta of ifti'al; thus, there are four linguistic forms, as Ibn al-Sikkit said. How subtle is the deletion of one of the two contiguous letters while the other remains at the end of this speech, which coincided with the departure of Al-Khidr from Moses (peace be upon them both).

Some verifiers said: This was specifically chosen for lightening because since it was repeated in the story, lightening the last one was appropriate. It was countered that that is also repeated, and it is lighter than this, so why was it not brought (in that form)? The response is that the difference is manifest between this and that. It is said: It was specifically lightened to indicate that what he encountered became light for Moses (peace be upon him) through the clarification of its reason. It was countered that this is made remote because it is in the recounting, not the recounted. You know this, as well as what we mentioned about it being a flower that cannot withstand being rubbed. The interpretation by the previous meaning—that which he mentioned as the intended one—is: "That is the culmination and consequence of that which you could not..."

(Endure with patience) – from the matters you witnessed. It then fulfills the promised explanation. It is permissible that the reference is to the explanation itself; the interpretation would then be by its well-known meaning. In any case, it is a summary of what preceded. In making the relative clause different from what passed, there is a repetition of the ambiguity and a strengthening of the rebuke.

It is said: Perhaps the attribution of the intention first to the singular pronoun of the speaker is because he is the direct agent of the finding of fault; second, to the pronoun of the speaker and others with him is because the destruction of the boy was by his direct action, and the replacement was dependent upon it, yet it was purely the action of Allah (Ta'ala) and His power; thus, the "our" pronoun is shared between Allah (Ta'ala) and Al-Khidr (peace be upon him); and third, to Allah alone, because Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) has no input in the boys reaching maturity. The direction of the plural pronoun was objected to on the grounds that the gathering of a creature with Allah in a single pronoun—especially the speaker—contains what it contains of abandoning etiquette. This is evidenced by what came regarding Thabit ibn Qays ibn Shammas, who used to speak in the assembly of the Prophet (peace be upon him) when delegations of the Arabs arrived. It happened that the delegation of Tamim came, and their speaker stood and mentioned their glories and merits. When he finished, Thabit stood and spoke a sermon in which he said, "Whoever obeys Allah (Azza wa Jall) and His Messenger (peace be upon him) has been guided, and whoever disobeys them has gone astray." The Prophet (peace be upon him) said to him, "You are a bad speaker for your people." Al-Khattabi clarified that he (peace be upon him) disliked the equality contained in his speech. The answer is that something similar occurred in the verses and Hadith. Among them is His saying (Ta'ala), "Indeed, Allah and His angels bless the Prophet," for the apparent meaning is that the pronoun in "bless" refers to Allah and the angels. And his saying (peace be upon him) in the Hadith on faith, "That Allah and His Messenger are more beloved to him than anything else." Perhaps what the Prophet (peace be upon him) disliked from Thabit was that he paused at his saying "disobeys them," not the equality in the pronoun.

The appearance of this is that there is no dislike absolutely in this equality, and this is one of the views on the issue. The second is what Al-Khattabi went toward, that it is disliked as a minor offense (tanzihan). The third, which is understood from the words of Al-Ghazali, is that it is disliked as a major offense (tahriman). Based on the view of minor dislike, some opined that it is not absolute; it might be disliked in one station and not in another. The response to what we are discussing was built upon this, saying: When the station in which he stood was that of oratory and grandiosity, and it was in the presence of polytheists while Islam was new and fresh, the Prophet (peace be upon him) disliked the equality from him in it. As for a station like this one—where the speaker and the addressee are whom you know, and it was intended to serve a point, which is his lack of independence—there is no dislike for the equality in it. Some limited the dislike to other than the Prophet (peace be upon him). In that case, the answer to what was mentioned is strengthened, because if it is permissible for the Prophet (peace be upon him), then it is in the speech of Allah (Subhanahu) a fortiori.

The summary of what was decided on the issue is that the truth is that there is no dislike in that in the speech of Allah (Ta'ala) and His Messenger (peace be upon him), as was indicated in the commentaries on Bukhari. As for humans, perhaps the chosen view is that it is disliked as a minor offense in one station and not another. Moreover, I do not say that this pronoun is shared between Allah (Ta'ala) and Al-Khidr (peace be upon him), not because it lacks etiquette, but because the appearance is that it is like the pronoun in "we feared," and the apparent meaning in that is the lack of sharing because it would necessitate committing a metaphor—assuming the point they mentioned in choosing the sharing in the pronoun "we intended" does not appear in choosing it in the pronoun "we feared," because the first speech did not contain two actions in the manner the second contained them, so contemplate this.

