Tafsir of An-Nur 24:33

(And let those who do not...) This is guidance for those who yearn for marriage but are unable to provide for its prerequisites and means, directing them to what is better and more appropriate for them. That is, let them strive for chastity and the preservation of their souls: (find [the means for] marriage), meaning the means for marriage, or they are unable to provide what is required for marriage from wealth—assuming fi‘āl is a noun for an instrument, like rakūb for that which one rides. (until Allah enriches them from His bounty) This is a generous promise of being favored with wealth, and an act of kindness toward them in their effort to remain chaste, a strengthening of their hearts, and an indication that His—the Exalted’s—bounty is more worthy of seeking and closer to the righteous.

Some Shafi‘is inferred from this verse the desirability of abstaining from marriage for one who does not possess its prerequisites, despite his yearning for it; while many people have leaned toward its recommendation based on the verse: (If they are poor, Allah will enrich them from His bounty). They interpreted the command for chastity in this verse as referring to one who cannot find a spouse, making fi‘āl an adjective in the sense of a passive participle, like kitāb in the sense of maktūb. It is not hidden that the mentioned purpose makes this interpretation far-fetched. Poverty does not necessitate finding the prerequisites, which are interpreted by them as the dowry, the clothing for the first time of consummation, and the day's sustenance.

It is mentioned in our authoritative books that marriage becomes obligatory upon the occurrence of tawqān—meaning intense longing—such that one fears falling into adultery if they do not marry. Likewise, it appears, [it is obligatory] if one cannot prevent oneself from forbidden gazing or masturbation by hand. It becomes a mandatory duty (farḍ) if one cannot avoid adultery except through it, such as being unable to resort to concubinage or fasting, which breaks the desire, as indicated by the Hadith: "And whoever cannot afford it, let him fast, for it is a protection for him." If one is capable of any of these, marriage does not remain a farḍ or an individually binding obligation; rather, it or something else that prevents one from falling into the forbidden suffices. Both categories are conditional upon possessing the dowry and the sustenance.

In Al-Baḥr, an additional condition for both was added: the absence of fear of injustice (jawr). Then he said: If the fear of falling into adultery should one not marry, and the fear of injustice should one marry, conflict, the latter takes precedence. Marriage is then disliked (makrūh), as indicated by Al-Kamāl in Al-Fatḥ. Perhaps this is because injustice is a sin relating to servants, whereas avoiding adultery is not; and the right of the servant is divided/prioritized when there is a conflict due to his need and the sufficiency of the Master—the Almighty and Exalted. This concludes [the discussion]. The implication is that it is also disliked when one does not possess the dowry and sustenance, because they are also the rights of a servant, even if the sin is adultery. However, they mentioned that borrowing for the dowry is recommended, and the implication is that it becomes obligatory if one fears adultery, even if one does not possess the dowry, provided one is capable of borrowing it. This contradicts the aforementioned condition, unless it is said: The condition is possession of the sustenance and the dowry, even by borrowing, or it is said: This applies to one who is incapable of earning and has no means of repayment.

Some prominent scholars have mentioned that what they said about the recommendation of borrowing should be taken as recommended only when one anticipates the ability to repay. In that case, if it is recommended with this expectation when one is safe from falling into adultery, it should be obligatory when adultery is certain. In fact, it should be obligatory then even if one does not firmly anticipate the ability to repay; and he is excused, as I see it, before Allah Almighty if he acts, dies, and leaves no means of repayment. So reflect on this. It is disliked when there is fear of injustice, as you have heard, and prohibited when it is certain, because marriage was ordained for the interest of safeguarding the soul and obtaining reward; with injustice, one commits a sin and falls into forbidden acts, so the interests vanish because these harms outweigh them.

It is a confirmed Sunnah, according to the most correct opinion, in the state of being able to engage in intercourse, pay the dowry, and provide sustenance, while not fearing adultery, injustice, or the neglect of obligatory or recommended deeds. If one is unable to do one of the first three, or fears one of the last three, then marriage is not a Sunnah for him, as indicated in Al-Badā’i‘. It is understood from Ashbāh of Ibn Nujaim that its being a Sunnah depends on intention. It is mentioned in Al-Fatḥ that if it is not accompanied by it, it is permissible, because its purpose then is merely satisfying desire, and acts of worship are not built upon that, so one is not rewarded. The intention for which one is rewarded is to intend to protect oneself and one's spouse from the forbidden. Likewise, the intention of producing offspring through whom the Muslims increase, as well as the intention of following the Sunnah and complying with the command. With us, it is better than busying oneself with learning or teaching, as in Durar al-Biḥār, and better than devoting oneself to supererogatory acts, as multiple scholars have stated.

