Al-Qasas: (78) "He said: 'It has been given to me only on account of knowledge that I have'..."
(He said), responding to those who counseled him: (It has been given to me only on account of knowledge that I have). It is as if he intended to reject their statement: "Just as Allah has been good to you," because that statement implies that Allah, the Exalted, bestowed those riches and treasures upon him without any cause or merit on his part. The essence of his statement is a claim that he deserved what he was given due to the knowledge he possesses.
His words (on account of knowledge)—according to most grammarians—are in the position of a circumstantial qualifier (hal) for the pronoun in utituhu ("it was given to me"). He thus restricted the agent (Allah) to this condition, pointing to the cause of the bestowal and the basis of his entitlement; meaning: "I was given it, being in a state of possessing knowledge."
It is permissible for 'ala (on/upon) to be causative (ta'liliyya), with the prepositional phrase attached to the passive verb utitu as a non-essential adverb (zarf laghw); it is as if he said: "I was given it because of knowledge." (That I have) is in the position of an adjective for "knowledge." The intended meaning is: "Knowledge peculiar to me, not to you."
It is also possible that [the phrase 'indi] is attached to the verb utitu, meaning: "in my estimation and my opinion," as one says, "This ruling is 'ind Abi Hanifa (according to Abu Hanifa), may Allah have mercy on him." In Al-Kashshaf, there is that which makes it apparent that when 'indi means "in my opinion/estimation," it is the predicate of an omitted subject—that is: "It is, in my opinion and view, thus." The sentence, in that case, is an incipit (musta'nafa) affirming that what he mentioned is an opinion he holds firmly. It is said in Al-Kashf: "This is the [correct] perspective."
Regarding this "knowledge," it is said: it refers to the knowledge of the Torah, for he was the most knowledgeable of the Children of Israel regarding it. Abu Sulayman al-Darani said: It was the knowledge of trade and ways of earning. Ibn al-Musayyib said: It was the science of Alchemy (al-kimiya). Moses, peace be upon him, knew this, and he bequeathed a third of it to Joshua the son of Nun, a third to Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and a third to Korah. Korah then deceived them both until he added their shares of knowledge to his own, so he would take lead and copper and turn them into gold. It is also said: Allah, the Exalted, taught Moses the science of Alchemy, and Moses taught it to his sister, and his sister taught it to Korah. It is narrated from Ibn Abbas that he specified it as the knowledge of the craft of gold. Others say it was the knowledge of extracting treasures and burials.
Abu Zayd said that "knowledge" refers to the knowledge of Allah—meaning: "It was given to me by knowledge from Allah, the Exalted, and a specific favor from His presence, may He be glorified, that He intended for me." In this interpretation, 'indi means "in my estimation." It is also said that "knowledge" means "the known object," like His words: "...and they do not encompass anything of His knowledge" (Qur'an 2:255). To this points what is narrated from Muqatil, who said: "That is, upon goodness which Allah, the Exalted, let me know."
Interpreting it as the science of Alchemy is widespread among those who practice it. In Majma' al-Bayan, it is also attributed to Al-Kalbi. Al-Zajjaj rejected this and said: "It is not correct, because the science of Alchemy is false and has no reality." Al-Tibi countered this by saying: "Perhaps it was in the category of a miracle." This was then rebutted by the claim that it is unsound, for otherwise, Korah would not have been able to achieve it.
The denial of Alchemy—a Greek word meaning "the artifice," or Hebrew in origin (kim-yah meaning "it is from Allah"), or Persian (ki-miya meaning "when" [with a specific method])—is not exclusive to Al-Zajjaj; rather, a group of distinguished scholars rejected it and stated its impossibility, while others held the opposite view.
If you desire a summary of the discourse, listen to what is recited to you: Some investigators have mentioned that the basis of the discourse in this craft, according to the philosophers, concerns the seven malleable metals: gold, silver, lead, tin, copper, iron, and kharsini (zinc/brass). Are they different in their essential forms (fusul), such that each is a distinct species from the other? Or are they different only in properties and qualities, such that they are all varieties of one single species?
