Tafsir of Al Imran 3:97

(In it are clear signs), such as the destruction of the tyrants who intended it with evil, like the Companions of the Elephant and others; the fact that predatory beasts do not attack prey within its precincts; the fact that birds do not shy away from people there; and that if rain falls in alignment with any corner of the House, there is abundance in the surrounding lands. Thus, if it aligns with the Yemeni Corner, there is abundance in Yemen; if it aligns with the Levantine Corner, there is abundance in the Levant; and if it encompasses the whole House, there is abundance in all countries. Such also is the scarcity of pebbles despite the multitude of those throwing them, and other such signs.

Among these, they counted the birds' veering away from flying directly over it throughout the ages. There is a discussion among the hadith scholars regarding this: some say nothing flies over it, while others say nothing flies over it except those that are infirm or seeking healing. This was challenged by the fact that the eagle flies over it to catch snakes. It is also said that birds whose blood is permitted to be shed fly over it, while the dove, despite its abundance, does not. Some have reconciled the two statements this way, though there is still some doubt in the heart regarding this, for some have reported witnessing birds flying over it entirely at certain times.

The genitive pronoun refers to the House, and the "container" (ẓarfiyyah) is metaphorical; otherwise, it would not be valid to count these as signs. The sentence is either an inception (musta'nafah) brought forth to clarify and explain the "guidance," or it is another circumstantial clause (ḥāl). There is no harm in omitting the "wa" (waw) in a nominal circumstantial sentence, as indicated by Abd al-Qahir and others. It is also permissible for it to be a circumstantial clause referring to the pronoun in "the worlds" (al-'ālamīn), where the governing agent is "guidance," or referring to the pronoun in "blessed" (mubārakan), which is the agent for it. Alternatively, it could be an adjective for "guidance," just as "the worlds" is.

His saying, (the Station of Abraham), is a predicate for an omitted subject, or a subject for an omitted predicate—meaning, "Among them is the Station of Abraham" or "One of them is the Station of Abraham." Al-Halabi preferred the latter. It is also said to be an appositive substitution of a part for the whole (badal al-ba'ḍ min al-kull), which is the view of Abu Muslim. Some allowed it to be an explanatory clause ('aṭf bayān), and it is valid to explain the plural with the singular based on the fact that the Station includes multiple signs: the imprint of the two feet in the solid rock is a sign; their sinking into it up to the ankles is a sign; the softening of some of this type without others is a sign; its remaining through the passage of time is a sign; and its preservation from enemies is a sign. Alternatively, this one sign is considered equivalent to many signs due to the prominence of its status and the strength of its indication of God’s power and the prophethood of Abraham (peace be upon him). This is supported by what Ibn al-Anbari reported from Mujahid, that he used to recite it as "a clear sign of monotheism" (āyatan bayyinatan bil-tawḥīd). However, this is countered by the fact that "signs" (āyāt) is indefinite and "the Station of Abraham" is definite; Abu Hayyan explicitly stated that such disagreement is not permitted in an explanatory clause according to the consensus of the Basrans and Kufans.

The reason for this imprint in this Station is what has been transmitted in the report from Sa'id ibn Jubayr: when the structure of the Kaaba rose, he stood on this stone to enable himself to raise the stones, and his feet sank into it. Other accounts have also been mentioned regarding this.

(And whoever enters it shall be secure). The accusative pronoun refers to the "Station of Abraham," meaning the entire Sacred Precinct (al-Ḥaram), as stated by Ibn Abbas, not just the location of the feet. It is possible that istikhdām (a rhetorical device) is used here. Al-Jassas said: "The mentioned signs were cited regarding the Sacred Precinct, then He said 'And whoever enters it' etc.; therefore, it must mean the entire Sacred Precinct." The sentence is either an initial sentence and not a conditional one, or it is a conditional sentence acting as a conjunction—as more than one scholar has said—to "Station," because in meaning it is "security for whoever enters it." Meaning: "Among them is the Station of Abraham and the security of whoever enters it." In this way, there is no need for the difficulty in explaining the plural, because the two signs are a type of "plurality," similar to three or four. It is permissible to mention these two signs while omitting others, indicating the multitude of signs. Such omission occurs in Prophetic hadiths and Arabic poetry. The first is like the narration: "Three things have been made beloved to you from your world: perfume, women, and the coolness of my eyes has been made in prayer"—according to the common version, even if they validated the omission of "three." The second is the saying of Jarir: "Banu Hanifa were three parts: a third were slaves, a third their clients..."

