Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:21

(O Mankind, worship your Lord): When the Glorious One explained the distinctions among those who are subject to religious obligations (the mukallafin) and categorized them into believers, disbelievers, and the wavering; and when He spoke regarding the first group: (Those who believe); regarding the second: (It is all the same to them); and regarding the third: (They [seek to] deceive Allah); and explained the outcomes of their states in this world and the hereafter, saying of the first: (They are upon guidance from their Lord, and it is they who are the successful); of the second: (Allah has set a seal upon their hearts... and for them is a great punishment); and of the third: (In their hearts is disease... and for them is a painful punishment because they [habitually] used to lie)—He, the Almighty, turned His address toward them by way of iltifat (shift in mode of address). This was to stir them to listen, to orient their hearts toward reception, and to compensate for the burden of worship with the sweetness of direct address. It suffices for this rhetorical flourish (nukta) that it is present in part.

"Ya" (O) is a particle, not a noun or a verb according to the correct view; it was established for calling one who is distant. It is said: it is for calling in a general sense, or it is shared among its categories. According to the first view, the near one is called by it by treating him as if he were someone else, either due to the high status of the caller or the called, or because the listener’s heedlessness and lack of understanding are treated as a distance. Sometimes it is for the sake of showing concern for the one called and urging him, because calling a distant person and obliging him to attend to a matter implies concern and urging; thus, it is used in the necessary implication of its meaning as a majaz mursal (synecdoche/metaphor), or as a isti'arah taba'iyyah (dependent metaphor) in the particle, or as makniyyah and takhyiliyyah.

It [the particle] is with the invoked noun—whether explicitly or implicitly—by virtue of its replacing a construction like nadaytu (I called), or by the ellipsis of the implied verb unadi (I call) due to the clarity of its meaning, while intending an utterance upon which silence is appropriate, as is the case with "no" and "yes."

"Ay" (in ayyuha) has well-known meanings. When occurring in a vocative, it is an indefinite noun established for a part of a whole; then it becomes definite through the act of calling. Through it, one calls upon that which contains "al" (the definite article), because "ya" does not enter upon [a noun with] "al" except in rare cases, due to the impossibility of combining two definite articles—they are like two identicals, and they do not meet except in rare instances such as: "No, by Allah, there is no remedy for what is in me, nor for what is in them, ever." It is given the ruling of the vocative and the intended object of the call is made a description (attribute) for it, and it is mandatory in this [vocative] case to use the specific vowel known as the damma, contrary to al-Mazini, who permitted it to be in the accusative case; yet he has no predecessor or successor in that, as it contradicts what has been heard [from the Arabs].

This [vowel] is strictly observed to signify that it is the intended object of the call. This does not contradict the fact that the description is a follower that is not intended in relation to its antecedent, because that is according to the original setting where nothing occurred to make it intended in itself—such as being an explanation for an ambiguity. Hence, they did not condition derivation for this description, even though grammarians—except for the few, like Ibn al-Hajib—conditioned it for adjectives as explained in its proper place.

The "ha" of attention is an extra, necessary [particle] for emphasis and as a compensation for what it deserves of a genitive (annexed) case, or what takes its ruling such as tanwin, as in: "Whatever you call [ayyama tad'u]," even if it is not used here as a genitive at all. The vocative occurred frequently in the Glorious Book in this manner because of the emphasis it contains, which the context often requires by repeating the mention, clarifying after ambiguity, emphasizing with the particle of attention, and the combination of the two definites.

This is what the majority holds. Al-Akhfash, due to his weak observation, was certain that "ayya" occurring in the vocative is a relative noun (mawsul) whose initial part of its silah (relative clause) was deleted by obligation for the sake of lightening the vocative. He supported this with the frequent occurrence of it being used as a relative noun in their speech, and the scarcity of its occurrence as a described noun. He excused its not being in the accusative case then—even though it resembles the annexed—by saying that because the initial part of its relative clause was deleted, it became common for it to be built upon the damma. Thus, the vocative particle, according to this, enters upon [something] built upon the damma and does not change it, even if it resembles the annexed. The first view is supported by the lack of need for deletion, the validity of the definition of the adjective, and the consistency with this. Moreover, if it were a relative noun, it would have been permissible to connect it with a verbal or adverbial clause—to other [possibilities] with which the fair-minded person would be certain of the superiority of the majority’s view.