In some of the authoritative books of the Shafi‘is, it is stated that marriage is recommended for one who needs it and finds its prerequisites of dowry, clothing for the first time of consummation, and the day's sustenance. It is not recommended for one who is in the Abode of War (Dār al-Ḥarb) absolutely, for fear for his children that they might adopt their religion or be enslaved. This must be interpreted as applying to one who does not believe it is highly probable that he will commit adultery if he does not marry, for a certain, immediate interest takes precedence over a future, imagined interest. If he lacks the prerequisites, it is recommended to abstain, because of His—the Exalted’s—saying: (And let those who do not... abstain...) to the end of the verse, and [because of] breaking his desire through fasting, due to the Hadith. That fasting excites heat and desire is only at the beginning; if it does not break it, he should marry. He should not break it with substances like camphor, as that is disliked, or rather prohibited for the man and woman if it leads to despair of offspring. The saying of a group that the Hadith indicates the permissibility of the impotent person cutting off his virility with medicine is rejected, for the medicines are dangerous. People have used camphor and it resulted in chronic illnesses, then they wanted to resort to schemes to regain their virility with expensive medicines, but it did not benefit them.

If one does not need marriage, it is disliked for him if he lacks the prerequisites; but if he possesses them, it is not disliked for him, because of his ability to do so, and its purposes are not confined to intercourse. Devoting oneself to worship is better than it. If one does not worship, then marriage is better according to the most correct opinion, as An-Nawawi said, because idleness leads to indecency. If one finds the prerequisites but has an infirmity like old age, a permanent disease, or is similarly incapacitated, it is disliked for him, due to his lack of need alongside the failure to protect the woman, which usually leads to her corruption. By this, the statement in Iḥyā’ is refuted, that it is a Sunnah for someone like the castrated person to imitate the righteous, just as it is a Sunnah to pass a razor over the head of a bald man. And the saying of Al-Fazārī: "What prohibition has been reported concerning the castrated one?" And need is not confined to intercourse. If these states occur after the contract, is it added to the beginning or not, due to the strength of continuity? Az-Zarkashī hesitated on this, and the second is the [preferred] view, as is apparent. This concludes [the discussion]. Therein is what was not addressed in the books of our companions as far as I know, but our principles do not reject it.

Furthermore, the apparent meaning is that the verse is specific to men; they are the ones commanded to remain chaste when incapable of the foundations and means of marriage. Yes, it is possible to argue for its generality and consider the dominance [of the masculine gender] if "marriage" is intended to mean "that which one marries," but you have already known what is in that. Do not imagine from this that remaining chaste is not recommended for women at all, for it is clear that it has been recommended in some cases. In fact, anyone who reflects, even slightly, will see the application of the rulings to their marriage, though I have not seen anyone among our companions who explicitly stated it. Yes, some Shafi‘is quoted from Al-Umm the recommendation of marriage for a woman who yearns for it, and attached to that a woman who needs financial support and fears succumbing to indecency. In At-Tanbīh, it says: Whomever marriage is permissible for, if she needs it, it is recommended for her. Al-Adhra‘ī quoted it from the companions of Ash-Shafi‘i, then discussed its obligation upon her if the forbidden act is not repelled from her except through it, and fasting has no role for her there. Through what was mentioned, the weakness of the statement of Az-Zanjānī is known: that it is a Sunnah for her absolutely, as there is nothing against her, alongside the performance of her affair and her protection. And the statement of another: It is not a Sunnah for her absolutely because there are grave rights of the husband upon her that are not easy for her to fulfill; indeed, if she knows of herself that she will not fulfill them and does not need it, it is prohibited for her. It is not hidden that what he mentioned after "indeed" is correct.

Some have inferred from the verse the invalidity of mut‘ah (temporary marriage), because if it were valid, abstention would not be mandatory for one who lacks the dowry, while the apparent meaning of the verse is its mandatory nature. It does not follow from that the prohibition of slave-concubinage, because one who cannot afford marriage due to the lack of a dowry cannot, usually, afford to purchase a slave girl, as Al-Kasa’i mentioned, and it is as you see.

(And those who seek the document...) After the Almighty commanded the marriage of the righteous among the slaves who are deserving of it, He—the Majestic and Exalted—commanded the writing of those among them who deserve it so that they might become free and dispose of their own affairs. Ibn as-Sakan narrated in Ma‘rifat aṣ-Ṣaḥābah from ‘Abdullāh ibn Ṣabīḥ, who said: "I was a slave to Ḥuwayṭib ibn ‘Abd al-‘Uzzā, and I asked him for a contract, but he refused. So the verse: (And those who seek the document...) was revealed." It is hinted from this that the mentioned ‘Abdullāh was the first to have a contract written. It might be imagined from this that the contract was known before, but Al-Khafājī quoted from Ad-Dumayrī that he said: "The contract is an Islamic term, and the first whom the Muslims had a contract written for was a slave of ‘Umar—may Allah be pleased with him—called Abū Umayyah." Ibn Ḥajar also explicitly stated that it is an Islamic term not known to the Age of Ignorance, and Allah—the Exalted—knows best.

