Tafsir of Al-Anbiya' 21:23

His saying, the Exalted: "He is not questioned as to what He does" can be viewed as an answer to an implied question arising from the affirmation of His, the Exalted's, oneness in divinity—which implies His oneness in creation and disposal—and the fact that the disbelievers describe Him in ways that are not befitting. It is as if one asked: "If Allah, the Exalted, is the God, the Creator, and the Disposer, why did He create those disbelievers, and why does He not divert them from what they say?" He answered with His saying: "He is not questioned," and the conclusion is that it is not appropriate for anyone to object to Him regarding any of His actions, for He is absolutely wise and does not do that which invites objection.

"While they will be questioned" regarding what they do, and objections will be raised against them. This ruling is universal regarding His actions, the Exalted, and it includes the creation of the disbelievers and bringing them into existence in the state they are in.

The way to resolve the question arising from the above, based on what this general answer points to, is that He, the Exalted, created the disbelievers—indeed, all those charged with responsibility—according to what He knew them to be in themselves. For creation is preceded by the will, the will is preceded by knowledge, and knowledge is subordinate to the known; thus, it attaches to the known as it is in its non-originated persistence, which its eternal aptitude necessitates. The words of Al-Shafi’i, may mercy be upon him, in his verses, might point to some of this: "He created the servants according to what He knew; thus, in knowledge, the youth and the aged proceed." Then, after creating them according to that, He charged them with responsibility to extract the secret of what preceded in the knowledge that is subordinate to the known, specifically the obedience and refusal that exist in their eternal aptitude. He sent the Messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners so that motivations might be stirred, so that he who perishes might perish upon evidence, and he who lives might live upon evidence, and so that people would have no argument against Allah, the Exalted.

Therefore, no objection can be directed against Allah, the Exalted, for the creation of the disbeliever. Rather, the objection is directed against the disbeliever for his disbelief, as it is one of the consequences of his aptitude in its non-originated persistence. His saying, the Exalted, may point to this: "And We did not wrong them, but they were wronging themselves," and the saying of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him: "Whoever finds good, let him praise Allah, and whoever finds otherwise, let him blame no one but himself." Although this is a matter of give-and-take, dispute, and debate, it is a position accepted by many of the verifiers and the illustrious gnostics.

Others have said: This is a new start (isti'naf), declaring that He, the Exalted, due to the strength of His dazzling greatness and the might of His irresistible authority, is such that none of His creatures can debate with Him or ask Him about what He does of His actions, following the statement that He has no partner in divinity. The pronoun "they" in "they will be questioned" refers to the servants—meaning, the servants will be questioned about what they do, even if it be the size of a speck or a date-stone (naqiran wa qatmiran), because they are owned by Him, the Exalted, and are His subjects; in this is a threat to the disbelievers.

The apparent meaning is that the negation is general across all times—meaning, He, the Exalted, is not questioned at any time about what He does. Al-Zajjaj restricted this to the Day of Resurrection, but the former is more appropriate, even if the aspect of the threat is more apparent in the latter. The verse is used as evidence that His actions, the Exalted, are not motivated by ends and objectives; thus, it is not said, "He did such-and-such for such-and-such," for if they were motivated by such, the servant would have the right to ask, "Why did You do it?" The Ash'arites went to this view, and they also have rational arguments for it. They interpreted the texts whose literal meaning suggests motivation as being metaphorical or as using the preposition for causality.

The school of the Maturidiyyah—as in Sharh al-Maqasid—and the Mu'tazilah is that they are indeed motivated by such, and the Hanbalites held this view, as Al-Tufi and others said.

The scholar Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Abi Bakr al-Dimashqi al-Hanbali, known as Ibn al-Qayyim, said in his book Shifa' al-'Alil: "Allah, the Exalted, is wise and does not do anything in vain, nor without meaning, benefit, and wisdom, which is the end sought by the action. Rather, His actions, the Exalted, proceed from profound wisdom for the sake of which He acts." The words of Allah, the Exalted, and the words of His Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him, have indicated this in places too numerous to count, and there is no way to encompass their individuals; so we mention some of their types. He proceeded to list twenty-two types over a dozen pages, then said: "If we were to attempt to mention what those like us can see of the wisdom of Allah, the Exalted, in His creation and His command, it would exceed ten thousand instances." He then said: "Is invalidating wisdoms, proprieties, and attributes—for which the laws were legislated—anything other than invalidating the Sharia entirely? And is it possible for a jurist on the face of the earth to speak in jurisprudence while believing in the invalidity of wisdom, propriety, motivation, and the Lawgiver's intent of the servants' welfare in the laws?" Then he said: "The truth, other than which is not permissible, is that He, the Exalted, acts by His will, His power, and His intention, and He acts for causes, wisdoms, and praiseworthy ends. He has deposited in the world powers and instincts by which creation and command subsist." This is the view of the majority of the people of Islam, most groups of investigators, and it is the view of all jurists without exception.

It is apparent that Ibn al-Qayyim and his peers among the Sunnis, who affirm the motivation of His actions, the Exalted, do not make the "specifier" of one of two opposites occurring—as the Ash'arites do—a mere attachment of the will in the famous sense. The verifiers among the Mu'tazilah, such as Abu al-Hasan, Al-Nazzam, Al-Jahiz, Al-'Allaf, Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi, and others, say: "Knowledge of the consequence of benefit resulting from bringing the beneficial thing into existence is what specifies the beneficial thing for occurrence." They call this "knowledge of the motive" (al-'ilm bi-al-da'i), which is the will according to them.

