Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:6

This is a new statement through which the condition of the disbelievers—the straying, rebellious, and obstinate—is distinguished. It follows the sublime exposition of the states of their opposites, who are characterized by the attributes of perfection and who achieve their objectives in this life and the Hereafter. It is not linked to the preceding verses with the conjunction used for narrating one story after another, because the intended meaning of that [preceding] section was to demonstrate that the Book is at the pinnacle of perfection in guidance, confirming that it is a certainty in which there is no room for doubt.

Following this is an exposition of the disbelievers’ attribute of persistence in disbelief and misguidance, to such an extent that warning them is of no avail. The argument that both sections are meant to illustrate the state of the Book—that it is guidance for one group and not for another—is of no benefit, because the fact that it is not guidance for them is understood consequentially, not as the primary intent. Furthermore, the fact that it is beneficial is a trait of the Book’s perfection, which supports the preceding mention of its exalted status and elevated rank, unlike the lack of benefit [for the disbelievers].

It is said that the conjunction was omitted because it is a new beginning, as if it were asked: "What is the matter with others, that they are not guided by it?" It is answered that because of their turning away and the loss of their receptivity, the Book's call to faith did not benefit them. However, this is unsubstantiated; once it is established that those specific attributes are what necessitate it [the lack of guidance], this question loses its grounds. Even stranger than this is the imagination that the omission is for the sake of extreme connection, assuming that explaining the rebellion of the disbelievers confirms that the Book is perfect in its guidance. Yes, it is possible—though far-fetched—to phrase the question by saying: "If the Book were perfect, it would be guidance for the disbelievers as well." The answer is that its failure to guide them is due to their rebellion and obstinacy, not to any shortcoming in the Book. A star is obscured from the sight of those with weak vision; the fault lies with the eye, not with the star’s lack of light.

The conjunction in the words of the Exalted (Indeed, the righteous are in bliss, and indeed the wicked are in hell) is for the sake of a unifying factor, since the first sentence is designed to state the reward of the virtuous, and the second to mention the recompense of the wicked, along with the parallelism and contrast they contain. Opposites and their like have been counted as a unifying factor requiring a conjunction, because the mind treats the two opposites as if they were correlates, striving to reconcile them in thought; indeed, they have said that an opposite is more readily brought to mind along with its opposite than are likes.

The sentence is initiated with inna (Indeed) to show concern for its content. Answers are also often initiated with it, because the questioner—being in doubt—is suited by emphasis.

The definition of the relative noun (alladhina - those) is either for covenant, referring to those whom the Prophet (peace be upon him) warned during his time and who persisted in their disbelief; or it is for the class [of people], as in the saying of the Exalted: (Like the example of him who shouts at what hears nothing) and the poet’s saying: "He strives when I build, to demolish my righteous work, and he who builds is not like one whose way is to demolish." In this case, it is general, which the intellect specifies to those who are not persistent [in disbelief], with the news of what was mentioned serving as the indicator.

There are three opinions among the jurists regarding when a specific pronoun returns to a general noun: it is said it restricts it; it is said it does not; and it is said to suspend judgment. They provided the example of the Exalted’s words: (And the divorced women shall wait for three menstrual cycles). The pronoun in "their husbands" refers only to those who are eligible for reconciliation. What some major commentators have mentioned—that the specifying factor here is the news—has been objected to: that determining the subject through the meaning of the news contradicts the established rule that the subject must be determined for the listener before the news is delivered. If the determination of the subject depended on the news, it would lead to circular reasoning.

Kufr (disbelief), with the damma, is the opposite of belief. Its root—from which the kufr with the fatha is derived—is a verbal noun meaning "covering." It is said kafara yakfuru after the pattern of qatala. The report in Al-Sahah that it follows the pattern of daraba is apparently incorrect, even though it was not noted in Al-Qamus. Its usage became widespread specifically for concealing a blessing, and in opposition to faith because it involves concealing the Truth and the blessings of absolute effusion.

