Tafsir of Al-Hajj 22:74

(And they have not appraised Allah with His true appraisal) Al-Hasan and Al-Farra' said: That is, they have not glorified Him, may He be exalted, with His true glorification. For His true glorification, Almighty, is that He be described as He has described Himself, and that He be worshipped as He has commanded to be worshipped. These people did not do that, for they worshipped besides Him those who are not fit for worship at all. In that, they described Him, may He be glorified, with that from which He is exalted, by attributing to Him, the Almighty and Majestic, a partner.

Al-Akhfash said: That is, they have not known Him with His true knowledge. For the true knowledge of Him, the Almighty, is to believe in Him while He is described as He has described Himself. These people did not believe in Him as such, due to their association of partners with Him and their worship of those besides Him whose state you have heard.

It is also said: The "true knowledge" is to know Him, the Almighty, in His essence (kinh). This is what is meant in his (the Prophet’s) saying—peace and blessings be upon him—: "Glory be to You, we have not known You with Your true knowledge."

You know that the apparent meaning of the Almighty’s saying, "They have not appraised Allah," is a report concerning the polytheists and a condemnation of them. When the intent behind it is the negation of knowing [His] essence, the matter becomes shared between them and the monotheists, for the knowledge of the essence has not been attained by any of the monotheists according to the verifiers. The aforementioned report points to this, as it indicates its non-attainment even by the most perfect of prophets—upon him and them be peace. If it was not attained by him—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—then its non-attainment by others is a fortiori. The possibility of interpreting the negated knowledge therein as the grasping of attributes is of clear status, as is the possibility of him—peace and blessings be upon him—attaining the knowledge of the essence after the aforementioned report, and his saying—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—: "Reflect on the signs of Allah, the Almighty, but do not reflect on His Essence, for you will not be able to appraise His true appraisal." The apparent meaning is the generality of the ruling, not limited to those addressed at that time. Likewise is the saying of the Greatest Truthful One (Abu Bakr), may Allah be pleased with him: "Inability to grasp [His] realization is realization," and the saying of Ali, may Allah’s face be honored—as part of a couplet—: "Searching for the secret of the Essence of Allah is polytheism." Indeed, Hujjat al-Islam Al-Ghazali, his teacher Imam al-Haramayn, the Sufis, and the philosophers have all declared the impossibility of knowing Him, the Almighty, in His essence.

It is narrated from Aristotle that he said regarding this: "Just as the eye is struck by darkness and dimness when staring at the body of the sun, which prevents it from complete vision, so too is the intellect struck by bewilderment and confusion when it wishes to grasp the essence of Him, the Almighty, which prevents it from grasping Him."

It is not hidden that this does not serve as a proof for the impossibility. The most that can be said is that it is rhetorical and does not yield anything but the insufficient conjecture in such a matter. Similar to this is the argument that all immaterial souls, human and otherwise—whether refined or not—are less immaterial and transcendent than the Necessary Being, and it is impossible for the lesser to grasp one who is more intense in immateriality and transcendence than it, just as it is impossible for the immaterial to grasp material things. Likewise is the argument that He, the Almighty, is closer to us than our jugular vein, so it is impossible to perceive Him just as it is impossible for sight to perceive what is attached to it.

Better than all of that is what has been said: Knowledge of His essence is not self-evident by necessity for a person or at a time, so it cannot be attained by anyone at any time by necessity; thus, it must be acquisitive (kasbi). Acquisitive knowledge is either a perfect definition or an imperfect one, and both are impossible, entailing the composition of the Necessary Being—due to the necessity of the definition being composed of the proximate or remote genus and the differentia—even though the imperfect definition does not yield the essence. As for a simple definition by a single term, it is patently impossible; for if that term were identical to His essence, knowledge of the thing would depend on knowledge of itself without any distinction between them—not even in general and specific terms, as in a compound definition with its perfect limit. If it were other than Him, it would not be a definition, but rather a description (rasm) or another concept not unknown to Him. As for a perfect or imperfect description, neither of them yields the essence by necessity.