"Kitāb" (the document) is the verbal noun of kātaba, like mukātabah, and its counterpart is ‘itāb and mu‘ātabah. That is, "And those who request of you the contract (from among those whom your right hands possess), whether they be male or female." With us, it is, according to the Law, the emancipation of the slave immediately in the hand, and in the neck (status) potentially. Its pillar is the offer in the wording of the contract or what leads to its meaning, and the acceptance, such as the master saying: "I have contracted with you for such-and-such dirhams which you shall pay to me, and you shall be free," and the slave saying: "I have accepted it." Thereby, he departs from the hand of the master, but not his ownership. If he pays the entire amount, he is freed and departs from his ownership. Its meaning is "writing the letters," i.e., gathering them. Its application to what was mentioned is because it contains the addition of the freedom of the hand to the freedom of the neck, or because the payment is usually divided into installments (nujūm) added one to another, or because the slave writes the price on himself to his master, and the master writes emancipation for him upon himself. This is more in line with the form of reciprocity, meaning mukātabah.

In Irshād al-‘Aql as-Salīm, they said: Its meaning is "I have written for you upon myself that you shall be free from me if you fulfill the money, and you have written for me upon yourself that you will fulfill that," or "I have written upon you the fulfillment of the money, and written upon myself the emancipation upon its arrival." Then he said: The investigation is that the contract is a name for the agreement resulting from the totality of the words of the master and the slave, like all other Islamic contracts concluded by offer and acceptance. There is no doubt that this does not occur in reality except from the two contracting parties, and the duty of each of them in truth is only to perform one of its conditions, expressing what is completed from his side, and originating from him the specific action belonging to him, without addressing what is completed from the side of his companion or originating from his own specific action. However, since each of those two actions was such that its realization in itself could not exist except contingent upon the realization of the other—necessarily, the commitment of emancipation in exchange for the payment from the side of the master cannot be imagined to exist and be obtained except through the commitment of the payment from the side of the slave, just as the contract of sale, which is the transfer of ownership of the object sold for the price from the side of the seller, cannot exist except through its transfer in exchange for it from the side of the buyer—there was no escape from including one of them in the other at the time of inception.

Just as the seller's saying "I sold" is the inception of the contract of sale in the sense of initiating what is completed from his side primarily, and what is completed from the side of the buyer secondarily, an initiation contingent upon his opinion—a contingency similar to the contingency of the contract of the unauthorized agent—so too is the master's saying "I have contracted with you for such-and-such," the inception of the contract of writing, meaning initiating what is completed from his side, which is the commitment of emancipation in exchange for the payment primarily, and what is completed from the side of the slave, which is the commitment of the payment, an initiation contingent upon his acceptance. So if he accepts, the contract is completed. Through this, a difficult problem is resolved concerning the attribution of the actions of contracts: if the pillar of a contract is offer and acceptance, it follows that something like "I sold such-and-such for such-and-such" would not be valid, because the one speaking it has not initiated anything except what is completed from his side, and that is not an Islamic sale, since in an Islamic sale, another action is necessary—meaning the buyer's acceptance—and that is what the mentioned speaker did not initiate. The outcome is that the attribution to the speaker's pronoun requires that he has initiated the sale, even though he has only initiated one of its pillars; so how can the attribution be valid? The way to resolve this through what was mentioned is apparent, although it was objected that it contains a claim belied by the consciousness of every rational contractor. Do you not see that when you say "I sold," for example, it does not cross your mind to initiate implicitly the purchase of another, initiating it contingent upon his opinion at all? Rather, the limit of what crosses the mind is to initiate the sale, not to initiate your purchasing it in the manner of the action of the unauthorized agent. Whoever claims that has defied his own consciousness. It was answered that implicit matters may be considered by the Law even if not intended, as is guided by the fact that they considered in the saying of one who says to another: "Free your slave on my behalf for such-and-such," and he frees him—the implicit sale with its two pillars, even if the speaker did not have that in mind and did not intend it.

It was investigated therein that they considered first the emancipation as the meaning of the word and the intended purpose, prioritizing the aspect of freedom. Then, when they saw that this was contingent upon ownership—which is contingent upon sale according to the prevailing custom—they considered the sale to complete for them the first consideration. They did not consider it the meaning of the word "emancipation" at all, so that intention would be a condition, even if their naming it an "implicit sale" suggests it. This is contrary to what we are in, as you have heard, for the initiation of acceptance has become a contingency for the essence of the Islamic sale, and it was considered an implicit meaning for it, to the point that it became in their view, as the apparent speech in Al-Irshād requires, something like "I sold," meaning "I initiated an offer from my side primarily and an acceptance from you as a substitute." It is apparent in such a case that intention is realized. Since the intention to initiate acceptance as a substitute was denied by consciousness, it is known that it is not an implicit meaning.

