Tafsir of Al-Anbiya' 21:22

"If there were therein [in the heavens and the earth] gods besides Allah, they would both have been corrupted."

His saying—Exalted is He—is a refutation of the multiplicity of gods. The pronoun in "therein" refers to the heavens and the earth, and what is intended by them is the entire universe, both its upper and lower realms. The intent of "being therein" is the capacity for disposal and governance, not the state of spatial occupation and stability therein, as the scholar al-Kalanbawi imagined. On this interpretation, the prepositional phrase is connected to "were."

Al-Tayyibi said: It is a predicate for "gods," similar to His saying—Exalted is He—"And it is He who is [God] in the heaven, and [God] on earth," and His saying—Glorified is He—"And He is Allah in the heavens and on the earth." He holds that the connection of the prepositional phrase to what was mentioned here is in view of its inclusion of the meaning of Creatorship and efficacy. You know that the apparent meaning is what was mentioned first.

"Except" (illa) denotes that what follows it is distinct from what preceded it, so it is in the position of "other than" (ghayr). It is stated in al-Mughni that it can be an adjective in the position of ghayr, thus it—and what follows it—describes an indefinite plural or something similar. He exemplified the first with this verse. More than one exegete has clarified that the meaning is: "If there were in them gods other than Allah." Al-Khafaji rendered this as an indication that illa here is a noun with the meaning of ghayr, acting as an adjective for what preceded it, and its inflection appeared in what followed it because it is in the form of a particle, similar to the definitive al- in an active participle.

The scholar al-Shamni denied that it is in the position of ghayr in terms of noun-status, citing what is in the marginalia of the second master (al-Allamah al-Thani) regarding His saying—Exalted is He—"There is no farid..." that there is no one who posits the noun-status of illa except when it is in the position of ghayr. Then he mentioned that the intent of it being in the position of ghayr is that it occupies its position in distinguishing what follows it from what preceded it, in essence or attribute.

In Sharh al-Kafiyah by al-Radi: The origin of ghayr is to be an adjective providing the distinction of its genitive from its qualified noun, either in essence—such as "I passed by a man other than (ghayr) Zayd"—or in attribute—such as "I entered with a face other than (ghayr) the one I went out with." The origin of illa, which is the mother of the particles of exception, is the distinction of what follows it from what precedes it, whether by negation or affirmation. When what follows illa and what follows ghayr gathered in the meaning of distinction, illa was made to carry the meaning of ghayr in its adjectival function; thus, what follows illa became distinct from what preceded it in essence or attribute, without considering its distinction in negation or affirmation. And ghayr was made to carry the meaning of illa in exception; thus, what follows it became distinct from what precedes it by negation or affirmation, without distinguishing it in essence or attribute. However, carrying ghayr to illa is more common than carrying illa to ghayr, because ghayr is a noun, and modification in nouns is more common than in particles; therefore, ghayr occurs in all the positions of illa.

You know that the immediate understanding is that illa, when it conveys the meaning of ghayr, is a noun. As for its remaining a particle—while being alone or with what follows it, by making them as a single entity, serving as an adjective for what preceded it—there is an obvious objection to that, and it is even more obvious when it is alone. Perhaps al-Khafaji did not say what he said unless he was aware of someone who posits its noun-status. It is possible that he was forced to say this by what is countered against the view that it remains a particle. By my life, he hit the mark when the Master said what he said, and the speech of al-Radi is not a text [unequivocal] in one of the two matters, as is not hidden from the fair-minded.

It is not correct for it to be an exception in terms of Arabic grammar according to the majority, because "gods" is an indefinite plural in an affirmative context. The doctrine of the majority—as stated explicitly in al-Talwih—is that it does not entail universality; thus, what follows it does not enter into it, such that it would need to be excluded by it. They mandate the inclusion of the exception in the excepted-from in connected exception, and they do not suffice with the possibility of entry, as al-Mubarrad and some scholars of jurisprudence have held. Therefore, according to them, "Men stood except Zayd" is not permissible, neither on the basis of the exception being connected, nor on it being disconnected, based on the fact that it must necessitate certainty of non-entry, which is definitively missing.

