Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:20

(The lightning almost snatches away their sight.) This is another explanatory resumption, as if it were said: "How, then, is their state regarding that lightning?" Thus He said: "It almost," etc. In al-Bahr, it is suggested that it may be in the genitive case for the "those" (dhawi) which was elided in the preceding passage. "It almost" (yakadu) is the imperfect form of kada, one of the verbs of proximity, and it indicates the near occurrence of the predicate and that it has not yet occurred. The first is due to the presence of its causes, and the second is due to an obstacle or the absence of a condition, as necessitated by custom. It is well-known that if it is negated, it affirms, and if it is affirmed, it negates; scholars have treated this as a riddle. Abu Hayyan did not approve of this and asserted that it is like all other verbs in that its negation is a negation and its affirmation is an affirmation.

The "al" (al-) in "the lightning" (al-barq) is for familiarity (al-'ahd), referring to what preceded, which was indefinite. It is also said that it refers to the lightning that accompanies thunderbolts, i.e., their lightning; and this is as you see it. The attribution of "snatching" (khatf)—which in its origin means taking quickly or plundering—to the lightning is of the same category as attributing burning to fire, and the verification of this will come soon, if God Almighty wills. It is common for the predicate of kada to be an imperfect verb not connected to the infinitive an (an al-masdariyyah), which denotes the future. As for the imperfect, it is due to its indication of the present state, which is appropriate for proximity, to the point that it is as if, due to its intensity, it had already occurred. As for it not being connected to an, it is because it contradicts what they intended. Phrases such as "I refused to understand" (abaitu ila fahm), "I almost refused" (ma kidtu abiyan), "poverty almost leads to disbelief" (kada al-faqru an yakuna kufran), and "it almost purified itself through long decay" (wa qad kada min tul al-bala an yumahhasa) are rare.

Mujahid, Ali ibn al-Husayn, and Yahya ibn Waththab read yakh-tafu with a kasra on the ta. The fatha is more eloquent. From Ibn Mas'ud comes yakhtatifu, and from al-Hasan comes yakh-tafu with a fatha on the ya and kha, and its origin is yakhtatifu, then the ta was assimilated into the ta. From Asim, Qatada, and al-Hasan also comes yakh-tafu with a fatha on the ya and a kasra on the kha and the doubled ta. From al-Hasan also and al-A'mash comes yakh-tafu with a kasra on all three and the doubling. From Zayd comes yukh-tiffu with a damma on the ya, a fatha on the kha, and a kasra on the doubled ta; this is for intensification (takthir) and exaggeration, not transitivity. The kasra of the ta in the past tense is the dialect of Quraysh, and it is the superior dialect.

(Whenever it illuminates for them, they walk in it; and when it darkens upon them, they stand still.) This is a third resumption. As if, when it was said that they are afflicted with the constant renewal of the snatching of sight, it was understood that they are busy doing what requires sight from time to time; otherwise, they would have closed their eyes just as they stopped their ears. Thus, it was asked, "What do they do in the states of the lightning’s flash and its absence?" The answer was that they are keen to walk; whenever it illuminates for them, they seize it and walk, and when it darkens upon them, they stop, waiting.

"Whenever" (kullama) in this verse and its likes is in the accusative case as an adverb of time, and its governor is "they walked" (mashaw). "What" (ma) is a causal particle (masdariyyah) or an indefinite noun meaning "time," so the sentence following it is a complement or an adjective. It is made a conditional because of the meaning of condition it contains, and it is for the sake of estimating what comes after it as an indefinite that provides a substitutive generalization (umum badali). This is why "whenever" provides repetition, as confirmed by the legal theorists (al-usuliyyun) and held by some grammarians and linguists. The derivation of repetition from "if" (idha) and other conditional particles is from external indications, according to the correct view, such as the saying: "When I find the burning of love in my liver, I come toward the water-carrier of the people, seeking cooling."

