Tafsir of Al Imran 3:182

( That ) is a reference to the verified torment, lowered in rank to the status of something sensed and observed. By using the demonstrative pronoun coupled with the particle lam and kaf—for the purpose of pointing to the gravity of its state and the distance of its status in terror and heinousness—it functions as a subject (mubtada’), the predicate of which is His saying, Exalted is He:

( is for what your hands have sent forth ) meaning: because of the deeds you have brought forth, such as the killing of the prophets and this statement [of disbelief] from which the heavens are almost torn apart. The intent behind "the hands" is the souls themselves; the expression of the whole through a part—around which most of the work revolves—is utilized here. It is permissible not to interpret "the hands" metaphorically, but rather to treat their "sending forth"—which is their work—as a reference to all deeds, most or many of which are practiced by the hand, by way of generalization (taghlib).

( And that Allah is not a tyrant to the servants ) This is a conjunction to ( what your hands have sent forth ), thus it falls under the ruling of the ba of causality (ba’ al-sababiyya). Its causality regarding the torment is that the negation of injustice necessitates justice, which in turn necessitates rewarding the doer of good and punishing the wrongdoer. To this, the leading exegetes have subscribed.

Our master, the Sheikh al-Islam, countered this by saying: Its corruption is manifest, for refraining from punishing one who deserves it is not injustice according to Sacred Law (shar'an) nor according to reason (aqlan), such that the negation of injustice could rise to the level of being a cause for punishment.

The summary of his argument is a refutation by way of the hypothetical syllogism (qiyas istithna'i): If refraining from punishment were injustice, then the negation of injustice would be a cause for punishment; but refraining from punishment is not injustice, therefore the negation of injustice is not a cause for it.

The response to this is that the source of this objection is the failure to distinguish between the cause (sabab) and the necessitating reason ('illa mujiba). The distinction is as clear as the morning: a cause is a mere medium and does not necessitate the occurrence of the effect—just as the pen is a cause of writing but does not necessitate it. Justice, necessitated by the negation of injustice, is a cause for the torment of the deserving, even if it does not necessitate it.

Thus, inferring the absence of causality from the absence of necessity is a highly flawed argument. As for their statement regarding justice "necessitating..." etc., it is an explanation of its requirement if it were left to its own nature, and a confirmation of it being a medium; it does not follow from it that rewarding or punishing is necessitated, as indicated by His, Glory be to Him, saying in the Hadith Qudsi: "My mercy has preceded My wrath." The summary of this is that the logical connection between the antecedent and the consequent in the hypothetical syllogism is denied; for why is it not permissible that refraining from punishment is not injustice, while the negation of injustice remains a cause—by way of the cause being a non-necessitating cause? There is no contradiction in that.

It should not be said that the basis of that objection might be the "concept" (mafhum) considered by al-Shafi'i, rather than the cause being necessitating. For we say: If by "concept" is meant the concept of His, Exalted is He, saying ( And that Allah... ), we say: its result is that justice is a cause for the torment of the deserving, and the concept derived from it is that justice is not a cause for the torment of the undeserving—which is a meaning agreed upon and in which there is no dispute. If it is meant that the concept derived from our saying "it is a cause for their torment" is that He, Exalted is He, is not a tyrant—meaning that if He did not punish them, He would be a tyrant—then we say: this, aside from being distant from the context of the objector’s speech, belongs to the category of inferring the absence of the effect from the absence of the cause. It is thus based on the cause being a necessitating cause, as we stated, and the same rebuttal we provided applies to it; it is not a matter of "concept" in any way. If anything else is meant, let it be clarified so that we may discuss it.

Some have deflected the objection by stating that the essence of the verse's meaning is: "Torment has befallen you and has not been withheld because Allah is not a tyrant to the servants." In its explicit text (mantuq), this indicates that the negation of injustice is not a cause for refraining from punishing one who deserves it; it does not indicate that injustice is a cause for refraining from punishment, but rather there is another cause for that, which is His, Exalted is He, grace. Thus, the objection does not apply. You know that this is also an oversight regarding the objector's intent, for whether the speech indicates that injustice is a cause for refraining from punishment or not is outside the scope of his inquiry, based on what you have known of the presentation of his speech. Furthermore, if the cause is intended to be the necessitating cause—as is the basis of that master's speech—its indication is manifest, for the existence of a necessitating cause is a cause for the existence of the effect, just as its absence is a cause for the absence of the effect—like the rising of the sun and the existence of the day. Thus, justice (the negation of injustice), when it is a cause for the torment of the deserving, its absence (injustice) is a cause for the absence of the torment.