It is said regarding the reason for the variation in style: The first is evil, so it does not befit attributing it to Him (Subhanahu), even though He (Jalla wa Ala) is the agent. The third is good, so its attribution was singled out to Allah (Azza wa Jall). The second is a mixture: its evil is the killing, and its good is replacing it with something better, so it was attributed to Allah (Ta'ala) and himself, considering both. The objection here is that this attribution exists in "we feared" as well, and where is the mixture of good and evil in it? Making the point in the expression, while it is merely agreeing with its successor, is nothing, as is not hidden. It is said: The apparent meaning is that he attributed the intention in the first two to himself, but he utilized variety in expression, so he expressed it with the pronoun of the speaker with others after having expressed it with the singular pronoun of the speaker, because the rank of inclusion is secondary to the rank of individuality. Furthermore, it contains a warning that he is among the great in the sciences of wisdom, so he would not embark upon this killing except for a high wisdom, unlike the finding of fault. He attributed the action of replacement to Allah (Ta'ala) as an indication of His (Subhanahu) independence in action, and that what the servant obtains is merely the accompaniment of the intention to act without influence upon it, as is the true school of thought. You know that the replacement itself is something that the servant's intention has no accompaniment to at all, and it only has accompaniment to the killing, upon which it is dependent. Moreover, this direction contains what it contains of remoteness.

In Al-Insaf, perhaps the attribution of the first to himself specifically is a matter of etiquette with Allah (Ta'ala) because the intention was "then a fault," so he (peace be upon him) behaved with etiquette by attributing the finding of fault to himself. As for the attribution of the second to "our," the apparent meaning is that it is like the saying of the king's confidants, "We ordered such and such, and we managed such and such," when they only mean the great king ordered and managed. This is evidenced by his saying in the third, "So your Lord intended that they should reach their maturity," and it is as you see.

It is said: The difference in style is due to the difference in the state of the knower of Allah (Subhanahu). In the beginning of his affair, he sees his self as influential, so he first attributed the intention to himself. Then he becomes aware that he is not independent in action without Allah (Ta'ala), so he attributed it to that pronoun. Then he sees that he has no input, and that the influencer and the Intender is only Allah (Ta'ala), so he attributed it to Him (Subhanahu) only. This is the station of fana (annihilation) and the station of "Allah was, and there was nothing with Him, and He is now as He was." This was countered by saying that if it is intended that these states passed over Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) and he was characterized by each of them during the conversation, this is false. How is it befitting that he, at that time, be among those who are characterized by the second rank, let alone the first, when he is the one who was given the laduni (divine) knowledge? If it is intended that he expressed it as one who is characterized by each rank of those ranks—even if he (peace be upon him) is in the highest of them—if that was a teaching for Moses (peace be upon him), then Moses (peace be upon him) is too exalted to be taught by Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) the issue of the creation of deeds. If it was a teaching for someone else, the station is not that station on the premise that there is someone else hearing this speech from him. If it is intended that he expressed in the three places with a specific style from those styles, except that He (Subhanahu) expressed in every place with a style, and thus the styles multiplied in His (Ta'ala) recounting the story to us as a teaching and an indication of those ranks, even if the speech of Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) was not like that, then Allah (Ta'ala) is too exalted and great to narrate from anyone a speech he did not say, or did not say the meaning of. Saying such is a type of fabrication against Him (Subhanahu).

What occurs to the mind of the poor servant is that what was taken into account in the answer was the state of the objection and what it contained and pointed toward. When the first objection was based on the fact that the lam in "to drown" is for causality, containing the attribution of the intention of drowning to Al-Khidr (peace be upon him), and the denial in it was less than the denial in what follows it—based on what the verifiers chose, that nukran is more eloquent than amran—it was appropriate that he explain by attributing the intention of finding fault to himself, pointing toward the negation of the intention of drowning from it, which the speech of Moses (peace be upon him) points toward, and that he not bring what indicates glorification or include anyone else with him in the intention due to the lack of glorification of the matter of the denial that necessitated being countered with what indicates the glorification of the intention contrary to what he (peace be upon him) supposed and denied.

When the second objection was in the utmost exaggeration and denial, and there in the final degree of denial, it was appropriate to point out that what he objected to and exaggerated in denying had been intended for a great matter, and had it not occurred, the occurrence of a grievous calamity would not have been safe. Thus, he attributed the fear and the intention to the pronoun of his glorified self or the speaker and another with him, for in the attribution of the intention to that is a glorification of its matter, and in its glorification is the glorification of the matter of what is intended. Likewise, in the attribution of fear to that is the glorification of its matter, and in its glorification is the glorification of the matter of what is feared. It is perhaps said, based on the intended meaning of the pronoun with us: In that attribution is an indication that what is feared and what is intended had reached such magnitude that Moses (peace be upon him) shared in the fear of it and in the intention of Al-Khidr, not that he be independent in denying what is of the foundations of that intention; with this, the root of corruption is severed from both origins.

When the third objection was very light, as it was in a tone with no rigidity or annoyance in its appearance or hidden depth, and yet it was not on the act itself but on the failure to take a wage for it so that it could be used for the erecting of the walls of the body and the removal of what it had been afflicted with of weakness, it was appropriate to soften the station in his answer and not attribute to himself—independently or by sharing—anything of the actions. Thus, he attributed the intention to the Lord (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) and did not suffice with that, but even added it to his own pronoun (peace be upon him). This does not negate the repetition of the denial and rebuke, because it relates to the total of what was passed by him first from that side. This is what Allah (Ta'ala) knows best regarding the reality of the secrets of the Book, and He (Subhanahu) is the Granter of what is correct.