Those who permitted exception in such a construction, like al-Mubarrad, made the nominative case in the Majestic Name (Allah) based on substitution (badal). This was challenged on the basis that no negation precedes it. It was answered that law is for a conditional, and it is like a negation. From him, it is also answered that it indicates impossibility, and the impossibility of a thing is its negation. He claimed that tafrigh (vacating) after it is permissible, and that a construction like "If there were among us except Zayd, we would have perished" is excellent speech. Sibawayh disagreed with this, saying: "If you said 'If there were among us the example,' you would have spoken incorrectly."

It was refuted by saying: They do not say "If a man came to me, I would honor him" (using the indefinite dayyar), nor "If any one came to me, I would honor him." If it were in the position of a negator, that would be permissible, just as "There is no man (dayyar) in it" and "No one (ahad) came to me" are permissible. Al-Damamini countered this by saying that al-Mubarrad can say: We have agreed on treating if (law) as an explicit negation and have permitted tafrigh with it. Allah—the Exalted—said: "And most of the people refused except kufran (disbelief)," and He said—Glorified is He—"And Allah refuses except to perfect His light," even though "He refused a man (dayyar) to come" and "He refused any one (ahad) to go" are not permissible. So, what is your answer regarding this is our answer [to you].

Al-Radi said: Al-Mubarrad permitted the nominative case in the verse as a substitution because law contains the meaning of negation. This is just as al-Zajjaj permitted substitution in "the people of Yunus" in His saying—Exalted is He—"If only there had been a community that believed..." by treating the tahdid (incitement) as a negation. It is better not to treat these two as valid for substitution and tafrigh with them, as it has not been established.

Al-Maliki mentioned in Sharh al-Tashil that the speech of al-Mubarrad in al-Muqtadab is like the speech of Sibawayh, and that tafrigh and substitution after law are not permissible. Likewise, the exception is not correct in terms of meaning. In al-Kashshaf, it is stated that the substitution and the exception in the verse are impossible in meaning, because then it would not benefit what the speech was intended for: the negation of multiplicity. And it would lead to the gods being such that the True God is not included in their count, which leads to corruption; so the negation of corruption implies His inclusion among them, and that is a form of corruption itself.

Then, the adjective, according to what Ibn Hisham held, is an intensifier, capable of being omitted, like the one in His saying—Exalted is He—"a single blast." So if one said, "If there were gods in them, they would have been corrupted," it would be correct and the intent would be achieved. Al-Shalubin and Ibn al-Sa'igh said: The meaning is not correct until illa is in the meaning of ghayr which is intended for substitution and replacement. It was refuted by saying that the meaning then becomes: "If there were in them a number of gods, as a substitute and replacement for Him—Exalted is His Majesty—they would have been corrupted," and this implies by its concept that if there were two, and He—the Almighty—was one of them, they would not have been corrupted, and that is false.

It was answered that the meaning of the verse then does not require this concept, because its meaning is: "If there were in them a number of gods, other than Him or together with Him—the Almighty—as a substitute for Him alone—the Almighty—they would have been corrupted." And that is something against which there is no dust. So know this.

The majority are upon the intent of distinction, and the intent of corruption is nullification and decay, or lack of creation. The verse, as more than one has said, points to a rational proof for the negation of the multiplicity of gods. It is a conditional syllogism in which the negation of the consequent is posited to result in the negation of the antecedent. It is as if it were said: "If the god were multiple in the world, it would have been corrupted." But it was not corrupted. The result is that the god is not multiple. In this, there is a usage of law that differs from the famous usage.