The position of the teacher Abu Nasr al-Farabi, followed by the philosophers of Andalusia, is that they are one species, and that their differences lie in qualities such as humidity, dryness, softness, hardness, and colors (yellowness, whiteness, blackness). These are all varieties of that single species. Based on this, they posit the possibility of one transforming into another through the change of accidents by the action of nature or craft.
Abu Bakr ibn al-Sa'igh, known as Ibn Bajjah, narrated in some of his writings from the aforementioned teacher that he said: "Aristotle has made clear in his books on minerals that the craft of Alchemy falls under the category of the possible, though it is a possibility whose actual existence is difficult—unless coincidences occur that facilitate its existence." He examined it first dialectically, proving it with a syllogism and then refuting it with a syllogism, according to his habit regarding positions frequently disputed. Finally, he proved it with a syllogism composed of two premises:
- Metals are one in species, and the difference between them is not in their essence but in their accidents—some in essential accidents and some in non-essential accidents.
- Any two things under one species that differ by an accident can be transferred into one another. If the accident is essential, the transfer is difficult; if it is removable, it is easy. The difficulty in this craft is due to the difference of most of these substances in their essential accidents. It seems the difference between gold and silver is very slight.
The position of Sheikh Abu Ali ibn Sina, followed by the philosophers of the East, is that they differ by their essential forms and are distinct species. He based upon this the denial of this craft and the impossibility of its existence, because the essential form is not something reachable by craft; it is only created by the Creator and Measurer of all things, Allah, the Almighty and Majestic. This is what Ibn Khaldun reported from him.
The Imam [Fakhr al-Din al-Razi] stated in Al-Mabahith al-Mashriqiyya (Part 4, Chapter 8): "The Sheikh accepted the possibility of dyeing copper with the dye of silver, and silver with the dye of gold, and removing most of the defects from lead. But as for stripping away or clothing with the essential specific form, he said: 'Its possibility has not appeared to me, as these sensible qualities seem not to be the forms by which these bodies become species, but rather accidents and requirements; their forms are unknown. If the thing is unknown, how can one intend to create or annihilate it?'"
Al-Tughra'i—one of the masters of this craft who authored several books on it—criticized Ibn Sina. He argued that the management and treatment (al-tadbir wa al-'ilaj) does not consist in creating or originating the essential form, but rather in preparing the matter to receive a property that comes—after the preparation—from its Creator and Maker, may His majesty and power be magnified, just as He, the Exalted, makes light overflow upon bodies through polishing. We have no need in this to conceive or know [the form]. If we have encountered the creation of some animals—like the scorpion from dirt and straw, or the snake from hair—what prevents us from encountering the same in minerals? This is all by craft, the subject of which is matter; its management and treatment are solely to prepare it to receive those forms, no more. "We attempt this in gold and silver; we take matter and describe it for treatment after it has the primary potential to receive the image of gold or silver, then we attempt, through treatment, until the potential to receive its form is completed." This is a valid response, it seems.
The Imam, after mentioning what you have heard of the Sheikh’s words, said: "It is not strong. We observe specific effects and actions in Theriac. If we do not posit a 'Theriacal form' for it, but rather say the actions are derived from that temperament and not from another form, then it is also permissible to say that the yellowness and weight of gold are derived from the temperament within it, not from a defining form. In that case, gold would have no essential form except mere yellowness and weight—but these are known, so it is possible to intend to remove or acquire them; thus, the Sheikh’s statement is invalidated. But if we affirm a defining form for it, we say: undoubtedly, we do not conceive of that form except as an essence that requires specific actions issuing from the Theriac. Whether this degree of knowledge is sufficient for intending its creation and annulment is debatable; if it is not sufficient, it must be impossible for us to make Theriac. If it is sufficient, then in our issue, it is also obtained, for we know that the golden form is an essence that requires melting, yellowness, and weight." He added: "We also know the accidents that suit it and those that do not, and we know that if a non-conforming accident becomes intense in the matter, the form is annihilated—like the water-form, for we know heat does not suit it, even if we do not know its essence in detail. Therefore, we can annihilate the water-form (by heating) and acquire it (by cooling the air). Likewise, in our issue."