Those who claim his prophethood (peace be upon him) used as evidence his saying "(And I did not do it of my own command)," which is apparent in that. The possibility that there was a prophet who commanded him to do that based on revelation, as claimed by those who argue for his sainthood, is a remote possibility. Moreover, there is not much benefit in describing him with His (Ta'ala) saying, "(We gave him a mercy from Us and We taught him from Us a knowledge)." Rather, it could be said: What is the benefit of this laduni knowledge if he needed, in order to show the wonders to Moses (peace be upon him), to mediate a prophet like him? Some said: That was by inspiration (ilham), and it is required to say that inspiration was a proof in some laws and that Al-Khidr was among those charged with that law. Otherwise, the apparent meaning is that its being a proof is not in the law of Moses (peace be upon him), and likewise, it is not a proof in our law according to the correct view. Those who deviated and said it is a proof conditioned it upon not being contradicted by a legal text. If Allah (Ta'ala) had informed some of His servants by inspiration of the likes of what He informed Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) of regarding the state of the boy, it would not have been lawful for him to kill him. What Imam Ahmad extracted from Ata, who said: Najdah al-Haruri wrote to Ibn Abbas asking him about the killing of children, so he wrote to him: "If you are Al-Khidr who knows the disbeliever from the believer, then kill them." Ibn Abbas only intended, as Al-Subki said, the argumentation and the deferral to what was not certain to cut off his greed in arguing using the story of Al-Khidr. It was not his (may Allah be pleased with him) intention that if that happens, killing is permissible. Thus, what Al-Yafi'i said in Rawd—that if Allah (Ta'ala) permitted some of His servants to wear a garment of silk, for example, and he knew the permission with certainty, then he wore it, he would not be violating the law, and the occurrence of certainty for him is from the perspective of its occurrence for Al-Khidr in his killing of the boy, since he is a saint, not a prophet, according to the correct view—is a stumbling block for which one is hardly forgiven, because the source of certainty today is inspiration, and it is not a proof according to the Imams. Those who deviated conditioned what they conditioned. Its occurrence by the news of Jesus (peace be upon him) when he descends is impossible because he (peace be upon him) will descend with the law of our Prophet (peace be upon him), and from his law is the prohibition of wearing silk for men except for medical treatment. What he mentioned regarding the denial of Al-Khidr's prophethood is not to be relied upon nor paid attention to. Among those who clarified that inspiration is not a proof from the Sufis is Imam Al-Sha'rani, who said: "Many people have stumbled in this area, and they have gone astray and led others astray. We have a work on that which I named Hadd al-Husam fi 'Unuq man Atlaqa Ijab al-'Amal bil-Ilham, and it is a light volume." He also said in his book named Al-Jawahir wa al-Durar: "I have seen from the words of Shaykh Muhyiddin (quddisa sirruhu) the following text: Know that we do not mean by 'the angel of inspiration,' where we have used it, anything except the subtleties extending from the angelic souls, not the angels themselves, for an angel does not descend with revelation upon the heart of anyone other than a prophet ever, nor does he command an divine affair in its entirety, for the law has been established, and the obligatory, the mandatory, and others have been clarified. So the divine command was cut off with the cutting off of prophethood and messengership. There remains no one whom Allah (Ta'ala) commands with an affair that becomes an independent law by which he is worshipped forever, because if He commanded him with an obligation, the Lawgiver had already commanded it, and if He commanded him with a permissible thing, it either becomes an obligation or a recommendation for him; this is the very essence of abrogating the law upon which he is, by making the legally permissible thing an obligation or a recommendation. If He leaves it as permissible as it was, then what is the benefit of the command brought by the 'angel of inspiration' to this claimant? If he says: 'The angel of inspiration did not come to me with that, but Allah (Ta'ala) commanded me without an intermediary,' we say: He is not believed in such, and it is a deception of the soul. If he claims that Allah (Subhanahu) spoke to him as He spoke to Moses (peace be upon him), then there is no one who says that. Furthermore, even if He (Ta'ala) spoke to him, He would not impart to him in His speech anything but knowledge and news, not rulings and law, and He would not command him at all."