Some people escaped the problem by committing to the view that "sale" is the offer and acceptance is a condition for its validity; so the saying of the speaker "I sold" is the inception of a sale that is potentially valid or not, and when the other says "I bought," its validity is determined. And their saying that the pillar of a sale is the offer and acceptance is one of the common inaccuracies. Or by committing to the view that "sale" and its likes have two applications: one is the contract resulting from the sum of offer and acceptance, as in your saying: "The sale occurred between Zayd and ‘Amr"; and the second is the offer only, as in your saying: "I sold him such-and-such, but he did not buy." The sale denoting the "inceptive I sold" is of this category, so there is no problem in attributing it to the speaker. So reflect and ponder.

In this station, there are investigations we have left out for fear of further straying from what we are engaged in, and Allah—the Exalted—is the Grantor of success. (And those...) it is possible that it is in the place of a nominative on the basis of being a subject (at the beginning of a sentence), and the predicate is His—the Exalted’s—saying: (so contract with them). This is by estimating the verb "say," based on the well-known view that the inceptive sentence does not occur as a predicate for the subject unless it is thus. Some scholars said: There is no need for interpretation in such a case, because it is in the sense of a conditional and a result, and that is why the fa (so) was brought in the predicate. It is also possible that it is in the place of an accusative on the basis that it is the object of an omitted verb explained by what is mentioned, and the fa therein is for containing the conditional also. In Al-Baḥr, it is permitted to say: "Zayd, so strike him" and "Zayd, strike him." If the fa enters, the estimation is: "Take heed, so strike him," so the fa is in the answer to an omitted imperative. You know that there is no need for this in the verse. Some scholars mentioned that the fa therein is based on the second possibility, because the right of the explainer is to follow the explained, and the intent is "contract after contract," for there is a multitude among the masters and likewise among the contractors, so the command for it to the master is not in relation to one contractor. This resembles unintelligible jargon.

The command is for recommendation, according to the correct view. It was said it is for obligation, and it is the school of ‘Aṭā’, ‘Amr ibn Dīnār, Aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk, Ibn Sīrīn, and Dāwūd. What ‘Abd ar-Razzāq, ‘Abd ibn Ḥumayd, and Ibn Jarīr narrated from Anas ibn Mālik, who said: "Sīrīn asked me for the contract, but I refused him. He went to ‘Umar—may Allah be pleased with him—who turned to me with the whip and recited His—the Exalted’s—saying: (so contract with them...)." In another narration: "Contract with him, or I will strike you with the whip," which is apparent in the opinion of obligation. The majority of the Imams, such as Mālik, Ash-Shafi‘i, and others, are of the view that the contract after the request and the fulfillment of the condition—which will come later, if Allah wills—is recommended. However, those of them who said that the apparent meaning of the command is for obligation, like Ash-Shafi‘i, did not say it follows its apparent meaning here, because it is after a prohibition, and it is selling his wealth for his wealth for the purpose of permissibility. He claimed its recommendation is from another evidence. The apparent meaning of the verse is the permissibility of the contract whether the payment is immediate, deferred, in installments, or not, due to the lack of restriction. The Ḥanafīs leaned toward that. The majority of the Shafi‘is went to the view that it is a condition that it be in installments in two or more stages, so it is not permitted without a time limit and installments absolutely. It was said: If the master owns some of the slave and the rest is free, a time limit and installments are not required. Their scholars rejected this and answered the claim of the verse's generality by saying that "the contract" implies installments, so it suffices without restriction because it is written that he is freed if he pays what is upon him, and such a thing does not happen immediately. They also objected to the saying of the validity of an immediate contract by saying that if the contract were concluded immediately, the demand for payment would be directed at him immediately, and he would have no money to pay, so he would be incapable of paying and returned to servitude, so the purpose of the contract would not be realized. This is like if one sold something for future delivery when it does not exist at the time of the deadline, for it is not permitted. You know what is in the "implication of installments in the contract," and that it harms the Shafi‘is, because the installments that the contract implies, according to their claim, are realized in one stage, so it would require that it be permitted with it, as most scholars have leaned toward, and they do not permit that and require two or more stages. What they mentioned in the objection is nothing, for there is no incapacity with the Muslims being commanded to help him with charity, gifts, and loans, and analogy to salam (forward buying) is not valid because the difference is apparent. Perhaps what was mentioned is like selling to one who does not possess the price, and there is no doubt in its validity. Thus it was said, and there is an investigation therein.

Ibn Khuwayzimindād said: If the contract was for an immediate payment, it would be emancipation for wealth, and not a contract. The difference between emancipation for wealth and the contract is mentioned in its place, (if you know any good in them), meaning honesty and the ability to earn; through these two, the "good" is explained. Ash-Shafi‘i explained it, and Al-Bayḍāwī mentioned that this interpretation was narrated as a marfū‘ (attributed to the Prophet) report. Something similar came in some narrations from Ibn ‘Abbās. Honesty was explained as not wasting money. It was said: It is possible that the intent is uprightness, but it is a condition for the recommendation of the contract that the slave not be known for spending what he has in obedience, because for such a one, freedom through the contract is not hoped for. Abū Dāwūd narrated in Al-Marāsīl and Al-Bayhaqī in his Sunan from Yaḥyā ibn Abī Kathīr, who said: The Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said concerning His—the Exalted’s—saying: (if you know any good in them): "If you know in them a craft." Its apparent meaning is the sufficiency of the ability to earn and not requiring honesty. It is a statement quoted by Ibn Ḥajar from some of them, and he objected to it by saying that if the contractor is not honest, he will waste what he earns, so the intended purpose will not be realized.

