Tafsir of Al Imran 3:129

This is a renewed statement, presented to explain that all beings belong exclusively to Him—the Exalted—after having previously stated that a portion of them belongs to Him. This serves as a confirmation of what preceded and completes the report regarding [Divine] exclusiveness. "What" (mā) is used as a general term for both rational and non-rational beings, by way of predominance. That is to say: to Him—Glorified be He—belongs everything in these two categories, or everything in these two realms, by way of absolute ownership, sovereignty, creation, and power. No one has any say alongside Him in this regard. The entire affair belongs to Him; He does what He wills and judges what He desires.

(He forgives whom He wills)—meaning, He forgives those among the believers whom He wills to forgive—so He does not punish them for their sins, out of His bounty. (And He punishes whom He wills)—meaning, He punishes those whom He wills to punish, out of His justice. The preference for the word "whom" (man) in both instances is because forgiveness and punishment are specific to rational beings. The presentation of forgiveness before punishment is intended to signify that His—the Exalted’s—mercy precedes His wrath.

The apparent meaning of the verse indicates that Allah’s forgiveness and punishment are not restricted by any condition. In fact, one could argue that imposing restrictions contradicts the context, for the intent is to establish that He—Glorified be He—is the absolute Owner. Thus, He has the right to do as He wills, with no one to prevent His will. If His forgiveness were restricted to repentance and His punishment to injustice, He would not be acting as He wills, but rather as repentance or injustice necessitates. Therefore, the verse is explicit in denying obligation upon Allah—the Exalted—and that it is permissible for Him to forgive the sinner and punish the righteous. This is the position of the majority (al-jama‘ah).

The Mu‘tazila held the view that forgiveness is conditional upon repentance; thus, whoever does not repent, it is impossible for Him to forgive them at all. They relied on two points for this:

1. The verses and hadiths that declare the warning of punishment for the disobedient.
2. That if the sinner knows he will not be punished for his sin, this would be an endorsement of it and an incitement for others to commit it, which contradicts the wisdom of sending messengers—peace and blessings be upon them.

They interpreted this verse as being conditional and qualified such absolute statements with either minor sins or major sins accompanied by repentance. They said the meaning of "He forgives whom He wills" is "if he repents." They took the evidence for this to be that He—the Exalted—followed His saying: (Or punishes them) with His saying: (For they are wrongdoers). This is proof that injustice is the cause that necessitates punishment, so there is no punishment without it, nor is there forgiveness while it exists; thus, it explains "whom He wills."

They supported this interpretation by what was narrated from al-Hasan regarding the verse: "He forgives whom He wills" (by repentance, and He does not will to forgive except those who repent) and "He punishes whom He wills" (and He does not will to punish except those who deserve it). And by what was narrated from ‘Ata’: "He forgives whoever repents and punishes whoever meets Him as an oppressor."

The majority held fast to the generality of the verses and responded to the opponents' arguments. As for the first argument: those verses and hadiths, even if their generality is accepted, only indicate the occurrence of punishment, not its obligation. The dispute here is over obligation, and the abundance of texts regarding pardon specifies the forgiven sinner from the general warnings. As for the second argument: the mere permissibility of pardon does not necessitate the belief that there will be no punishment, let alone certainty of it. How could the permissibility of pardon necessitate the knowledge of an absence of punishment, when the general warnings, coupled with the utmost threats, prioritize the aspect of occurrence for every individual? That is sufficient as a deterrent; how then could the knowledge of the permissibility of pardon be an endorsement or incitement to sin in the presence of such a deterrent?

Furthermore, many of the Mu‘tazila restricted the likes of His saying: (Indeed, Allah forgives all sins) to minor sins. If the permissibility of pardon, as they claimed, necessitated the knowledge that there would be no punishment, then the obligation would apply equally to them: one could say that the one who commits a minor sin, if he knows he will not be punished for his sin, would also be a case of endorsement and incitement for others. This is inherently flawed.

What they presented as evidence for restriction is countered by what points to absoluteness—namely: (And to Allah belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth). This is connected in meaning to His saying: (You have no say in the affair). This indicates that He—Glorified be He—possesses absolute disposal, which is contrary to what they say, as they made His disposal and will conditional upon the requirements of wisdom, and they claim wisdom requires not forgiving one who does not repent. It is hidden to no one that this is a matter of contention, for both will and wisdom are among His attributes, and neither follows the other. Even assuming they follow one another, we do not concede that wisdom requires not forgiving one who does not repent.

Moreover, following up (Or punishes them) with (For they are wrongdoers) indicates nothing more than that injustice leads to punishment. Who denies this connection? The denial is that it should be an explanation for "whom He wills." Where is the evidence that every injustice is like that? The wording has no generality, nor is it of the type of the "concept of an attribute" (mafhum al-sifah) to be valid as evidence in this context. As for what was narrated from al-Hasan and ‘Ata’, it has no known chain of transmission at all. Let whoever claims it produce it if they are truthful.

Among the things that prove its falsehood is that it places a restriction on the infinite mercy and narrows its paths without definitive proof. One would not think such a disgraceful thing of someone like al-Hasan. Even if we concede the truthfulness of the narration and that it does not necessitate what was mentioned, the statement of al-Hasan and his likes does not permit abandoning the apparent meaning of the Book, and the Truth is more deserving of being followed.

If the opponent says: "We rely in this matter on the necessity of a contradiction," we respond: then this is a return to reasoning—and we have already made you taste the "red death" in that—not to the verses. Thus, the implication of this verse remains in its generality, which is what we are seeking here. Furthermore, this verse was revealed concerning the disbelievers according to most narrations, and the belief of the majority is that forgiveness for them is conditional upon repentance from disbelief and a return to faith, as is clarified by His saying: (Indeed, Allah does not forgive that partners be associated with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills). They are not a point of dispute between the two groups, so whoever from among the Mu‘tazila uses this [verse] for their corrupt purpose has strayed from the straight path.

(And Allah is Forgiving, Merciful)—a concluding endorsement confirming the content of His saying: (He forgives whom He wills), with an addition. In specifying the conclusion with this, there is an indication of prioritizing the aspect of grace and favor, and in it is that which supports the position of the majority.