Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:3

(Those who believe in the Unseen, establish prayer, and spend from what We have provided them.)

This is an attribute of the Muttaqin (the God-fearing) mentioned previously. If by Taqwa (God-fearing) one intends its highest rank, then this description is specifying; if the second, it is clarifying; if the third, it is praising. In the Sharh al-Miftah al-Sharifi, it states that if Muttaqi is taken in its technical sense—namely, one who performs duties and abandons sins—then if the addressee is ignorant of that meaning, the description is clarifying; if they are knowledgeable, it is praising. If it is taken closer to its linguistic meaning, it is specifying.

I find it most likely that the relative pronoun (alladhina) is separated [from the preceding] with the intention of providing information about them through what follows, thereby establishing it for what preceded. Even if it is understood implicitly, it is as if it were stated explicitly, which is sufficient for connection and initiating a new sentence—whether grammatically or rhetorically—as if it were asked: "What is the state of the Muttaqin that they were singled out for this guidance?" The pause on Muttaqin is complete according to this view, and good according to the first.

Iman (faith) in the language is tasdiq (verification/assent), meaning submitting to the ruling of the one informing and accepting it, and holding them to be truthful. It is the verbal noun (if'al) derived from al-amn (safety), as if the reality of believing in him is that he grants him safety from falsehood and opposition. It takes the preposition lam (as in: "Shall we believe in you [li-tu'mina laka]"), and the preposition ba' (as in the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH): "Faith is that you believe in God [tu'mina billah]"). They said: The first is in consideration of it being synonymous with the meaning of submission, and the second is in consideration of it being synonymous with the meaning of acknowledgment—an indication that tasdiq is not considered unless it is accompanied by acknowledgment. It is also used in the sense of trusting, as the one who trusts has become in a state of security; it is also a conventional reality (haqiqa 'urfiyya) in this sense, as found in the Asas. The metaphorical nature of it is understood from the apparent meaning of the Kashshaf.

As for the Shari'ah, it is the verification of what is known by necessity that the Prophet (PBUH) came with, in detail where detail is known, and in summary where summary is known. This is the position of the majority of researchers. However, they differed as to whether the basis of the rulings of the Hereafter is solely this meaning or is accompanied by iqrar (verbal affirmation). Al-Ash'ari and his followers held that this meaning alone is sufficient, as it is the intended goal; verbal affirmation exists only to make known its existence, for [faith] is an internal matter, yet rulings are applied upon it. Whoever verifies with his heart and abandons affirmation while being able to do so is a believer in the eyes of the Shari'ah between him and God, and his abode is Paradise. However, Ibn al-Humam mentioned that those who hold this view agreed that it is binding upon him to believe that if he were asked to affirm, he would do so. If he is asked and does not affirm, it is disbelief of defiance (kufr 'inad).

Our Imam Abu Hanifah (may God have mercy on him) and the majority of those who followed him held that affirmation and what functions in its stead, like the gesture of a mute person, is necessary. Thus, the aforementioned verifier would not be a believer with a faith upon which the rulings of the Hereafter are based, just as the one who prays with hypocrisy does not benefit from his prayer. Perhaps this is because God Almighty condemned the defiant more than He condemned the negligent, ignorant ones. An opponent may argue that the condemnation is for verbal denial—which is undoubtedly a sign of falsehood—or for the denial of the heart, which is falsehood itself. The conclusion of this is preventing the achievement of tasdiq for the defiant, as tasdiq is the opposite of denial. What he achieves is only ma'rifa (cognition), which is the opposite of ignorance. They have agreed that this ma'rifa is outside of the linguistic tasdiq, which is what is considered in Iman.

Indeed, they differed on whether this is included under conception (tasawwur) or logical verification (tasdiq al-mantiqi). The second author held it to be the latter, and that it is possible for the image resulting from the complete predicative proposition to be a conception, and that logical tasdiq is identical to linguistic tasdiq. Therefore, their leader explained it in Persian books as "accepting as true," and in Arabic as what opposes falsehood and denial. This is exactly the linguistic meaning. This is supported by what the Master, the Authority, mentioned in the marginalia of Sharh al-Talkhis: that the logician only explains what exists in custom and language. However, it is objected that the meaning expressed by "accepting as true" is a definitive matter, and the author confirmed it in al-Maqasid. This is why, in the chapter of Iman, verification that reaches the limit of certainty and submission is sufficient, even though logical tasdiq includes the conjectural by agreement. They divide knowledge—in the broader sense—exclusively into conception and verification to explain the need for logic in all its parts, including the dialectical syllogism composed of popular and conceded premises, the rhetorical syllogism composed of accepted and probable premises, and the poetic syllogism composed of imaginative premises. If logical tasdiq were not general, the need for these parts would not be proven, and this is manifest.

Sadr al-Shari'ah leaned towards the latter: that the image resulting from the complete predicative proposition is definitely tasdiq. If it is obtained by intention and choice such that it necessitates submission and acceptance, it is linguistic tasdiq. If it is not so—such as when one's sight falls upon something and one knows it to be a wall, for example—then it is certain cognition (ma'rifa), not linguistic tasdiq. Thus, for him, linguistic tasdiq is more specific than the logical one.

