Tafsir of Az-Zumar 39:7

(If you disbelieve) in Him, the Exalted, despite witnessing the aforementioned inducements for belief and gratitude, (then God is independent of you). That is: He, the Almighty, informs you that He is independent of your belief and your gratitude, and that He is not affected by their absence. (And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants), because of the harm it brings upon them. (And if you are grateful, He approves it for you), that is, the gratitude, because of the benefit it brings you.

Those who adhere to the rational goodness and evil of actions say: His lack of approval for disbelief is due to its rational ugliness, and His approval for gratitude is due to its rational beauty. Approval is either in the sense of love or in the sense of willing while refraining from objection, and it is countered by displeasure, as stated in Sharh al-Masayirah. Thus, "His servants" is taken according to its literal generality. Others have interpreted it as "willing" without any qualification, and it is countered by hatred. These people say: He may approve of disbelief—meaning He may will it—for some people, such as the disbelievers. Al-Sakhawi reported this from Al-Nawawi in his book al-Usul wa al-Dawabit, and Ibn al-Humam reported it from Al-Ash'ari and the Imam of the Two Holy Mosques (Imam al-Haramayn). This is what Al-Khafaji stated in his glosses on the Tafsir al-Baydawi.

What I have seen in al-Dawabit—which is a very small manuscript—is the following: "The issue of the school of the people of truth is the indication of the decree and its establishment, and that all created things, their good and their evil, are by the decree of God Almighty and His predestination. He is the Wielder of will for all of them, and He hates sins, even though He, the Glorified, wills them for a wisdom He knows." As to whether it is said that He, the Exalted, approves of sins and loves them, there are two schools of thought among our theologians, reported by the Imam of the Two Holy Mosques and others. The Imam of the Two Holy Mosques said in al-Irshad: "Among the things the people of truth have differed upon is the application of the terms 'love' and 'approval.' Some of our companions said: It is not permitted to say that God, the Exalted, loves sins and approves of them, due to His saying: 'And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants.' Those among our scholars who have conducted deep research have not paid attention to the intimidation of the Mu'tazila; rather, they said: God, the Exalted, wills disbelief, loves it, and approves of it, and [that] the will, love, and approval are one and the same." He said: "The intent of 'His servants' in the verse are those who are guided to faith, and they were attributed to God, the Exalted, to honor them, just as in His saying: 'Servants of God who drink from it,' meaning His elect, not all of them."

Do not be heedless of the difference between this and what Al-Khafaji mentioned. Al-Bahr reported the specification of "the servants" from Ibn Abbas. It is said: It is permissible, despite this, to interpret "the servants" as universal, and the meaning would be: "He does not approve of disbelief for all His servants, but He approves of it and wills it for some of them."

Regarding His saying: 'Vision perceives Him not'—according to one opinion, the prominent scholar of the eras, the author of al-Kashf, has a precious verification on this topic which I have not seen for any other eminent scholar. It is that "approval" (rida) is countered by "displeasure" (sukht). It is sometimes used with the preposition 'an (from) and bi (with), and sometimes it is transitive by itself. If you say: "I am satisfied with (raditu 'an) so-and-so," it only enters upon the entity, not the meaning, but it is in consideration of an action emanating from him that necessitates approval; and in opposition to it is "I am displeased with (sakhattu 'alayhi)." There are two differences between them:

1. If you say: "I am satisfied with so-and-so because of his benevolence," the ba is not necessarily for causality; rather, it is permissible to be a connector, like the ba in "I am satisfied with (raditu bi) God's decree." If you say: "I am displeased with (sakhattu 'alayhi) him because of his evil," the causality becomes fixed. Thus, the origin here should have been the mention of the connector, but ellipsis is frequent in usage, unlike the case there (where there is no ellipsis).

2. If it is said: "I am satisfied with (raditu bi) it," this must enter upon the meaning, unless it enters upon the entity as a preface to the meaning to be more emphatic. You say: "I am satisfied with (raditu bi) God's decree" and "I am satisfied with (raditu bi) God, the Almighty, as a Lord and Judge." Close to this is: "I heard the speech of so-and-so" and "I heard him speaking."

If it is made transitive by itself, its entry upon the entity is permissible, like saying: "I am satisfied with (raditu) Zayd," even if it is in consideration of a meaning, as an alert to his being satisfied with that characteristic; it contains emphasis. It is also permissible for it to enter upon the meaning, like saying: "I am satisfied with (raditu) the authority of so-and-so." The first is more frequent in usage, and it is like their saying: "I praised Zayd" and "I praised his knowledge." As for when it is used with lam (for), it becomes transitive by itself, like saying: "I am satisfied with (raditu laka) this for you," and its meaning is what will come soon, God willing.