‘Abd ibn Ḥumayd narrated from ‘Ubaydah as-Salmānī, Qatādah, Ibrāhīm, and Abū Ṣāliḥ that they explained "good" as honesty, and the apparent meaning of their speech is its sufficiency and not requiring the ability to earn. Ibn Ḥajar also quoted this from some of them and objected to it by saying that if the contractor is not capable of earning, there is harm to the master in his contract, and there is no reliance on helping him with things like charity and zakāt. Ibn Mardūyah narrated from ‘Alī—may Allah honor his face—that he explained "good" as money. A group narrated it from Ibn ‘Abbās, from Ibn Jurayj, and it was narrated from Mujāhid, ‘Aṭā’, and Aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk. It was objected to that this is weak in wording and meaning. As for the wording, because it is not said "in him is money," but rather "he has money" or "for him is money." As for the meaning, because the slave has no money, and because what is immediately understood by "good" is other than that, even if "good" is applied to money in His—the Exalted’s—saying: (It is prescribed for you, when death approaches one of you, if he leaves any good, to make a bequest). It was answered that it is possible that the intended "good" for these prominent scholars is the ability to earn money, except that they mentioned what is the original intended purpose from it, being lax in the phrasing, and there are many such instances.

Abū Ḥayyān said: What is apparent from usage is that it is the religion; you say: "So-and-so has good in him," and nothing comes to mind except uprightness. It was objected to that it does not suit the context and would require that one should not contract with a non-Muslim. Many of our companions explained it as "that they do not harm the Muslims after emancipation," and they said: If the damage to them is deemed highly probable after emancipation, it is better to leave contracting with them. The apparent meaning of the condition is that if they do not know any good in them, it is not recommended for them to contract, or it is not obligatory upon them. This is due to the disagreement on whether the command is for recommendation or obligation, so the verse does not imply the lack of permissibility upon the absence of the condition, for the utmost that is required is the absence of the conditioned, and there is nothing in it except the command indicating obligation or recommendation. Whoever said it is for permissibility committed to the view that the condition here has no implied meaning, as it follows the custom of contracting with one whose goodness is known. Thus it was said, and what I see is the prohibition of the contract if the master knows that the contractor, if he were free, would harm the Muslims.

In At-Tuḥfah by Ibn Ḥajar, in the chapter of the Contract, at the saying of An-Nawawi that it is recommended if a strong, honest slave who can earn asks for it, and it is not disliked in any way, the text says: "But Al-Bulqīnī investigated its being disliked for a sinful person who puts his earnings into sin, and if the master seized it, he would refrain from that." He and others said: "Rather, the situation ends in prohibition," i.e., and it is an analogy to the prohibition of charity and the farḍ (compulsory) if it is known that the one who takes them spends them in forbidden ways. Then I saw Al-Adhra‘ī investigate it concerning one who is known to earn through sinful ways, and it is explicit in what I mentioned, since the pivot is on empowering him by means of it to commit the forbidden. This concludes [the discussion]. What was mentioned as the pivot is present in it. We say: Then the intent of "knowledge" is strong suspicion, which is [the basis for] most Islamic rulings. (And give them from the wealth of Allah which He has given you). The apparent meaning is a command for the masters to give the contractors something from their wealth as help for them. In its ruling is the remission of some of the contract money, and the least that constitutes wealth suffices for that.

‘Abd ar-Razzāq, Ibn al-Mundhir, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Al-Ḥākim—who authenticated it—Al-Bayhaqī, and others narrated through the path of ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥabīb from ‘Alī—may Allah honor his face—from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—that he said: "A quarter is remitted for the contractor." This also came in some narrations as stopped at ‘Alī—may Allah honor his face. Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī said: "It is the most correct." Perhaps that is an opinion derived from his reasoning—may Allah be pleased with him. The claim that this is not said based on opinion, so it is in the ruling of the marfū‘, is prohibited. Because of this report and the saying of Ibn Rāhwayh: "The people of interpretation reached a consensus that the quarter is what is meant by the verse." They said: It is better to give the quarter. Ibn Mas‘ūd and Al-Ḥasan considered giving a third good, Ibn ‘Umar—may Allah be pleased with them—giving a seventh, and Qatādah giving a tenth. The command for giving, according to us, is for recommendation. The Shafi‘is said: "It is for obligation," since there is no diverting evidence from it. They explicitly stated that it is incumbent upon the master or his heir, prioritizing it over the costs of preparation.