It has been difficult for the theologians to define legal disbelief that is not consequential, and they differed in its definition according to their differences in defining faith. However, what the Shafi'is—may Allah have mercy on them—relied upon is that it is the denial of what it is known the Messenger (peace be upon him) brought, of things so widespread that both the elite and the commoners know them. Thus, one who denies a matter of consensus is not a disbeliever absolutely; rather, only one who denies a matter of consensus regarding which there is a text—and which is among the manifest matters that all people share in knowing, such as prayer and the prohibition of wine—is a disbeliever. He who denies a matter of consensus known only to the elite, such as the inheritance rights of a granddaughter alongside a daughter, is not a disbeliever. He who denies a matter of consensus that is manifest but has no text, there is disagreement regarding the ruling of his disbelief.

As for our masters the Hanafis—may Allah be pleased with them—they did not stipulate for disbelief anything other than certainty regarding the occurrence of the matter that the denial concerns, not that the knowledge of it must reach the level of necessity. This is a momentous matter, and it seems that for this reason, Ibn al-Humam said: "It must be interpreted as applying when the denier knows for certain that it is established," because the criterion for disbelief is denial or mockery. It does not count against taking denial as the definition that the scholars of the Law ruled some actions and sayings to be disbelief when they are not, on the face of it, a denial by the doer. They stated that these are not themselves disbelief, but are rather indicators of it. The indicator was placed in the position of the signified to protect the sanctuary of religion and preserve the Sharia of the Master of Messengers (peace be upon him). Some forbidden acts dictated by base desires are not like this, so the principle is not invalidated by other than disbelief, such as wickedness. For instance, wearing the insignia of disbelievers is not in reality disbelief, as our master Imam al-Razi and others have said; rather, they judged it to be disbelief because it is a manifest sign of an internal state—namely, denial. For it is apparent that one who believes in the Messenger (peace be upon him) would not do such a thing; thus, when he does it, it points to the absence of belief. This holds as long as there is no indicator to the contrary. Hence, some researchers said: "If the wearing of the disbelievers' insignia is for mockery and jest, it is not disbelief." Our master al-Shihab said: "This is not far-fetched if there is an indicator." And I say: If there is an indicator for a purpose other than mockery and jest, it is also not disbelief, contrary to what some who claim knowledge today think; they are not among its people in any capacity.

Furthermore, "denial" here means rejection. It is not an objection to say that one who is in doubt or lacks both belief and denial is neither a believer nor a rejecter, and that this is the position of "between the two stages," which is false according to the Sunnis. It is permissible that the disbelief of the doubter and the empty-minded is because their abandonment of acknowledgement, despite the availability [of evidence], is evidence of denial, just as uttering the testimony is evidence of belief. It is also said that it is from "I denied (ankartu) the thing," meaning I was ignorant of it; this also avoids the objection. However, in that case, denial in the sense of ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, which would imply that the knower who is not a believer—like the Jewish rabbis—is an intermediate, so the difficulty remains.

In Al-Mawaqif, disbelief is defined as the lack of belief in the Messenger (peace be upon him) regarding some of what it is known by necessity that he brought. Perhaps he also says that some actions and sayings are placed in the position of lack of belief. It was objected to taking "necessity" [into account] that what is established by consensus may fall outside of necessities, and likewise, the innocence of Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) was established by the Quran, and its linguistic evidences do not compel knowledge, so it also falls outside of necessities. It was answered that the departure of what is established by consensus from necessities is prohibited, and that linguistic evidence provides knowledge when accompanied by indicators—which are present in the innocence of Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her). Our scholars (may Allah be pleased with them) counted many things in the chapter on disbelief that I do not see as necessitating disbelief, and expelling one from the community is a matter that nothing resembles; therefore, one should be cautious in this chapter as much as possible. Ibn al-Humam's statement: "Be gentle with people." And in Abkar al-Afkar, there is a discussion on this topic that is astonishing. I do not desire length without depth, nor superfluousness without benefit.

The Mu'tazila used this verse and its like to argue for the temporal creation of His speech (the Almighty), because the truthfulness of the report requires that the event mentioned—namely, the relation in time—precedes the reporter. Everything preceded by time is created. It was answered that the precedence of the mentioned event requires the attachment of His eternal speech to the event; thus, the necessary consequence is the precedence of the event over the attachment, which is its creation, and it does not necessitate the creation of the Speech itself, just as in His (the Almighty’s) knowledge of the occurrence of things: it has a created attachment without the knowledge itself being created. Or it may be said that since His Essence and Attributes are not temporal, all times are equal to them, just as all places are equal to them. Thus, each of the types is present before Him in its own rank, and the difference in expressions is with regard to the temporal listener, in observation of wisdom in the matter of understanding. Other things were said which would take long to mention.