When this is established, it will become clear to you that "approval" in its origin is attached to the meaning, and sometimes it is the entity in consideration of its attachment to the meaning or in consideration of the preface. These are three categories verified by their examples. It is, in reality, a psychic state that follows the attainment of something congruent, with joy and sufficiency in it. Thus, it is necessarily different from the "will," because the will precedes the act, while this follows it. This meaning—in cases where it is not used with lam—is clear to a degree that does not escape any person of insight. As for when it is used [with lam], the matter is obscured because if you say: "I am satisfied with (raditu laka) the trade for you," the one who is satisfied with the trade is the person you are addressing, and you have only clarified to him that the trade is something worthy of being approved of. The meaning is not "I am satisfied with your trade," but rather "I am making you approve of the trade." The congruence here is between the one performing the action and the one to whom the lam is attached. Then, he may approve of what you approve for him if he knows the aspect of congruence, and he may not. There is a trope here, either by making "approval" a metaphor for "making one approve" (because everything approved is praised), or because you have made its status as being "approved for him" equal to its status as being "approved for you."

Know that "approval" in regard to God, the Exalted, is impossible, because He, the Glorified, never experiences the occurrence of a quality following an event at all. Thus, it is a metaphor—just as anger is. It is either from the names of qualities, if interpreted as the will to reward them with a reward like that of one who approves of those under his authority; or it is from the names of actions, if it means "making one approve" and that it is like His saying, the Exalted: "God is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him"—it is either a case of mushakala (poetic assimilation) or a case of the aforementioned metaphor. As for His saying, the Glorified: "I have approved for you Islam as a religion," it is definitive that it is of that category in relation to whom it is also correct to describe as approving in reality. Therefore, His saying, the Exalted: "And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants," is a statement uttered on that same path without interpretation, indicating that He, the Glorified, does not "make disbelief approved" for His servants as He "makes Islam approved" for them and accepts it. As for the fact that He does not "will" disbelief to exist, it is not of this category at all, nor is it among the requirements of this structure.

The departure into specifying "the servants" is out of the narrowness of criticism. The statement of the researchers: "Obediences are by the approval of God, the Exalted, and sins are not," is not because of this verse, but because approval in its original sense is impossible for Him. He has indeed reported that He was pleased with the believers because of their obedience in numerous places of His Noble Book.

Al-Zamakhshari—may God treat him according to His justice—interpreted "approval" in such contexts as "choice," and this is inseparable from the will. You know its fallacy from what has been verified. Furthermore, we say: When He, the Glorified, guided to the truth and threatened the falsehood, it was as a completion of mercy upon all His servants—the two groups—by His saying: "If you disbelieve" to His saying: "He approves it for you," alerting to the Essential Independence, and that He, the Exalted, is far above His command for good being for His benefit, or His prohibition of evil being for His harm. Then, in the transition from the expected literal address to His saying: "And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants," there is what alerts that their servanthood and His Lordship, the Glorified, require that He not approve that for them. It also contains the fact that if they describe themselves with disbelief, it is as if they have departed from the rank of His servanthood, the Exalted, and remained in permanent humiliation. Then it was said: "He approves it for you" to alert to the increased specification. This is the secret composition that the group of human thought is confounded before grasping. And God, the Exalted, knows best.

This is a solid statement worthy of acceptance, except that it might be said: It does not conform to the school of the Salaf (predecessors), as they do not interpret "approval" in His regard, and its being an expression of a psychic state—to the end of what was mentioned in his tafsir—is only within us. Since His Essence, the Exalted, is distinct from all other essences, His qualities, the Glorified, are likewise. The reality of "approval" in His regard is distinct from its reality in us. And where is the dust compared to the Lord of Lords? The discussion has already preceded in this position in a way that quenches the seeker and heals the sick.

We say: The lack of interpretation does not imply [what is claimed] in what we are addressing. Approval—whether interpreted or not—is other than the will, because of the discourse on precedence and delay mentioned earlier. Among those who explicitly stated this is Ibn Atiyyah, who said: "Contemplate the will, for its reality is only in that which has not yet occurred, and the reality of approval is only in that which has already occurred. Consider this in the verses of the Qur'an and you will find it, even if the Arabs sometimes use it in their poems by way of metaphor, this for that."