Yes, an objection was raised against it, which some of the earlier scholars of Arabic found difficult, saying: there is no answer for it. This is that what they claimed to be a follower is declined with the raf' (nominative), and every declensional vowel occurs only by a governor (amil), and there is no governor that requires raf' there because its antecedent is built in wording and in the accusative in place. So there is no justification for its raf'.

I say: This is one of the discussions that occurred between Abu Nizar and Ibn al-Shajari. The matter is that a question arose about the damma of this follower. Abu Nizar wrote that it is a damma of construction (bina'), not a damma of inflection (i'rab), because a damma of inflection must have a governor requiring it, and there is no governor here. Sheikh Mansur Mawhub ibn Ahmad wrote that it is a damma of inflection, and it is not permissible for it to be a damma of construction; whoever says that has overlooked the truth. This is because the object of the call—the one built upon damma for taking the place of the particle—is the intended object. The noun occurring after it, even if intended by the call, is an adjective—meaning it is impossible for it to be built [as well], because it is in the nominative case with a true raf'. For this reason, al-Mazini permitted the accusative case for it based on the position, just as it is permitted in "O, Zayd, the clever one." The cause of the raf' is that since the damma continued in every definite vocative, it resembled what the verb is ascribed to, so its adjective was treated according to the wording and was thus made nominative.

Ibn al-Shajari replied with what the Sheikh replied, writing that it is a damma of inflection, because the damma of the singular vocative occupies, by its consistency, a position between two positions. It is not like the damma of haythu (where), because it is not consistent due to the lack of consistency of the cause that necessitated it; nor like the damma of Zayd in kharaja Zayd (Zayd went out), because it occurred by a verbal governor. When the damma was consistent in ya Zayd, ya 'Amr, and likewise consistent in ya rajul, ya ghulam to an uncountable degree, the consistency in it took the place of the semantic governor occurring for the mubtada' (subject) in terms of the raf' being consistent in every noun that is initiated without a verbal governor and for which a predicate is brought—such as 'Amrun muntaliq (Amr is departing) and Zaydun dhahib (Zayd is going), and so on. Since the damma of the vocative continued in most names, just as the damma resulting from initiation continued in inflected names, the Arabs likened it to the damma of the mubtada' and thus followed it with the damma of inflection in the adjective of the vocative, such as ya Zaydu-t-tawil (O tall Zayd). It was also combined that the consistency is a meaning, just as initiation is likewise. It is the habit of the Arabs to treat one thing like another with the existence of the slightest suitability between them—to the point that they have treated things according to their opposites. Do you not see that they followed the vowel of inflection with the vowel of construction in the recitation of one who reads Al-hamdu lillahi with the damma on the lam? Likewise, they followed the vowel of construction with the vowel of inflection in ya Zayd bin 'Amr for the one who vocalized the dal of Zayd with fatha. This is a summary.

Ibn al-Shajari mentioned this in his Amali and was harsh in his attack on Ibn Nizar, explaining what occurred between them face-to-face. Were it not for excessive length, I would have mentioned it with all its details. You know what is in all of that of weakness. For this reason, some verifiers said: The truth is that it is a vowel of following and suitability for the damma of the vocative, like the kasra of the mim in ghulami (my slave). In that case, the objection is repelled, as is not hidden to the perfect.

• The discussion remains regarding the lam entering upon this adjective: is it for definition or not? What the majority holds, and what is famous, is that it is for definition as previously indicated. When Abu Nizar was asked about this, he said: It is not for definition there, because definition only occurs between two [parties] regarding a third, and the lam in the case we are in enters upon the name of the one addressed. Then he said: The correct view is that it entered as a substitute for "ya." Even though it is a vocative, its calling is verbal, and the vocative in reality is the one coupled with "al." When they intended to emphasize the attention and estimated the repetition of the vocative particle, they disliked the repetition, so they compensated for the vocative particle with the second "ha" and the third with "al."

Ibn al-Shajari refuted this, saying: This is a corrupt statement. Rather, the lam there is for defining presence, like the definition in your saying "This man came," for instance. However, when it entered upon the name of the one addressed, the ruling went to the address, for the fact that our saying ya ayyuha-r-rajul means ya rajul. And since the man is the one addressed in meaning, the ruling of the address prevailed, so it sufficed with two [particles] because the names of address do not need a third presence for their definition. Do you not see that your saying "I went out, O this [person]," and "I departed," and "I honored you," has no need for a third? Not every aspect of definition requires that it be between two regarding a third, for the first-person pronoun in ana kharajtu (I went out) is definitely known, and its definition does not depend on the presence of a third. Also, what was mentioned in the story of compensation implies, by its outward appearance, that the origin of ya ayyuha-r-rajul, for example, was ya ay ya ya rajul, and that they compensated for the second "ya" with "ha" and for the third with the alif and lam. You know that this, in addition to contradicting the statement of the group, is a strange statement that the ear finds repulsive and nature rejects. So understand.