The Karramiyyah held that Iman in the Shari'ah is verbal affirmation of the two testimonies, and nothing else. The Khawarij, al-'Allaf, and 'Abd al-Jabbar from the Mu'tazilah held that every act of obedience is Iman, whether obligatory or supererogatory. Al-Jubba'i, his son, and most of the Basran Mu'tazilah held it to be the obligatory acts of obedience, excluding the supererogatory. Al-Qalanisi from the Sunnis and al-Najjar from the Mu'tazilah—and this is the position of most of the traditionists—held that it is cognition with the heart, affirmation with the tongue, and action with the limbs. It is said: The secret of this difference is the difference in whether the one responsible is the soul only, the body only, or the aggregate of both.

The truth is that the root of every school is an evidence that invited its proponent to follow it. The clearest of the schools is that it is tasdiq. Therefore, the leader of the believers, 'Ali (may God honor his face), said: "Faith is cognition, cognition is submission, and submission is verification." This school is supported by God Almighty's saying: "Those are they in whose hearts He has written faith," His saying: "And faith has not yet entered your hearts," His saying: "And his heart is at peace with faith," and the saying of the Prophet (PBUH): "O God, keep my heart firm upon Your religion." Since he attributed it in these and countless similar instances to the heart, it proves that it is an act of the heart and is nothing other than tasdiq, as it has not been defined in the Shari'ah by any other meaning. Otherwise, there would be no transmission (naql), and the address concerning Iman would be an address to what is not understood, and because it is against the original principle (asl), one should not turn to it without evidence.

The possibility that the texts intend linguistic Iman—which is localized in the heart—not Shari'ah Iman, and that it is permissible for affirmation or other things to be part of its meaning, is rebutted by the fact that Iman is among the religious transmissions (manqulat shar'iyya) according to the specificity of the object (muta'allaq). This is why the Prophet (PBUH) explained its object, not its meaning, saying: "That you believe in God, His angels, the Books, His messengers, and the Last Day, and the decree, its good and its evil." Thus, in the linguistic meaning, it is a metaphor in the speech of the Lawgiver, and the original principle in usage is the literal reality. Also, actions were mentioned as conjoined to Iman, as in God Almighty's saying: "Those who have believed and done righteous deeds," and a part is not conjoined to the whole. The descent of the angels and the Spirit, according to one of the two views, is interpreted as exiting [the concept of faith] for the sake of rhetorical consideration, and singling them out [by mentioning them] as supererogatory acts, whereas their exclusion is contrary to the apparent meaning, and the apparent meaning is sufficient as a proof.

Also, making Iman a condition for the validity of actions, as in God Almighty's saying: "And whoever does righteous deeds while he is a believer," with the certainty that the conditional cannot enter into the condition, as it is impossible to condition a thing for itself—since a part of the condition is a condition. Also, it has been transmitted that Iman is proven for one who abandons some actions, as in God Almighty's saying: "And if two parties of the believers fight each other," even though a thing cannot be realized without its pillar. Also, what we have mentioned is closer to the original principle, as there is no difference between them except in the consideration of the specificity of the object, as is not hidden.

The opponent has raised points for enforcement:

1. If Iman were merely tasdiq, it would not vary, whereas the Iman of the Messenger (PBUH) does not resemble the Iman of the commoners, nor even the elite.
2. Immorality (fusuq) contradicts Iman and does not coexist with it by the text: "But God has endeared faith to you and has made it pleasing in your hearts and has made hateful to you disbelief and immorality." If it meant tasdiq, it would not be impossible for them to coexist.
3. Committing a major sin contradicts it because of God Almighty's saying: "And He is merciful to the believers," alongside His saying regarding the perpetrator: "And let not pity for them withhold you." If it meant tasdiq, it would not contradict it.
4. The believer is not disgraced, for God Almighty said: "The Day on which God will not disgrace the Prophet and those who believed with him," and He, the Exalted, said concerning highway robbers: "For them is disgrace in this world, and for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment." Thus, they are not believers, even though they are mussadiq (verifiers).
5. The one capable of Hajj who leaves it without excuse is a disbeliever, for God Almighty says: "And [due] to God from the people is a pilgrimage to the House—for whoever is able to find thereto a way. But whoever disbelieves—then indeed, God is free from need of the worlds," even though he is mussadiq.
6. Whoever does not rule by what God has revealed is a mussadiq, yet he is a disbeliever by the text: "And whoever does not judge by what God has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers."
7. The adulterer is the same, by the text of the Prophet (PBUH): "The adulterer does not commit adultery while he is a believer," and likewise the one who intentionally abandons prayer without excuse, and similar cases.
8. The one who disparages a prophet, for example, is mussadiq, yet he is a disbeliever by consensus.
9. Performing duties is the Religion, by God Almighty's saying: "And they were not commanded except to worship God, [being] sincere to Him in religion, inclining to truth, and to establish prayer and to give zakah. And that is the correct religion." Religion is Islam, by God Almighty's saying: "Indeed, the religion in the sight of God is Islam," and Islam is Iman, because if it were something else, it would not be accepted from one who seeks it, as He, the Exalted, said: "And whoever seeks other than Islam as religion—never will it be accepted from him."
10. If it were tasdiq, it would not be valid to describe the responsible person with it in reality except at the time it issues from him, as with all other acts, yet the sleeper and the negligent are described as such by consensus, even though tasdiq does not remain in them.
11. It would be necessary to say to one who verifies the divinity of other than God, the Exalted, that he is a believer, which is contrary to consensus.
12. God Almighty described some who believe in Him, the Mighty and Majestic, as being polytheists: "And most of them believe not in God except while they associate others with Him." If it were tasdiq, it would be impossible for it to coexist with polytheism.