It was objected to them that the Necessary Being, the Exalted, is a "necessitator" (mujib) in the attachment of His knowledge, the Exalted, to all known things. If the specifier necessitating occurrence were the knowledge of benefit, that specifier would be inherent to His own Self, the Exalted; thus, His action, the Exalted, would be necessary due to an external matter, necessary for the agent, and this explicitly contradicts choice in the narrower sense. Thus, the Necessary Being would not be a chooser (mukhtar) in this sense, but it would lead to what the philosophers went to regarding choice that is compatible with necessity. This objection does not apply to those who say that the specifier is the attachment of the eternal will, because that attachment is not inherent to the Self of the Necessary Being, even if it is eternal and everlasting, there being no room for its attachment to the other opposite instead of the occurring opposite. Yes, the objection that is difficult to evade—which is mentioned in the books of theology—does apply to them. A similar objection to what was mentioned was raised against the Hanafis, for they went to [the theory of] motivation and made the knowledge of the consequence of benefits the cause for the attachment of knowledge to occurrence. Thus, it is not feasible for them to hold the view that the Necessary Being is a chooser in the narrower sense, because the essence necessitates knowledge, knowledge necessitates the attachment of the will, and the attachment of the will necessitates the action. There is no escape except to say that the necessity of knowledge of benefit and interest for the attachment of the will is denied by them; rather, it is a "preponderator" (murajjih), a preponderance that does not reach the level of necessity.

As for what has been said—that if the preponderance does not reach the level of necessity, it is permissible for the preferred thing to occur at one time and not occur at another time despite that same preponderance—if the specification of one of the two times for occurrence were by the addition of something else to that preponderance, then the preponderance would not be a preponderance. Otherwise, it would necessitate the "preponderance of the unpreponderated" (tarjih al-marjuh), or rather, it would necessitate the preponderance of the unpreponderated in the other time because occurrence was preferred by that preponderance; this is refuted in two ways. However, this only applies to the complete cause in relation to its effect, not in relation to the choosing agent regarding his action. If it is meant that the preponderance necessitates [the action] without a preponderator—as is necessary in the complete cause—then the lack of necessity is clear. If it is meant [that it is] a preponderance without a preponderator, then the invalidity of the consequence in the choosing agent is denied, for otherwise, what is the difference between a "necessitating agent" (fa'il mujib) and a "choosing agent" (fa'il mukhtar)? Secondly, the preponderance in relation to one time might not be a preponderance in relation to another time; rather, it might be contrary to the interest. Thus, it does not necessitate the preponderance of one of two equals or the unpreponderated in another time; rather, it necessitates the preponderance of the preferred thing at every time, for He, the Exalted, is All-Knowing of all the interests befitting the times. Thus, His will, the Exalted, attaches to the occurrence of every possibility at a time [determined] by the consequence of the interests befitting that time upon its occurrence; therefore, there is no problem. This is what is relied upon. For a proponent could say regarding the first view that the preponderance of the unpreponderated is impossible regarding the Wise Necessary Being, even if it is permissible regarding other individuals of the choosing agent.

Furthermore, it occurred in the speech of the philosophers that the actions of Allah, the Exalted, are not motivated by ends and objectives. Their meaning, according to some of them, is the negation of motivation from His action, the Exalted, by that which is other than His Essence, because He, the Glorified, is complete in agency and does not depend in it upon another. It does not follow from this that the end and the object are negated from His action, the Exalted, absolutely. That is why it was valid for them to say: His knowledge, the Exalted, of the order of the good—which is identical to His Essence, the Exalted—is a final cause and an object in creation. Their meaning by "necessitation" (iqtida') in their definition of the final cause is that which necessitates the agency of the agent, absolutely without separation. But they were lenient in that, relying upon the understanding of the one trained in the sciences. They declared that He, the Exalted, has no object in the possibilities and does not intend their benefits, because every agent who acts for an object other than his own essence is needy of that object and perfected by it, and the perfecter must be more noble; thus, the object of the agent must be that which is above him, even if it is according to supposition, and He has no object in what is below Him. The attainment of the existence of the possibilities from Him, the Exalted, upon the utmost of perfection and the finality of refinement, is only because His Essence, the Exalted, is an essence from which things do not proceed except upon the most perfect that is appropriate and the most profound of possible benefits. Thus, the Necessary Being, according to them, necessitates—from His attachment to His own Essence, which is the source of all good and perfection—the attainment of the possibilities in the most perfect way and the most upright order, and the "consequents" (lawazim) are the broad ends, if by "end" is meant that which necessitates the agency of the agent, and they are essential if by it is meant that which follows the action essentially, not accidentally, like the existence of the principles of evil and others in the hylomorphic natures. Then, just as He, the Exalted, is an end in the sense pointed to, He is an end in the sense that all things are seeking Him, yearning for Him naturally and by will, because He is the pure good and the true beloved, glorified is His Majesty and universal His bounty.

The divinely inspired sages (al-hukama' al-muta'allihun) have judged the circulation of the light of love throughout all existing things, despite the differences in their strata; were it not for that, the spheres would not rotate, nor would the darkness be illuminated. So, glorified is He who is an Irresistible God, and He is the First and the Last. The completion of the discussion in this station, according to the schools of the theologians and the philosophers, is to be sought in its place.

Al-Hasan recited: "He is not asked, and they are asked" (la yus'al wa yus'alun), by transferring the vowel of the hamza to the sin and deleting it.