• "An-nas" (mankind): It is a collective noun, according to what a group of investigators has established. The plurals and their names decorated with generality, where there is no external context—as is indicated by the occurrence of an exception—its origin is connectedness, and it requires entry into the scope of the term with certainty. This is not conceivable except through generality, such as "I struck Zayd except his head" and "I fasted Ramadan except the last ten." The latter is general in interpretation. Likewise, emphasis by what conveys generality, because if there were no generality there, the emphasis would be a foundation (rather than a confirmation), and the consensus is contrary to that. The commonality of the Companions—may Allah be pleased with them—using generality as evidence, as in the hadith of the Saqifah, and they are the leaders of guidance [supports this].

Then, this address in instances like ya ayyuha-n-nas (O mankind) is called "oral address" (khitab shafahi) by the legal theorists. They said: It is not general for those who came after those existing at the time of the revelation, or for those after those present at the places where revelation descended. The first [view] is the [correct] direction, and its ruling is established for them by another evidence from text, analogy, or consensus. As for mere wording, it is not. The Hanbalis said: Rather, it is general for those after them until the Day of Resurrection. The first group argued that we know it is not said to the non-existent things like "O mankind." Al-'Adud said: Denying it is stubbornness. And [they argued] that addressing a child or the insane with such [terms] is prohibited; if we do not direct it toward them despite their existence due to their incapacity for the address, then the non-existent is more entitled to be prevented, as its reaching them is more distant.

The others argued that if the Messenger (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) was not addressing those after them with it, he would not be a messenger to them, and the consequent is negated. Also, scholars have never ceased using such examples as evidence against the people of the eras after the Companions, which is a consensus on their generality.

It was answered: As for the first, the message only requires conveying the message in general, which does not depend on oral address. It is sufficient that it reaches some orally and others by setting up evidences and signs indicating that their ruling is the ruling of those whom he addressed. As for the second, it is not determined that this is because it encompasses them; rather, it may be because they knew that its ruling is established for them by another evidence, as stated by more than one [scholar].

In the commentary of the second scholar on the Sharh al-'Adudiyyah, it is said that the statement of the generality of the oral address, even if attributed to the Hanbalis, is not far-fetched. Some eminent investigators said: It is the famous view, to the extent that they said the truth is that the generality is known by necessity from the Muhammadan religion, and it is the closest. Al-'Adud’s statement that "denying it is stubbornness" is true if the address were for the non-existent specifically, but if it were for the existing and the non-existent by way of overriding (taghlib), then no. Similar to it is eloquent and common, and everything used as evidence to the contrary is weak.

Many Shafi'is went to the [view of] generality, holding that it is general in the exactness of its wording and its utterance without need for other evidence. It has been said: It is of the type of general address that is carried on other than its literal meaning, as in His saying: "If you honor the noble, you control him, and if you honor the base, he rebels."

Regardless, what is narrated from Ibn Mas'ud and 'Alqama—that everything in which ya ayyuha-n-nas descended is Meccan and ya ayyuha-lladhina amanu is Medinan—if it is authentic and not interpreted otherwise, does not necessitate restricting this general [term] in any way to the disbelievers. Rather, they are also included in it and are ordered to perform worship, such as belief, and the command for a thing is a command for what it cannot be fulfilled without. The claim that faith is the foundation of worship—and if it were obligatory by the obligation of worship, the foundation would become a subordinate—is rejected by the fact that being a foundation in terms of validity does not contradict being subordinate in terms of obligation. Moreover, it is also obligatory independently. It is amazing how this was hidden from the scholars of Samarkand. This is what the Iraqis and Shafi'is went to, and it is supported by the manifest meanings of the verses, such as His saying: "And woe to the polytheists, who do not give the zakah," and His saying: "What put you into Saqar? They will say: 'We were not of those who prayed, nor did we used to feed the poor.'" The Bukharians went to the view that they are obligated only regarding belief. Abu Hanifah—may Allah be pleased with him—did not explicitly state anything on the issue, but in the words of his second companion, there is what indicates it. Perhaps that is from the Imam because there is no fruit to the disagreement in this world, due to the consensus that as long as they are disbelievers, they are prevented from undertaking it and are not ordered to do so. If they become Muslims, they are not obligated to make it up. Its fruit is only in the Hereafter: that they are punished for neglecting it just as they are punished for neglecting faith—according to those who say it is obligatory upon them—and for neglecting faith only according to those who do not say it is obligatory. This is in matters other than punishments and transactions; as for those, it is agreed that they are addressed by them.