Imam Rabbani, the Renovator of the second millennium (quddisa sirruhu al-'aziz), clarified in Al-Maktubat in numerous places that inspiration does not make lawful what is forbidden nor forbid what is lawful. It is known from that there is no contradiction between the Law (Shari'ah) and the Truth (Haqiqah), the outward and the inward. His words (quddisa sirruhu) in Al-Maktubat are overflowing with this. In the forty-third letter of the first volume, he says that some people inclined toward atheism and heresy, imagining that the primary goal is behind the Shari'ah. Far be it! We seek refuge in Allah (Subhanahu) from this evil belief. Every aspect of the Path (Tariqah) and the Shari'ah is the other; there is no contradiction between them by the amount of a hair's breadth. Everything that contradicts the Shari'ah is rejected, and every truth rejected by the Shari'ah is heresy. He also said in the middle of the forty-first letter of the first volume, in the topic of Shari'ah, Tariqah, and Haqiqah: "For example, the tongue not speaking lies is Shari'ah, and the negation of the thought of lying from the heart, if it is by effort and labor, it is Tariqah, and if it becomes easy without effort, it is Haqiqah. In sum, the inward, which is the Tariqah and the Haqiqah, completes the outward, which is the Shari'ah. Thus, those walking the path of Tariqah and Haqiqah, if things appear from them during the path whose outward contradicts the Shari'ah and is incompatible with it, it is from the drunkenness of the moment and the overwhelming of the state. When they surpass that station and return to sobriety, those contradictions are lifted entirely, and those opposing sciences become, in their entirety, scattered dust."

He also said—may Allah (Ta'ala) benefit us with his sciences—in the middle of the thirty-sixth letter of the first volume: "The Shari'ah has three parts: knowledge, action, and sincerity. As long as these parts are not realized, the Shari'ah is not realized. When the Shari'ah is realized, the pleasure of the Truth (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) is obtained, and it is above all worldly and afterlife happiness, and 'the pleasure from Allah is greater.' The Shari'ah is responsible for gathering all happiness, and there remains no goal behind the Shari'ah. The Tariqah and the Haqiqah, with which the Sufis are distinguished, are both servants to the Shari'ah in completing the third part, which is sincerity. So the goal of them is the completion of the Shari'ah, not another matter behind that," to the end of what he said.

He also said, may the mercy of the King of the Supreme be upon him, in the middle of the twenty-ninth letter of the aforementioned volume after much investigation: "It is established that the path of reaching the degrees of Divine nearness (Jalla Sha'nuhu), whether it is the nearness of prophethood or the nearness of sainthood, is confined to the path of the Shari'ah which the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) called to and became commanded with in the verse, 'Say: This is my way; I invite to Allah with insight, I and those who follow me,' and the verse, 'Say: If you love Allah, then follow me, Allah will love you,' also points to that. Every path other than this path is misguidance and deviates from the true goal. Every path rejected by the Shari'ah is heresy. Witness to that is the verse, 'And that this is My path, which is straight,' and the verse, 'So what is there after truth except misguidance?' and the verse, 'And whoever seeks other than Islam as a religion,' and the Hadith of the Prophet drawing a line for us, and the Hadith, 'Every innovation is misguidance,' and other Hadiths," to the end of what he said.

He (quddisa sirruhu) said in Ma'arif al-Sufiyyah: "Know that the ma'arif (gnoses) of the Sufis and their sciences at the end of their journey and walking are only the sciences of the Shari'ah, not that they are other sciences besides the sciences of the Shari'ah. Yes, many sciences and ma'arif appear during the path, but one must pass beyond them. In the end of ends, their sciences are the sciences of the scholars, which are the sciences of the Shari'ah. The difference between them and the scholars is that those sciences, relative to the scholars, are theoretical and deductive, while relative to them, they become unveiled and necessary."

He also said: "Know that the Shari'ah and the Haqiqah are united in truth, and there is no difference between them except in summary and detail, in deduction and unveiling, in the unseen and the seen, and in effort and lack of effort. The Shari'ah is of the former, and the Haqiqah is of the latter. The sign of reaching the reality of the Haqq al-Yaqin (certainty of truth) is the correspondence of his sciences and ma'arif to the sciences and ma'arif of the *Shari'ah. As long as contradiction exists, even by the smallest hair, that is evidence of not reaching. What occurred in the expression of some of the masters that the Shari'ah is the shell and the Haqiqah is the kernel, even if it suggests the lack of straightness of the speaker, it is possible that he meant that the summary, relative to the detailed, has the ruling of the shell relative to the kernel, and that deduction relative to unveiling is likewise. The great ones, whose states are straight, do not permit the bringing of such suggestive expressions," to the rest of his noble expressions that can hardly be counted.

My master, the Rabbanite Pole, Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (quddisa sirruhu), said: "All the saints do not derive except from the speech of Allah (Ta'ala) and His Messenger (peace be upon him), and they do not act except by their outward." The master of the group, Al-Junayd (quddisa sirruhu), said: "All paths are closed except to one who follows the footsteps of the Messenger (peace be upon him)." He also said: "He who has not memorized the Quran and not written the Hadith is not to be followed in this science, because our science is restricted by the Book and the Sunnah." Al-Sari al-Saqati said: "Sufism is a name for three meanings: he does not extinguish the light of his knowledge with the light of his piety, he does not speak with an inward secret in a science which the outward of the Book contradicts for him, and the miracles do not carry him to violate the prohibited things of Allah." He also (quddisa sirruhu) said: "He who claims an inward knowledge which the outward ruling contradicts is mistaken."

Abu al-Husayn al-Nuri said: "Whoever you see claiming a state with Allah (Ta'ala) that takes him out of the seriousness of legal science, do not approach him. Whoever you see claiming a state that has no support from guarding the outward, accuse him regarding his religion." Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz said: "Every inward overflow that the outward contradicts is false."