Abu Hayyan claimed that the repetition mentioned by the theorists and others in "whenever" comes only from the generality of "every" (kull), not from its structure, which contradicts the transmitted and the rational. It is used here in its implied meaning as a metonymy or metaphor, which is eagerness and love for what it entered upon. Hence, he said with illumination "whenever" and with darkening "if." Abu Hayyan’s saying that "repetition, whenever it is understood from 'whenever' here, necessitates repetition in 'if'" is due to him being oblivious to what they intended by this metonymical and metaphorical meaning.

"Illuminated" (ada’a) is either transitive, as in the saying: "Look again, O Abd Qays, perhaps the fire that illuminated for you the hobbled donkey," and the object is elided, meaning "whenever it illuminates for them [a path], they walk in it" and follow it; or it is intransitive, and in that case, an additive is estimated, i.e., "whenever it flashes for them, they walk in the place of its light." Estimation is necessary, for walking is not in the lightning, but in its location and the place of its light’s radiance.

The view that "in" (fi) is for causality and the meaning is "they walk because of the illumination" is doubted by those who have a taste for Arabic. The intransitive view is supported by the reading of Ibn Abi 'Abla as da’a (trilateral). In the codex of Ibn Mas'ud, instead of "they walked in it" (mashaw fihi), it is "they passed in it" (madaw fihi). To indicate their weakness due to their extreme fear and bewilderment, the Exalted did not bring what indicates speed. When the object of "illuminated" was elided, and the indefinite was the basis, it indicated that due to extreme confusion, they were stumbling blindly and walking in every path.

The meaning of "darkens upon them" (azlama 'alayhim) is "it became hidden from them." It is well known to use azlama intransitively. al-Azhari, who is sufficient in the Tahdhib, mentions that each of the descriptions of darkness can be intransitive and transitive. Regarding the possibility of transitivity here—and this is supported by the reading of Zayd ibn Qutayb and al-Dahhak as uzlima (in the passive voice)—it is agreed upon by grammarians that the standard passive voice from a transitive verb makes the object elided, i.e., "when the lightning darkens the viewing of the path due to its concealment, they stopped," meaning they ceased walking. It is used metaphorically for business stagnation; from this is "the market stood still" (qamat al-suq). In its opposite, it is said: "The situation moved" (mashat al-hal).

(And if God had willed, He would have taken away their hearing and their sight.) This is a conjunction to the totality of the resumptive sentences. They did not make it a conjunction to the closest one, for it is a conclusion of them, as it is outside of the parable and is not suitable as an answer. Conjoining what is not an answer to an answer is not correct. Some investigators permitted it, as there is no harm in adding to the answer what is appropriate for it, even if it has no direct role in it; rather, it is sometimes praised if the occasion requires it, as in (What is that in your right hand, O Moses?). The possibility of it being a parenthetical or a circumstantial state from the pronoun "they stood" by estimating the subject, or conjoined to the first sentence with the interruption of verbal and estimated gaps, is considered excess by people of merit.

The claim that He brought it for the reproach of the hypocrites—as they did not stop, for He who is capable of creating the crash of thunder and its flash and their annihilation is capable of taking away their hearing and sight; so will they not return from their misguidance?—is a place for reproach. It is not correct to conjoin the element of the parable. The object of "willed" here is elided, and often the object of "wills" is elided if it occurs within the scope of a condition and is not strange. The meaning is: "If God had desired to take away their hearing by the crash of thunder and their sight by the flash of lightning, He would have taken it." Since something indicating the qualification has preceded from "they make" and "almost," it strengthened the context's indication of it and took it out of strangeness.

You may also not qualify that object and qualify the answer as al-Zamakhshari did, or not qualify it at all. The meaning would be: "If God had desired to take away those powers, He would have taken them without a cause, so what they have done would not avail them." Will (mashiyyah) in the view of the theologians is the same as desire (iradah). It is said: the origin of mashiyyah is the creation of a thing and hitting it, even if it is used conventionally in the place of iradah. Ibn Abi 'Abla read la-adhhaba Allahu bi-asma'ihim (He would have taken away with their hearing), which is interpreted as the addition of the ba for emphasizing transitivity, or that adhhaba is intransitive in the sense of dhahaba, as was said about "it sprouts with oil" and "do not cast with your hands," since combining two transitivity markers is not permitted. Some estimate an object for it: "He would have taken them away in it," so the matter is made easy.