The command for worship here is for the three groups, considering that what is meant is the comprehensive [worship] for creating its foundation, its increase, and its stability. Thus, i'budu (worship) indicates a demand in the present for an independent act of worship, which is for the disbelievers a beginning of worship, for some believers an increase, and for others constancy. Beginning, increase, and constancy are not part of the concept [of worship] by setting, so there is no harm in anything at all, contrary to the one who imagined it and thus strained himself to refute it.

The Glorious One mentioned "the Lord" to point out that the immediate cause for worship is the blessing of upbringing (tarbiyah), even if the worship of the perfect ones for His Self—the Almighty—is without any intermediary at all, other than that He is He. So glory be to an God, how Great is He! And a Lord, how Generous is He!

(Who created you and those before you): The relative clause is a laudatory description of the Lord, and in it is also a justification for worship or Lordship, as has been said. If the address in "your Lord" includes the three groups, then so be it; if it is restricted to the polytheists and "the Lord" is intended in the sense of what was customary among them of applying it to other than the Almighty, it is possible that it is restrictive if the genitive is carried on the genus, or explanatory if it is carried on the covenant. It is not far-fetched on this account to be laudatory, because the absolute [usage] suggests the Lord of Lords, unless making it for restriction and explanation is clearer based on what they were upon, and as a hint toward what they were upon, and because it is the origin, so it is not abandoned except with evidence.

"Creation" (khalq) is bringing into existence without a prototype; it can also be in the sense of determination (taqdir). According to the first, nothing other than Him—the Almighty—is described by it. According to the second, others may be described by it, such as: "So blessed is Allah, the best of creators," and "And when you create [takhluqu] from clay." Also, Zuhair’s saying: "And you carve what you have created, while some people create but do not carve." It is strange that Abu 'Abdullah al-Basri, the teacher of Judge 'Abd al-Jabbar, said: Applying "Creator" to the Almighty is impossible because determination requires thought and calculation, and these [attributes] are [denied]. This is a controversial issue between him and Allah the Almighty, who said: "He is the Creator, the Producer." And by the statement of Allah the Almighty, I speak.

The second relative pronoun is connected to the accusative in khalaqakum (created you). Qabli-kum (before you) is an adverb of time—frequently—and place—rarely—and it is used metaphorically for precedence in honor and rank. If the address includes the believers and others, then those who were before them are those who preceded them in existence, and whoever exists who is higher in rank than them. In this is a reminder of the perfection of the Majesty of Allah and His Lordship, and in it is the confirmation of the matter of worship, which is not hidden. The Glorious One brought the attention to their creation first—even if it is later in time—because man's knowledge of his own state is more apparent, and because they are the ones faced with the command to worship, so alerting them first to themselves is more emphatic and important.

He brought "creation" as the silah (relative clause), and relative clauses must be of known affiliation to the addressee; hence, the relative pronoun is known to him by what it contains of the covenant. Its informativeness is conditioned as a sign that there is none among those addressed who denies that the Creator is Allah the Almighty—(And if you asked them, "Who created them?" or "Who created the heavens and the earth?" they would surely say, "Allah")—even if that is understood from the description, based on what they said: "Information after knowledge of it is description, and descriptions before knowledge of it are information." If there is someone there who does not know that Allah is his Creator and the Creator of those before him, it is necessary to claim overriding or to treat the non-knower as the knower due to the clarity of the proofs, so the sentence comes out in the form of the known, contrary to the requirements of the outer appearance.