As for the remission from the contractor for a valid contract of a portion of the money contracted for, or paying a portion of the contracted amount after taking it or from its type, and that remission is better than payment because it is what is reported from the Companions, and because the help in it is certain, while what is paid might be spent in another direction, and it is better in the last installment. The most correct opinion is that the time of obligation is before emancipation, and it is implied if there remains of the installment an amount with which the contract money is fulfilled. It is widespread that they say the remission is obligatory, and it is refuted by his saying—may Allah bless him and grant him peace: "The contractor is a slave as long as a dirham of his [contract] remains," for if the remission were obligatory, the remainder would necessarily fall from him. Also, if the remission were obligatory, its obligation would be contingent upon the contract, so the contract would be an obligator and a remover at the same time. Also, it is a contract of exchange, so one is not forced into remission like a sale. It was said: The meaning of (give them) is "lend them." It was said: It is a command for them to spend on them after they have paid and been freed. Attributing the wealth to Him—the Exalted—and describing it as His—the Exalted—giving it to them is for the purpose of urging compliance with the command by realizing what is commanded. For observing the arrival of the wealth to them from His side—the Glorified—alongside Him—the Almighty and Exalted—being the true owner of it, is one of the strongest motivations to spend it in the commanded direction. It was said: It is a command of recommendation to the general public of Muslims to help the contractors by giving them charity. Ibn Abī Ḥātim narrated from Zayd ibn Aslam that it is a command for the guardians to give them from the zakāt. This is similar to what was mentioned in Al-Kashshāf that it is a command to the Muslims, in the sense of obligation, to help the contractors and give them their share which Allah—the Exalted—made for them in the House of Wealth, like His—the Glorified’s—saying: (and for the necks), according to Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions. It is permissible for the master, if he is wealthy, to take what was given as charity to the contractor due to the change of ownership, just as in the case if he bought the charity from a poor person or the poor person gifted it to him; for the contractor possesses it as charity, and the master possesses it as compensation for emancipation. The same ruling applies if he becomes incapable after paying some of it for the rest, so he is returned to servitude, or he is emancipated from a source other than the contract. The cause is also the change of ownership according to Muḥammad, and there is obscurity in it because what was taken did not occur as compensation for emancipation. As for when he is returned to servitude, it is apparent; and as for when he is emancipated from other than the contract, it is because emancipation was not conditional upon paying that. So reflect.

Abū Yūsuf explained the problem as: There is no impurity in the essence of charity; the impurity is only in the act of the taker, because it is an act of humiliation by the taker, and that is not permissible for him without need. The taking was not found from the master. It was objected that it contradicts its being "the dirt of the people" in the Hadith. It was quoted from Ash-Shafi‘i that if the contractor is returned to servitude or emancipated from other than the contract, the master must return what he took unless it was destroyed before, because what was paid to the contractor did not occur in its place, and the desired goal was not achieved by it.

Al-Ṭībī said: Through this, it is apparent that the analogy of that to the charity which was bought from a poor person is not correct. The pivot, in my view, is the difference between the two aspects of ownership; whenever it is realized, no doubt remains in the permissibility. It has been authenticated that Barīrah, the freedwoman of ‘Ā’ishah—may Allah be pleased with them—came after emancipation with beef. ‘Ā’ishah said to the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—: "This is what was given as charity to Barīrah." He—upon him be peace and blessing—said: "It is charity for her, and a gift for us." He—upon him be peace and blessing—signaled its permissibility for the family of the House for whom charity is not permissible, due to the difference of the two aspects of ownership. So reflect. The contract has many rulings sought in the books of jurisprudence.

(And do not force your slave girls to prostitution...) Muslim and Abū Dāwūd narrated from Jābir—may Allah be pleased with him—that a slave girl of ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl, called Musaykah, and another called Umaymah, he used to force them into adultery. They complained about that to the Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and the verse was revealed. Ibn Abī Ḥātim narrated from As-Suddī who said: ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy had a slave girl called Mu‘ādhah. Whenever a guest arrived, he would send her to him to have intercourse with her, desiring reward from him and honor for him. The slave girl came to Abū Bakr—may Allah be pleased with him—and complained about that to him. Abū Bakr mentioned it to the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—who ordered that she be taken. ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy shouted: "Who will defend us against Muḥammad—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—who overcomes us regarding our slaves?" and the verse was revealed. It was said: This cursed one had six slave girls: Mu‘ādhah, Musaykah, Umaymah, ‘Amrah, Arwā, and Qutaylah, and he forced them into prostitution and imposed taxes on them. Two of them complained to the Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and the verse was revealed. It was said: It was revealed concerning two men who used to force two of their slave girls into adultery, one of them being Ibn Ubayy. Ibn Mardūyah narrated from ‘Alī—may Allah honor his face—that they used to force their slave girls into adultery in the Age of Ignorance, taking their wages, so they were forbidden from that in Islam, and the verse was revealed. It was narrated similarly from Ibn ‘Abbās—may Allah be pleased with them. According to all narrations, there is no specification of the address to those concerning whom the verse was revealed; rather, it is general for all those held accountable.