We concede that it is tasdiq, but what prevents it from being tasdiq with the tongue, as the Karramiyyah said? Especially since linguists understand nothing from tasdiq other than tasdiq with the tongue.

The reply to the first: That the single tasdiq—even if we concede no increase or decrease in it between the Prophet and one of us—it does not prevent variation between the two Imans due to the intercalation of actions and strength between the renewed numbers of Iman, and the scarcity of its intercalation, or due to the occurrence of doubts and questionings or their lack. For the Prophet (PBUH) is the most perfect of the perfect. + The hornet and the hawk both have wings and beat them while flying, but there is a difference between what the hawk hunts and what the hornet hunts.

To the second: The verse contains nothing to indicate that immorality does not coexist with Iman. If it were said, "He has endeared knowledge to you and made immorality hateful to you," would that prove a contradiction between knowledge and immorality? The fact that disbelief is the opposite of Iman is not derived from the verse, but from outside of it. Even if we concede the verse indicates what you mentioned, it is opposed by what indicates the opposite, like God Almighty's saying: "Those who have believed and did not mix their faith with injustice," as it indicates the concurrence of injustice with Iman in some cases.

To the third: We do not concede that committing a major sin contradicts Iman. "And let not pity for them withhold you in the law of God" means: do not let compassion cause you to abandon the limits of God Almighty after they have become obligatory.

To the fourth: What was mentioned of the two verses has no indication, because the verse of negating disgrace only indicated its negation in the Hereafter for the believers absolutely, or for the Prophet's companions (may God be pleased with them), and the verse of the robber indicates disgrace in this world. It does not follow that the contradiction of disgrace on the Day of Resurrection to Iman implies its contradiction to Iman in this world.

To the fifth: We do not concede the disbelief of one who abandons Hajj without an excuse. "But whoever disbelieves" is the start of a new sentence, or the meaning is whoever does not verify the rituals of Hajj and denies them—and that tasdiq is not imaginable with that.

To the sixth: The meaning of the verse "whoever does not judge" is whoever does not verify or whoever does not judge by anything that God revealed, or what is intended by that is the Torah, by the context of what precedes.

To the seventh: It is possible to say the meaning of "The adulterer does not commit adultery while he is a believer" is that he is not secure from the punishment of God; i.e., if he commits adultery—we seek refuge in God—let him fear His punishment, the Exalted and Majestic, and not be secure from His scheme. Or, the meaning is he does not commit adultery while considering it lawful, or he does not commit adultery while being upon the attributes of the believer of avoiding forbidden things. This interpretation is more deserving than contradicting linguistic conventions due to its frequency, unlike the other. The same is said for similar cases.

To the eighth: We do not deny the coexistence of major sins with Iman rationally, but the Ummah is in consensus on the apostasy of the one who disparages; thus, we know the negation of tasdiq upon the existence of disparagement, for example, by religious transmission. Combining action according to the linguistic convention and the consensus of the Ummah on apostasy is better than nullifying one of them.

To the ninth: The verse has distinguished between Religion and the performance of duties due to the conjunction, which is apparently evidence of difference. We concede that Religion is the performance of duties and that Religion is Islam, but we do not concede that Islam is Iman. What is intended by "other than Islam" in the verse is not what is different from it according to the concept; otherwise, it would follow that prayer and zakah, for instance, are not accepted. Rather, it is the different according to reality (sidq). In that case, it is possible that Islam is more general. This is like saying, "Whoever seeks other than religious knowledge has erred"—you do not rule that the one who seeks dialectical theology (kalam) has erred. It is obvious that the condemnation of the non-general does not necessitate the condemnation of the specific, for your saying "The non-animal is condemned" does not necessitate that the human is condemned.

To the tenth: It is a mutual obligation; whatever is your answer is our answer. Moreover, we say that tasdiq during the state of sleep and negligence remains in the heart; the mental lapse is only from its obtainment. Sleep is the opposite of perceiving things initially, not that it contradicts the continuation of the perception obtained during the state of wakefulness. We concede, but the Lawgiver made the one who verified, upon whom nothing contradictory occurs, in the ruling of the one who remains, such that the believer is a name for one who believed in the present or the past and upon whom nothing that is a sign of falsehood has occurred.

To the eleventh: The lack of naming the one who verified the divinity of other than God as a believer is only because of the specificity of the object of Iman in the Shari'ah. So calling him a believer is valid in view of the linguistic convention and invalid in view of the Shari'ah usage.