The word "if" (law) is for suspending the occurrence of a past event—which is the consequence—upon the occurrence of a supposed event—which is the condition—because of the rotation between them, either in reality or by claim. From the thesis of the supposed condition is its indication of its definite non-occurrence. The one who disputes this is stubborn. As for its indication of the non-occurrence of the consequence, it has been said and said, but the truth is that if the rotation between them is based on considering the judgment, it is an indication of it by necessity of the implication that the non-existence of the cause entails the non-existence of the caused. As for the total rotation—like the one in His saying: "And if He had willed, He would have guided you," and your saying "If you had come to me, I would have honored you"—it is obvious.

Then, the speech may be driven to explain the non-occurrence of the consequence by the non-occurrence of the condition, as in the two examples, and this is the common usage of "if." Hence, it is said that it is for the impossibility of the second due to the impossibility of the first. It may also be driven to argue by the non-occurrence of the second—because it is manifest or accepted—for the non-occurrence of the first, because it is the opposite, as in His saying: "If there were, within the heavens and earth, gods besides God, they both would have been ruined" and "If it had been good, they would not have preceded us to it." The implication in the first is real, and in the second, it is claimed. The same applies to the non-existence of the two implications. This is not by way of external causality, but by way of rational indication returning to the causality of knowledge of the non-existence of the second for the knowledge of the non-existence of the first. Whoever is not attentive claims that it is for the non-existence of the first due to the non-existence of the second.

As for the partial rotation material—as in your saying: "If the sun had risen, light would have been found"—it is because the consequence dependent on the condition is not the existence of any light, but the existence of the specific light arising from the rising, and there is no doubt about its non-existence due to its non-existence. This is if the judgment is based on considering the rotation. If it is based on its absence, then either another orbit for it is considered or not. If it is considered, the indication follows the state of that orbit. If there is a contradiction between it and the first non-existence, the indication is determined, as if you said: "If the sun had not risen, light would have been found [via the moon]." The existence of light is, in reality, suspended due to another cause, which is the orbit, and the absence of rising is placed in its stead because it is an indicator of it, as if it were said: "If the sun had not risen, light would have been found via the moon, for example."

There is no doubt that this consequence is non-existent upon the non-existence of the condition, due to the impossibility of lunar light when the sun rises. If there is no contradiction between them, the lack of indication is determined, as in the hadith: "If she were not my stepdaughter in my care, she would not be lawful to me, as she is the daughter of my brother through nursing." The orbit considered within the condition—namely, her being the daughter of the brother—does not contradict her non-existence, which is her being his stepdaughter; rather, it is consistent with it. It is necessary for them to have their effects together, namely, the prohibition arising from this and that.

If no other orbit is considered, and the judgment is built on considering its absence, then there is no indication in it of that at all. The thrust of the speech then is to clarify the confirmation of the consequence in any case by suspending it upon what contradicts it, so that it may be known that it is confirmed upon the occurrence of what does not contradict it—a fortiori—as in His saying: "Say: 'If you possessed the storehouses of the mercy of my Lord, then you would withhold [them].'" The consequence has been suspended upon what contradicts it, signaling that it is in itself of such a nature that it must be confirmed even if its cause is assumed to be non-existent or its cause of non-existence is realized—how much more so if it is not so? This is on the method of the conditional "if" (law al-wasliyyah). "How excellent a servant is Suhayb; if he did not fear God, he would not disobey Him." If this is carried upon suspending the lack of disobedience within the lack of fear upon another orbit, like modesty which is consistent with fear, it is of the category of the stepdaughter hadith. If it is carried upon clarifying the impossibility of his disobedience as an exaggeration, it is of this category.