"Al-Fatayāt" is the plural of "fatāh," and every one of "fatā" and "fatāh" is a famous metonymy for the male slave and the female slave absolutely. The Lawgiver—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—commanded their expression added to the "my" pronoun, not as "slave" and "female slave" added to him. He—upon him be peace—said: "None of you should say 'my slave' and 'my female slave,' but rather 'my youth' and 'my maiden.'" It is as if he—upon him be peace—disliked servitude to other than Him—the Glorified and Exalted—and there is no restriction upon Him—the Exalted—in adding the latter two to other than Him—the Exalted—in His status. The "worship" mentioned in this station, considering its original meaning, has a beautiful place and added relevance to His—the Glorified’s—saying: (to prostitution), which is the adultery of women, as in Al-Baḥr, from the aspect of its proceeding from their young ones, because they are the ones from whom that is usually expected, not the elderly and the young.

His—the Almighty and Exalted’s—saying: (if they desire chastity) is not to restrict the prohibition to the case of their desiring chastity from adultery, and excluding what is other than it from its ruling, such as if the forcing was due to their dislike of adultery for the sake of the adulterer, or for the sake of the time, or for the sake of the place, or for other matters that justify forcing in general. Rather, it is to preserve the custom of those concerning whom the verse was revealed, as they used to force them into prostitution while they desired chastity, with the abundance of their desire that commands indecency, and their shortcomings in knowing the matters that call to virtues and prevent the commission of indecencies. In it, there is the addition to make their situation ugly and to vilify them for what they used to do of indecencies, which is not hidden. For anyone who has the slightest chivalry can hardly be satisfied with the indecency of those he holds among his slave girls, let alone commanding them to it or forcing them into it, especially when desiring chastity and the abundance of desire for it, as the expression "desired" in the past tense implies, and the preference for the word "if" over "when," because the desire for chastity from slave girls is like the rare and exceptional, or to indicate the obligation of ending the forcing when the desire for chastity is in the realm of hesitation and doubt; so how much more if it is certain to occur, as is the reality? From the orientation of this condition, one knows what we have pointed out of the beauty of the place of "the maidens" here considering its original meaning, that it has no implied meaning, even if it is supposed as an adjective; for the condition of considering the implied meaning, according to those who hold it, is that what is mentioned was not brought out in the form of the prevailing [custom]. A group clung to the verse to invalidate the saying of the implied meaning, so they said: If it were considered, it would require the permissibility of forcing when there is no desire for chastity, and forcing into adultery is not permissible under any circumstances by consensus. From what we mentioned, the answer to it is known.

In the Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar al-Ḥājibī by Al- ‘Aḍud, the answer to that is first: It is among that which was brought out in the form of the prevailing [custom], for the prevailing [custom] is that forcing occurs when there is a desire for chastity, and there is no implied meaning in such a case. Secondly, that the implied meaning required that, and it was negated by a stronger opposing evidence, which is the consensus. It might be answered that it indicates the lack of prohibition when there is no desire, and that is established, for forcing is not possible then because if they do not desire chastity, they do not dislike prostitution, and forcing is only binding an action that is disliked; and if it is not possible, prohibition does not relate to it, because the condition of accountability is possibility, and the lack of prohibition does not necessitate permissibility. This concludes [the discussion]. Perhaps what we mentioned first is the most worthy, and more than one made the increase of ugliness and vilification an answer with slight change, and there is no harm in it.

Some claimed that (if they desire chastity) refers to His—the Exalted’s—saying: (And marry the unmarried among you), which is something that evokes wonder. In short, there is no argument in that for the invalidators of the saying of the implied meaning. Likewise, there is no argument for them in His—the Exalted’s—saying: (in order to seek the fleeting enjoyment of worldly life), for it is, as in Irshād al-‘Aql as-Salīm, a restriction on forcing, not in the sense that it is the pivot of the prohibition against it, but in the sense that it is what is habitual among them also, brought to vilify them for what they are upon of carrying a great burden for the sake of a small trifle. That is, "Do not do what you are upon of forcing them into prostitution to seek the enjoyment that is fast to vanish and quick to decay." So the intent of "seeking" is the request accompanied by obtaining the requested and fulfilling it in action, as it is the one suitable to be the goal for forcing, resulting from it, not the absolute which encompasses the prior request that prompts it. And there is no specification for "the fleeting enjoyment of worldly life" that consists of what they earn, meaning the wages they take for adultery with them, even if the apparent meaning of many reports requires that; rather, what encompasses it and their children from adultery. Through this, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr explained it, as Ibn Abī Ḥātim narrated from him. In some reports, there is what implies that they used to force them to that for the sake of the children.

Aṭ-Ṭabarānī, Al-Bazzār, and Ibn Mardūyah narrated with a sound chain from Ibn ‘Abbās that a slave girl of ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy used to commit adultery in the Age of Ignorance and bore him children from adultery. When Allah—the Exalted—forbade adultery, he said to her: "Why do you not commit adultery?" She said: "By Allah, I will never commit adultery." So he struck her, and Allah—the Exalted—revealed (And do not force...) to the end of the verse. This and its likes do not require the specification of "the enjoyment" to children, as is not hidden.