It was objected that the impossibility of self-evidence regarding all individuals and all times requires evidence, as it might be attained after refining the soul through the true laws and stripping it of human impurities and bodily obstacles. Even if we concede the impossibility of self-evidence in that manner, we could choose the view that knowledge is acquired through a perfect definition composed of genus and differentia. The furthest that entails is intellectual composition, which is not impossible unless we say it entails external composition, which necessitates need for parts, contradicting the Necessity of Existence. We do not say that, for the chosen view among a group is that the parts of the quiddity are derived from one simple thing, and they are united in quiddity and existence; thus, they are abstract concepts, not real ones, so there is no entailment. Yes, that would be the case if we said the parts are derived from things that are distinct externally, but we do not say that. For if it were said then that the parts themselves are distinct in quiddity and existence—as a faction held—the objection arises regarding the invalidity of predication between them, for necessarily, two things existing with two distinct existences cannot have one predicated of the other, like Zayd and Amr. If it were said they are distinct in quiddity but not existence—as another faction held—the objection arises regarding the necessity of a single existence of the person resting on multiple beings that are distinct in quiddity. Even if we concede the entailment between intellectual and external composition, we can say: We do not concede that no description yields the essence by necessity. How could it not, when it is useful when the essence is an essential concomitant of the description in the specific sense? Indeed, it is possible for every description to yield it based on the Ash'ari principle that all possibilities originate from Him, the Almighty, without condition, even if that yielding does not occur at all, since the discussion is on the impossibility of attaining the essence through acquisition. This is what they said.

Mulla Sadra argued for the negation of intellectual parts for Him, the Almighty, by stating that His reality, the Almighty, is pure Is-ness and sheer existence. If He, the Almighty and Majestic, had a genus and differentia, His genus would be in need of the differentia—not in its concept and meaning, but in that it exists and comes to be in act. Then it would be said: That genus is either pure existence or a quiddity other than existence. In the first case, it follows that what we assumed to be a differentia is not a differentia, for the differentia is that by which the genus exists; this is only conceivable if the reality of the genus is not the reality of existence. In the second case, it entails that the Necessary Being, the Almighty, has a quiddity, while it has been verified that the very existence is His reality, without doubt. Furthermore, if He, the Almighty, had a genus, He would be included under the category of substance and would be one of the substantial species, thus sharing with the rest in the genus. It has been proven that their possibility is established, and it has been verified that the possibility of the species entails the possibility of the genus, which entails the possibility of each of the individuals of that genus insofar as it is a specimen of it. For if existence were impossible for the genus insofar as it is a genus—that is, absolutely—it would be impossible for every individual. Thus, from that, the possibility of the Necessary Being—far above that—would follow.

The foundation of this is that the reality of the Necessary Being, the Almighty, is pure existence, which is what the wise and the eminent verifiers have held. The intent of this "existence" is not the infinitive meaning that no one is ignorant of, for there is no doubt in the impossibility of it being the reality of the Necessary Being, may He be exalted. Rather, it is in the sense of the "principle of effects," as verified by Al-Jalal Al-Dawani, who elaborated on this in his annotations on Sharh al-Tajrid, and in his commentary on Al-Hayakil al-Nuriyya, and other treatises. Mulla Sadra has a long and extensive discussion in this place and in his discourse on Al-Jalal's words. He has verified the speech in another manner, which can be requested from his book Al-Asfar. However, we shall mention here a question and answer from his speech related to what we are in. We say: He said: "If you ask: How can the Essence of the Creator, may He be exalted, be identical to the reality of existence, whose conceptualization is self-evident, yet the Essence of the Creator is unknown in essence? I reply: It has passed that the intensity of manifestation and the confirmation of existence there, alongside the weakness of the power of perception and the weakness of existence here, became the source of His concealment, the Almighty, from us. Otherwise, His Essence, the Almighty, is at the height of radiance and illumination."

If you return and say: "If the Essence of the Creator is the very existence, it is either that existence is the reality of the Essence, as is the immediate understanding, or it is predicated of it as an accidental predication, just as the concept of 'thing' is predicated of Him, the Almighty. In the first case, it is either that the intent is this general meaning, which is self-evident in conception, extracted from beings, or another meaning. The first is visibly corrupt. The second implies that His reality, the Almighty, is other than what is understood from the word 'existence,' like other quiddities, only you named that reality 'existence'—as if a human were named 'existence.' It is clear that this naming has no effect on the rulings, and this category reverts to the Necessary Being not being the existence discussed, and it entails that the Necessary Being, the Almighty, has a quiddity, and it has been proven that every possessor of a quiddity is an effect. In the second case—that it is predicated of Him accidentally—it is not hidden that this does not exempt Him from a cause, but rather requires Him to be existing. For this reason, the majority of the later philosophers held that existence is non-existent."

I say: The origin of this problem is the assumption that the meaning of this common general concept being "accidental" is that the predicated has an existence and the predicate has another existence, like the 'walker' in relation to the 'animal,' and the 'laugher' in comparison to the 'human.' It is not like that. Rather, this concept is a title and a representation of the existential beings, and its relation to them is like the relation of humanity to the human and animality to the animal. Just as the concept of humanity allows it to be said: "It is identical to the human," because it is a mirror to observe it and a representation of its aspect, it is also valid to say: "It is other than him," because it is a relative matter, while the human is a substantial quiddity. In short, existence is not like possibility, such that there is nothing alongside it for the infinitive meaning to represent; rather, it is like "blackness," which may mean the relative meaning itself—that is, the quality of being black—and may mean that by which a thing is black—that is, the specific quality. Just as if blackness were assumed to subsist in its own essence, it would be correct to say its essence is identical to the quality of being black, and if a body were assumed to be characterized by it, it would not be correct to say its essence is identical to the quality of being black—though this matter is a mental consideration for everyone.