To the twelfth: Iman is the opposite of polytheism by consensus. What they mentioned is binding on every school. We say that Iman there is linguistic, for in the Shari'ah case, the verification of everything one knows the Prophet (PBUH) came with is considered, as preceded. Thus, the polytheist who verifies some things is not a believer except according to the language, not the Shari'ah, due to his breach of monotheism; the verse is an indication of this. Their saying that linguists do not understand, etc., is a mere claim not supported by proof. Yes, there is no doubt that the one who affirms with the tongue alone is called a believer linguistically, due to the establishment of the evidence of Iman—which is the verification of the heart—within him, just as the angry one and the happy one are called such by way of reality due to the establishment of the evidences indicating them from the necessary effects of anger and joy. The rulings of Iman are applied upon him outwardly, and there is no dispute in that; the dispute is only in his being a believer in the eyes of God Almighty. The Prophet (PBUH) and those after him, just as they used to judge the Iman of those who spoke the two testimonies, used to judge the disbelief of the hypocrite. This proves that the act of the tongue is not sufficient for Iman. This is something two rams should not butt heads over.

It seems that for this reason, al-Raqqashi and al-Qattan stipulated the heart's conformity with ma'rifa according to the first, and tasdiq acquired by choice according to the second. The Karramiyyah said: Whoever hides denial and shows submission, even if he is a believer linguistically and by Shari'ah due to the realization of the indicative word that the word Iman was set for, he deserves eternal abode in the Fire because of the lack of realization of what that word signifies, which is the intended purpose of considering its indication. After probing the statements in this position, I see no harm in what the righteous predecessors went to, which is that the word Iman is set for the common denominator between tasdiq and actions. Thus, its usage for tasdiq alone, and for the aggregate of tasdiq and actions, is a reality—just as what is considered in the specific tree according to custom is the common denominator between its trunk and the aggregate of the trunk with the branches and leaves. So, "non-existence" is not applied to it as long as the trunk remains. Tasdiq is in the position of the root of the tree, and actions are in the position of its branches and twigs. As long as the root remains, Iman remains. It has been transmitted in the Sahih: "Iman has seventy-odd branches; the highest is the statement 'There is no god but God,' and the lowest is removing a harmful object from the road." Close to this is the statement of those who said actions are outward effects resulting from Iman, and the word Iman is applied to them metaphorically. There is no disagreement between the two statements except that the application of the word to them is a reality according to the first, and a metaphor according to the second, which is a verbal debate. It is obvious that the immediate understanding from Iman here is tasdiq.

"The Unseen" (al-ghayb) is a source (masdar) placed in the position of a description, and it is a ghayb (absentee/hidden) for exaggeration, by making it as if it were the object itself. Making it the meaning of the passive participle (maf'ul) is rejected, as in the Bahr: "Al-ghayb is the source of ghaba, which is intransitive and from which a passive participle cannot be formed." Making it an explanation of the meaning—because the absent one is absent by himself—is an artificiality without a motive, or it is a fa'il form lightened like qil and mayyit. In the Bahr, it should not be claimed except where it is heard lightened and heavy. A group explained it here as that which does not fall under the senses and which intuitive reason does not necessitate. From it is what no evidence has been set for, and the All-Knowing, the Aware, has been unique in its knowledge—like the knowledge of the Decree, for instance. From it is what evidence has been set for, like the Truth Almighty and His exalted attributes, for He is ghayb known by whoever God Almighty has granted light, according to that light. For this reason, you find people varying in it. The saints—may God benefit us by them—have a share, unless it is from it + And from here it was said: "Ghayb is the witnessing of the whole with the eye of the Truth." The servant may be granted the proximity of supererogatory acts, so the Truth, the Exalted, becomes his sight by which he sees and his hearing by which he hears, and he ascends from that to the proximity of obligatory acts and becomes a light. There, the ghayb becomes a witnessing for him, and what is missing for us is present for him. Despite this, I do not allow for anyone who has reached that station to be said to know the Ghayb: "Say, 'None in the heavens and earth knows the unseen except God.'" And say to the victim of love: "You have fulfilled its due," and to the claimant: "Far be it; the kohl is not the kohl."

People differed as to what is meant by it here in various statements, until the Shi'ah claimed it is the "Rising One" (al-Qa'im), yet they sat back from establishing the argument for that. What the heart inclines toward is that it is what the Messenger (PBUH) informed of in the hadith of Gabriel (peace be upon him): God Almighty, His angels, His books, His messengers, the Last Day, and the Decree—its good and its evil; because the Iman required by the Shari'ah is that, especially since the two attributes after it have been joined to it. Its entailment of the application of ghayb to Him, the Exalted, is implicitly understood. Ghayb and gha'ib (the absent) is what allows for presence and absence, which does not harm, for there is no application of it to Him, the Exalted, specifically. Thus, this is not of the category of naming. Furthermore, we do not concede that ghayb is only used for what allows for presence. Some scholars differentiated between ghayb and gha'ib, saying: God Almighty is ghayb and not gha'ib, and they mean by gha'ib that which does not see you and you do not see it, and by ghayb that which you do not see. It is not far-fetched to say by way of dominance (taghlib) to include the Iman of the companions (may God be pleased with them) in Him (PBUH), as he is not ghayb in relation to them. Or it is said: Iman in him (PBUH) returns to the Iman in his message, for instance, for there is no meaning to Iman in him himself stripped of attributes, and his message is ghayb for which evidence was set up, just as it was set up for us, even if we differ by news and witnessing. Or it is of the attribution of what belongs to the part to the whole metaphorically, as "The sons of so-and-so killed so-and-so." Or the meaning is that they believe in the ghayb just as they believe in the witnessed, so the witnessed and the other are equal for them.

