Tafsir of Al-Hajj 22:46

(Have they not traveled through the earth): This is an exhortation for them to travel in order to observe and draw lessons from the ruined sites of those who perished. This applies if they had not yet traveled; and if they had, it is an exhortation to contemplate and draw lessons, with the traveling mentioned because contemplation is dependent upon it. It is permissible that the interrogation is for the purpose of denial (denouncing their failure to do so) or confirmation (admitting the fact of their failure). In either case, the conjunction is connected to an implied element required by the context.

As for the words of the Exalted, (that they might have hearts), the verb is in the accusative case (mansub) as a response to the interrogation, according to Ibn Atiyyah; as a response to the confirmation, according to Al-Hufi; and as a response to the negation, according to some. The school of the Basrans holds that the accusative is due to the omission of an (to), from which and the verb an infinitive is formed, conjoined to an assumed infinitive. The school of the Kufans holds that it is in the accusative due to al-sarf (the shift), for the meaning of the speech is a report; they shifted it from the jussive (jazm) of conjunction (to yasiru) and returned it to the "brother of the jussive," which is the accusative—and this is as you see. The school of Al-Jarmi holds that the accusative is due to the fa itself.

Mubashshir ibn Ubayd read (fayakuna) with the yā’ (as a masculine prefix).

(Hearts with which they might understand): That is, with which they might know what must be known of monotheism. Thus, the object of ya‘qiluna (they understand) is omitted, as the context indicates it. The same is said regarding His saying, (or ears with which they might hear): that is, hear with them what must be heard of revelation, or the reports of the perished nations from those of the people who neighbor them, for they are more knowledgeable of their condition than they are. (For indeed, it is not the eyes that are blind, but blind are the hearts which are in the chests.)

The pronoun in (fa-innaha) refers to the "affair" (al-qissa), and it is explained by the sentence following it. In such cases, masculine is permissible in consideration of al-sha’n (the affair/state); to this effect is the reading of Abdullah (Ibn Mas'ud): fa-innahu. The femininity is made appropriate here by the fact that what follows it contains feminine elements. It is said: it is permissible for it to be a vague pronoun explained by the eyes, and the original was "Indeed, the eyes are not blind" (fa-innaha al-absaru la ta‘ma), provided that the sentence "la ta‘ma" (are not blind)—consisting of the verb and the hidden subject—is the predicate after the predicate. When the first predicate was omitted, the explicit noun (al-absar) was raised in place of the pronoun because there was no explicit element for the pronoun to refer back to. Thus, it became a subject explaining the pronoun. Abu Hayyan objected to this, stating it is not permissible because the pronoun explained by a singular noun following it is restricted to specific categories: the category of rubba, the category of ni‘ma and bi’sa, the category of al-a‘mal, the category of substitution (badal), and the category of the subject and predicate—and what is here is one of those. He was countered by the claim that it is of the category of subject and predicate, such as: "It is not but our worldly life" (in hiya illa hayatuna al-dunya), and the entrance of a "nasikh" (abrogating agent) does not harm it. In this there is room for consideration.

The meaning is: the blindness of the eyes is not considered, for only the blindness of the hearts is considered. It is as if the blindness of the eyes is not blindness in relation to the blindness of the hearts. Therefore, the speech is a tail-piece (tadhyil) to emphasize the gravity of their lack of heart-perception, and that it is the blindness after which there is no blindness—nay, there is no blindness except it. Or the meaning is: their eyes are sound and healthy, having no blindness, but it is in their hearts. It is as if it was said: "Have they not traveled so that they might have hearts with insight? For the affliction is in the insights of their hearts, not in the vision of their eyes." This is the affliction compared to which all other afflictions are minor. It is as if He is urging them to remove the disease and is rebuking them for their sluggishness regarding it. Describing the hearts as "those which are in the chests," according to what Sibawayh said, is for emphasis, as in His saying, (They speak with their mouths) and your saying, "I saw with my eye."

Al-Zamakhshari said: It has become conventionalized and believed that blindness in its literal sense has the eye as its place, which is for the pupil to be struck by something that obscures its light, and its usage for the heart is metaphorical. And so, when it was intended to establish what is contrary to the aforementioned—namely, attributing blindness to the hearts literally and denying it for the eyes—this depiction required additional specification and increased definition so that it would be established that the place of blindness is the heart, not the eyes. Just as you say: "The sharpness is not for the sword, but for your tongue which is between [your jaws]." How much more so when it is in the position of saying: "I have not denied the sharpness of the sword and attributed it to the tongue by a slip or an oversight of mine, but I have intended it for it specifically, with intent."