The Master (al-Sayyid al-Sanad) said: Law is sometimes used in the context of argumentation, so it is understood from it that the existence of the consequent is linked to the existence of the antecedent, with the non-existence of the consequent, so the non-existence of the antecedent is known from it. Even though it is rare, it exists in the language. It is said: "If Zayd were in the city, he would have come to us," to know from it that he is not in it. From this is His saying—Exalted is He—"If there were therein gods besides Allah, they would have been corrupted."

The second Master said: The masters of intellect have made law a tool for necessary connection (talaazum), indicating the necessity of the consequent for the conditional without intending to cut off the non-existence of both. This is why the exception of the essence of the antecedent is valid according to them. They use it to indicate that knowledge of the non-existence of the consequent is the cause for knowledge of the non-existence of the antecedent, by the necessity of the non-existence of the malzum (necessitated) by the non-existence of the lazim (necessitator), without regard to what the cause of the non-existence of the consequent is in reality. This is because they use it in syllogisms to acquire sciences and affirmations. There is no doubt that knowledge of the non-existence of the malzum does not require knowledge of the non-existence of the lazim, but the matter is the opposite. If we examine, we find its usage according to the rule of language is more frequent, but it is sometimes used according to their rule, as in His saying—Exalted is He—"If there were therein..." etc. So it appears that the purpose is to affirm the non-existence of the multiplicity of gods, not to explain the cause of the absence of corruption. And there is a discussion regarding this that is repelled by care. It is not hidden from you that some grammarians have a view similar to this. Al-Shalubin and Ibn 'Usfur have said: Law is merely for connection between two occurrences in the past, without indicating the impossibility of the first and the second, just as in (if) is merely for connection in the future. The apparent view is that the particularity of the past here is not taken into account.

Some claimed: Law here is for the non-existence of the second due to the non-existence of the first, as is famous regarding it, and the deduction is completed. The flaw in this is not hidden from those who examine closely. Then the Master said in Sharh al-Aqa'id: The argument is persuasive (iqna'iyyah), and the necessity is customary, as is appropriate for rhetorical speech, for the custom is that a barrier and conflict prevent the multiplicity of the ruler. Otherwise, if corruption in act is intended—that is, their deviation from this observed system—mere multiplicity does not necessitate it, for the possibility of agreement on this system exists. And if the possibility of corruption is intended, there is no proof for its non-existence; rather, the texts testify to the folding of the heavens and the removal of this system, so it is necessarily possible.

Likewise, if their corruption is intended as their non-creation, in the sense that if two creators were hypothesized, obstruction between them in actions would be possible; thus, one of them would not be a creator, so no creation would exist. The necessity is not categorical, because the possibility of obstruction only necessitates the lack of multiplicity of the creator, and it does not necessitate the non-existence of the creation. Furthermore, it is met with a prohibition of necessity if the lack of creation in act is intended, and a prohibition of the non-existence of the consequent if the possibility is intended. So, he denied that the verse is a demonstration (burhan), whether corruption is interpreted as a departure from the system or as the lack of creation. There is a reproach in this regarding what he pointed to in Sharh al-Maqasid concerning its being a demonstration for the second. For after he established the argument of tamanu' (obstruction), he said: This argument is called the argument of obstruction, and it is pointed to by His saying—Exalted is He—"If there were therein gods..." the verse.

If the lack of creation is intended, its formulation is to say: If gods were multiple, the heavens and the earth would not have been created, because their creation is either by the sum of the two powers, or by each of them, or by one of them, and all are void. As for the first, because the will of a god is the perfection of power. And as for the last two, because of what passed regarding the concurrence and the preference without a preference. And if corruption is intended as the departure from what they are upon in terms of system, its formulation is to say: If gods were multiple, there would be between them conflict and competition, and a distinction of the work of each from the other by the rule of customary necessity. Thus, this coherence among the parts of the world—by virtue of which the whole became like a single person—would not have occurred, and the order of the system in which the survival of species and the arrangement of effects lies would be disrupted.