Ibn al-Sumayqa' and Zayd ibn 'Ali—may Allah be pleased with them—read wa khalqi man qablikum and wa-lladhina min qablikum with a fatha on the mim. It was considered problematic due to the succession of two relative pronouns with only one silah. It was resolved by making man an emphasis for alladhina, so it does not need a silah, like his saying: "From the people who, those who, when the base fear them, they rattle the door ring." It was objected that a particle is not emphasized without repeating what it is connected to, so a relative pronoun is more entitled to that, as its emphasis is almost like the emphasis of part of the noun. So man in that case is relative or descriptive, and it is the predicate of an implicit subject, and what follows it is the silah or an adjective, and it, with the implicit [subject], is the silah of the first relative pronoun. It would be, according to one of the possibilities, like: "So I said and denied the faces, they are they." And the explanation of the verse is similar to this.

It is said: Min (in min qablikum) is extra, and some grammarians permitted the addition of nouns, and al-Kisa'i permitted the addition of the relative man. He made it so, [as in the poem]: "And it suffices us as a virtue over others that we love the Prophet Muhammad."

Some also considered the famous reading problematic because alladhina are entities and min qablikum is deficient, having no benefit in informing about them. Thus, connecting to it is the same, except upon an interpretation. The interpretation is that the adverb of time, if described explicitly or implicitly with context, allows informing and connecting to it. You say: "We are on a good day," and what is here is in the estimate: "those who were from a time before your time." Abu al-Baqa' estimated: "those He created before your creation," so he deleted the verb which is the silah and raised its complement in its place. So contemplate.

(That you may become righteous): La'alla (that/perhaps) in the famous view is established for hope, which is the desire for the occurrence of a beloved, possible matter, and for ishfaq (apprehension), which is the anticipation of a feared, possible matter. The apparent [meaning] is the opposition, so it would be shared. Al-Radhi mentioned that it is for hope, which is the anticipation of something without certainty of its occurrence, so desire and apprehension enter into it.

What the heart leans toward is what some investigators mentioned: it is for the creation of an anticipation of a matter wavering between occurrence and non-occurrence, with the precedence of the first. Either it is beloved, so it is called raja' (hope), or it is disliked, so it is called ishfaq (apprehension). This may be considered realized in action—either from the perspective of the speaker (which is common, because the meanings of constructions are established by him) or from the perspective of the addressee (treating him as the speaker in the complete engagement with the speech flowing between them), from which is: (Perhaps he may remember or fear). It may also be considered realized potentially by a type of metaphor, signaling that that matter is in itself a place for anticipation, described with a quality that validates it, without there being any actual anticipation by an anticipator at all.

In the noble verse, if the clause is made a state (hal) from the object of khalaqakum (created you) and what is connected to it by way of overriding the addressees over the absent ones—because they are the ones ordered to worship—it is impossible to carry la'alla upon its reality. Not regarding the speaker, because of the impossibility of hope for the Knower of the unseen and the seen, who does what He wills; nor regarding the addressees, because they at the time of creation were not knowing, so how can hope be conceived from them? And it is not permissible to make it an estimated state, because the estimated state at the time of creation is piety, not the hope for it. Therefore, it must be carried upon the metaphorical meaning: that the demand for piety from them—after the gathering of its causes and incentives—is likened to hope, in that the object of each one of them is optional between doing and not doing, with the precedence of the side of action. Thus, the word la'alla established for that [meaning] is used, making it an isti'arah taba'iyyah (dependent metaphor).

Or [it is that] the image drawn from the state of their Creator is likened, in comparison to them after He empowered them for piety and leaving it, with the precedence of [doing] it, to the state of the one hoped from, in comparison to the one who is able to do the hoped-for thing and leave it, with the precedence of the existence of [that action]. Thus, it is an isti'arah tamthiliyyah (representational metaphor). However, He mentioned of the likened-to what is the pillar of it, meaning the word la'alla. Or, their selves are likened to one from whom piety is hoped, so some of its requirements are established for it, meaning hope—thus it is an isti'arah bil-kinayah (metaphor by implication). Making the subject of the metaphor and representation His, the Almighty's, will is a Mu'tazilite nudge founded on the rule stating the permissibility of the desired thing failing to occur from His will.

Some said it is hope here, but it is not from the speaker nor from the addressee, but from others, as in His saying: (Perhaps you would leave [tarkun] some of what is revealed to you). Because when every newborn is born upon the fitra (natural disposition), he is such that if a contemplator contemplates him, he anticipates from him hope that he will be pious. And it is not far-fetched.