A group of philosophers argued against its possibility with several points:
- Nature creates these bodies from elements unknown to us, and those elements have specific quantities unknown to us, and the qualities of those elements have known ranks which are unknown to us, and for the completion of action and reaction, there is a specific time unknown to us. With ignorance of all this, how can we make these bodies?
- The dyeing essence: Is it more patient against fire than the dyed, or is the dyed more patient, or are they equal? If they are equal in patience, they are of one species; thus, neither has priority in being the "dyer" over the "dyed."
- If it were possible by craft, it would not be [solely] by nature—but the consequent is false. Firstly, because we have never found a likeness for it. Secondly, if it were permissible for what is produced by nature to exist by craft, then it would be permissible for what is produced by craft to exist by nature—so a sword or a bed would exist by nature. Since the impossibility of the consequent is proven, the impossibility of the antecedent is proven.
- These bodies have natural places which are their mines, and these are to them as wombs are to animals; so whoever permits their generation outside those mines is like one who permits the birth of animals outside of wombs.
The Imam replied:
- To the first: It is invalidated by the craft of medicine.
- To the second: It does not follow that the equality of the dyer and the dyed in patience against fire implies equality in essence, for two different things may share some attributes.
- To the third: It is possible for that which is found by nature to be found by craft, like fire obtained by striking [flint], and Nushadir (sal ammoniac) is sometimes made from barley, as well as many vitriols. Even if we found no example for it, it does not necessitate the certainty of its negation. Nor does the possibility of obtaining a natural thing by craft imply the possibility of the reverse; rather, the matter rests on proof.
- To the fourth: Whoever intends to turn copper into silver is not like an originator of something, but like one treating a patient; for copper is of the essence of silver, but it contains illnesses and ailments. Just as treatment is possible not [only] in the place of formation, so too is it here. Moreover, the essence of the argument is that what forms in the mountains cannot form by craft—and this is where the dispute lies.
Ibn Khaldun, after mentioning Ibn Sina’s words and Al-Tughra'i’s refutation, said: "We have another approach in refuting the practitioners of this craft, from which the impossibility of its existence and the falsehood of all their claims become clear." He argued that their treatment is based on observing the matter prepared with the primary potential, making it a subject, and mimicking the management of nature for the body in the mine until it turns into gold or silver. They multiply the active and passive powers to complete it in a shorter time, because it is established that multiplying the power of the actor decreases the time of its action. It is established that gold only completes its formation in its mine after 1,080 years—the great solar cycle. Therefore, if powers and qualities are multiplied in the treatment, the time of its formation must necessarily be shorter. Or, they attempt through their treatment to obtain a temperamental form for that matter, making it like leaven for dough—turning the dough into its own nature, doing to it what [the leaven] attained of puffiness and friability so that it is easily digested in the stomach and quickly changes into nourishment. That form performs the desired actions, and that is the Elixir.
Know that every formation from the elemental generators must involve the gathering of the four elements in varying proportions—if they were equivalent in proportion, no mixture would occur. There must be a dominant part, and there must be an innate heat in every mixture, which is the actor because it is the guardian of its form. Furthermore, every formation in time must involve the transition of its stages—from stage to stage until it reaches its end. Look at the state of man in his development: a drop, then a clot, then... until his end. The proportions of the parts in each stage are different in their quantities and qualities; otherwise, the first stage would be exactly the last. Likewise, the innate heat in each stage differs from the other. Look at gold: what occurs in its mine over 1,080 years, and the states through which it passes! The Alchemist would need to match the action of nature in the mine, mimicking it with his management and treatment until it is finished.
A condition of any craft is the visualization of what is intended by it. One of the common proverbs of the wise is: "The end of thought is the beginning of work, and the end of work is the beginning of thought." Thus, these states of gold must be visualized in its numerous stages and varying proportions, and what substitutes for it in terms of the amount of multiplied powers, until he mimics the action of nature.