The reproach is to say: The multiplicity of gods does not necessitate conflict in act by way of the will of each of them for the existence of the world independently, without the intervention of the power of the other; rather, the possibility of that conflict exists, and possibility does not necessitate occurrence. It is possible that it might not happen, but they might agree on creation by partnership, or one of them might delegate to the other. Mawla al-Khayali discussed this with other things as well. Then he said: The research in this position is that if the noble verse is interpreted as a negation of the multiplicity of the creator absolutely, it is a persuasive argument. But the apparent meaning of the verse is the negation of the multiplicity of the creator who is effective in the heavens and the earth, since the intent of "being therein" is not spatial occupation but disposal and effectiveness. The truth is that the necessity is categorical, for concurrence is void. Their effectiveness is either by way of gathering or distribution, so it necessitates the non-existence of the whole or part when one of them is not a creator, because he is a part of the cause or a complete cause. Thus, the world is corrupted, i.e., this sensory existence is not found, in whole or in part.

It is possible to orient the necessity such that it is categorical absolutely, which is to say: If the god were multiple, the world would not be possible, let alone existent; otherwise, obstruction between them would have been possible, which necessitates the impossible. For the possibility of obstruction is a necessary consequence of the sum of the two matters: multiplicity and the possibility of any of the things. So when multiplicity is posited, it necessitates that nothing is possible, so that obstruction—which necessitates the impossible—cannot occur.

Al-Kalanbawi intended five investigations on the first, some of which are weak and some of which are fat. Then he said: The truth is that the orientation of the second for the categorical nature of the necessity is correct, not the first. Master al-Dawani has speech in this position, and the mentioned scholar has mentioned its pros and cons of refutation and confirmation. Then he mentioned that for them, "obstruction" has two meanings. One of them is the will of one of the capable ones for the existence of the act, and the other is its non-existence, and this is what is intended by obstruction in the famous argument of obstruction. The second is the will of each of them for its creation independently without the intervention of the power of the other in it, and this is the obstruction they considered in the impossibility of a created thing between two capable ones. Their saying: "If the god were multiple, nothing of the possible things would exist, for it necessitates one of two impossibles: either the occurrence of a created thing between two capable ones, or preference without a preference," is built upon this. The essence of the argument is that if two gods capable of perfection existed, obstruction between them would be possible, and the consequent is void. For if they obstructed and each of them willed creation independently, it necessitates either that no product occurs at all, or it occurs by the power of each of them, or by one of them, and all are void. Its occurrence by the sum of the two powers with this will necessitates their weakness, due to the failure of the will of each of them in relation to his will; thus, they would not be gods capable of perfection. And they were posited as such.

From here it appeared that on the assumption of multiplicity, if a product existed, it would necessitate the possibility of one of two impossibles: either the possibility of concurrence or the possibility of preference without a preference, and all are impossible. In this respect, with the interpretation of corruption as the lack of creation, it is said that the necessity in the verse is categorical. So it is a persuasive argument from one aspect and a categorical argument from another; the first is in relation to the commoners, and the second is in relation to the elite.

Muslih al-Din al-Lari, after long speech, said: "It is said: I say I will formulate the argument derived from the noble verse in a way more excellent than all else, which is that the god worthy of worship must be a necessary existent, and the necessary existent is one whose existence is the essence of his self according to the masters of investigation. For if it were distinct from it, it would be possible, due to its need for its existence to another, which is existence itself. If it were multiple, it would necessitate that it is not existence, so things would not be existent, because the existence of things is by their connection to existence. Thus, the corruption of the heavens and the earth appeared in the apparent meaning, not in the meaning of non-creation, for that is an obvious affectation."

You know that the intention of non-creation is more apparent on this deduction. Moreover, this type of deduction is among what the philosophers went to. Indeed, most of their proofs indicating the Oneness, which is the most sublime of divine objectives—or rather, all of them—depend on the truth that the essence of the Necessary—Exalted is He—is pure existence subsisting by itself, expressed as necessary essence and confirmed existence. Whatever is affected by necessity or existence is in itself possible, and its existence, like its necessity, is derived from another, so it is not necessary.