"Whoever" (man) is either for rational beings, or it covers them and non-rational beings as well, by way of generalization (taghlīb), since beasts and birds—and even plants—are secure there. In that case, "security" means what can be attributed to all of them through a kind of interpretation. On the first premise, it is possible that security means safety in this world from things like killing, maiming, and other punishments. Ibn Abi Hatim reported from al-Hasan regarding this verse that he said: "In the pre-Islamic era, a man would kill another, then enter the Sacred Precinct, and if the son or father of the victim met him, he would not touch him." Ibn al-Mundhir reported from Umar ibn al-Khattab that he said: "If I found the killer of al-Khattab in it, I would not touch him until he exited." Ibn Jarir reported from his son that he said: "If I found the killer of Umar in the Sanctuary, I would not harm him." Ibn Abbas said: "If I found my father's killer in the Sanctuary, I would not approach him." His position on this was that if someone killed or stole outside the Sanctuary and then entered it, he should not be sat with, spoken to, or harmed, but rather he should be besieged until he exits, at which point he is taken and the prescribed punishment is carried out. If he killed or stole within the Sanctuary, he is punished within it. The reports from him on this are numerous, and the detailed views on the issue have already been discussed.

As for it meaning security in the Hereafter from punishment—as held by al-Sadiq (may God be pleased with him)—Abd ibn Humayd and others reported from Yahya ibn Ja'da that whoever enters it shall be secure from the Fire. Al-Bayhaqi reported from Ibn Abbas that the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) said: "Whoever enters the House enters into good and exits its sins forgiven." It is reported from other chains that he (may God bless him and grant him peace) said: "Whoever dies in one of the two Sanctuaries will be resurrected among the secure on the Day of Resurrection." In a report from Ibn Umar, he said: "Whoever is buried in Mecca as a Muslim will be resurrected secure on the Day of Resurrection." It is permissible to intend the general meaning, interpreting it as security in both this world and the Hereafter, which is perhaps the apparent meaning of the unqualified phrasing.

(And pilgrimage to the House is a duty upon the people to God). An initial sentence in which the subject is "pilgrimage" (ḥajj) and the predicate is "to God" (lillāh). "Upon the people" ('alā al-nās) relates to what the predicate relates to, or to an omitted word acting as a state (ḥāl) for the implied pronoun in the prepositional phrase, with the agent being "permanence" (istiqrār). It is permissible for "upon the people" to be the predicate, and "to God" to relate to what it relates to. It is not permissible for it to be a state from the implied pronoun in "the people" because the agent of the state would then be a meaning, and a state does not precede its governing agent in the view of the majority. Ibn Malik permitted it if the state is a prepositional phrase or an adverb, but not when the agent is a "meaning" (ma'nawī). It is also permissible for "pilgrimage" to be in the nominative due to the first or second prepositional phrase. In language, it means intent or the frequenting of one who is exalted. The intent here is a specific act that became dominant until it became a religious reality (ḥaqīqah shar'iyyah). The "al" in "the House" is for reference (al-'ahd). Hamza, al-Kisa'i, and Asim (in the version of Hafs) read it as ḥij (with a kasra), which is the dialect of Najd.

(Whoever is able to find a way to it) is a substitution for "the people," a substitution of a part for the whole, and the pronoun in the substitution is implied—i.e., "among them." It is also said to be a substitution of the whole for the whole, where "people" refers specifically to them, requiring no pronoun. It is also said to be the predicate of an omitted subject—i.e., "They are those who are able" or "The duty upon them is whoever is able." It is possible that it is in the accusative through the suppression of a verb, meaning "I mean," or that it is the agent of the verbal noun (maṣdar) and it is genitive to its object—meaning "And it is upon the people to perform the pilgrimage to the House for whoever among them is able." This has a famous debate.