The noble verse is addressed on the common usage, beneficial to the heinousness of their state and the terror of what befell them, and that the matter has reached such a point that if the will of God Almighty were attached to removing their powers, they would have been removed, due to the realization of what it necessitates—a complete necessity. It is said: the word "if" in it is the linking of its consequence to its condition, stripped of indicating the non-existence of one for the non-existence of the other. The master, the Mufti of the Ottoman lands, mentioned all of that, and I think he hit the target. However, the words of our master, al-Siyalkuti, imply the choice that "if" is posited for the mere suspension of the occurrence of an event in the past upon the occurrence of another event in it, without indication of the non-existence of the first or the second, or the continuity of the consequence; rather, all these matters are outside its concept, derived with the help of indications so that the claim of homonymy or reality and metaphor is not necessary without need. Some said this as well.

What Ibn al-Hajib went to—that it is for the indication of the non-existence of the first due to the non-existence of the second—is from the requirements of this concept, and it being a requirement does not necessitate that it is intended in all instances, for indication is different from intention. He mentioned that what they said—that it is for suspending the occurrence of an event in the past upon the occurrence of another event by supposition—while cutting off its non-existence, entails the non-existence of what it was suspended upon due to its non-existence. Thus, it signifies that the non-existence of the second in the exterior is only due to the non-existence of the first in it, with its dependence on the non-existence of the first being taken into its input. You have known that it entails the opposite of the principle.

It is responded to him that what is derived from the suspension upon an event supposed to occur is the demonstration of the obstacle to the occurrence of the suspended thing in the past, and that it did not exit from the original non-existence to the limit of existence and remained in its state due to its existence being linked to a non-existent matter. As for its non-existence being a cause for its non-existence in the exterior, absolutely not. How so, when the grammatical condition may be a cause added to the consequence? Yes, this is the requirement of the conventional condition. What the scholar al-Taftazani used as evidence for its provision of external causality from the saying of the Hamasi: "If the hoofed one had flown before her, she would have flown, but he did not fly," because the exception of the antecedent does not yield—is that the necessary conclusion of what was mentioned is that it is not used to argue from the non-existence of the first for the non-existence of the second, and it does not follow from it that it is not used for mere suspension to signify the demonstration of the obstacle while the requirement exists. How so? If its meaning were the provision of the causality of non-existence, the exception would be an emphasis and repetition, unlike if its meaning were mere suspension, for then it would be provision and establishment.

This is the substance of what they said in response and acceptance, and the cream of what they mentioned in summary and detail. The majority of the muftis of the Arabic language have issued fatwas according to what the Mufti of the Ottoman lands said. I do not obligate you to imitate; the statements are before you, so choose from them what you want.

(Indeed, God is over all things competent.) This is like a justification for the conditional and a confirmation of its content, which speaks to His power, the Exalted, to take away what was mentioned, for He who is capable of the whole is capable of the part. A "thing" (shay’) linguistically is what is valid to be known and informed about, as Sibawayh stated. It includes the non-existent and the existent, the necessary and the possible. Its applications vary, and what is intended by it is known from indications. It is used sometimes and all its individuals are intended, as in His saying: (And God is of all things Knowing), by the indication of the divine knowledge encompassing the necessary, the possible, the non-existent, the existent, and the impossible considered under the heading of "thing."

It is used and the "possible" is intended absolutely, as in the noble verse by the indication of power, which only attaches to the possible. It may be used and the "external possible existing in the mind" is intended, as in His saying: (And do not say of anything, "Indeed, I will do that tomorrow," except [when adding], "If God wills"), by the indication of it being conceived as something intended to be done tomorrow. It may be used and the "non-existent possible established in reality" is intended, as in His saying: (Our word to a thing when We intend it is but that We say to it, "Be," and it is), by the indication of intending formation, which is specific to the non-existent.