"Sawa’" (alike) is a verbal noun meaning equality; it is not dualized or pluralized. They dispensed with dualizing it by dualizing "siya" except in rare cases. It is as if it were originally a verbal noun, as al-Radi said, and it is in the nominative case as two predicates, and what follows is in the nominative case through it as a subject—as if it were said: "Indeed, those who have disbelieved, your warning and its absence are equal for them"—or it is the predicate of a deleted subject, estimated as "the matter is that they are alike," then he clarified the two matters with his words (whether you warn them or do not warn them). Or it is a predicate for what follows it, i.e., your warning and its absence are equal, which is the famous view on the tongues of students in such cases. Several things were raised against it: First, that a verb cannot be ascribed to it. Second, that it invalidates the priority of the interrogation. Third, that the hamza and am (or) are positioned for one of two matters, and everything that indicates equality can only be ascribed to multiple things; hence it is said, "His presence and absence are equal," and not "or his absence." Fourth, that on the assumption that it is a predicate, it would not be valid to front it, due to the confusion of the subject with the agent.

The answer, regarding the first point, is that it is of the type of speech where the side of the wording is abandoned for the side of the meaning. The Arabs incline in places in their speech toward meanings with a manifest inclination, such as "Do not eat fish and drink milk," meaning: "It is not possible for you to eat fish and drink milk." If it were run according to its outward appearance, it would require the conjunction of a noun in the accusative to a verb, indeed, a singular to a sentence that has no place [in syntax]. Al-Baydawi’s claim—may Allah brighten his countenance—that the wording was used in part of its meaning, which is the act, metaphorically, and therefore it is valid to predicate it—is like the validity of predicating what is intended for its mere wording, such as "daraba" (he struck) being a past verb with an open 'ba'—does not hold where the two equivalents or one of them, after the hamza of equality, is a nominal sentence, as in the words of the Exalted: (It is the same for you whether you call them or you are silent). This falls into the [category of] inclination toward meaning, despite the fact that it does not necessitate departing from the literal truth.

Ibn Jinni reported from Abu Ali that he said: "The sentence composed of a subject and predicate occurs in the place of a verb governed in the accusative by an implied 'an' (that), and the speech and opinion on it turn to the path of the verbal noun," such as the words of the Exalted: (Do you have among those your right hands possess any partners in what We have provided for you so that you are equal regarding it?) and the words of the Almighty: (Does he have knowledge of the unseen, so he sees?). Do you not see that the 'fa' is an answer to the interrogation, and it directs the verb after it to the accusative by an implied 'an', and the accusative verb is a verbal noun inevitably, as if he said: "Does he have knowledge of the unseen, so his vision [sees it]?" And "Is there any partnership between you, so equality [exists]?"

Regarding the second and third points, the answer is that the hamza and am have been stripped of the meaning of questioning regarding one of the two matters, and because they were equal in the knowledge of the questioner, they were made equal in the attachment of the ruling to both of them. For this reason, it was said that they are used metaphorically for the meaning of the conjunctive 'wa' (and), indicating the gathering of its conjuncts in a certain ratio without observing priority or posteriority. Then, such a meaning, even if it is intended, is not observed in the title of the subject after the composition, just as the meaning of the conjunction is not observed; thus, it is not said in the translation here except "warning and its absence are equal," without looking at the equality such that one would say: "If the estimation of the subject is 'the two equal things', then applying 'sawa'' to it becomes futile." It is repelled by what repels it. Imam al-Aqsarai said that "whether you warn them" and so on, transitioned from being intended as one of them to being intended as both, and this is the meaning of the equality found in it. As for the ruling of equality in the lack of benefit, it only resulted from his words (It is the same for them whether you warn them or do not warn them). He mentioned that he found the like of it from Abu Ali al-Farisi, and the speech of al-Mawla al-Fanari revolves around this boundary.