Abu al-Abbas Ahmad al-Dinwari said: "The tongue of the outward does not change the ruling of the inward." In Al-Tuhfah by Ibn Hajar, Al-Ghazali said: "Whoever claims that he has a state with Allah (Ta'ala) that drops from him the likes of prayer or the prohibition of drinking wine, it is obligatory to kill him, even if there is a view regarding the judgment of his eternity in Hellfire. Killing the likes of him is better than killing a hundred disbelievers, because his harm is greater." There is no view in his eternity, because he is an apostate for declaring lawful what is known to be forbidden, or denying the obligation of what is known to be obligatory—necessarily in both. Hence, he was certain in Al-Anwar of his eternity.

He said in Al-Ihya': "Whoever says that the inward contradicts the outward is closer to disbelief than to faith," and other things. In the Risalah of Al-Qushayri is a part of it. What should be known is that the speech of the verifying knowers, even if it points to there being no contradiction between the Shari'ah, the Tariqah, and the Haqiqah, also points to the fact that there are unveilings and unseen sciences in the Haqiqah. That is why you see them saying: The science of Haqiqah is the laduni science, the science of unveiling, the science of gifted knowledge, the science of secrets, the hidden science, and the science of inheritance. However, this does not point to contradiction, for the unveilings and unseen sciences are the fruit of sincerity, which is the third part of the Shari'ah. So the Haqiqah is consequent upon the Shari'ah and a result of it. Nevertheless, those unveilings and unseen sciences do not change a legal ruling, nor restrict the absolute, nor make absolute the restricted, contrary to what Sajaqli Zadeh imagined when he said in the explanation of the Ihya' expression previously: "Al-Ghazali wants by the inward what is unveiled to the scholars of the inward regarding the lawfulness of some things for them, even though the Lawgiver forbade it for His servants absolutely. It must be said: Its lawfulness was unveiled to them due to a hidden reason that made it lawful for them, and the Lawgiver's (Ta'ala) prohibition of that to His servants is restricted to the absence of the unveiling of the reason that makes it lawful for them. Whoever has that reason unveiled to him, it is lawful for him, and whoever does not, then no. However, the Lawgiver (Subhanahu) forbade it to His servants absolutely and left that restriction due to the rarity of its occurrence, for whoever has it unveiled to him is very few. An example is the unveiling of the lawfulness of scuttling the ship and killing the boy for Al-Khidr (peace be upon him). So the scuttling and the killing became lawful for him by that unveiling, and their being lawful for him contradicts the absolute prohibition of the Prophet (peace be upon him) for his nation against harm and against the killing of children. But they are restricted; the first is restricted to when a usurper is known to be there, for example, and the second if it is not known that the boy will become a misguider and misled. But the Lawgiver left the two restrictions due to the rarity of their occurrence and in reliance upon the understanding of those firmly rooted in knowledge of them," to the end of what he said. The previous texts call out to the contrary, as you have heard. Furthermore, those unseen matters and unveilings—and indeed everything that Sufis obtain of manifestations—are not goals in themselves, and the perfected person does not stop at them nor pay attention to them. Imam Rabbani (quddisa sirruhu) mentioned in the thirty-sixth letter mentioned above, part of which was quoted, that they are "nourishment by which the children of the path are raised, and one should pass beyond them and reach the station of pleasure, which is the end of the stations of the journey and attraction. It is precious, and not one in thousands reaches it." Then he said: "Those who have little insight consider the states and ecstasies as stations, and the visions and manifestations as goals; so inevitably, they remained in the chains of illusion and imagination and became deprived of the perfections of the Shari'ah. 'It is difficult for the polytheists that which you invite them to; Allah chooses for Himself whom He wills, and guides to Himself whoever turns to Him.'" It is known from this that those perfected in the Shari'ah cross over that and do not pay attention to it, nor consider it a goal. Their main goal is obtaining the station of pleasure. Upon this is interpreted the verse of the Mathnawi where he says: [Persian verse omitted]. Sometimes the perfected person is veiled from all of that and joins, from this perspective, the common people. It is known from what was mentioned that Moses (peace be upon him) was more perfected than Al-Khidr, and the superior knowledge of Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) in the science of Haqiqah was relative to the present state, for Moses (peace be upon him) crossed over that and did not stop at it because he was in the station of legislation. Perhaps his request for teaching was by divine command as a test for him due to that slip. They mentioned that the more exalted the ascent of the perfected person, the lower his descent, and the lower his descent, the more perfected he is in guidance and the more complete he is in adding—due to the increased suitability then between the guide and the guided. This is why they said in what is narrated: Al-Hasan al-Basri stood on the bank of a river waiting for a boat. Habib al-Ajami came and said to him, "What are you waiting for?" He said, "A boat." He said, "What need is there for a boat? Do you not have certainty (yaqin)?" Al-Hasan said, "Do you not have knowledge?" Then Habib crossed the water without a boat, and Al-Hasan stood. The superiority is for Al-Hasan, for he was combining the knowledge of certainty (ilm al-yaqin) and the eye of certainty ('ayn al-yaqin), and he knew things as they are. In the essence of the matter, the power was made hidden behind wisdom, and wisdom is in the causes. Habib was a person of drunkenness; he did not see the causes, so he was dealt with by their lifting. From here appears the secret of the scarcity of miracles among the Companions, despite the statement of Imam Rabbani: "The end of Uwais, the master of the Followers, is the beginning of Wahshi, the killer of Hamza the day he embraced Islam. So what of others besides Uwais with others besides Wahshi?"