"Who" (man) in these views is a relative pronoun. It is also possible that it is a conditional, with the conclusion omitted—indicated by what precedes it—or that it is the conclusion itself, based on the established disagreement between the Basrans and Kufans. There must be a pronoun returning from the conditional sentence to "upon the people," the estimate being "whoever is able among them... then upon him is to perform the pilgrimage." This is favored by its parallelism with the condition that follows. The genitive pronoun refers to the House or the pilgrimage, as it is the subject being discussed. It relates to the "way" (sabīl) because of the meaning of reaching/accessing it contained within it, and it is placed before it for the importance of its status.

"Ability" (istiṭā'ah) in origin is the request for the willingness of an action and its ease. The intended meaning of the request is the will, which necessitates power, so it is applied to power absolutely, or as "ease"—which is more specific than power—and this is what is intended here; its verification will follow shortly, God willing. Power is either physical, financial, or both. The first is the view of Imam Malik; thus, pilgrimage is obligatory for him if one is capable of walking and earning on the way. The second is the view of Imam al-Shafi'i; thus, he made substitution (istinābah) mandatory for the disabled if they find the cost for one who represents them. The third is the view of our greatest Imam (may God be pleased with him). This is supported by what al-Bayhaqi and others reported from Ibn Abbas (may God be pleased with them), that he said: "The way is that the servant's body be healthy and he has the price of provisions and a mount without it causing him hardship."

Imam al-Shafi'i (may God be pleased with him) used as evidence what al-Daraqutni reported from Jabir ibn Abdullah, who said: When this verse was revealed, a man stood up and said: "O Messenger of God, what is the way?" He said: "Provisions and a mount." This is reported through various chains and is apparent for the view of al-Shafi'i, as he restricted ability to the financial rather than the physical. This is openly contrary to what Imam Malik held. As for our Imam, he interprets what occurred in that report as an explanation of some of the conditions of ability, evidenced by the fact that if, for example, the safety of the road is missing, the pilgrimage is not obligatory. Apparently, the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) did not address the health of the body because the matter was obvious. How could he not, when the reality of the "way" is the path that brings the person who is able to the House, and that is not conceivable without health. Among the things supporting that the hadith is an explanation of some conditions is that in some reports, it is restricted to only one of the things mentioned. Al-Daraqutni also reported from Ali (may God honor his face) that the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) was asked about the way and said: "That you find the back of a beast," and he did not mention provisions.

This verse is used as evidence that ability must precede the act, and that the saying that it is with the act is false. The direction of the evidence is apparent. It was answered that the ability which we claim is with the act is the reality of the power by which the act occurs. Ability is also applied to another meaning: the soundness of the causes, instruments, and limbs—meaning that the accountable person is in a state where his causes, instruments, and limbs are sound. We have no dispute that this ability is before the act, and it is the basis for the validity of accountability. This is what is meant in the verse, so they say.

The investigation of the discussion on this station according to them: It is famous from al-Ash'ari that power is with the act, meaning it exists at the moment of its occurrence and relates to it at that moment, and does not exist before it, let alone relate to it. Many of the Mu'tazila agreed with this, such as al-Najjar, Muhammad ibn 'Isa, Ibn al-Rawandi, Abu 'Isa al-Warraq, and others. Most of the Mu'tazila said: Power is before the act and relates to it at that time, and it is impossible for it to relate to it before its occurrence. Then they differed regarding the remaining of power. Some said it remains at the time of the existence of the act, even if the remaining power is not the power for it. Others denied this.