Some researchers went to the view that they are originally for questioning about one of the two matters, and they are equal in the knowledge of the questioner, and that equality is gone here because the questioning has been stripped from them, and equality in knowledge remains. This is the meaning of the statement of those who said the hamza and am are stripped down to the meaning of equality; thus, what is obtained here is that "the two equal things in your knowledge are equal in the lack of benefit." This, despite its difficulties, is something we can dispense with through what we have mentioned. Similar to it is what al-Amili mentioned, that the full meaning of both is equality and questioning together, so they were stripped of the meaning of questioning and the remainder was equality. Because of the repetition of the ruling of equality with one meaning, emphasis is obtained, as if it were said: "The equality of warning and its absence is equal." This is far from the arena of investigation, as is not hidden. Their talk of "stripping" suggests that there is a figurative transfer here in which the whole was used for its part; in reality, it is either a metaphor or used for the implication of its meaning.

Then, it is famous that it is not permissible to use the conjunction aw (or) after sawa' if the hamza of equality is present, such that in Al-Mu'ni, it is said: "It is from the solecism of the jurists." In Sharh al-Kitab by al-Sirafi: "When sawa' is followed by the interrogative alif, am is mandatory, as in 'Whether you stood or sat' (sawa'un 'alayya aqamta am qa'adta). If one of two nouns is conjoined to another after it, it is conjoined with wa (and) only, such as 'Zayd and Amr are equal to me.' If it is followed by two verbs without questioning, one is conjoined to the other with aw (or), as in your saying: 'It is the same to me whether you stood or sat.' If it is followed by two verbal nouns, such as 'Your standing and your sitting are the same to me,' you may conjoin with wa or aw." The reason it entered into the two verbs without questioning is because of the meaning of compensation contained therein; the estimation of the example is: "If you stand or sit, they are on equality."

The apparent meaning of this is an exposition of the Arabs' usage of sawa', and he did not recount any anomaly in any of that. Therefore, the reading of Ibn Muhaysin from the path of al-Za'farani, "Whether you warn them or (aw) do not warn them," is anomalous in narration only, not in usage, as Ibn Hisham’s speech implies. Understand this position, for people have erred in it after people.

As for the fourth point, the grammarians have clearly stated that this is restricted to the verbal predicate, not the adjective, such as "Zayd stood," which cannot be fronted because the subject would be confused with the agent. Thus, if it is not prohibited in the explicit adjective, its non-prohibition here is even more appropriate, as has been said.

He (the Almighty) deviated from the verbal noun and did not bring it according to the original form for two reasons: a linguistic one, which is the suitability of the entry of the hamza and am, because they are originally for questioning, and the verb is more appropriate for them; and a semantic one, which is the illusion of renewal, looking at the outward appearance of the form. It contains an indication that he (peace be upon him) brought this about and created it, and thus fulfilled the trust and delivered the message. They did not believe because of the precedence of wretchedness and the overtaking of the decree, not because of a shortcoming on his part—and far be it from him! Even if it expresses despair, it contains consolation for him (peace be upon him).

"‘Ala" (upon) is here in consideration of its original meaning, because equality is transitive with 'ala, as in the words of the Exalted: (Established upon the Throne). It is said it means "with," so in Al-Mughni, it is stripped for the sake of prepositional status; and on this, the majority of commentators are agreed. The statement that it is here for harm, like an invocation against them, is not substantiated, because "sawa'" is used with 'ala absolutely, as in the saying: "My affection is eternal, whether you visited or did not visit."

"Al-indhar" (warning) is frightening absolutely or delivering a message. It is most often used in frightening against the punishment of Allah (the Almighty), and it is transitive to two [objects], as in the words of the Exalted: (Indeed, We have warned you of a near punishment) and (Say, "I have warned you of a lightning bolt"). So the second object here is deleted, i.e., "the punishment," whether overtly or implicitly. It is considered good not to estimate it, so it may be general. In Al-Bahr: "Warning is notification along with frightening within a period that allows for taking precautions against the feared thing; if it does not allow, it is alerting and informing, not warning." He did not mention the good news because it is understood by way of textual implication, for warning is more impactful on the heart and stronger in effect; if it did not benefit, then the good news of the lack of benefit is even more [understandable]. It is said there is no place for good news here, because the disbeliever is not worthy of it.