These are all encompassed only by the All-Encompassing Knowledge—the Knowledge of Allah, the Almighty and Majestic. Human knowledge falls short of this. The state of one who claims to obtain gold through this craft is like one who claims the craft of creating a human from semen. If we were to grant him the encompassing knowledge of [the semen's] parts, proportions, stages, and the way of its creation in the womb—and he knew that with a realized knowledge of all its details so that nothing escaped him—we would grant him the creation of this human. But how could he possess that? The conclusion is that the industrial action, according to what their words require, is preceded by visualizations of the states of the natural mineral which one intends to equal and mimic, and the action of matter possessing powers therein in detail. Those states have no end, and human knowledge is incapable of what is below them. Thus, intending to turn copper into gold is like intending to create a human, animal, or plant. This is the most reliable of the proofs I have known indicating the impossibility. The impossibility here is not due to the impossibility of the essential forms, nor due to nature, but due to the impossibility of encompassing [the details] and the insufficiency of humans in that regard.
What Ibn Sina mentioned is distinct from this. There is another aspect regarding the impossibility in terms of its end: The wisdom of Allah, the Exalted, in the two stones [gold and silver] and their rarity is that they are the pillars of people’s earnings and wealth. If they were obtained by craft, the wisdom of Allah therein would be nullified, as their existence would become so common that no one would acquire anything from them. Another aspect: Nature does not abandon the closest path in its actions to follow the most distant one. If this industrial path—which they claim is true, closer than the path of nature in its mine, and shorter in time—were true, nature would not have abandoned it for the path it takes in forming and refining gold and silver.
As for Al-Tughra'i’s comparison of this management to what he encountered of simple components for their likes in nature, such as the scorpion and the snake and their creation, it is a true matter in that regard—he reached what he reached, as he claimed. As for Alchemy, it has not been reported from any person of knowledge that he discovered it or its path. Its practitioners have always stumbled blindly and found nothing but false stories. If that were true for any of them, his son, student, or companions would have preserved it from him, and it would have been transmitted among friends, ensuring the verification of the work after him until it spread and reached us or others.
As for their saying that the Elixir is like leaven and that it is a compound that changes what is placed in it into its own nature, it is nothing, because leaven only changes dough and prepares it for digestion—which is corruption (fasad), and corruption in materials is easy and occurs with the slightest of actions and natures. The desired result of the Elixir is turning the metal into what is more noble and higher, and that is creation (takwin); creation is more difficult than corruption, so the Elixir is not compared to the leaven.
Then he [Ibn Khaldun] said: "The verification of the matter is that if Alchemy exists as the philosophers who speak of it claim, it is not of the category of natural crafts, nor is it completed by industrial means. Their speech on it is not from the approach of the natural sciences, but from the approach of their speech on magical matters and other extraordinary events." Maslama al-Majriti mentioned something similar in his book Al-Ghayah, and his speech on it in Rutbat al-Hakim is from this approach, as is the speech of Jabir in his treatises.
In sum, if its attainment is true, it happens from beyond the crafts and natures; it occurs by the influences of the soul and extraordinary events, like walking on water and the creation of birds. It is nothing but a miracle (mu'jiza), a charismatic gift (karama), or magic (sihr). That is why the speech of the philosophers on it is composed of riddles that are not grasped except by one who has delved into the depths of the sciences of magic and become acquainted with the actions of the soul in the world of nature. Extraordinary events are not limited, and no one intends to attain them.
The Imam al-Razi held to its possibility, saying: "The truth is its possibility, because the seven bodies are common in that they are malleable, fire-resistant bodies, and the gold is only distinguished from others by yellowness and weight, or the golden form that provides these two accidents—if that is established. And that by which they differ is not necessarily tied to that by which they share. Therefore, it is possible for the corporeality of copper to be characterized by the yellowness and weight of gold—and that is the desired result."