Abu Muslim al-Isfahani chose that the meaning is that these Muttaqin believe in the ghayb; i.e., in the state of absence from you, just as they believe in the state of presence, not like the hypocrites who "when they meet those who believe, they say, 'We believe,' and when they are alone with their devils, they say, 'Indeed, we are with you; we were only mockers.'" It is on the level of God Almighty's saying: "That is so he may know that I did not betray him in [his] absence." It is possible to say: in the state of the absence of the believer in him. In Sunan al-Darimi, from Ibn Mas'ud (may God be pleased with him), that al-Harith bin Qais said to him: "With God, we reckon what you have preceded us in, of seeing the Messenger of God (PBUH)." Ibn Mas'ud said: "With God, we reckon your Iman in Muhammad (PBUH) while you did not see him. The matter of Muhammad (PBUH) was clear to whoever saw him. By Him besides Whom there is no god, no one has better Iman than Iman in the ghayb." Then he read "Alif Lam Mim. This is the Book... to His saying: 'the successful.'" The superiority of one Iman over another from one aspect does not necessitate its superiority from all aspects, nor does it necessitate the superiority of the one characterized by one over the one characterized by the other. For superiority varies according to additions and considerations, and there may exist in the inferior what is not in the superior. By this, Ibn Mas'ud (may God be pleased with him) calmed the yearning of al-Harith with what was transmitted from him (PBUH) in a marfu' manner: "Yes, a people who come after you will believe in me without seeing me." How self-sufficient he (may God be pleased with him) was from what he answered with, for it excludes the companions (may God be pleased with them) from this generality which is in this verse, as his reading of it in evidence suggests. Some scholars held this view, and I do not incline to it. It was said that the meaning of ghayb is the heart, meaning they believe with their hearts, not like those who say with their mouths what is not in their hearts. The ba' in the first is for causality, and in the second and third for accompaniment, and in the fourth for the instrument.

Iqamat (establishing) is from iqama. It is said: "I established the thing (aqamtu)" if you fulfilled its right. God Almighty says: "You have nothing until you uphold (tuqimu) the Torah and the Gospel," i.e., fulfill their right with knowledge and action. The meaning of "they establish prayer" is they adjust its pillars by performing it while combining the requirements and duties, or it with the etiquettes and traditions—from "He straightened the wood (aqama al-'ud)" if he made it straight. Or they persist in it and are constant—from "The market stood (qamat al-suq)" if it was profitable, and "I established it (aqamtuha)" if I made it profitable. Or they gird themselves for its performance without lassitude or weakness, from their saying "He stood by the matter and established it (qama bi-al-amr wa-aqamahu)" if he was diligent in it. Or they perform it and do it, and he expressed this by iqama because standing is one of its pillars. These are four aspects. In the discourse on the first two, there is a consequential metaphor (isti'ara taba'iyya), and on the last two, a metonymy (majaz mursal). The explanation of this in the first is that straightening the pillars is likened to straightening wood by removing its crookedness—it is straight, likening it to the upright. Then iqama was borrowed from the leveling of bodies, which became a reality in it, for the leveling of meanings like adjusting the pillars of prayer according to what is its right. It was said iqama in the sense of leveling is a reality in entities and meanings, rather, straightening in meanings like religion and doctrine is more common, so there is no need for metaphor. The metaphorical nature of what has no doubt in it—cognitively and narratively—is not hidden, and that usage is a famous metaphor or a conventional reality. In the second, the profitability of the market is like the person standing in a good state and complete manifestation, so "standing" was used in it and "establishment" in its profitability. Then it was borrowed from it for constancy, for each of them makes its object desirable, competed for, and turned toward. This is a subtle meaning that only the elite would know, though there is a metaphor within a metaphor in it. Perhaps for this reason, al-Tibi leaned to the fact that in this aspect there is an allusive metonymy (kinaya talwihiyya), as he expressed constancy by iqama. For the establishment of prayer in the first sense indicates it is desirable, and its being wasted indicates its debasement, like a market; if it is seen standing, it indicates the profitability of its goods, and its profitability indicates the turning of desires toward it, and this demands constancy, unlike it if it were not standing. In the third, standing by the matter indicates care for its state, and its constancy is necessary, so standing was applied to its necessity. It may be said that "he stood by the matter" means he was diligent in it and fulfilled his obligation without delay or shortcoming, as if he stood by himself for that, and he established it—i.e., he raised it on his shoulders in its entirety. In that case, it is valid to be a representative, implicit, or explicit metaphor. It is also permissible to be a metonymy, because whoever stood for a matter on the feet of determination and raised it on the shoulders of diligence has exerted his effort in it. In the fourth, the performance intended is the act of prayer, and the constraint is outside, expressed by iqama by the relation of necessity, for it is necessary from the performance of prayer and its existence in its entirety the act of standing, which is iqama, because the act of the thing is an act for its parts, or the part-whole relation, because iqama is a part or a detail of the absolute act. It is also permissible that there is a metaphor of resemblance of performance to iqama in that both of them are an act related to prayer.