I say: The perfected person, even if he is as you know, there is above him the most perfected, who is the one who never ceases ascending in his descent and descending in his ascent, and that is none other than the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him). Were it not for that, he would not have sustained the upper and lower world. This is the returning of the Haqiqah and Shari'ah to him (peace be upon him) in the most perfect way, as we indicated previously. Praise be to Allah (Ta'ala) for making us of his nation and his offspring. What was said by Imam Al-Ghazali in Al-Ihya' does not undermine what we mentioned, which is that the knowledge of the afterlife is two parts: knowledge of unveiling and knowledge of conduct. As for the knowledge of unveiling, it is the knowledge of the inward, and it is the end of the sciences. It is the knowledge of the truthful ones and those brought near, and it is an expression of a light that appears in the heart upon its purification and cleansing from condemned traits. By that, what was heard before of its names is unveiled, and for it were imagined summarized meanings that were not clear, so they become clear at that time until knowledge is obtained of the Essence of Allah (Ta'ala), His perfect attributes, His actions, and His wisdom in the creation of the world and the afterlife. This is because the intention is that that is from the knowledge of the inward, which is the knowledge of the Haqiqah. This part cannot be absent from a prophet, for the rank of the truthful ones is below the rank of the prophets (peace be upon them), as they decided regarding the verse, "Those are with those whom Allah has blessed from the prophets, the truthful, the martyrs, and the righteous." From what we mentioned of the lack of contradiction between Shari'ah and Haqiqah, it is known what is in the words of Al-Bulqini in refuting what he considered problematic from the statement of Al-Khidr to Moses (peace be upon them): "I am upon a knowledge..."—where he claimed that it indicates in its appearance the impossibility of teaching both knowledges together, while it is not impossible. He answered that the knowledge of unveilings and truths contradicts the knowledge of the outward, which he is not charged with, and contradicts what he has of the Haqiqah. By my life, he erred in what he said, and by the Truth are men known. It is as if he did not rely upon it, so he followed it with another answer which is contrary to the apparent.

You know there is no need for any of that, and the problem is from weak observation. Furthermore, the story of Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) is not suitable as a proof for whoever claims contradiction between the two knowledges. For the greatest thing that is problematic in it is the killing of the boy because he was created a disbeliever, and he feared from his remaining alive the apostasy of his parents. That is also Shari'ah, but it is specific to him (peace be upon him) because, as the scholar Al-Subki said: "It was revealed to him to act by the inward and the contrary to the outward that is in accordance with wisdom." So there is no problem in it, even if it is known from our Shari'ah that it is not permissible for anyone, whoever they may be, to kill a young child, especially between two believing parents. How could it be permissible to kill him because of a reason that did not occur? The newborn is not described as a real disbeliever nor a real believer. The agreement of laws in rulings is something that no one among the creatures has gone toward, let alone the great scholars. This is apparent based on the view of his prophethood. As for based on the view of his sainthood, it is said: that the saint's acting by inspiration was at that time Shari'ah, or as it is said that he was commanded to do that at the hand of a prophet other than Moses (peace be upon him). As for erecting the wall without a wage, there is no problem in it because it is benevolence, and the furthest thing imagined is that it is for the wrongdoer, so let it be so, and there is no harm, for it is from noble character. As for scuttling the ship so that it would be safe from the tyrant's usurpation, they said: It is something that there is no harm in, to the point that Izz ibn Abd al-Salam said: "If a person has under his hand the wealth of an orphan, or a foolish person, or an insane person, and he fears a tyrant will take it, it is obligatory upon him to find fault with it for the sake of its preservation." The statement is that of the one who found fault with the orphan's wealth and the like if the orphan and the like dispute him after puberty, as he did it to preserve it, according to the most correct view, as Al-Qadi Zakariya said in the commentary on Al-Rawd, just before the chapter on deposits.

Similar to that is if he had under his hand the wealth of an orphan, for example, and he knew that if he did not give some of it to a bad judge, he would snatch it from him and hand it over to some treacherous person, and that would lead to its loss. It is obligatory upon him to pay him something, and he should investigate the least possible amount to satisfy him, and his word is accepted. Some said: The furthest the story points to is the establishment of inward knowledge, and this is conceded, but the application of "inward" to it is relative, as mentioned previously. It was in his (peace be upon him) saying, "Indeed, among the knowledge is that which is like the hidden state, only the scholars of Allah (Ta'ala) know it; if they speak it, only those deceived by Allah (Ta'ala) deny it," an indication of that. The "deceived ones" are the scholars of the outward who were not given that. Some of its affirmers use as evidence the saying of Abu Hurayrah: "I memorized from the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) two vessels of knowledge; as for one of them, I disseminated it, and as for the other, if I disseminated it, this throat would be cut." This was also used as evidence for the contradiction between the two knowledges.