Once this is established, we say in the answer to the first alternative: We choose the first part, which is that existence is the reality of the Essence. As for your statement in the second alternative: "It is either that existence is what is understood from the word 'existence,' etc.," we choose from it that which corresponds to what is understood from this word—that is, the reality of external existence, of which this concept is a representation. For existence, in our view, has a reality in every existing thing, just as blackness has a reality in every black thing. However, in some beings, it is mixed with deficiencies and non-existents, and in others, it is not. Just as blacks are varied in blackness—some stronger and more intense, others weaker and less—so too are beings; nay, existences are varied in "existing-ness" in perfection and deficiency. We can also choose the second part of the two alternatives of the first point, except that this general concept, even if it is accidental in the sense that it is not—insofar as it is a titling concept—an existence in the external world such that it is identical to something, it is nonetheless a representation of the very reality of existence subsisting in its own essence. It is true of it such that the source of its truth and the objective reality of its predication upon it is that very reality, not something else that it subsists in, like other accidentals in their truth regarding things. So the truth of this concept regarding specific existence resembles the truth of essential attributes from this aspect. Thus, your statement does not apply to us: "The truth of existence regarding it does not exempt it from a cause," because it would only not exempt it from a cause if its state of existing were due to the occurrence of this meaning or the subsistence of a portion of existence. It is not like that. Rather, that specific existence is, by its own essence, existing, just as it is, by its own essence, existence—whether the concept of existence is predicated of it or not. That which the philosophers held to be non-existent is not the specific existences, but this general mental matter that is true of the quiddities and existential specificities.

This concludes [his points]. As for what he alluded to regarding the multiplicity of existences, the Peripatetics held it. According to the majority, they are realities that differ and are multiplied by their own selves, not by the mere accidental addition to quiddities, so as to be similar in reality, nor by differentiae, so as for absolute existence to be a genus for them. Some of them said they differ in reality, such that there is a difference between them by gradation (tashkik), like the existence of the Necessary Being and the existence of the possible, and likewise the existence of the immaterial and the existence of bodies. A faction of the accomplished philosophers said that there is nothing in the external world but one personal existence, whose essence is unknown, which is the Essence of the Necessary Being, may His state be exalted. As for the observed possibilities, they have no existence, but rather a connection to the true existence, which is the Necessary Being by essence. Yes, it is applied to them that they are existing in the sense that they have a relation to the Necessary Being, the Almighty. The concept of "existing" is more general than existence that subsists by its own essence and the matters related to it in a manner of relation. The truth of the derivative does not contradict the subsistence of the principle of derivation in its own essence, which reverts to it not subsisting in another, nor [does it contradict] the state of what it is true of being a matter related to the principle, not a subject for it in any way, as in the case of a "blacksmith" or a "sun-touched person." Moreover, the practice of the masters of language and the people of speech is of no consideration in validating realities. They said: The fact that the derivative is from the secondary intelligibles and the primary self-evidents does not clash with the principle being an established, individuated reality of unknown essence. The secondary nature of the concept and its establishment sometimes differ in relation to matters.

It is not hidden what is in it from various perspectives. Similar is what circulated on the tongues of a faction of the Sufis that the reality of the Necessary Being is absolute existence, clutching to the fact that it is not permissible for Him to be a non-existence or non-existent, which is apparent, nor a quiddity existing by existence or with existence, by way of causality or restriction, due to the need and composition therein. So it is determined that He is existence. And it is not specific existence because if it were taken with the absolute, it would be compound, or if it were merely the predicate, it would be in need, due to the necessity of the dependent's need for the absolute. This argument of theirs is weaker than a spider's web.