The group leaned to the preference of the first aspect because it is clearer, closer to reality, and more beneficial, and it is what is narrated from the interpreter of the Qur'an, Ibn 'Abbas (may God be pleased with them), as Ibn Jarir and Ibn Abi Hatim brought it forth from ways from him. Perhaps that is from him by instruction from the Messenger of God (PBUH), or a carrying of the speech of God Almighty upon its best interpretations, as it is appropriate for the order of perfect guidance and complete, comprehensive success, and in it is the great praise and general commendation. It is not far-fetched to say it entails what is in the last aspects, and the last is chosen as it was said in the hadith: "I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God, and establish prayer and give zakah. If they do that, they have protected their blood and property from me except by the right of Islam." It does not harm the preferability of the first in the ancient speech, for it is objected that if that were intended, it would be said "they pray." Diverting from the more concise and manifest without benefit is not appropriate in eloquent speech, let alone the most eloquent of speech, and for every station there is a saying. So understand.

Salah (prayer) originally, according to some, is in the sense of supplication, and from it is his saying (PBUH): "If one of you is invited to food, let him answer, and if he is fasting, let him pray." In the view of the people of the Shari'ah, it is used for the essence of the pillars, because it is a supplication with the three tongues: the state, the act, and the saying. It is famous in the principles of jurisprudence that the Mu'tazilah are of the view that these and their likes are invented Shari'ah realities because they were transmitted from linguistic meanings. Judge Abu Bakr is of the view that they are famous linguistic metaphors that did not become realities, and the majority of the companions are of the view that they are Shari'ah realities from linguistic meanings. Abu 'Ali said, and al-Suhayli preferred it, that Salah is from salawayn (the two tendons) for two veins in the back, because the first thing observed of its conditions is moving them for bowing. Ibn Jinni found it commendable, and the supplicant was called musalli (one praying) by likeness to him in his humbleness to the bowing and prostrating one. It was said Salah was taken from that because it came second to Iman, so it was likened to the musalla of the horses for the one who comes with the salawayn of the preceding. The Imam denied the derivation from salawayn, basing it on the fact that Salah is among the most famous words, so its derivation from the non-famous is at the limit of distance. I almost agree with him, even if it is said that lack of fame does not invalidate transmission. It was said from "I straightened the stick (sallaytu al-'asa)" if you straightened it with a straightener; so the musalli is as if he strives in straightening his outward and inward, like what he attempts in straightening the wood by exposing it to fire. It is fa'alah with an open 'ayn, according to the famous view, and some permitted its quiescence, so the movement of the 'ayn would be transmitted from the lam. The codices agreed on writing the waw in place of the alif in mishkat, najat, manat, salah, zakah, and hayat where they are unified, singular, and definite with the lam, and on writing the possessive from them like salati with an alif, and it was deleted from some Uthmanic codices. They agreed on writing the plural from them with the waw upon the pronunciation. Al-Ja'bari said: The aspect of writing the waw is an indication that its origin from which it is flipped is waw, and it is a following of the emphasis. This is the meaning of Ibn Qutaybah's saying: Some Arabs incline the alif toward the waw. I did not choose the justification by it because of its lack of occurrence in the Great Qur'an and the speech of the eloquent. The meaning of Salah here is the obligatory prayer, which is the five prayers as Muqatil said, or the obligatory and supererogatory as the majority said. The first is what is narrated from Ibn 'Abbas (may God be pleased with them), and the Imam claimed it is what is intended because it is what success applies to, because he (PBUH), when he explained to the Bedouin the attribute of the obligatory prayer, said: "By God, I will not add to it nor subtract from it." The Prophet (PBUH) said: "The Bedouin has succeeded if he is truthful."