The truth is that Alchemy is possible and is among the natural crafts, but knowledge of it is among the most difficult sciences, which are not known except by one whom Allah, the Exalted, has designated for it and specifically favored among His servants and saints. It is a science in whose pursuit minds have wandered and intellects have gone astray. Its origin is divine revelation, and it was obtained by some through purification and constant study combined with experimentation. It reached those who were not eligible for revelation, and they did not engage in what some engaged in by learning from those whom Allah, the Exalted, favored.
Aris—one of the distinguished scholars of this science—said: "Its beginning was revelation from Allah, the Exalted; then it was studied and perished, so whoever discovered it extracted it from the books." The tradition of Allah has proceeded that whoever attains it keeps it secret except from whom Allah wills. The wise have recommended keeping it hidden from those who are not its people. Indeed, it is said that Allah, the Exalted, took covenants upon intellects in their primordial nature (fitra) to keep it secret, to guard it, and to be wary of spreading or wasting it. Thus, you see the philosophers have made it the ultimate of riddles and obscured it to the utmost, until the speech of those who did not know their intent was counted as idle talk (khurafa), and its speaker was judged as foolish and silly. By this concealment, the wisdom of Allah, which Ibn Khaldun claimed [existed] in the two forms of currency, was preserved, and his deduction that he heard regarding it (mentioned above) falls.
Jabir ibn Hayyan, who is an Imam in this craft—and denying that he existed is foolishness—stipulated in his book Sirr al-Asrar what we have said, where he stated: "Every wise man set his symbol and book upon a vague meaning—from the settings of dissolution, sublimation, and washing—on the four natures, and called them 'the heavy bodies.' He described the treatments with words and meanings that are ambiguous; so to the wise, it is open, and to the ignorant, it is closed. They may go so far as to take those very bodies and test them, yet they derive no benefit from them, and they curse the wise for concealing this work. The world is built on dirhams and dinars, and people—craftsmen and fighters—only work out of desire or fear. [The wise] knew that if they revealed this secret so that everyone knew it, the order of the world would not be completed; it would be ruined, and no one would work for anyone. So they turned away from that and concealed it."
Then, it is not hidden that what Ibn Khaldun mentioned first—that it is impossible due to the lack of encompassing [details]—if it is established that it was from revelation, is nothing. Moreover, even if that is not established, the same applies to his claim that nature does not leave the closest path in its actions to follow the furthest one; for we say: [the path] that occurs from [the combination of] natures also has two paths: a distant one that wisdom requires it to follow mostly, and a close one that wisdom also requires it to follow rarely, through whom Allah wills from His servants.
As for his claim that its practitioners have always stumbled blindly: if he means the leaders of this craft—like Hermes, Socrates, Plato, Agathodemon, Pythagoras, Hercules, Porphyry, Maria, Zosimos, Aris, Democritus, Stephanus, Belynas, Mahareris, Jabir ibn Hayyan, Al-Majriti, Abu Bakr ibn Wahshiyya, Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi, and others too numerous to count—then they did not stumble blindly, and to prove their blindness is [as difficult as] "stripping the thorn-bush." Their riddles are for a point they clarified; it does not indicate their blindness. And if he means those who engage in it from the contentious in his era and these eras, then what Maslama mentioned applies to most of them, and it does not attack its possibility.
Al-Tughra'i criticized this type of person in his book Tarakib al-Anwar: "The sincere teacher is found in every craft except in this art. How can sincerity be hoped for among a people who call each other 'the envious,' and who have sworn among themselves never to explain these secrets—especially in this era, when this science has completely perished, and the one who encounters it and searches for it has become a laughingstock among the people?"
I spent a period of time searching for anyone thought to have a piece of this science, but I found no one who smelled its scent or knew a part of a word of it. I found the practitioners of this noble craft [to be] either a deceiver selling his religion and integrity for a small price of the world, wasting people's wealth on experiments born of ignorance; or a deceived person, robbed of his sanity by failed hope and false greed, busying himself with falsehood rather than seeking a good livelihood and relying on wishes and lies. The limit of one of them is to look at the books of Jabir and his peers, taking the literal meanings of their words and being deceived by the appearances of their claims, without the truths of their meanings. They—and all the philosophers of this craft who have passed—warn people against being deceived by the literal meanings of their books, and they declare themselves that they use symbols and riddles. Yet, their words are not heeded and they are not believed. [And so on, to the end of what he said.]