If it is made a state from the subject of khalaqakum (created you), the reality is also impossible, and some of the ways are necessitated. If it is made a state from the pronoun of i'budu (worship), it is permissible to keep the hope upon its reality, directed to the addressees—meaning they are hoping for piety. What is meant by it then is the limit of the stages of the travelers, which is casting off desire, abandoning other-than-God, and winning the Supreme Beloved. In that is the limit of the goal and ascending above the Lote Tree of the Utmost Boundary. This has become widespread among the distant and the near. By this, the encouragement becomes valid, and what was said—that what is befitting the Quranic eloquence is to consider from the beginning of the matter the goal of their worship and what is a delight for them, meaning the reward, not what is burdensome for them, meaning piety—is repelled. Even if it leads to it, the way of repelling is apparent.

What Mawla al-Taftazani said—that restricting worship to the hope of piety does not have much meaning, but rather the appropriate is restricting it to piety or its being accompanied by the hope of its reward—is repelled by the fact that in hope there is an alert that the worshiper should not slacken in his worship and should be in a state of fear and hope. Yes, they said: The state is a restriction for its operator, and here it is the command. If we say: It is more general than obligation, then there is no problem. If we say: It is literal in obligation, it would necessitate the obligation of the hope restricted to the worship commanded. Perhaps it is not obligatory. The statement that it necessitates the obligation of the restricted but not the restriction is a discussion in the fundamentals, which is not hidden to those who know them.

What was objected—that it requires, according to this view, being in between the stick and its bark, since "who made the earth for you" is connected to "your Lord," an adjective for it—is repelled by the fact that the separation makes the division easier, even if there is a spiritual connection. If "the One who made" is made a mubtada' (subject) whose predicate is "do not make," the problem almost disappears and the discussion is lifted. Nevertheless, there is no doubt in the weakness of this view, even if the words of our Master al-Baydawi suggest its superiority.

Then, it is not far-fetched to say that the meaning in the verse is based on justification, either because la'alla comes in the sense of kay (so that), as went al-Anbari and others, who cited as evidence his saying: "So you said to us, 'Stop the wars, so that [la'alla-na] we may stop,' and you pledged to us every pledge." Or because it is for desire; so it is used metonymically, by the context of the situation, for the realization of what follows it, according to the custom of the great. Then it is used metaphorically for every realized [thing], like the realization of the cause, whether there is desire with it or not, as has been said.

It is not a valid objection that the justification of creation—which is His action, the Almighty—is something that most Ash'aris did not permit, as they forbade justifying His actions—the Almighty—with purposes, lest it imply His perfection—the Almighty—by other than Him, which is impossible. We say: The truth from which there is no escape is that His actions—the Almighty—are justified by the interests of the servants, even though He—the Almighty—is not obligated to do the most beneficial. Whoever denies the justification of some actions, especially religious rulings like penalties, has almost denied prophethood, as our Master Sadr al-Shari'ah said. Pausing on that in every place is not necessary, given that some make the disagreement in the issue verbal: if the cause is interpreted as what the agent depends on and is perfected by, that is impossible for Him—the Almighty. If it is interpreted as the wisdom that necessitates the action outwardly with His self-sufficiency, there is no doubt in its occurrence, and no one denies that except an ignorant one or an obstinate one.

The reason the Almighty did not say in the system "you worship" for the sake of "worship" or "you fear" for the sake of "you may fear" is so that its two sides may correspond, while it includes an ingenious craft of returning the end to the beginning, because piety is the limit of the worshiper's matter; thus the speech is more inducing to worship and more binding. So it was said, and in the heart there is something [of doubt] about it. The cause of the deletion of the object of tattaqun (you may fear) is what is not hidden. Ibn 'Abbas—may Allah be pleased with him—estimates it as "polytheism," and al-Dahhak as "the Fire." Do not estimate anything.

When the Almighty commanded those who are obligated with the worship of the Lord who brought them into existence, and described Him with what He described Him—and it is known that the description is a tool for distinguishing the described from other than him, and that linking the ruling to the description indicates the cause—the verse indicated that the way of knowing Him—the Almighty—and knowledge of His oneness and His worthiness of worship is to contemplate His work. Since upbringing and creation, upon which worship is hinged, are prior to asking for it, it is understood that the servant does not deserve a reward, as He has blessed him before worship with what cannot be counted, of which human energy is not enough to thank, and his worship cannot resist a tenth of a tenth of it. The verse was used as evidence by those who claimed that imposing the impossible (taklif al-muhal) is occurring, as the Almighty ordered His worship to those who believe in Him and those who disbelieve, after His informing about them that they will not believe and that they will not return from their misguidance. The discussion on that has preceded, so refer to it.