It may be used and the "external existent" is intended, as in His saying: (And I had already created you before, when you were nothing), meaning no external existence, because of the impossibility of intending to negate it being a "thing" in the general linguistic sense which includes the non-existent established in reality; because every creature is in eternity a "thing," i.e., a non-existent established in reality. The application of "thing" to it has been established, and the principle in application is reality, and one does not deviate from it except for a diverter, and there is no diverter. The prevalence of its use for the existent does not constitute a diverter, as that is only because the attachment of purpose in conversations to the states of existents is more frequent, not because it is specific to it linguistically.

What the master al-Baydawi mentioned—that it is specific to the existent because it is originally the infinitive of "willed" (sha’a), used in the sense of "willed" sometimes (and in this case, it encompasses the Creator, the Exalted) and in the sense of "willed" (*mashi’) at other times (i.e., its existence is willed, etc.)—contains, along with what it contains, that it entails (in His saying: "And God is of all things Knowing") the use of a homonym in its two meanings, because if it is in the sense of "the Willed" (al-sha’i), it does not include things like inanimate objects in his view, and if it is in the sense of "its existence is willed," it does not include the Necessary, the Exalted is His majesty. There is a dispute in the use of a homonym for its two meanings, and there is no dispute in using the verse as evidence for the encompassing of His knowledge, the Exalted.

As for what was mentioned in the commentaries of al-Mawaqif and al-Maqasid, it is clatter without flour, and a din without a weapon. Our master al-Kurani, may his soul be sanctified, has sufficed us the burden of lengthiness in refuting it. The dispute in this, even if it is verbal and the research into it is the function of linguists, it is based on the dispute over whether the non-existent possible is established or not. This is a research in which peoples have long been bewildered and in which feet have slipped.

The truth, which the Gnostics hold, is the first [that it is established], because the non-existent possible—i.e., what this concept is validly applied to—is conceived, and some of it is willed to the exclusion of others. Everything that is like this is distinguished in itself without the assumption of the mind, and everything that is like this is established and fixed outside our minds, detached from external existence. Thus, it is only in reality (nafs al-amr). What is intended by it is the knowledge of the Truth, the Exalted, considering its non-differentiation from the most holy Essence, for the knowledge of the Truth, the Exalted, has two considerations: the first is that it is not other, the second is that it is not identical. It is not said in the first consideration that knowledge is a follower of the known, because subordination is a relation requiring two distinct things, even if only by consideration, and there is no distinction when there is no differentiation. It is said in the second consideration due to the relative distinction that justifies subordination. The known that knowledge follows is the Essence of the Truth, the Exalted, with all its affairs, relations, and considerations. Hence, they said: His knowledge of things in eternity is identical to His knowledge of Himself, because every thing is from the relations of His knowledge in the first consideration. So when the Essence is known with all its relations, then every thing has been known from being identical to His knowledge of Himself.

Since the partner is not from the relations of knowledge in the first consideration—as it has no establishment in itself without assumption, for what is established as such is that He, the Exalted, has no partner—then knowledge does not attach to it in the second consideration primarily. And whenever the attachment of knowledge to things is eternal, they were not pure non-existents, as it would not be valid then for them to be an endpoint, as there is no distinction. So if they have realization in some way, they are eternal with the eternity of knowledge. Hence, the quiddities were not made by their essences, because making (ja'l) is a follower of the will, which is a follower of knowledge, which is a follower of the known which is established. So establishment is prior to making by degrees. Thus, they are not, from the aspect of establishment, an effect of making, otherwise it would circulate. They are only made in their existence, because the world is originated, and every originated thing is made.