Their arguments for this are various. The first: That the relation of power to the act means bringing it into existence, and bringing into existence what is already in existence is impossible because it is obtaining what is already obtained. Rather, the "bringing into existence" must be before the "existence." This is why it is valid to say: "He brought it into existence, so it came into existence." This was answered that this is based on the premise that the generated power is an influencer (mu'aththir), which is denied. Even if we grant it, it is said that the "bringing into existence" of the existent by that existence—which is the effect of that "bringing into existence"—is permissible in the sense that the existence which makes it exist at the time of "bringing into existence" is dependent on the agent and branches off from its creation. What is impossible is the "bringing into existence" of an existent by another existence. The investigation is that the influence occurs with the obtaining of the effect according to time, even if it is prior to it according to essence. This priority is what permits the use of the "fa" (so/then) between them.

The second: If it is permissible for power to relate at the time of occurrence, it would necessitate power over the remaining [act] at the time of its remaining, and the consequent is false. The explanation of the linkage: the obstacle to the relation of power to it is only that it is already in existence, and the incident at the time of its incident is also already in existence. This was answered by saying we allow it because the endurance of its existence is by the endurance of the relation of power to it, or we differentiate by what invalidates the linkage regarding the need of the existent for what originates it versus the remaining [existent]. If power did not relate to the first, it would remain in its non-existence, and we assumed its existence—this is a contradiction. If it did not relate to the second, it would remain in existence, which corresponds to reality. Or we disprove the evidence first by the influence of knowledge or "all-knowingness" by consensus, for that is conditional on the time of the act's occurrence, not its remaining. Second, by the influence of the act in the agent being an agent, for the act is influential in that at the time of occurrence, and assuming the act is remaining, it does not influence at the time of remaining. Third, by the accompaniment of the will, since they mandate it at the time of occurrence, not at the time of remaining, so the situation with power is the same.

The third: That power being with the act necessitates the occurrence of God's power or the eternity of His determined object, and both are false. Rather, His power is eternal and its relation in eternity is to His determined objects. Thus, the relation of power to its determined objects before their occurrence has been proven. If it were impossible for generated power, it would be impossible for eternal power, but it is not. This was answered that the remaining eternal power differs in essence from the generated power whose remaining is not permitted according to us; therefore, the permissibility of its priority over the act does not necessitate the permissibility of the generated one's priority over it. Then, the eternal power relates in eternity to the act with a conceptual relation that does not necessitate the existence of the act, and it has another relation to it at the time of its occurrence that necessitates its existence; therefore, the eternity of its effects does not follow from the eternity of its conceptual relation.

The fourth: That it follows from this premise that the disbeliever, in the time of his disbelief, is not accountable for faith because it is not in his power at that state preceding it. Rather, we say: It follows that it is not conceivable for anyone to rebel, for with the act there is no rebellion, and without it there is no power, so there is no accountability, so there is no rebellion. Furthermore, the strongest of the excuses of the accountable person that must be accepted to push off accountability from him is that what he is accountable for is not in his power. If he was not capable of the act before it, the accountability for not performing the act should be lifted from him, and this is false by the consensus of the nation. Furthermore, if it were permissible to hold the disbeliever accountable for faith while it is not in his power, then it should be permissible to hold him accountable for the creation of substances and accidents. This was answered that accountability for the impossible is permissible according to us, so we commit to the permissibility of the aforementioned accountability for creation. We can differentiate by saying that the abandonment of faith is within his power, unlike the non-existence of substances and accidents, for that is not in his power at all; therefore, accountability for the creation of them does not follow from the permissibility of accountability for faith. In short: the thing being "within one's power," which is a condition for accountability according to us, is that the thing or its opposite is related to power. This is obtained in faith because his abandonment of it—by engaging in its opposite—is within his power at the time of his disbelief, unlike the bringing into existence of substances and accidents, for that is not in his power at all—neither the act nor the abandonment. Thus, accountability for it is not permissible. As for what was mentioned regarding the matter of excuses and the necessity of accepting them, it is based on the principle of rational good and evil, and the evidence for their invalidity has been established in its place, as is in Al-Mawaqif and its commentary.