Among the most famous of these is that if we hypothesize two necessary existent beings, they would be partners in the necessity of existence and distinct by one of the matters; otherwise, they would not be two. And what is the basis of distinction? Is it the totality of the essence or a part of it? There is no way to the first, because if the distinction were by the totality of the essence, the necessity of existence shared between them would be outside the essence of each of them or outside the essence of one of them, which is impossible due to what has been established that the necessity of existence is the very essence of the Necessary. And there is no way to the second, because each of them would be a compound of that by which they share and that by which they are distinct. Every compound is needy, so it would not be necessary. If it were not necessary, then each of the two necessaries—or one of them—would be possible in itself. This is a contradiction.

It was challenged that the meaning of their saying "the necessity of existence is the very essence of the Necessary" is that the effect of the attribute of the necessity of existence appears from that very essence, not that that essence is identical to this attribute. So there is no contradiction between their sharing in the necessity of existence and their differentiation by the totality of the essence. It was answered that the intent is identity, and the meaning of their saying that "the necessity of existence is the very essence of the Necessary" is that His essence, by His own essence, is the equivalent of this judgment and the source of its extraction without the addition of another matter and without considering any other aspect other than His Essence—Exalted is He—whatever that aspect may be, whether real, relative, or negative. Likewise is the analogy of the rest of His attributes—Exalted is He—according to the proponents of their identity among the people of investigation.

The clarification of this according to their school is that just as you might conceive the "continuous"—for instance—as the continuous itself, like the formal part of the body in that it is a body, and you might conceive something else: that thing is the continuous, like matter. Likewise, you might conceive the Necessary Existent in that it is a Necessary Existent, and you might conceive something else: that thing is the Necessary Existent, and the equivalent of the judgment by it. The counterpart in the first is the essence of the subject and its self only, and in the second, it is it with another aspect which is an attribute subsisting in the subject, whether real or abstractive. And every necessary existent that was not the very Necessary Existent itself, but rather had an essence—that essence being qualified as a necessary existent—then in its being qualified, it needs the occurrence of this matter and a maker that makes it such that this matter is extracted from it. So it is in itself possible in existence, and by that it became a necessary existent, so it would not be a necessary existent by itself. It is the very Necessary Existent by itself. Let the rest of His attributes—Exalted is He—the real, perfect ones such as knowledge, power, and others, be measured against this.

It was also challenged that why is it not allowed that what differentiates them is a contingent matter, not a constituent one, so that composition is required? It was answered that this necessitates that the determination is contingent, which is the opposite of what was proven by demonstration.

Ibn Kammuna has in this position a doubt that is widely known to be difficult to repel and hard to solve, to the point that some called it, due to its presentation, "the pride of the devils." It is: Why is it not allowed that there be two simple identities, unknown in essence, differing by the totality of the quiddity, each of which is necessary by itself, and the concept of "necessary existent" is extracted from them and predicated upon them in a contingent way? I have seen similar to it in Mulakhas of the Imam—may Allah have mercy on him. Perhaps if you are informed of the truth of what we mentioned, its solution will be easy for you. If you want clarification, then listen to what was said in that: The concept of "necessary existent" must be either extracted from the very essence of each of them without considering an external aspect, whatever that aspect may be, or with the consideration of that aspect. Both alternatives are impossible. As for the second, because of what was established that everything whose essence is not merely the aspect of the extraction of necessity is possible in its essence. And as for the first, there is no equivalent for the predication of one concept and a match in essence with the cutting off of the consideration of any aspect whatsoever. It is impossible for it to be essentially distinct, diverging truths not shared in any essential thing at all. Perhaps every sound-natured person judges that things that are divergent, in that they are divergent without a unifying aspect, are not an equivalent of a single judgment and that which is narrated about by it. Yes, that is permissible if those things were identical in that they are identical, even if in a negative matter.

