Tafsir of Al Imran 3:104

The Almighty commanded them to perfect others immediately after commanding them to perfect themselves, so that they may be guides who are themselves guided, in contrast to their enemies. For what the Almighty has narrated regarding the state of [the enemies] previously indicates that they are astray and leading others astray.

The majority recite [the lam in] li-takun (let there be) with a quiescent lam (the lam of command), while it is also recited with a kasra on the lam according to the linguistic root. Takun may be derived from the "complete" kāna (meaning "to exist"), in which case ummah (nation) is its subject, the sentence yad‘ūna (they invite) is its descriptor, and minkum (from among you) relates to takun or to a suppressed element as an adjective for ummah that was placed before it, thereby becoming a circumstantial qualifier (ḥāl). Or, it may be derived from the "incomplete" kāna (auxiliary verb), in which case ummah is its noun, yad‘ūna is its predicate, and minkum is either a circumstantial qualifier for ummah or related to the incomplete kāna.

An ummah is a group that ta’ummu—that is, intends or aims for a specific matter. It is applied to the followers of prophets due to their gathering upon a single goal; to a role model, such as in [the verse]: "Indeed, Abraham was a [comprehensive] nation" (an ummah); to a religion or creed, as in: "Indeed, we found our fathers upon a nation" (an ummah); and to time, as in: "And remembered after a nation" (an ummah); among other meanings.

The intended meaning of "inviting to good" is inviting to that which contains religious or worldly benefit. Thus, the command to enjoin good and forbid evil following it in His saying—“and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong”—is of the category of "coupling the specific with the general" to signal the greater excellence of these two over other good deeds. This is what has been said.

Ibn al-Munir said: This is not of that category because the general term good already encompasses all that is mentioned, for the good to which one is invited is either performing a commanded act or refraining from a prohibited one; it does not go beyond these two. Thus, singling them out does not distinguish them from the rest of the included items. Therefore, it is more appropriate to say that the benefit of this specification is to mention the invitation to good generally, and then in detail. There is an obvious sense of importance in this repetition of the mention, unless a convention is established that restricts "enjoining good and forbidding evil" to certain types of good, in which case what was mentioned holds true. Yet, I do not see this convention as established.

This view has a valid basis, for if "inviting to good" were interpreted to include worldly matters—even if no command or prohibition were attached to them—it would be more general than a communal obligation (farḍ kifāyah). The implications of this are not hidden. Furthermore, Ibn Marduyah recorded from al-Baqir (may Allah be pleased with him) that the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) recited, "And let there be [arising] from among you a nation inviting to [all that is] good," and then said: "The good is following the Quran and my Sunnah." This indicates that inviting to good does not include inviting to worldly affairs.

Some people interpreted "good" as a specific "right" (ma‘rūf), namely faith in Allah Almighty, and made the "right" (ma‘rūf) in the verse signify all other acts of obedience. In that case, what Ibn al-Munir said also does not apply. This is supported by what Ibn Abi Hatim recorded from Muqatil: that the "good" is Islam, the "right" (ma‘rūf) is obedience to Allah, and the "wrong" (munkar) is disobedience to Him.

The omission of the direct objects for the three verbs is either for the sake of acknowledging their obviousness—meaning, they invite people (even if they are not yet religiously accountable) and command them and forbid them—or for the intention of establishing the act itself, similar to saying "so-and-so gives," meaning they perform the act of inviting, commanding, and forbidding and bring them into reality.

It is said that the address is directed to those to whom the first address was directed in the opinion [of some], namely the Aws and the Khazraj. Ibn al-Mundhir recorded from al-Dahhak that it is directed specifically to the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), who are the narrators. The majority, however, hold that it is general, and that those mentioned are included in it as a primary inclusion.

The "min" (from) here is said to be for partition (tab‘īḍ), and it is also said to be for clarification (tabyīn). It is an "abstractive" (tajrīdiyyah) usage, just as one says, "So-and-so has an army from his sons" or "The commander has a regiment from his servants," intending by that all of the sons and servants.

The origin of the disagreement on this is that scholars have agreed that enjoining good and forbidding evil is a communal obligation (farḍ kifāyah). No one disagreed with this except for a few, including Sheikh Abu Ja'far among the Imamiyyah, who said: "They are individual obligations (farḍ ‘ayn)."

They differed on whether an obligation that is communal is binding upon all the accountable individuals and is dropped from them by the performance of some, or whether it is binding only upon the some. Imam al-Razi and his followers held the second view, due to the sufficiency of its attainment by some. If it were obligatory upon all, the action of some would not be sufficient, for it is unlikely that an obligation upon an accountable person would be dropped by the action of another. The majority held the first view, which is the apparent stance of Imam al-Shafi'i in al-Umm. They argued this by the fact that everyone incurs sin by neglecting it; if it were not obligatory upon them all, they would not be sinful for leaving it.

The former group answered this by saying that their sin for neglecting it is due to them failing to realize what was intended to be realized by them in a general sense, not because of an individual obligation upon them. This was objected to by the majority, stating that this is what is truly unlikely—namely, that a group is sinful due to the neglect of another group of an act that they were tasked with.