His words (the Mighty and Majestic) (they will not believe) may be an explanation for the summary of what preceded it, in which there is equality, disbelief, and the lack of benefit of the warning. The past, according to the outward appearance, is silent about the continuity, and "they will not believe" indicates it and clarifies it; so there is no need to say that this is in view of the meaning of the word, while ignoring that it is news about those who persist, in which case it has no place in syntax, as is the case for explanatory sentences. According to al-Shalubin, it has a place, for it is a clarifying conjunction according to him. It is also possible that it is a circumstantial clause emphasizing what preceded it, and the owner of the circumstantial state is the pronoun in "on them" or "warn them." This is not like "Zayd is your father, kind," for the lack of what is stipulated in this type here. Or it may be a substitute—either a substitute of inclusion, because the lack of benefit of what passed includes the lack of belief, or a substitute for the whole, because it is the same as it in the outcome; or a predicate after a predicate; or the predicate of a deleted subject, meaning "they are those who do not believe"; or the predicate of inna, and the sentence before it is an interpolation. In Al-Tashil: "The interpolation is that which is beneficial in strengthening," and here it is like the cause for the ruling, due to its indication of the hardness of their hearts and their lack of being affected by the warning, which necessitates the lack of belief. Since the subject indicates the lack of belief in the past and the predicate indicates its continuity in the future, the illusion of a lack of benefit in the report is repelled. Making the sentence an invocation is far-fetched, and more far-fetched is what was narrated that the pause is at "do not warn them" and the beginning is "they will not believe," as a subject and predicate. Rather, one should not pay attention to it.

Al-Jahdari read "sawa'un" with the lightening of the hamza according to the dialect of Hejaz; it is possible he made the waw pure, and possible he made the hamza between-and-between—that is, between the hamza and the waw. From al-Khalil, it is reported that he read "su'un 'alayhim" with the damma of the sin with a waw after it; it is a deviation from the meaning of equality to insult and ugliness. Upon this, it has no syntactic relation to what follows it, as in Al-Bahr. The Kufans and Ibn Dhakwan, and it is the dialect of Banu Tamim, read "a'andhartahum" with the realization of the two hamzas, which is the original. The people of Hejaz do not permit combining them, seeking lightness. The two Haramian [reciters], Abu Amr, and Hisham read with the realization of the first and the easing of the second; however, Abu Amr, Qalun, Isma'il bin Ja'far from Nafi', and Hisham insert an alif between them, while Ibn Kathir does not. The realization of both was reported from Hisham with the insertion of an alif between them, and it is the reading of Ibn Abbas and Ibn Abi Ishaq. It was reported from Warsh like Ibn Kathir, and like Qalun, the substitution of the second hamza with an alif, so two stationary letters meet in a way that is not the standard according to the Basrans. Al-Zamakhshari claimed that this is a solecism and a departure from the speech of the Arabs from two aspects: One, the combination of two stationary letters on a non-standard basis. Second, that the way to ease a moving hamza preceded by a fatha is by easing it between-and-between, not by substituting it with an alif, because that is the way of the stationary hamza. What they said is the doctrine of the Basrans, while the Kufans permitted the combination on a basis other than that permitted by the Basrans. This reading is of the category of performance, and the report of the Egyptians from Warsh and the people of Baghdad recount the easing between-and-between, as is the rule. Thus, attacking it is not an attack on what is among the seven-fold mutawatir. However, the Mu'tazili had poor manners in his expression.

This verse and its like were used as an argument by those who say that it is possible to be burdened with the impossible in itself, based on the assumption that the relative noun refers to specific people. The gist of the argument is that He (the Almighty) reported that they will not believe, yet commanded them to believe, which is impossible; for if it were possible, no impossibility would result from assuming its occurrence. However, it is necessary, for if they were to believe, His report would turn into a lie, and their belief would include the belief that they will not believe, because it is among what he (peace be upon him) brought. Their belief that they will not believe is a branch of their attribute of lacking belief; thus, they would be characterized by both belief and lack of belief, and the two opposites would meet. Both matters—the turning of His report into a lie and the meeting of two opposites—are impossible, and what necessitates the impossible is impossible.

It was answered that their belief is not among the matters in dispute because it is possible in itself, and by His (the Almighty) reporting the lack of belief, it does not depart from possibility; at most, it becomes impossible by way of the "other." The necessity of its occurrence leading to a lie or the meeting of opposites is in consideration of that, because His (the Almighty’s) reporting the occurrence or non-occurrence of a thing does not negate the power over it, nor does it remove it from essential possibility, because the turning of the truth is impossible. It only negates its non-occurrence or occurrence, so it becomes impossible by the "other." The necessary consequence for the possible is that nothing impossible results from assuming its occurrence, looking at it in itself. As for looking at it in its impossibility by the "other," it sometimes necessitates what is impossible in itself, like the lack of the first caused effect necessitating the lack of the Necessary [Being].

