Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:169

This is a new statement intended to clarify the nature of his hostility, detail the various modes of his evil and corruption, and show that his interaction with them is confined to this. It may also be an explanation for the cause mentioned before, meaning: whoever is of this nature is indeed a manifest enemy. Or, it may be an explanation for the fundamental principle, meaning: whoever is of this nature should not be followed; thus, the ruling is substantiated by two causes: hostility and the enjoining of the aforementioned.

The "command" here is not in its literal sense. This is not because the Almighty's saying, "Indeed, over My servants you have no authority," contradicts it—for that is predicated on the view that a command requires superiority, as is the doctrine of the Mu'tazila. Otherwise, mere attempts at dominance do not negate the possibility of him having "authority." Furthermore, "My servants" is meant to include all, as evidenced by the exception, and the address in "He enjoins you" is to all people, not just his followers.

Rather, the reason is that we find within ourselves that he does not literally request actions from us; his actions are nothing but beautification and incitement. Therefore, "enjoining" here is a metaphor (isti‘ara tab’iyya) for that, which implies that the addressees are in the position of those who are commanded and submissive to him, which serves to belittle their intellect and disparage their status. It cannot be objected that if "enjoining" means "beautification," it should be said "he enjoins for you" (lakum), or if it means "incitement," it should be "he enjoins you to do evil" (‘ala al-su’), for the text mentions the word "command," and the conventions of its usage must be observed.

"Evil" (al-su’) in its origin is an infinitive meaning "he grieved him," then it was applied to all sins, whether they be speech, action, or belief, because they all share the quality of grieving their perpetrator. "Indecency" (al-fahsha) refers to the ugliest of these types and the greatest in terms of causing grief. It is narrated from Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) that "evil" is that for which there is no set legal punishment (hadd), while "indecency" is that for which there is a set punishment. Others say they have the same meaning: that which the intellect rejects, deems to have no benefit or praiseworthy end, and which the Sharia considers ugly. In that case, the conjunction serves to treat the difference in description as a difference in essence, for it is "evil" because it grieves the rational person, and "indecency" because he perceives it as repulsive.

Perhaps what drives this interpretation is that the Almighty labeled all sins and indecent acts as sayyi’a (evil) in His saying: "Whoever earns a sayyi’a," "Indeed, good deeds remove sayyi’at," and "The recompense of a sayyi’a is a sayyi’a like it." He also labeled all sins as fawahish (indecent acts), saying: "Say: My Lord has only forbidden fawahish, what is apparent of them and what is hidden." It is possible to respond: We concede this, but when sayyi’a and fahisha come together, they diverge in meaning, and when they are separate, they coincide. Thus, the [previous] line of reasoning does not hold.

"And [that you should] say about Allah that which you do not know." This is conjoined to the previous clause. That is: Does the devil enjoin you to fabricate lies against Allah by claiming He forbade this or permitted that, or by claiming that He commanded the taking of partners and is pleased with the corruption you are upon? Specifying the act of fabrication—even though it is included in what preceded—is to emphasize its gravity. The object of "knowing" is omitted, meaning: that which you do not know to be permitted by Him, the Almighty. Warning against this necessarily entails warning against fabricating things about the Almighty that one knows have not been permitted, just as is the case with many of the polytheists.

The literal meaning of the verse suggests a total prohibition against following conjecture (zann), because conjecture is the linguistic and conventional opposite of knowledge. This poses a problem: the jurist (mujtahid) acts according to the conjecture derived from the texts, so how is it permissible for the follower (muqallid) to follow him? The answer is that the conjectured ruling for the mujtahid must be acted upon by virtue of conclusive evidence, which is consensus (ijma’). Every ruling that must be acted upon definitively is known definitively to be the ruling of Allah Almighty; otherwise, acting upon it would not be definitively obligatory. Everything known definitively to be the ruling of Allah is "known" (ma’lum) in a definitive sense. Therefore, the conjectured ruling for the mujtahid is known definitively. In summary: conjecture is sufficient in the process of obtaining it, then through consensus on the obligation to act upon it, the conjectured becomes known, and the conjecture turns into knowledge. Thus, following the mujtahid is not, in any way, "following conjecture." To claim otherwise is a misunderstanding of the principles.