You know it is possible that he meant by the other which, if he disseminated it, he would be killed, the knowledge of trials and what occurred from the Banu Umayya and the Prophet's (peace be upon him) condemnation of specific people among them. There is no doubt that disseminating that in those eras would lead to killing. Even if we concede that he intended by it the inward knowledge called the science of Haqiqah, we do not concede that the cutting of the throat for its dissemination would be because it contradicts the inward of the legal science, but rather because of the illusion of contradiction held by those in power, those in charge of loosening and binding, and command and prohibition among the leaders of that time. So understand.

The scholars used as evidence what is in the story, according to what the commentators of Hadith and others mentioned, the recommendation of travel for knowledge, the virtue of seeking it, the recommendation of utilizing etiquette with the scholar, respecting the masters, refraining from objecting to them, interpreting what is not understood of their actions, movements, and words by their outward, fulfilling their promises, apologizing upon contradicting them, the permissibility of taking a servant in travel, carrying provisions in it, that it does not negate reliance (tawakkul), attributing forgetfulness and the like of disliked matters to the devil metaphorically and out of etiquette to avoid attributing them to Allah, the scholar apologizing to the one who wants to take from him for not teaching him what his nature cannot bear, prioritizing the will in the affair, the master conditioning on the follower, that forgetfulness is not to be punished for, that three times has weight in repetition and the like, the permissibility of boarding a ship—and in it is judging by the outward until the contrary is shown, because of Moses' (peace be upon him) denial—the permissibility of a person requesting food when he needs it, that doing good is not to be abandoned even with the base, the permissibility of taking a wage for actions, that a poor person does not leave poverty by owning a tool with which he earns or something that does not suffice him, that usurpation is forbidden, and that it is permissible to bury wealth in the earth. In it is the establishment of the miracles of saints according to the saying of whoever says: Al-Khidr is a saint, and other things that appear to the pursuer or the contemplator. In sum, this story has contained many benefits and dangerous high goals, so look deeply into that, and Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) will take charge of your guidance.

From the chapter of pointing in the verses, according to what some of the people of pointing have mentioned: "(So they found a servant from among Our servants)"—in it is an indication that Allah (Ta'ala) has chosen ones whom He attributed to Himself and cut off from others. The most chosen of His (Azza wa Jall) chosen ones is he whom He attributed to the Majestic Name, which is the name of the Essence that gathers all attributes, or to the pronoun of the unseen referring to Him (Ta'ala), and that is none other than His most noble beloved (peace be upon him). "(We gave him a mercy from Us)"—and it is the rank of nearness to Him (Azza wa Jall). "(And We taught him from Us a knowledge)"—and it is the special knowledge that is not known except from His (Ta'ala) side. Dhu al-Nun said: "The laduni knowledge is that which judges over the creation regarding the locations of success and abandonment." Al-Junayd (quddisa sirruhu) said: "It is the witnessing of the secrets without suspicion in it, nor contradiction occurring, but it is the unveilings of lights from the hidden of the unseen matters, and it is obtained for the servant if he guards his limbs from all sins, annihilates his movements from all intentions, and becomes a specter before the Truth without a wish or an intended goal." It is said: "It is a knowledge by which the Truth (Subhanahu) makes His saints know what is in it of benefit for His servants." Some of them said: "It is an unseen knowledge relating to the world of actions, and more specific than it is the standing upon some secrets of destiny before the occurrence of their event, and more specific than that is the knowledge of the special names and descriptions, and more specific than that is the knowledge of the Essence."