Rizq (provision) with an open ra' is linguistically the giving of what the animal benefits from; it is said it includes others like plants. With a kasrah it is a name from it, and a source also according to a saying. It was said the origin of rizq is luck (hazz), and it is used in the sense of the provided, benefited-from, and in the sense of ownership, and in the sense of gratitude according to the Azd. The theologians differed in its meaning in the Shari'ah. What the Ash'arites rely upon is what God Almighty drives to the animal, so he benefits from it, whether it is lawful or unlawful, from foods, drinks, clothing, or other than that. The famous view is that it is a name for what God Almighty drives to the animal to be nourished by. It follows from the first that loans would be provision, because it is something God drove to the animal so he benefited from it, and there is a delay in making it provision according to custom, as is not hidden. It also follows that a person eats the provision of another, because it is permissible that the other benefits from it by eating, except that the verse agrees with it, as it is permissible that the benefit is from the aspect of spending on another, unlike the second definition, for what one is nourished by cannot be spent unless it is said the application of provision to the spender is a metaphor because he is at the threshold of it. The Mu'tazilah explained it in the famous view sometimes as what God Almighty gave His servant and enabled him to dispose of, and sometimes as what God Almighty gave for his stability and survival specifically. Since the attribution to God Almighty is considered in its meaning and that there is no provider except God, the Exalted, and that the servant deserves condemnation and punishment for eating the unlawful, and what is attributed to God Almighty, the Mighty and Majestic, according to them, cannot be ugly, nor its perpetrator deserving of condemnation and punishment, they said that rizq is the lawful, and the unlawful is not rizq. To this, al-Jassas from us went in the book Ahkam al-Qur'an. According to us, everything is from Him, by Him, and to Him: "Say, 'All is from God,'" and there is no power or strength except by God, "And to God return the matters." The condemnation and punishment are for the poor conduct of the causes by choice. Yes, the etiquette of the best of the believer's capital is that it should not be attributed to Him, the Exalted, except the best and the most superior, as Abraham (peace be upon him) said: "And when I am ill, it is He who cures me," and God Almighty said: "You have bestowed favor on them, not of those who have evoked [Your] anger." So the unlawful is rizq in itself, but we use etiquette in attributing it to Him, the Exalted. The evidence for the inclusion of rizq in it is what Ibn Majah, Abu Nu'aym, and al-Daylami brought forth from the hadith of Safwan bin Umayyah, who said: 'Amr bin Qurrah came and said, "O Messenger of God, God has written misery for me, so I do not see that I am provided for except from my hand to my mouth, so permit me to gain wealth without obscenity." He (PBUH) said: "There is no permission for you, nor honor, nor favor. You have lied, enemy of God. God Almighty has provided you with lawful, good provision, but you chose what God Almighty forbade you of His provision instead of what God made lawful for you of His lawfulness." He carried it on the basis of mushakala (assimilation), like the saying that it is possible his (PBUH) saying "you chose, etc." being provision for whomever I carry it to, so the reasoning falls due to the existence of the possibility which is contrary to the apparent meaning very much. If such possibility cast doubt on the reasoning, no evidence would remain on the face of the earth, and attacking the chain of narration is not accepted without a basis, and it is the foundation of the Pleiades, as is not hidden. The reasoning for this topic, as done by al-Baydawi and others, that if the unlawful were not rizq, the one nourished by it all his life would not be provided for, and it is not so because of God Almighty's saying: "And there is no creature on earth but that upon God is its provision," is nothing, because the Mu'tazilah may not restrict rizq to food, but be satisfied with absolute benefit, not benefit by the act, rather the ability to it. Thus, the evidence is not complete unless it is supposed that that person did not benefit from the time of his death to the time of his life by anything with a lawful benefit—not a suck from a breast, nor a drink of permissible water, nor a look at a beloved, nor a connection to a desired thing, rather, not even the ability to that at all. Custom dictates its non-existence, and the material of the refutation must be realized. Furthermore, if its existence were supposed, they would say that is not unlawful in relation to him, and "whoever is forced, neither desiring nor transgressing, then there is no sin upon him." Also, they may object with one who lived for a day, for example, then died before partaking in lawful or unlawful things. What our answer to them is will be their answer to us, even though the verse did not indicate that God Almighty delivers everything that everyone benefits from to him, for the reality is contrary to that. Rather, it indicated that He, the Exalted and Majestic, drives the provision and enables the benefit from it. So if turning away from the lawful to the unlawful happens, it does not harm the realization of His being a provider, the Glorious and Majestic. Also, it may be said: the meaning of the verse is "there is no creature characterized by being provided for," so the material of the refutation does not enter to harm its exit, just as fish do not enter into their saying "every creature is slaughtered by the knife"—i.e., every creature characterized as slaughtered. So the characterization that this does not serve as evidence. The better [way] is to argue by the consensus before the appearance of the Mu'tazilah that whoever eats the unlawful all his life is provided for all his life with that unlawful, and the apparent meanings testify to the division of rizq into good and evil, and they are sufficient in such a matter. The original principle upon which the specification was built has been left by the Sunnis as a level, barren plain.

