Tafsir of Al-Anbiya' 21:17

Surah Al-Anbiya' 21:17

ﱶ ﱷ ﱸ ﱹ ﱺ ﱻ ﱼ ﱽ ﱾ ﱿ ﲀ

Had We intended to take a diversion, We could have taken it from [what is] with Us - if [indeed] We were to do so.

Tafsir

Ruh al-Ma'ani

Verse range: 21:17

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Al-Anbiya: (17) "If We had intended to take a pastime..."

"If We had intended to take a pastime, We would have taken it from Ourselves" is an initiating clause that affirms what preceded it regarding the negation of play in the creation of the heavens, the earth, and what is between them. The meaning of the verse, as asserted by the author of al-Kashf, is: If We had intended to take a pastime, then such a taking would have been from Our side—that is, a "divine" pastime. The wisdom you perceive as mere "play" from your side is, in reality, absolute gravity and wisdom. Thus, the meaning is: "If We had intended it, it would have been impossible [to occur as you imagine]."

His saying, the Almighty: "If We were to act" (17) This serves as a reinforcement for that meaning, used to emphasize the impossibility [of the action]. In is conditional, and its apodosis is elliptical—that is: "If We were to act" as those who are described as acting with play, then such would be Our action. If it were interpreted as a negation (meaning "We are not doers of such things")—thereby being an explicit statement of the conclusion of what preceded, as held by the majority of exegetes—it would be highly eloquent.

Al-Zamakhshari said: "From Ourselves" means from the side of Our power. He argued that the essence of the meaning is: "If We had intended that, We would have taken it [from Ourselves], for We are capable of everything; however, We did not intend it because Wisdom prevented it." The author of al-Kashf mentioned that his interpretation of this as "power" is not clear, and al-Baydawi and others have also interpreted it as such. Its outward meaning implies that the taking of a pastime falls under the category of power, though it has been said that such an act is essentially impossible for the Almighty, and that which is impossible cannot be an object of power.

The response to this is that the truth of a conditional statement does not necessitate the truth of the two components; rather, it is a suspension upon the impossibility of the will. Alternatively, it is said that Wisdom does not negate the taking of that which is of the nature of a pastime; rather, it negates the performance of an act by which He, Glorified be He, Himself becomes "distracted." Thus, there is no impossibility in the taking itself, but rather in the attribution of it [to Him].

The truth, in my view, is that "futility" (al-'abath), being a deficiency, is impossible regarding His right, and therefore refraining from it is mandatory for Him, Glorified and Exalted be He. Even if we do not use the term "mandatory upon Him," we are proponents of "mandatory from Him," Exalted be His Majesty. The most excellent of the late scholars, al-Kalanbawi, stated: The school of the Maturidis—who affirm that acts have inherent qualities of beauty or ugliness prior to the arrival of the Divine Law—holds that if an act contains an aspect necessitating ugliness, then that act is impossible for the Almighty; its omission is "mandatory from Him," not "mandatory upon Him," such as the imposition of obligations beyond one's capacity, or lying, according to the verifiers among the Ash'aris and Maturidis. If it does not contain such an aspect, the act is possible for Him, but not mandatory upon Him. They agree with the Ash'aris that nothing is mandatory upon Him.

Anyone who denies that "futility" is a deficiency, just as lying is, has been stubborn against his own intellect. Even more profound than this is that one understands from the words of some researchers the assertion of the necessity of observing absolute wisdom regarding Him, lest one be led to one of the well-known impossibilities. The negation of the existence of "play" regarding Him is a negation of necessity in specific instances, as the Mu'tazilah claim. Perhaps "necessity" here refers to the inevitability of the action proceeding from Him, such that He is unable to refrain from it because its cause necessitates it by choice—not absolutely, nor on the condition of total preparation—so as not to lead to the rejection of the principle of free will. Just as rejecting it is not required in Imam al-Razi’s preference for what many Ash'aris chose regarding the necessity of knowledge for reflection (nazar) according to reason. Nevertheless, one should avoid the unrestricted usage of "necessity" regarding the Almighty; reflect upon this, for it is important.

It is also said: The meaning of "from Ourselves" is from what is befitting Our Presence among the immaterial entities (al-mujarradat), meaning: We would have taken it from that, not from the elevated celestial spheres and the physical bodies, as is the habit of tyrants in raising thrones, beautifying them, leveling seats, and decorating them.

It is not hidden that the majority of the Sunnis deny the existence of [independent] immaterial entities. Furthermore, assuming the verse is interpreted as mentioned, the intent is to refute those who claim the existence of "pastime" in this world, not that it is permissible to take it among the immaterial entities; rather, its impossibility is even more apparent there. Al-Jubba'i stated that the meaning is: If We had intended to take a pastime, We would have taken it from Ourselves such that no one would know about it, because it is a deficiency, and concealing it is more appropriate. This is faster to come to mind than what is in al-Kashf, but it is deeper in its objective.

Imam al-Wahidi said: Al-lahw (pastime) is the seeking of recreation for the soul. A woman is called lahw, as is a child, because one seeks recreation through them; hence, a man’s wife and child are called his "two sweet-smelling plants" (rayhanatayh). The meaning is: If We had intended to take a wife of pleasure or a child of pleasure, We would have taken it from Our side—that is, from what We choose and select of what We will, as in His saying: "If Allah had intended to take a son, He could have selected from what He creates whatever He willed." The exegetes said: This means from the Hūr al-'Īn (houris). This is a refutation of the Jews' claim regarding Uzair and the Christians' claim regarding the Messiah and his mother, in that he, peace be upon him, is a son, and she is a consort. The meaning of "from Ourselves" is: from Our side, where no one else has any authority, for a man’s child and wife are with him, not with another.

Interpreting lahw as "child" is narrated from Ibn Abbas and al-Suddi. According to al-Zajjaj, it is the word for "child" in the Hadrami dialect. Regarding it meaning "woman," Qatada reported this from the people of Yemen without attributing it to a specific city. Al-Tabarsi claimed that its origin refers to sexual intercourse, used metonymically for the woman because she is the object of intercourse, citing the verse of Imru' al-Qais: “Unless Basasa claims today that I have grown old, and that my peers do not appreciate/deserve [the pleasure of] the pastime.”

The most apparent [interpretation] is to carry lahw upon what you heard first [i.e., play/amusement], because of His saying: "And what is between them [as] players," and because the negation of having a son will come explicitly, if Allah wills. It is known from this that the notion of it being a refutation of the Christians and their ilk is not appropriate here. Finally, the context suggests that In is conditional and the apodosis is omitted, trusting in the indication of what preceded it, meaning: "If We were to be doers [of play], We would have taken it from Ourselves." And its being a negative [particle], while sound in meaning—and stated by a group including Mujahid, al-Hasan, Qatada, and Ibn Jurayj—is rebutted by some, noting that the negative In usually appears with the lam (the separator la), though the matter here is simple.