Rather, we say: If we look at the very concept of the existence of the masdar (infinitive), known in a way from the ways by necessity, observation and research lead us to the fact that its truth and that which is extracted from it is a thing subsisting in itself, which is the True Necessary, the Absolute Existence that is not tainted by generality, particularity, or multiplicity. For everyone whose existence is this existence, it is not possible that there be between it and another thing that also has this existence, a distinction or a difference at all. So there would not be two; rather, there would be one essence and one existence, as the author of al-Talwihat hinted by his saying: "Pure existence, than which there is nothing more perfect—whenever you hypothesize a second, when you look, it is it, for there is no distinction in the purity of a thing." So the necessity of His existence—Exalted is He—which is His essence—Glorified is He—indicates His oneness—Glorified is He—so contemplate.

It is not hidden from you that most of the proofs for this sublime objective can be derived from the noble verse, and corruption is then interpreted as non-creation. So you must derive it, even if it requires some affectation. Beware of being satisfied with making it a persuasive argument, as many have gone, for this sublime objective is too sublime to be satisfied with in it by persuasions based on popularity and custom. The author of al-Kashshaf—may his secret be purified—has speech upon which the marks of investigation appear in this position. We will mention it, if Allah—the Exalted—wills, as he chose in the interpretation of His saying—Exalted is He—"Then each god would have taken what he created, and some of them would have sought to overcome others."

Then do not imagine that the negation of two and one does not follow from the verse, for the negation of "gods" [in the plural]—which differs from the specific one in person—necessitates by necessity that every one of them differs from Him in person, and it is more eloquent than the negation of "one" that differs from the specific one in person. Furthermore, it is a way to reach His saying—Exalted is He—"Or have they taken gods from the earth?" And the establishment of the necessity is sufficient in the negation of the one and the two as well.

The context of the noble verse was challenged by the fact that it is apparent that it was only driven to invalidate the worship of idols, pointed to by His saying—Exalted is He—"Or have they taken gods from the earth who raise the dead?" because of its mention after it. And it does not invalidate except the multiplicity of the god who is the Creator, the Powerful, the Planner, the Complete in Divinity, and He is not multiple according to the polytheists: "And if you asked them who created the heavens and the earth, they would say: Allah." And they say regarding their gods: "We only worship them so that they may bring us closer to Allah in position." So what they said is not invalidated by the verse, and what the verse invalidates, they do not say. From here, it was said the meaning of the verse is: "If there were in the heaven and the earth gods, as the worshippers of idols say, it would necessitate the corruption of the world, because those gods they speak of are inanimate things that cannot plan the world, so it necessitates the corruption of the world."

It was answered that His saying—Exalted is He—"Or have they taken..." etc., is driven for the prohibition of the worship of idols, even if they do not have complete divinity, because worship is only appropriate for one who has that. After the prohibition of that, He—Glorified is He—pointed out that whoever has what was mentioned cannot be but one. Moreover, the explanation of the name "God" is the Necessary Existent by itself, the Living, the All-Knowing, the Willing, the Powerful, the Creator, the Planner. Whenever they apply it to a thing, its description by that is binding upon them, whether they like it or not. So the verse is for the invalidation of what their speech necessitates in the most complete way: "Exalted is Allah, the Lord of the Throne, above what they describe."

22. "That is, exalt Him with the most perfect exaltation from there being besides Him—Exalted is He—gods, as they claim. So the fa (so) is for the ordering of what follows it upon what preceded it, from the establishment of Oneness and the bringing out of the Majesty into the position of the pronoun for the indication of the cause of the judgment. For divinity is the basis of all the attributes of perfection, among which is His exaltation—Exalted is He—from partners, and for the rearing of awe and the introduction of terror. The description as "Lord of the Throne" is for the confirmation of the exaltation, with what is in that of the rearing of awe. It is apparent that the intent is the reality of the command to exalt. It is said: The intent is to express wonder at one who worshipped those base objects of worship and counted them as partners while the Great Worshipped One exists, the Creator of the greatest things. The speech upon it is also like a result for what preceded it from the proof."