The matter has worsened in our time to an extent that language cannot explain. The [claim] that Alchemy is [derived] from the influences of souls and extraordinary events, and thus is only a miracle, a charismatic gift, or magic, is nothing. Rather, it is [by] ordinary causes, but they are hidden from most people; the influences of souls have no place in it at all. Yes, it may be that from a prophet or a saint comes what comes from the alchemist without engaging in those [ordinary] causes, so it is a charismatic gift or a miracle.
That the approach of some philosophers' speech on it is the approach of their speech on magical matters does not indicate that it is a type of magic or its derivatives; that is [merely] from their riddles about its matter. They have varied their riddles for it and followed every path in doing so. Belynas set his book on it [using the language of] spheres and stars; some spoke of it in proverbs; some spoke of it in stories that are more akin to myths; and so on. In sum, it is a craft that very few know. Engaging in it and attempting to know it from its books without a wise man knowledgeable in its symbols—as the ignorant practitioners of it do today—is pure madness.
That its origin is divine revelation or something similar is what prevails in one's estimation. Al-Tughra'i brought in his books, such as Jami' al-Asrar and others, what indicates this. He mentioned that it was narrated from Hermes that he said: "Allah, the Almighty and Majestic, revealed to Seth, son of Adam, peace be upon them both: 'Plant the gold in the white, pure earth and water it with the water of life.'" Maria said: "I am not telling you from my own self, but I am telling you what Allah, the Exalted, commanded His prophet Moses, peace be upon him, and let him know: that the stone Nastaris is what holds the dye." Zosimos and Aris attributed its transmission to Moses, peace be upon him. Aris mentioned that the work on it was done by the Jews in Egypt, and Joseph, peace be upon him—the first of the Children of Israel to enter Egypt—knew it, so Pharaoh honored him for the wisdom Allah had given him. He also mentioned a symbolic chapter which he attributed to Solomon, peace be upon him.
Al-Tarsusi said in his book: "When Allah, the Exalted, brought Adam, peace be upon him, down from Paradise, He compensated him with the knowledge of everything, and the knowledge of the craft was among what He taught him. It moved from people to people, as other sciences moved, until the days of Hermes the First." He also said: "They narrated to us from Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari with his connected chain that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said: 'The earth was folded for me, and I was shown its easts and wests, and I was given the white and red sulfur.'"
Jabir narrated from Ja'far al-Sadiq, may Allah be pleased with him, many narrations regarding this, to the point that he attributed a number of his books to him. I do not verify his statement, nor do I deny it; I respect him for his position in knowledge and action, [and keep him far] from the fabrication of the Imams. It is narrated from the Commander of the Faithful, Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, that he was asked: "What do you say about the science of Alchemy that people have delved into?" He looked down for a while, then raised his head and said: "You have asked me about the sister of prophecy and the twin of manhood. It has been and it will be. There is no tree, nor clay, nor anything except that it has a root and a branch, or a root or a branch." It was said: "O Commander of the Faithful, do you not know it?" He said: "By Allah, the Exalted, I know it better than the knowledgeable ones, for they speak of the science upon its exterior without its interior, while I know the science—its exterior and its interior." It was said: "Mention something of it to us so we may take from you." He said: "By Allah, the Exalted, were it not that the soul is persistent in evil, I would have spoken." It was said: "Would you have spoken?" He said: "I know that in the mercurial quicksilver, the shining gold, the saffron iron, and the green copper-verdigris are treasures whose end is not reached. Some are impregnated by others, and they separate into latent gold." It was said: "O Commander of the Faithful, we do not know this." He said: "It is stagnant water, still air, changing fire, and liquid earth." They said: "We do not understand this." He said: "If it were permissible for the believers among the people of wisdom to speak to people in other than this, the children in schools would know it." [End of Al-Tughra'i's speech, summarized.]