Ibn al-Munir also took the path of differentiation between them as mentioned here, except that he interpreted "approval" and mentioned that it is not possible to interpret it in the verse as "will," and he criticized Al-Zamakhshari in that, as a reward for his speaking against some Sunnis who opposed the Mu'tazila in their claim of the unity of approval and will, and that He may will what the servant does not do, and the servant may do what He, the Almighty, does not will. He said: "Grant that the one who persists in that belief has rust upon his heart or cloudiness on the scales of his intellect; is he not claimed—or claimed for him—that he is an expert in the paths of expressions? So how did he wander from the path—nay, the path in the dark—and lend a deaf ear to the caller of expertise? Except if desire, when it takes hold, makes falsehood appear as truth and covers the explicit expression... may it be far, far away! Is the requirement of Arabic, let alone the rational laws, not that the conditioned is contingent upon the condition? Thus, the existence of the conditioned before the condition is not conceivable rationally, nor is its past and the condition's future linguistically, traditionally, and by the consensus of both parties—the Sunnis and the innovators—that God's will for the servants' gratitude, for example, is prior to the existence of gratitude from them. How, then, is it permissible to interpret 'approval' as 'will,' when it has been made in the verse a conditioned [result] and a recompense, and the occurrence of gratitude has been made a condition and a compensated act? The necessary consequence of this rationally is the precedence of the 'willed'—which is the gratitude—over the 'will'—which is the approval—and linguistically, the precedence of the conditioned over the condition. So when the invalidity of interpreting approval as will is established rationally and traditionally, the correct object for it is fixed: it is the recompense for gratitude by what is customary to recompense the approved-of with, of reward and honor. The meaning of the verse—and God, the Exalted, knows best—is: 'And if you are grateful, He will recompense you for your gratitude with the recompense of one who is approved of.' And there is no doubt that the recompense is future in relation to the gratitude. Thus, the condition and the recompense were fixed according to their requirements linguistically, and that was organized according to the requirements of rational evidence on the invalidity of the precedence of the willed over the will rationally. Similar to this is said regarding His saying: 'And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants,' meaning: He does not recompense the disbeliever with the recompense of the approved-of, but rather the recompense of the one who is angered against, with punishment and torment." End quote.

It cannot be said: "Since His saying: 'Then God is independent of you' is a recompense in consideration of the information, as was pointed out before, then let His saying: 'He approves it for you' be by that consideration, and thus it does not follow that the approval itself is delayed." For we say: Such consideration is common in nominal sentences whose content is realized before the condition, like: "And if He touches you with good, He is Powerful over everything," and in the past tense when it occurs as a recompense, like: "If he has stolen, then a brother of his has stolen before." But in the present tense (imperfect), it is not so, and the refined taste rejects this consideration in it. Furthermore, what need calls for that here? I do not see it as anything but the defense of falsehood, and God's refuge is sought.

Then, it is known from the totality of what we have presented the truth of what they said, that there is no mutual implication between will and approval, just as approval is not an expression of the reality of the will. However, Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim divided the will into two categories: creative and legislative, and mentioned that sins like disbelief and others occur by God's creative will, not His legislative will. According to this, approval is inseparable from the legislative will; so everything willed by God with the legislative will is approved by Him, the Glorified. This division is not something I grasp, unless the legislative will is the will that the willed [object] is approved. Reflect on this.

Ibn Kathir, Nafi' (in one narration), Abu 'Amr, and Al-Kisa'i read yardahu (He approves it) with the stretching (ishba') of the damma of the ha'. The rule for stretching the ha' or not is that if what precedes it is quiescent, it is not stretched, like 'alayhi and ilayhi; and if it is mobile, it is stretched, like bihi and ghulamihi. Here, what precedes it is quiescent by estimation—the alif omitted due to the jussive. If it is made to exist by rule, it is not stretched, as in the reading of Ibn 'Amir and Hafs. If one ignores it, it is stretched, as in the reading of those I mentioned, and this is the most eloquent. It may sometimes be stretched and sometimes elided in other cases, and stretching it may be considered good even without the condition for a subtle point. Abu Bakr read yardahu with the quiescence of the ha', and Abu Hatim did not approve of it, saying: "It is a coarseness that is not permissible." But it is a dialect of the Banu Kalam and Banu 'Aqil to treat the conjunction like the pause.

(And no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another) is a clarification of the non-transferability of the disbeliever's disbelief to another. The discussion of this sentence has preceded, as well as His saying: (Then to your Lord is your return, and He will inform you of what you used to do; indeed, He is Knowing of what is in the breasts).