Existence is not a state such that power does not attach to it, which would entail that the Creator, the Exalted, is not the Creator of the possibles and not capable of them. It has been verified that existence, in the sense of what, by its joining to possible quiddities, results in the effects peculiar to them, is existent. Why? Firstly, because every concept different from existence is only existent by a matter that joins it, which is existence; so it is existent by itself, not by an additional matter, otherwise it would regress, and its distinction from other than it is that its existence is not additional to its essence. Secondly, because if it were not existent, nothing would exist at all, because the possible quiddity before the joining of existence is characterized by external non-existence. If existence were non-existent, it would be like it, needing what it needs. So the effects would not result from the quiddity by its joining, because upon the estimation of it being non-existent, there is nothing in it after non-existence except its need for existence. This is precisely what is realized in the quiddity before the joining, so no description that it did not have before is produced for it by the joining. If this needy existence were providing the result of the effects, the quiddity would be independent of existence while needing it, and the necessary conclusion is false due to the impossibility of the gathering of the two contraries. So existence must be existent by an existence that is itself, otherwise it would regress or terminate at an existence that is existent by itself. The first is false, and the second is decisive for what is requested.

Yes, existence in the sense of "being existent" is a state, because it is a consideration-based description, not an accident and not a negation. Even with this, making attaches to it, but not primarily; rather, by the joining of a portion of existent existence to the quiddity, and thus the quiddity is characterized by being existent. It is manifest that it does not entail, from the lack of attachment of power to existence in the sense of "being existent" primarily, that it does not attach to it in any way.

The quiddities are made in their existence, so the existence of every thing must be identical to its reality, in the sense that what the reality of the thing is validly applied to from external matters is identical to what its existence is validly applied to. They do not have two identities distinct in the exterior, like blackness and body. Since if existence stood by a non-existent quiddity, contradiction would follow; and if [it stood by an] existent [quiddity], two existences would follow with circulation or regression. The saying that existence joins the quiddity as it is has no verification in it, for it has been verified in its place that the quiddity before the presentation of existence is characterized in reality by non-existence, definitely, due to the impossibility of its emptiness of the two contraries in it. At most, we say that if we do not consider non-existence with it, we cannot judge it to be non-existent. Our not considering non-existence with it at the time of the presentation of existence does not make it detached from it in reality; it only makes it detached from it by our consideration. The joining of existence is a matter that occurs to it by consideration of reality, not from the aspect of our consideration. So its emptiness of non-existence by our consideration does not validate its being characterized by existence as it is in reality, free from the hindrance.

So there are no two identities, one of which stands by the other; rather, the individual in the exterior is identical to the determination of the quiddity in it, and it is identical to the quiddity in it too, since determination is not an existent matter different in essence from the individual, joined to the quiddity in the exterior, distinct from them in it, composed of it and the individual. Rather, there is no existence in the exterior except for individuals, and they are identical to the determinations of the quiddity and identical to the quiddity in the exterior, due to their union in it. Upon this, there is no doubt in the potentiality of the possible, since its making is by making its portion of absolute existence that is existent in the exterior, accompanied by accidents and modes which its readiness for the portion of the specific quiddity necessitates; so it becomes an individual. The creation of the individual from the quiddity in the mentioned way is identical to the creation of the quiddity, because they are united in the exterior, in making and existence, and distinct in the mind only. This is the verification of their saying: "The made is the specific existence." And no non-existent is ready for its presentation unless it has establishment in reality, for what has no establishment—and it is the negated—has no requirement for the presentation of existence in any way, otherwise the impossible would be possible, and the necessary conclusion is false. So the eternal establishment of the quiddity of the possible is what is termed for the presentation of possibility that validates potentiality, not that it is the obstacle as they imagined.

This is all, and the research is long, and the subject is noble. We have saturated the speech on it in the Iraqi Responses to the Iranian Questions in a way that we refuted the speech of the objectors who disagree with what we followed our masters, the Sufis—may God Almighty sanctify their secrets—in. This is a small portion that will benefit you in interpreting the noble verse, so memorize it; I do not think you will find it in a commentary. Since "thing" is general linguistically and terminologically among the people of God—even if the Mu'tazilah also went to this—it must be, in such a case as we are in, specified by the evidence of reason to the possible.