The answer to this is that having others dropped from obligation by their action is not more deserving than the others being sinful for their neglect. It is said: Rather, it is more deserving, because a parallel has been proven in Sacred Law: the dropping of a debt on Zayd by the payment of ‘Amr, whereas it has not been proven that one person is made sinful by the neglect of another. Thus, the statement of the majority holds.

The objection that "this is what is truly unlikely" was challenged by the argument that this would only hold if the obligation in the outward sense were tied to that other group exclusively. But this is not the case; rather, both groups are equal in the potential for the command to be addressed to them and to be attached to them, without any preference for one over the other. Thus, there is no "making a group sinful for the neglect of another" in the aforementioned sin, because it is not known that the other was specifically tasked with it. Rather, both groups are equal in the probability that each is tasked with it. Thus, the mentioned objection is misplaced. Furthermore, if we say, as a group of the proponents of the second school chose, that "the some" is indefinite, the situation leads to the conclusion that the one tasked is not a specific group. Therefore, the one tasked is the "shared degree" between the groups, which is true of every group. All groups are equal in the attachment of the address to them through its attachment to the "shared degree" that is equal among them. Thus, there is no problem with the sin of all.

The dispute between the two groups does not become merely verbal, as the address in this case covers all according to both views, and so does the sin upon neglect, since one holds the claim of attachment to each individual, while the other claims attachment to all by way of transmission (sarāyan) from its attachment to the shared element. The fruit of this is that whoever doubts whether another has performed that required act is not obligated according to the theory of transmission, but is obligated according to the theory of the beginning (ibtidā’), and it is not dropped from him unless he thinks it likely that the other performed it. From here, one can dispense with the answer to what was objected to by the majority, so what was said regarding it does not harm us.

Moreover, it is said regarding what was stated: A debt is not entirely similar to our case, because Zayd’s debt is obligatory upon him alone in the outward sense and has no relation to anyone else, which is why it is valid for it to be dropped by the payment of another, and not valid for the other to be sinful for the failure to pay. This is contrary to our case, as the relation of the obligation in the outward sense is equal for both groups, so it is possible for each group to be sinful for the neglect of the other due to the attachment of the obligation to them in the outward sense and their equality with the other in that attachment.

As for their saying, "It has not been proven that one person is made sinful by the performance of another," it does not match the search, for the claim is not the sinfulness of one person for the performance of another, but his sinfulness for the neglect of the performance. Therefore, the match is: "It has not been proven that one person is made sinful by the neglect of the performance of another." This is resolved by the fact that the attachment in the outward sense is shared among all the groups. Thus, the view held by Imam al-Razi and his followers is validated, which is the choice of Ibn al-Subki, contrary to his father.

Once this is established, know that those who say the one tasked is "the some" said that "min" (from) is for partition, and those who say the one tasked is "the all" said that it is for clarification. They supported this by saying that Allah Almighty affirmed the enjoining of good and forbidding of evil for the entire nation in His saying, “You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong.” This does not imply that inviting [to good] is an individual obligation, for jihad is a communal obligation by consensus despite being established by general addresses. So reflect upon this.

(And those)—that is, those described with those perfect qualities—(are the successful ones)—that is, the ones perfect in success. By this, the restriction implied by the separation and the defining of both parts [of the nominal sentence] is validated. Imam Ahmad and Abu Ya'la recorded from Durrah bint Abi Lahab who said: The Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) was asked who is the best of people, and he said: "The best of them in enjoining what is right, the best of them in forbidding what is wrong, the most God-fearing among them, and the most connective of them to kinship."

Al-Hasan narrated: "Whoever enjoins good and forbids evil is the vicegerent of Allah, the vicegerent of His Messenger (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), and the vicegerent of His Book." And it was narrated: "You shall enjoin what is right and you shall forbid what is wrong, or Allah will empower over you an oppressive ruler who will not respect your elders nor have mercy on your young. Your righteous ones will call out, but they will not be answered, and you will seek help, but you will not be helped."

Enjoining good is obligatory or recommended according to the nature of what is being enjoined, and the same applies to forbidding evil—if we hold that the makrūh (disliked) is a munkar (wrong) in the religious sense. But if it is interpreted as that for which one deserves punishment, just as ma‘rūf (good) is that for which one deserves reward, then it is only obligatory. Some have held this view, though it is countered by the fact that they are not on opposite ends of a spectrum.

The most apparent view is that it is obligatory upon the sinner to forbid the sin he is committing, because he is required to forbid every actor, and leaving the forbidding of some—namely himself—does not drop from him the obligation of forbidding the rest. The same is said regarding enjoining good. This is not contradicted by His saying, “Why do you say what you do not do?” because it is interpreted as meaning his neglect of the action, not the speech itself. Nor by His saying, “Do you order righteousness of the people and forget yourselves?” because the reproach is for their forgetting themselves, not for their ordering righteousness. From some of the predecessors: "Order the good, even if you do not do it."

Yes, enjoining good and forbidding evil have well-known conditions. Their essence is "Do such and such" and "Do not do such and such." Fighting to ensure compliance is a command beyond that, and is not part of their [the terms'] essence, even if it is obligatory upon some, like the rulers in certain instances, because that is another ruling, as is suggested by his (peace be upon him) saying: "Order your children to pray when they are seven years old, and beat them for it when they are ten, and separate them in their beds."