The evidence for what is common from al-Ash'ari: It is said that power is an accident that God creates in the animal, with which it performs the voluntary acts; therefore, it must be contemporaneous with the act in time, not preceding it, otherwise it would necessitate the occurrence of the act without power, according to the demonstration of the impossibility of the remaining of accidents. This was challenged by what is in the evidence for the impossibility of the remaining of accidents from strong reflection, and that it may be said that assuming the aforementioned impossibility is granted, there is no dispute in the possibility of the renewal of instances following disappearance. So from where does the occurrence of the act without power follow? This was answered by saying that we only claim the necessity of that if the power with which the act is performed is the preceding power. As for if you make it the renewed instance that is contemporaneous, then you have admitted that the power with which the act is performed is only contemporaneous. If you claim that it must have instances that occur so that the act is not possible with the first that occurs of the power, then the explanation is upon you.

The truth, in my view, in this issue is that the condition for accountability is the strength that becomes influential by the permission of God Almighty upon the joining of the will that follows the will of God, due to His saying (Subhanahu): "God does not charge a soul except [with that within] its capacity." The clarification is that just as He (Ta'ala) is essentially rich beyond the worlds, so too is He Wise and Generous. Just as His essential richness is to do what He wills and judge what He desires, so too is the requirement of His generosity and mercy the consideration of what His mercy (Subhanahu) requires, as indicated by al-'Adud in 'Uyūn al-Jawāhir, and Abu Abd Allah al-Dimashqi elaborated on it in Shifā' al-'Alīl. It is known that wisdom does not require that one who cannot comply be ordered to do an act, nor one who cannot avoid it be forbidden from it. Therefore, by the requirement of the wisdom He observed in what He created and ordered—out of grace and mercy—it is necessary that the accountability be according to capacity. If it is so, the condition of accountability is the strength that becomes influential if the will is joined to it. This is before the act. The power that is with the act is the power that has gathered the conditions of influence, among which is the joining of the will to it. In this way, Imam al-Razi reconciled the school of al-Ash'ari (who said power is with the act) and the Mu'tazila (who said it is before it). He said: "Perhaps al-Ash'ari meant by power the strength that has gathered the conditions of influence; therefore, he ruled that it is with the act and that it does not relate to opposites. The Mu'tazila meant by power merely muscular strength; therefore, they said it existed before the act and relates to opposite matters." This is a correct reconciliation.

(And whoever disbelieves, then indeed God is independent of the worlds) (97). It is possible that it refers by "whoever disbelieves" to one who does not perform the pilgrimage, and he expressed the abandonment of pilgrimage as "disbelief" to be severe and strict toward the one who abandons it, just as happened in what Sa'id ibn Mansur, Ahmad, and others reported from Abu Umama from his saying (may God bless him and grant him peace): "Whoever dies without performing the pilgrimage of Islam, and is not prevented by a restricting illness, a tyrannical ruler, or an obvious necessity, then let him die in whatever state he wishes—as a Jew or a Christian." Similar is what was narrated with a sound chain from Umar ibn al-Khattab (may God be pleased with him) that he said: "I have intended to send men to these lands to see everyone who has wealth and has not performed pilgrimage, and impose the jizya upon them; they are not Muslims." It is also possible to keep "disbelief" to its apparent meaning, based on what Ibn Jarir, Abd ibn Humayd, and others reported from 'Ikrama, that when "And whoever seeks other than Islam as a religion" was revealed, the Jews said: "We are Muslims." The Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) said to them: "Indeed God has obligated the pilgrimage to the House upon the Muslims." They said: "It was not written for us," and refused to perform the pilgrimage, so "And whoever disbelieves" was revealed.