It was said, in explaining the impossibility of their believing that they will not believe, that it is a burdening with contradictions, because acknowledgement in reports they do not acknowledge at all necessitates their lack of acknowledgement of that, and burdening with a thing is burdening with its consequences. It was opposed by prohibition, especially regarding negative consequences.

It was also said because their acknowledgement of the fact that they do not acknowledge it necessitates that they do not acknowledge it, and what necessitates its own existence is its non-existence, which is impossible. It was refuted that it is permissible for that necessity to be due to its impossibility by the "other," as in the case here.

It was also said because a person’s inner acceptance of the opposite of what he finds in himself is impossible. It was objected that it is permissible for Allah (the Almighty) not to create the knowledge of his belief, so he believes in the fact that he does not believe. Yes, it is contrary to custom, but it is not of the impossible in itself. Thus it was said, and the position is not without something, and yet more something. The discussion is long, and satisfying it here is like burdening with what is not possible. It will come to you, if Allah (the Almighty) wills, in the most complete manner.

Then, the benefit of the warning after the knowledge that it does not bear fruit is the extraction of the secret of what preceded it: the knowledge following the known, regarding obedience and refusal in those burdened. (So that people may not have an argument against Allah after the messengers). For if Allah (the Almighty) had entered, from the beginning, everyone into His abode which was known beforehand to be their abode, the state of the punished among them would have been what Allah described: (And if We had destroyed them with a punishment before him, they would have said, "Our Lord, if only You had sent a messenger to us so we could have followed Your verses before we were humbled and disgraced"). So He sent messengers, bringers of glad tidings and warners, to extract what is in their receptivity of obedience and refusal, so that he who perishes may perish on the basis of evidence, and he who lives may live on the basis of evidence. For the reminder benefits the believers, and the argument is established by it against the others; for after the reminder and the delivery of the message, the motives for obedience and refusal stir according to the eternal receptivity, and the act or the abandonment follows, by the preceding Will which follows the Knowledge, which follows the Known that is eternally fixed. Thus, the benefit and harm result from reward and punishment.

The argument was established against the disbeliever because what he refrained from bringing after the arrival of the call and the appearance of the miracle—namely, faith—if it were impossible in itself absolutely, it would not have occurred from anyone. But it did occur; thus, it is known that its non-occurrence from him was from a refusal arising from his eternal receptivity by his own evil choice. Even if his refusal was by Allah’s creation of it in him, the act of Allah follows His Will, which follows His Knowledge, which follows the Known. And the Known, in terms of its eternal fixation, is not created. Thus, the attachment of Knowledge to it, according to what it is in its uncreated fixation, is what his eternal receptivity necessitates. Then the Will attached to specifying what was previously known from the requirement of his eternal receptivity, so Power manifested it according to the Will. The Almighty said: (He gave everything its creation). Therefore, He said: (Say, "Allah has the perfect argument"). But He did not will, for it was not previously known, as it is a disclosure of the Known and what is in his eternal receptivity. Thus, the Known, receptive to guidance in itself, He disclosed as being what it is in its acceptance of it, and the one receptive to straying, He attached to as being what it is in its lack of acceptance of it. So He did not will except what was previously known from the requirements of receptivity. Thus, Power did not manifest except what Allah (the Almighty) willed, so it is correct that Allah has the perfect argument, glory be to Him, if disputed, because Allah (the Almighty) (has given everything its creation) and what its receptivity necessitates, and He did not lack anything from it.

For this reason, he (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever finds good, let him praise Allah, for Allah is benevolent with creation, and there is no obligation upon Him; and whoever finds other than that, let him blame none but himself." Because He did not manifest His Power by His generosity and mercy—from what wisdom necessitated from the matter in which there is no good for him except for being the requirement of his receptivity—so praise be to Allah in every state, and we seek refuge in Him from the states of the people of deviation and misguidance.

He (the Almighty) said (It is the same for them) and did not say "for you," because the warning and its absence are not the same for him (peace be upon him), due to the virtue of the warning that is obligatory upon him over leaving it. And if the relative noun refers to specific people, as an act of covenant definition as previously mentioned, it would contain a miracle by His reporting of the unseen—namely, the death of those on disbelief—as was...