Power among the Ash'arites is a self-attribute with an addition, necessitating the ability to create, annihilate, and maintain—not the ability itself, because it is a consideration-based matter—and there is no negation of incapacity regarding Him, the Exalted, because it is of the negative attributes. Perhaps the one who chose that chose it to reduce the self-attributes or to negate them. The "Capable" is he who, if he wills, does, and if he does not will, does not do. Since will, in our view, is an attribute that prefers one of the two sides of the potentiality, and among the philosophers it is the eternal providence, it was permissible for us to define it as mentioned, unlike them, contrary to whoever was deluded in it. The "All-Powerful" (al-Qadir) is the One who does what He wills according to what wisdom necessitates, and rarely is anyone other than Him, the Exalted, described by it. The "Mighty" (al-Muqtadir), if used for Him, the Exalted, its meaning is the "All-Powerful," or if used for humans, its meaning is the one who affects and acquires power. The derivation of power is from "measure" (qadr), meaning limitation and determination.

In the verse is evidence that the originated possible, during its state of remaining, is potential, because it is a "thing," and every thing is potential for Him, the Exalted. The meaning of it being potential is that the actor, if He wills, annihilates it, and if He wills, does not annihilate it. The need of the possible during its remaining for the influencer is something agreed upon by those who said that the cause of need is possibility, by necessity that possibility is a requirement for it during the remaining. As for those who said that the cause of need is origination alone or with possibility, they said it is independent, as there is no origination then, and they held onto the remaining of the building after the building’s vanishing in that. When some of them saw the hideousness of that, they said: the substances are not free from accidents, and they do not remain for two times; so the independence from the Capable, the Exalted, is not conceivable in any state. This is what al-Ash'ari went to. When the people of the exterior saw the defiance of the senses in it, they denied it. Yes, the Gnostics among the people of witnessing concede it; they are sufficient for you, to the point that they added to that and said: the substances do not remain for two times either, and people are in confusion from a new creation. I concede what they said and entrust my affair to God, who is not limited by any state. He was and nothing was with Him, and He is now as He was.

Then, the intent of this parable is to liken the state of the hypocrites in severity and their garment of faith—lined with disbelief and embroidered with deception, for fear of killing—to the state of those in a heavy rain that has what it has. They plug the holes of their ears with their fingers for fear of destruction, to the end of what is known of their descriptions. The aspect of resemblance is the presence of what is beneficial in its outward aspect, while in its inward aspect is a great affliction. It is said: The Exalted likened the hypocrites to the people of the rain and their faith, which is mixed with it, in what was recited, in that although it is beneficial in itself, but since it was found as such, its benefit returned as harm. Their hypocrisy is for fear of damage, by placing fingers in ears—from its implication, fear of death—in that it does not repel anything from the decree, and their bewilderment due to the intensity of what they are in and their ignorance of what they do and leave. They are such that whenever they encounter a flash of the lightning, they seize it as an opportunity, with fear that it might snatch their sight, so they walk a little; then when it hides, they remain restricted, having no movement.

It is said: He made Islam, which is the cause of benefits in the two abodes, like the rain, which is the cause of benefit. What is in Islam of severities and limits is in the position of darkness and thunder, and what is in it of spoils and benefits is in the position of lightning. They have placed their fingers in their ears from hearing its severities, and when the lightning of spoils flashes for them, they walk in it. (And when it darkens upon them) with severities, (they stand) in bewilderment. Others said other things. What the elegance of the revelation necessitates and its majesty of exalted status demands is not hidden from you when the flashes of providence shine for you. From the inner meanings is the resemblance of those mentioned in the first resemblance to those of the rain, so His saying: (Whenever it illuminates) etc., is an indication that whenever they find sweetness from their obedience and an immediate benefit, (they walk in it), and when the path of graces is blocked for them, they abandon acts of obedience. al-Husayn said: When their desire of the world in religion illuminates for them, they increase in acquiring it; (and when it darkens upon them, they stand) in bewilderment.