Some knowers mentioned that among the sciences is that which only the prophet knows. He used as evidence his (peace be upon him) saying in the Hadith of the Ascension, as mentioned by Al-Qastalani in Mawahib and others: "My Lord asked me, and I could not answer Him, so He placed His hand between my shoulders, and I felt its coolness, so He bequeathed to me the knowledge of the first and the last and taught me various sciences. A knowledge He took an oath upon me to keep secret, as He knew no one could bear it other than me; a knowledge He gave me the choice in; a knowledge He taught me the Quran, and Gabriel (peace be upon him) would remind me of it; and a knowledge He commanded me to disseminate to the common and the special of my nation." Allah (Ta'ala) has knowledge that He reserved for Himself (Azza wa Jall), and He did not make any of His creatures know it. "(Moses said to him: May I follow you on that you teach me from what you have been taught [of] sound judgment?)" He said it by divine test as we have mentioned. Faris said as in Asrar al-Quran: "Moses (peace be upon him) was more knowledgeable than Al-Khidr in what he took from Allah (Ta'ala), and Al-Khidr was more knowledgeable than Moses in what occurred to Moses (peace be upon him)." He also said: "Moses was remaining by the Truth, and Al-Khidr was annihilating by the Truth." "(He said: Indeed, with me you will never be able to have patience. And how can you have patience for that which you do not encompass in knowledge?)" It is said: Al-Khidr knew that Moses (peace be upon him) was the most noble of creation to Allah (Ta'ala) in his time and that he was of great sharpness, so he became alarmed of his companionship, lest there occur from him with him what does not befit his station. Some of them said: He made him despair of himself lest his companionship busy him from the companionship of the Truth. He said "(You will find me, if Allah wills, patient, and I will not disobey you in an order)." Some of them said: Had he said as the sacrificed one (peace be upon him) said: "(You will find me, if Allah wills, of the patient ones)," he would have been granted patience just as he was granted the sacrifice. The difference is that the speech of the sacrificed one is more apparent in the seeking of refuge and breaking of the soul, as he linked with the will of Allah (Ta'ala) his finding himself one of a group characterized by patience, and the speech of Moses (peace be upon him) is not like that. "(So they set out until when they came to the people of a village, they asked its people for food)"—they followed the path of asking, which relates to the humbleness of the soul in the path, and it does not negate reliance, and likewise earning. "(He said: If you wished, you could have taken for it a wage)"—it is as if he (peace be upon him) wanted to repel what made them need to ask from those base people. In it is a look toward the causes, and it is from the states of the perfected people, as passed in the story of Al-Hasan al-Basri and Habib. In this is an indication that he was more perfected than Al-Khidr (peace be upon them both). "(He said: This is separation between me and you)"—that is, according to what I intended. Al-Nasr Abadi said: When Al-Khidr knew Moses had reached the end of etiquette and the limitation of his knowledge relative to his knowledge, he said that so that Moses would not ask him after that about a science or state, and thus be exposed.

It is said: He feared he would ask him about the secrets of the الربانية (Divine) الصفاتية (Attribute-related) الذاتية (Essence-related) sciences, and he would be unable to answer him, so he said what he said. "(And as for the boy, his parents were believers, and we feared that he would overwhelm them with tyranny and disbelief)"—it is said: He was very handsome and was beloved in the extreme to his parents, so he feared their being tempted by him. The verse is of the problematic ones in appearance, because if Allah (Ta'ala) had decreed disbelief upon them, then the killing of the child would not benefit them, and if He (Subhanahu) had not decreed that, then his remaining would not harm them. The answer is that what was decreed was their remaining upon faith if he were killed, and he killed him so they would remain upon that. It is said that what is decreed might change, and there is no necessity from that except the change in the attachment of His (Ta'ala) attribute, not in the attribute itself, so that change would be necessary in Him (Azza wa Jall). The discussion of that has passed at His (Ta'ala) saying, "(Allah eliminates what He wills or confirms, and with Him is the Mother of the Book)." It was also considered problematic that the dreaded result vanishes by his being granted faith, so what is the need for killing? The answer is that the apparent meaning is that he was not prepared for that, so it is incompatible with wisdom. It is as if Al-Khidr (peace be upon him) saw in what he said a type of debate, so he finished with that by his saying "(And I did not do it of my own command)"—that is, rather I did it by the command of Allah (Azza wa Jall), and He (Subhanahu) is not questioned about what He commands and does. Perhaps his saying to Moses (peace be upon him) what he said when the bird pecked in the sea was the closing of the door of debate regarding what Allah (Ta'ala) commanded, His affair. Perhaps the knowledge of the likes of these issues is of the knowledge that Allah (Subhanahu) reserved for Himself. "(And they encompass nothing of His knowledge except what He wills)."

Some interpreted the two seas' gathering as the gathering of the master's sainthood and the disciple's sainthood; the rock as the soul; the fish as the heart salted with the salt of love for the world and its adornment; the ship as the Shari'ah; the scuttling of it as the demolition of the custom in the outward with righteousness in the inward; the drowning of its people as causing them to fall into the seas of misguidance; the boy as the commanding soul; the killing of him as the slaughtering of him with the sword of discipline; the village as the body; its people as the human powers from the senses; the asking for food as the seeking of their actions which are specific to them; the refusal of hospitality as the prevention of giving their special qualities as is befitting due to their exhaustion and weakness; the wall as the attachment that prevents between the speaking soul and the world of the abstract; the intention of collapse as the being on the verge of cutting off attachments; the erecting of it as the strengthening of the body and kindness to the powers and senses; the will to take a wage as the will for patience on the severity of discipline to obtain unveilings and the addition of lights; the poor ones as the common people; the sea in which they learn as the sea of the world; the king as the devil; the ships which he usurps as the acts of worship empty of humility, humbleness, and reverence; the two believing parents as the heart and the soul; the good replacement as the reassuring and inspired soul; the treasure as the theoretical and practical perfections; the righteous father as the detached intellect whose perfections are in act; and the reaching maturity as their reaching by the master's training and his guidance to the perfect rank. This is what Al-Naysaburi chose, and others chose another interpretation which is more profound than it. This is what Allah the Granter of what is correct is. To Him is the return and the final destination.