I heard that some tribes of the Bedouin of Iraq, like the Āl ‘Izzah, command their slave girls to commit adultery for the sake of children, like the action of the Age of Ignorance. This is not strange from the Bedouin, especially in these eras in which many of the aspects of the Islamic rulings have become stripped in many places, for they are more worthy not to know the limits of what Allah revealed. And there is no power nor strength except by Allah. And His—the Exalted’s—saying: (And whoever forces them...) to the end, is an introductory sentence brought to confirm the prohibition and emphasize the obligation of acting by explaining the salvation of the forced women from the punishment for what they were forced to do, and the return of the calamity of the forcing upon those who force, as an indication. That is: "And whoever forces them to what was mentioned of prostitution (then indeed Allah, after their forcing, is Forgiving, Merciful)."

(to them) as in the reading of Ibn Mas‘ūd. ‘Abd ibn Ḥumayd and Ibn Abī Ḥātim narrated it from Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr from him, but by placing (to them) before (is Forgiving, Merciful). It was narrated likewise from Ibn ‘Abbās—may Allah be pleased with them. It is indicated by it, as was said, His—the Exalted’s—saying: (after their forcing), i.e., their being forced, on the basis that "the forcing" is a verbal noun constructed for the passive. Its placement between the subject of "Indeed" and its predicate is to indicate that this is the cause for the forgiveness and mercy.

Ibn Abī Shaybah, Ibn Jarīr, and others narrated from Mujāhid that he said: "Forgiving, Merciful to them, and not to them." Al-Ḥasan, when he recited the verse, would say: "To them, by Allah, to them." In specifying that to them and determining its pivot on what you have heard, alongside the prior mention of the ones who force also in the conditional, there is an indication of their being deprived of forgiveness and mercy entirely, as if it was said: "Not to them, or not for him." Due to the appearance of this estimation, it sufficed with it against the returning pronoun to the subject of the condition which is necessary in the conditional sentence according to the most correct opinion, as in Al-Mughnī. It was said, in orienting the matter of the returning pronoun: that "their forcing" is a verbal noun added to the object, and the subject of the verbal noun is an omitted pronoun returning to the subject of the condition, and the omitted is like the expressed. The estimation is: "after their forcing them." Abū Ḥayyān rejected it by saying that they did not consider among the connectors the omitted subject for the verbal noun in such as "Hind, I marveled at the striking of Zayd," even if the meaning is "at her striking Zayd." So they did not permit this structure, and there is no difference between it and what we are in. It was said: The answer to the condition is omitted, and what is mentioned is an explanation for what is understood from that omitted part. The estimation is: "And whoever forces them, then upon him is the consequence of their forcing, not transgressing to them; for indeed Allah, after their forcing, is Forgiving, Merciful to them." In it is a deviation from the apparent and committing to more omission without necessity. That it is for the causation of the reward on the condition is nothing.

He said in Al-Baḥr: "The correct view is that the estimation is 'Forgiving, Merciful' to them, so that there may be in the answer to the condition a pronoun returning to the subject of the condition about which the sentence of the answer informs, and that is conditional upon repentance." In it is an impairment of the elegance of the majestic structure and a belittling of the matter of the prohibition in a station of intimidation. The matter of the connection does not stop upon that. Similar to it is what was said: The estimation is "for them both," so the way is what preceded. The prepositional phrase in the reading of the one whom you heard, Ibn Jinnī said: "It is related to 'Forgiving' because it is closer to it, and because 'fa‘ūl' is more established in transitivity than 'fa‘īl'." It is permitted that it be related to "Merciful" for the sake of the preposition, if it is estimated as a predicate after a predicate, and it is not estimated as an adjective for "Forgiving" due to the impossibility of the adjective preceding its described. The acted-upon is only correctly placed where its agent is placed, and the predicate is not thus. Also, it is better in the predicate because the rank of mercy is higher than the rank of forgiveness, since forgiveness is caused by it, so it is as if it is preceding in meaning even if it is delayed in wording. The meaning is on its connection to both, as is not hidden. The connection of forgiveness to them, despite their being forced—they have no sin—is based on the fact that the forced person is not held accountable, and there is no sin without accountability. The detail of the problem is in the fundamentals. It was said: "Because of the intensity of the punishment for the one who forces," for if the forced woman, despite the existence of the excuse, is in the position of being punished until she needs forgiveness, then what is the state of the one who forces? And to indicate that the limit of Islamic forcing and the perseverance to reach it—so he commits [it]—is narrow, and Allah—the Exalted—forgives that by His kindness. It was said: "For the sake of intimidating the matter of adultery and urging the forced women to cling to refraining from it," or to consider that they, even if they are forced, are not free in the folds of adultery from a taint of compliance by the rule of human nature.