In his book Mafatih al-Rahma wa Masabih al-Hikma, he mentioned from sixty prophets and sages that they spoke of the veracity of this science. In the heart, there is something [of doubt] regarding the correctness of these reports. The most likely probability is that if there were a piece of news about Alchemy acceptable to the hadith scholars, it would have spread, and it would not have been denied by those who are among their elite, such as Sheikh al-Islam Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah; for he denied its proof and authored a treatise denying it. Perhaps the refutation by Sheikh Najm al-Din ibn Abi al-Dharr al-Baghdadi and his rejection of what he [Ibn Taymiyyah] said therein—as Al-Safadi claimed—was only regarding what is in the category of rational proofs; for the man [Ibn Taymiyyah] in the category of transmitted proofs (naqliyyat) is someone whom Najm al-Din and his likes cannot race. [Ibn Taymiyyah] is of the category of rational proofs, even if he is also distinguished, but he is beneath him in transmitted proofs. The topic is delicate, to the extent that some of the greatest scholars have wavered in its matter, denying it at times and affirming it at others. Here is the sheikh of philosophers and their leader, Abu Ali ibn Sina: I have heard him reported to have denied it at first, and it was reported that he returned from that. Despite the excellence of his mind and the loftiness of his status in philosophy in all its branches, he did not grasp the reality of its work, until Al-Tughra'i said in Tarakib al-Anwar: "My astonishment at Abu Ali ibn Sina does not end; how did he permit himself to write a treatise on this art, thereby shaming himself, contradicting the principles he holds, and falling short in it compared to many of the hashwiyya (ignorant ones), the dark of mind and dull of understanding?"
He said in Jami' al-Asrar: "Sheikh Abu Ali ibn Sina, due to his excessive passion for this science and his strong intuition that it is true, authored a treatise on it. He excelled in what relates to the principles of natural sciences, but due to the concealment and obscurity of the people's path from him, he did not mention a correct word in the treatments peculiar to our science, nor did he point to the mention of the true temperament, the weights, the hidden combinations, the fires and their layers, and the instrument without which the work is not completed—which is one of the ten conditions. He did not go beyond the treatments of the hashwiyya [regarding] mercuries, sulfurs, burying in horse manure, and busying oneself with these foul things. Were it not for the affliction of arrogance, the good opinion a man has of his own knowledge, and his eagerness that no part of knowledge should escape him, it would have been incumbent upon one like him, with his wealth of knowledge and high status in factual research, to be content with what he has and not expose himself to what he does not know. What has reached us of his treatments from his companions who witnessed them is that he did not know the reality of our science. We have seen in his own handwriting notes collected from the speech of Jabir ibn Hayyan and Khalid ibn Yazid that also indicate this." [Summary ends.]
The discourse on this subject is long, and what we have mentioned is sufficient for those who wish to have a glimpse of some of what has been said regarding it. And Allah, the Exalted, is the Giver of success. Then, the claim that "knowledge" in the verse refers to the knowledge of extracting treasures and burials requires the establishment of this science. The people of the science of letters (al-huruf) and talismans (al-talsamat) affirm it, and they have long discourse on it; its existence is permissible, and Allah, the Exalted, knows best about its existence in actual reality.
(Has he not known that Allah has destroyed before him of the generations who were stronger than him in power and more numerous in accumulation?) This is an affirmation of his knowledge of that and an alert to his error in his arrogance. His knowledge of that may have been from the Torah, or from Moses, peace be upon him, or from history books, or from storytellers. "Power" (quwwa) may refer to physical and moral strength, and "accumulation" (jam') may refer to the accumulation of wealth or the gathering of men. The meaning is: Has he not paused at what his knowledge provides, and has he not known what Allah, the Exalted, did with those who were stronger than him in power (physically or morally) and more numerous in wealth or groups surrounding and serving him? So he should not be arrogant with what he is arrogant with.