From the path of al-Dahhak, it is reported that when the verse of pilgrimage was revealed, the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) gathered the followers of religions—the idolaters of Arabia, the Christians, the Jews, the Magians, and the Sabaeans—and said: "Indeed God has obligated the pilgrimage upon you, so perform the pilgrimage to the House." Only the Muslims accepted it, and five groups disbelieved in it, saying: "We do not believe in it, we do not pray toward it, and we do not face it," so God (Subhanahu) revealed "And whoever disbelieves," etc. Ibn Abbas went with keeping it to its apparent meaning, for al-Bayhaqi reported from him that he said regarding the verse: "Whoever disbelieves in the pilgrimage, not seeing the pilgrimage as a virtuous act and not seeing its abandonment as a sin." Ibn Jarir narrated that when the verse was revealed, a man from Hudhayl stood up and said: "O Messenger of God, is it disbelief for whoever abandons it?" He said: "Whoever abandons it without fearing His punishment, and performs the pilgrimage without hoping for His reward, then that is it." In both possibilities, the verse is not a valid evidence for the one who claims that the committer of a major sin is a disbeliever. "Who" (man) can be a conditional—which is the apparent meaning—or a relative pronoun. In both possibilities, what comes after the "fa" (fainna) is dispensed with the need for a linking pronoun by placing the noun in place of the pronoun, since the origin is "then indeed God is independent of them."

It is also permissible to keep the plural general and dispense with the linking pronoun by including the mentioned ones in it as a primary inclusion. Independence in this context is a metonymy for wrath, as it is said. This is why it is valid to make it a conclusion, and if you refuse, then it is the evidence. In the verse, as they said, there are types of considerations expressing the perfection of care for the matter of pilgrimage and the severity upon its abandoner that cannot be surpassed. Among them, they counted the choice of the news form and presenting it in the form of a nominal sentence that indicates firmness and permanence in a way that implies that it is a right due to God in the liabilities of the people; generalizing the ruling first, then specifying it second; calling the abandonment of pilgrimage "disbelief" in that it is the act of the disbelievers; and mentioning "independence" and "the worlds."

Al-Tayyibi mentioned that in the specification of the comprehensive Name of the Essence and the fronting of the predicate is an indication that this is an act of worship that should not be restricted except to a Worshipped One who is comprehensive of all perfections. And in placing the noun "the House" in place of the pronoun after it preceded it as indefinite, there is an exaggeration in its description to the utmost limit, as if He arranged the ruling on the appropriate description. Likewise, in mentioning "the people" after mentioning it defined is an indication of the cause of the obligation, which is their being "people." And in appending "And whoever disbelieves, then indeed God is independent of the worlds," it is in meaning an emphasis to signify that this is faith in truth and the great blessing, and that its practitioner is worthy because God—by His majesty and greatness—is pleased with him with a complete pleasure, just as He was wrathful toward its abandoner with a great wrath. In the specification of this act of worship and its being the religion of Abraham (peace be upon him) after the refutation of the People of the Book in the preceding verses, and returning to mentioning them after a grave address and a momentous matter for that great act of worship. Some found solace for its being a great act of worship in that it is of the ancient laws, based on what was narrated that Adam (peace be upon him) performed the pilgrimage for forty years from India on foot, and that Gabriel said to him: "The angels were circumambulating this House before you for seven thousand years." Ibn Ishaq claimed that God did not send a prophet after Abraham except that he performed the pilgrimage. What others explicitly stated is that there was no prophet who did not perform the pilgrimage, contrary to the one who exempted Hud and Salih (peace be upon them). Regarding its being obligatory upon those before us, there are two views: it is said that the correct one is that it was not obligatory except upon us, but this is considered strange. A group claimed it is the best of acts of worship for its inclusion of both wealth and the body. There is a disagreement regarding the time of its obligation: it is said before the migration, and it is said in the first of its years, and so on until the tenth. It was validated that it was in the sixth. Yes, he (may God bless him and grant him peace) performed the pilgrimage before his prophethood, after it, and before the migration—pilgrimages the number of which is unknown, and the naming is metaphorical considering the form. It was even said that regarding the pilgrimage of the Truthful (Abu Bakr) (may God be pleased with him) in the ninth, but the opposite is the view, because he (may God bless him and grant him peace) is only ordered with a canonical pilgrimage. The same is said regarding the eighth, in which he ordered 'Attab ibn Asid, the governor of Mecca. After that, the Farewell Pilgrimage, no others.