What I have verified from the books of the Greatest Sheikh—may his secret be sanctified—and the books of his companions is that Allah, the Almighty, is not an expression for absolute existence in the sense of the natural universal existing externally within its individuals, nor in the sense of its individuals—that it is intelligible in the soul, corresponding to each of its particulars externally in the sense that what is in the soul, if it were to exist in any of the external persons, would be that person exactly without any difference at all. Rather, it is in the sense of the lack of restriction to other than Him while He exists by His own essence. In the second chapter of Al-Futuhat, it is stated that the Truth, the Almighty, is existing by His essence, for His essence, absolute existence, not restricted by other than Him, nor caused by anything, nor a cause for anything. Rather, He is the Creator of the effects and the causes, and the King, the Holy, Who has always been. In Al-Nusus by Sadr al-Qunawi, the conceptualization of the "absoluteness of the Truth" is conditioned by it being understood as a negative attribute, not in the sense that its opposite is restriction. Rather, it is an absoluteness from the unity and multiplicity that are known, and also from the limitation in both absoluteness and restriction, and in the combination of all of that while being transcendent of it. So all of that is valid regarding Him while He is transcendent of all.

Some of the eminent scholars mentioned that Allah, the Almighty, according to the masters of the Sufis, is the specific existence, the Necessary Existent by essence, subsisting by His essence, individuated by His essence, encompassing every perfection, transcendent of every deficiency, manifesting in whichever of the manifestations He wills, with the preservation of transcendence. Then he said: "This is what is also required by the saying of Al-Ash'ari that existence is identical to the Essence, along with his final saying in his book Al-Ibanah regarding carrying the ambiguous matters upon their apparent meanings while maintaining transcendence with 'There is nothing like unto Him'."

The verification of this is that it has been proven by argument that the Necessary Existent by essence is existing. So He is either the existence abstracted from quiddity, individuated by His essence; or the existence accompanied by quiddity, individuated according to it; or the quiddity that is a subject for existence, individuated according to it; or the combination composed of the quiddity and the existence, individuated according to it. There is no way to the fourth, because composition is among its requirements—the need [for parts], which contradicts essential necessity. Nor to the third, because of the quiddity's need for existence in its external realization. Nor to the second, because of the existence's need for the quiddity in its individuation according to it. The need in all of them contradicts essential necessity. Thus, the first is determined. So the Necessary Being, the Almighty, existing by His own essence, is the existence abstracted from quiddity, individuated by His essence. Then, it is either absolute with true absoluteness—which is that which is not opposed by a restriction of the capacity for every absoluteness and restriction—or it is restricted by a specific constraint. There is no way to the second, because the compound of the constraint and its subject has the requirement of need, which contradicts essential necessity. Thus, the first is determined. So the Necessary Existent by essence is the existence abstracted from quiddity, subsisting by His essence, individuated by His essence, absolute with true absoluteness.

The people of this view held that there is nothing in the external world but one existence, which is the True Existence, and that there is no existing thing other than Him. As for the quiddities of the possibles, they are non-existent matters, distinguished in themselves by an essential distinction, and they are fixed in knowledge, having never smelled the scent of existence nor ever will. But their rulings appear in the poured-forth existence, which is the "added light," and the scholars call it the "created truth." These are the ones famous as the people of the Unity (al-Wahda). Perhaps the statement we narrated from some of the accomplished philosophers reverts to their statement, and it is beyond the stage of the intellect. Because of it, nations have gone astray and exited the fold of Islam.

In short, the statement that the reality of the Necessary Being, the Almighty, is not known to anyone—neither by intellectual nor sensory grasp of essence—is a matter about which I have no doubt regarding its correctness. The verifiers, even the people of the Unity, have gone toward it. The statement to the contrary, narrated from some of the theologians, should not be paid any attention at all. I do not know if the knowledge of the reality is possible or not. Perhaps the statement of its impossibility is more in accord with His greatness, the Almighty, and His majesty, which is exalted above the grasp of intellects. As for witnessing the Necessary Being with sight, there is disagreement among the people of the Sunnah regarding its occurrence in this realm. As for in the other realm, there is no disagreement, except that some Sufis said: It does not occur except by considering some manifestation, and as for considering true absoluteness, it does not. As for witnessing Him, the Almighty, with the heart, it has been said that it occurs in this realm, but in the sense of witnessing His holy light—and that varies according to the difference in preparedness—not in the sense of witnessing the Essence itself and the reality. Whoever claims that, the matter has become confused for him, so he claimed what he claimed.

This is so. Some people said: There is no obstacle to "His true appraisal" meaning "His true knowledge," and "His true knowledge" meaning "knowledge of the essence," and that it is not attained by anyone—believer or otherwise—in what we are in, because the intent is to establish His greatness, the Almighty, which contradicts what the polytheists are upon, and the fact that no one knows the essence of His reality necessitates greatness in the most perfect manner. So reflect on all of that, and Allah, the Almighty, is the Granter of success to what is correct.

(Indeed, Allah is All-Strong) over all possible things, (All-Mighty)

(74)

(Overcoming all things). You have already known the state of their gods, who are overpowered, belonging to the most humiliated of the helpless. The sentence is in the position of providing the reason for what precedes it.