It is possible that the interrogative hamza is for denial, entering upon an omitted [sentence], and the sentence "and he did not know" is a circumstantial clause affirming the denial and indicating the negation of what it enters upon, as in your saying: "Do you claim jurisprudence while you do not know the conditions of prayer?" The intent is to reject his claim of knowledge and his self-aggrandizement by denying this knowledge from him—that is: "He knew what he claimed, and he did not know this, so he might protect himself from the wrestling places of the destroyed ones." It is said that "and he did not know" is conjoined to that omitted [sentence], and the denial of knowledge from him is because he did not act upon its requirements. (And the criminals shall not be asked about their sins.)
The apparent meaning is that this is in the Hereafter, and the pronoun "their sins" refers to the criminals, and the agent of asking is either Allah, the Exalted, or the angels, peace be upon them. The "asking" denied here—and likewise in His words, the Exalted: "So on that Day, neither man nor jinn shall be asked about his sin" (55:39)—is, according to what is said, the asking for investigation. The denial of this relative to Him, the Exalted, is clear. Relative to the angels, peace be upon them, it is because they are informed of their records or they recognize them by their marks, as He, the Exalted, said: "The criminals shall be known by their marks, so they shall be seized by the forelocks and the feet" (55:41). The "asking" affirmed in His words, the Exalted: "So by your Lord, We shall surely ask them all" (15:92), is the asking of reproach and rebuke; thus, there is no contradiction between the two verses.
It is permissible that "asking" in both places has the same meaning, and the negation and affirmation are in consideration of two places or two times; the stations on the Day of Resurrection are many, and the day is long, so there is no contradiction. The apparent meaning is that the sentence is not within the scope of "knowledge" [previously mentioned]. Perhaps the aspect of its connection to what precedes it is that when He, the Exalted, threatened Korah by mentioning the destruction of those before him from his likes in the world, He followed that with what contains a threat to all criminals with what is more atrocious than the torment of the Hereafter; for the lack of asking the sinner while He is intensely angry with him signals his inevitable downfall. Al-Zamakhshari made the sentence an appendage (tadhil) to what precedes it.
It is said that this is in the world: the intent is that He, the Exalted, destroyed those whom He destroyed of the generations by His knowledge, the Exalted, of their sins, so He, the Exalted, did not need to ask them about them. It is said that the pronoun "their sins" belongs to "whoever is stronger than him in power"—that is, the destroyed ones of the generations; and the singular and plural are in consideration of the word and the meaning. The meaning is: "And it shall not be asked about the sins of those destroyed ones [by] others among those who are criminals." And it is known that he who is not a criminal is not asked about their sins a fortiori, due to the enmity between the two classes. So the meaning leads to: "The sins of the destroyed ones shall not be asked [of] others—neither of those who are criminals nor of those who are not." Rather, every soul is a pledge for what it has earned. Both sayings are as you see.
Perhaps it may cross your mind to conjoin this sentence to the interrogative sentence, or to make it a circumstantial clause (hal) from the agent of "destroyed" or from its object. But if you reflect even slightly, you will remove it from your mind and refuse to force the speech of Allah, the Exalted, onto that. Abu Ja'far read—in one narration—"wa la tus'alu" (addressing you with 'ta') and the jussive; and Al-Mujrimuna (the criminals) in the accusative. Abu al-'Aliyah and Ibn Sirin read "wa la tus'alu" likewise, but we do not know if they made Al-Mujrimuna accusative like Abu Ja'far, or nominative as it is in the reading of the majority. The apparent is the first. The author of Al-Lawaih permitted the second and mentioned two aspects for it:
- That the pronoun "their sins" belongs to the destroyed ones of the generations, and the nominative Al-Mujrimuna is by implying the subject—that is: "They are the criminals."
- That Al-Mujrimuna is a substitute for the pronoun "their sins" in consideration that its origin is nominative, because the annexation of "sins" to it is like the annexation of the gerund (masdar) to the agent-noun (ism fa'il). It was objected against this that "sins" is plural; if it is a plural gerund, there is a dispute regarding its functioning.