It was said: It is a conjunction to ( what you have sent forth ) to indicate that the causality of their sins for their torment is qualified by the absence of His, Exalted is He, injustice; for were it not for that, it would have been possible for Him to punish them without their sins, not that He would not punish them for their sins.

Our master, the Sheikh al-Islam, also countered this, saying: You are aware that the possibility of Him, Exalted is He, punishing His servants without a sin—or rather the occurrence of it—does not contradict that the punishment of these disbelievers is because of their sins, such that one would need to consider its absence alongside it. One would only need to do so if the claim were that all His punishments are because of the sins of those being punished.

It is not hidden from you that "not to punish them for their sins" in the words of the proponent is coordinated with his saying "to punish them," and the meaning is that the mention of this qualification removes the possibility of Him punishing them without sins, due to the possibility that He might not punish them for their sins, for that is something good according to Sacred Law and reason. By his saying "to indicate that the causality of their sins for their torment is qualified..." he intended that its determination for causality is only obtained by this qualification; for with the possibility of His punishing without a sin, it is possible that the cause of the torment is the will for torment without a sin. The essence of the verse's meaning would then be: "This torment of yours only arose from your sins, not from anything else." Once you have known this, it becomes clear to you that the master's invalidation of the author's words—based on the "possibility of Him punishing..."—arises from an oversight of his intent. His speech is not about the contradiction between these two matters in their essence, but about the contradiction between the possibility of torment without a sin and the determination of the causality of sins for it. Likewise, his statement following that, "One would only need to do so if the claim were..." also arises from an oversight, because the need for that qualification in either scenario is only for the sake of rebuking the addressees and silencing them in their confession of their own shortcomings—that there is no cause for the torment except from their own side.

Thus, to claim there is a need in one instance and not the other is very weak. Moreover, there is no conflict between this proponent and what was narrated first from the leading exegetes, where the coordinated part was made a cause there, and here it is a qualification of the cause, because the intent of "cause" is a mere medium, as we indicated previously. It is a medium regardless of whether it is considered an independent cause or a qualification of the cause. Yes, between them—as will come, if Allah wills—a conflict appears from another angle, but it is also invalid, as we shall substantiate by His might, Exalted is He.

The summary is that the conjunction here is unobjectionable, and it is the apparent meaning; to it, those who have gone to it have subscribed, and it is permissible to make it—to which the Sheikh al-Islam has subscribed—"that" and what follows it in the position of nominative, as the predicate of a deleted subject. The clause is a supplementary parenthesis confirming the content of what preceded it, meaning: "The matter is that He, Exalted is He, is not one who punishes His servants without a sin from their side." The expression of this through the negation of injustice—even though punishing them without a sin is not injustice according to the established rule of the People of the Sunnah, let alone being extreme injustice—is to manifest the perfection of His transcendence, Exalted is He, from that by depicting it in the form of what is impossible to emanate from Him (which is injustice), just as one expresses the abandonment of rewarding deeds as "wasting" them, even though deeds do not necessitate reward such that its omission would result in "wasting" them. The hyperbolic form (sighat al-mubalagha) is for the sake of emphasizing this meaning by presenting the aforementioned punishment without a sin in the form of hyperbole in injustice.

From here, one learns the answer to what was said: "Negating injustice itself is more eloquent than negating its abundance, and negating abundance does not negate its root; rather, it might imply its existence." It was also answered that it is a negation of both the root of injustice and its abundance, considering the individual acts of injustice; thus the hyperbole in (zallam - "greatly tyrannical") is based on quantity, not quality. Or, that if much injustice is negated, then little is negated, because whoever commits injustice does so to benefit from it; therefore, if he refrains from much of it despite the increase of his benefit in the case of one for whom benefit and harm are possible, then for his little, with the scarcity of its benefit, he is more inclined to refrain. Or, that zallam is for relational attribution, like attar (perfumer), meaning injustice is not attributed to Him at all. Or, that every attribute of His, Exalted is He, is in the most perfect of ranks; so if He were, Glory be to Him, unjust, He would be a "great tyrant." He negated the consequent to negate the antecedent. It was objected that it does not follow from His attributes being in the utmost ranks of perfection that the hypothetical establishment [of a negative trait] would be likewise; rather, the default for attributes of deficiency, if they were to be established, is that they be deficient. It was answered that if an attribute is hypothetically established for Him, it is hypothetically established with the perfection that accompanies it. To say that this applies to attributes of perfection and not attributes of deficiency only necessitates that they not be established, not that they be established as deficient. The remainder of the discussion on this point will follow, if Allah wills.