Infaq (spending) is infad (execution); it is said "I spent the thing" and "I executed it" in the same meaning, and the hamza is for causality. The origin of the root indicates exiting and going, and from it is nafaq (tunnel) and nafiqa' (burrow). God, the Exalted, brought the object forward out of care for what God, the Exalted, entrusted to the servant, or because it is prior to spending outwardly, and for the proportion of the endings. The meaning of rizq here is the lawful because it is in the position of describing the Muttaqin, and there is no praise in spending the unlawful. It is said: The saying of the jurists is not rejected [here]—that if property accumulates with someone, the owner of which is not known, he should give it in charity; if he finds the owner, he pays its value or its equivalent to him. This spending is something one is rewarded for, because when he did it by the permission of the Lawgiver, he deserved praise, because when he did not know the owner, it was for him to dispose of it, and it transferred by guarantee to his ownership, and the prohibition shifted to its price. Moreover, there has been a disagreement in what if one does good with stolen property whose owner is known, as Ibn al-Qayyim said in Bada'i' al-Fawa'id. Ibn 'Aqil went to the fact that there is no reward for the usurper in it because he is sinful, nor for the owner of the property because he has no intention, and there is no reward without it. He only takes from the good deeds of the usurper according to the extent of his property. It was said that it is a benefit obtained by his property, and from it it was born, and its like is rewarded, like a righteous child for which he is rewarded even if he did not intend it. The speech of some is understood—and it is a matter of great strangeness—that the usurper is also rewarded if he spends it in good, even if he transgressed, and he is compensated from his good deeds because of his taking it, because if he acted immorally with it, he would be punished twice: once for the usurpation and once for the immorality. So if he does good with it, he should be rewarded for it. "And whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." It is not rejected by his saying (PBUH): "God does not accept charity from ghulul (treachery/stolen goods)," and his saying: "Indeed, God is good and does not accept except good," because the outcome of what was mentioned is that the reward is on the very turning away from spending in disobedience to spending in what is obedience in itself, not on the charity itself, for example, with unlawful property in terms of it being unlawful. The difference is subtle and cannot be guided to except by success.

The spending here has been differed upon. It was said—and it is the most appropriate—spending property in the ways of good, or giving from the outward and inward blessings, and knowledge that is not spoken of like a treasure that is not spent from. From Ibn 'Abbas: Zakah. From him, Ibn Mas'ud: spending on dependents. From al-Dahhak: supererogatory [giving] before the obligatory Zakah or spending in Jihad. Perhaps these statements are examples of the spender; there is no disagreement in it, and some made it a disagreement and preferred it to be the obligatory Zakah because of its proximity to its sister, prayer, in several places of the Qur'an. Min is partitive then, and its secret is not asked about, for the obligatory Zakah is not from all the property. As for when the intent of spending is its absolute, general [meaning], the benefit of its inclusion is the indication that spending some property is sufficient for the description of the spender with guidance and success, and it does not depend on spending all the property. The saying of our master al-Baydawi, following al-Zamakhshari: that it is for refraining from the forbidden extravagance, [and] is specific to one who could not bear poverty and gulp the bitterness of reliance, otherwise the Truthful One (may God be pleased with him) gave all his property in charity, and the Prophet (PBUH) did not disapprove of it due to his knowledge of his patience and his insight into what was settled in his chest. From here, when al-Hasan bin Sahl was told: "There is no good in extravagance," he said: "There is no extravagance in good." It was said: The point in including min partitive is that rizq is more general than the lawful and the unlawful, so it was included to signal that the spending that is counted is what is from the lawful, and it is a part of rizq. Ma in the verse is either relative, a source, or described. The first is more appropriate, so the return pronoun ('a'id) is deleted. It was problematic that if it is estimated as connected, the connection of two pronouns united in rank follows, and separation in their like is obligatory. If it is estimated as separated, its deletion is prevented, as they have made the mention of the separated mandatory, reasoning that it was only separated for a purpose, and if it is deleted, the indication of it is lost. It was answered upon the choice of each: As for the first, because when the two pronouns differed in plurality and singularity, it was permissible to connect them, even if they united in rank, like his saying: "For your face in benevolence is expansion and brightness / I am its... [verse]." Also, it does not follow from the prevention of that when spoken that it is prevented when estimated, for the removal of the verbal ugliness. As for the second, that what prevents its deletion is what was separated for a conceptual purpose like limitation, not absolutely, as Ibn Hisham said in al-Jami' al-Saghir, and more than one pointed to it. Min was written connected to ma with the nun deleted, because the preposition and the governed are like one thing, and the nun was deleted in pronunciation, so it was appropriate to delete it in writing, as he said in the Bahr. God, the Exalted, made the descriptions of "those who" as present tense verbs and did not make the relative pronoun al so he connects it to the active participle, because the present tense, as some mentioned, signals renewal and occurrence, along with what is in it here of renewed continuity, and these attributes are renewed in the Muttaqin, and the active participle, according to them, is not like that. This type was ordered [in this order] because actions are either of the heart—and the greatest of them is the belief in the reality of monotheism, prophecy, and the Resurrection, for if it were not for that, actions would be like a mirage in a plain which the thirsty calculates as water—or of the body—and their origin is prayer because it is the differentiator between disbelief and Islam, and it is the pillar of religion, the ascension of the monotheists, and the mother from which the rest of good deeds and righteousness branch out. For this reason, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "And the coolness of my eye was placed in prayer." God Almighty has applied Iman to it, as a group of commentators said in God Almighty's saying: "And never would God have caused your Iman to be lost." Or they are financial—namely, spending for the sake of God Almighty—and it is that which, if it is found, the stability on Iman is known. These three have differing ranks, so God, the Exalted and Majestic, ordered that, bringing forward the most important, then the important, and the most necessary, then the necessary, because Iman is necessary for the responsible person at every moment, prayer in most times, and spending in some situations. So understand that, and God takes charge of your guidance.