This verse, according to what is said, was revealed regarding Ibn Umm Maktum when he heard His saying, (And whoever is blind in this [life] will be blind in the Hereafter). He said: "O Messenger of Allah, I am blind in this life; shall I be blind in the Hereafter?" Perhaps this narration, if it is authentic, strengthens the first meaning, as the realization of the answer through the verse is very apparent. It is as if it was said to him: You do not fall under the generality of "(Whoever is) blind," because the blindness of the eyes in this world is not blindness in reality compared to the blindness of the heart. The one who enters under the generality of that is the one who is characterized by the blindness of the heart. This suffices as an answer, whether the meaning of His saying (And whoever is blind in this [life] will be blind in the Hereafter) is "Whoever is blind in heart in this world is likewise in the Hereafter," or "Whoever is blind in heart in this world will be blind in sight in the Hereafter," because in the Hereafter secrets will be laid bare, and the blindness of the heart will appear in the form of the blindness of the sight. Yes, there is a dispute regarding the authenticity of the narration. In Al-Durr al-Manthur, Ibn Abi Hatim narrated from Qatadah that he said regarding this verse: "It was mentioned to us that it was revealed regarding Abdullah ibn Zaidah," meaning Ibn Umm Maktum. The status of a report narrated in this manner is not hidden.

The saying (Have they not traveled...) was used as evidence for the recommendation of traveling in the earth and seeking the remnants (of ancient peoples). Ibn Abi Hatim recorded in Kitab al-Tafakkur from Malik ibn Dinar that he said: "Allah the Exalted revealed to Moses, peace be upon him: Take sandals of iron and a staff, then travel in the earth and seek the remnants and lessons until the sandals are worn out and the staff breaks." And the saying (that they might have...) was used as evidence that the seat of the intellect is the heart, not the head, as Al-Jalal al-Suyuti stated in Ahkam al-Qur’an al-‘Azim.

Imam al-Razi said: In the verse is an indication that the intellect is knowledge, and that its seat is the heart. You know that the intellect being knowledge is the preference of Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini, who argued for it by saying that one who understands a thing knows it, and one who knows a thing understands it; and upon the assumption of divergence, that is not said. This is unsound, because if "knowledge" is intended to mean "all knowledge," it follows that he who misses some knowledge, despite having acquired others, would not be "understanding" (having intellect). If "some knowledge" is intended, the definition is not achieved due to lack of distinction. The evidence mentioned is incorrect because it is possible that knowledge differs from intellect while they remain concomitant. Al-Ash'ari said: There is no difference between intellect and knowledge except in generality and specificity; knowledge is more general than intellect. If a specific knowledge is meant, it is said: "It is the knowledge that turns one away from the ugly and calls one to the beautiful"—this is the view of Al-Jubba'i. It is also said: "It is the knowledge of the best of the two good things and the worst of the two evils," which is the view of some of the Mu'tazilah, and they have other views. The view chosen by Al-Qadi Abu Bakr is that it is some of the necessary sciences, such as the knowledge of the impossibility of the gathering of two opposites, that there is no intermediary between negation and affirmation, that an existing thing cannot be anything but eternal or originated, and the like. Imam al-Haramayn argued for the validity of this and the invalidation of others by what he mentioned in Abkar al-Afkar regarding what is for and against it. Al-Muhasibi, may Allah have mercy on him, chose that it is an instinct by which one reaches knowledge. He was countered by the fact that if he intended "knowledge" by "instinct," what applies to the one who says it is knowledge applies to him; and if he intended something other than knowledge, the existence of something beyond knowledge by which one reaches knowledge may not be granted.

The author of Al-Qamus said after citing several views on the intellect: "The truth is that it is a spiritual light by which the soul perceives necessary and theoretical knowledge." Perhaps we will verify this in another place, if Allah the Exalted wills.

Furthermore, there is a dispute among the rationalists regarding the heart's being the seat of knowledge. It is famous among the philosophers that the seat of knowledge pertaining to universals and abstract particulars is the rational soul, and the seat of knowledge pertaining to material particulars are the corporeal powers established in parts of the body, which are divided into five external and five internal; the former are called external senses and the latter internal senses, and the matter of each is famous.

Some of the later philosophers claimed that the perceiver of universals and particulars is the soul, and the powers are absolutely not perceivers, but rather tools in the perception of the soul. Some of our [scholars] have also adopted this. In Abkar al-Afkar, after citing the two views of the philosophers, it states: "As for our companions, a specific structure is not a condition for them; rather, every part of the human body in which perception and knowledge subsists is a perceiver and knower. That this should subsist in the heart or elsewhere is not intellectually necessary nor is it impossible, but the Divine Law has indicated its subsistence in the heart by His saying, (Indeed in that is a reminder for whoever has a heart), His saying, (that they might have hearts with which they might understand), and His saying, (Do they not then reflect upon the Quran, or are there locks upon their hearts?)." End quote.

It is not hidden that the evidence mentioned for the heart being the seat of knowledge is not without issue. Yes, the indication of the verses that the human heart, by virtue of what has been deposited within it, has a complete role in perception and consciousness is undeniable, yet it also testifies to the role of what has been deposited in the brain in that as well. From here, I do not see a basis for the claim that one of them has a role to the exclusion of the other. The fact that a man is struck on his head and his intellect departs does not indicate that only what is deposited in the brain has a role in knowledge, as is not hidden to one who has a sound heart and a straight mind. So contemplate.