Tafsir of An-Nisa' 4:115

And whoever opposes the Messenger (meaning: distances himself from him, from the shaqq [split/cleft], for each of the two opposing parties is in a shaqq—a side—other than the shaqq of the other). Because of the clear distinctness between the Messenger and his opponent, the idgham [assimilation] was disconnected here, as it was in His saying—Exalted is He—in Al-Anfal: "And whoever opposes Allah and His Messenger," in consideration of the conjoined party. It was not disconnected in His saying—the Exalted—in Al-Hashr: "And whoever opposes Allah."

Al-Khatib said: The rule regarding the un-splitting [dismantling of idgham] and the idgham is that the Al in the Noble Name [Allah] is necessary/fixed, unlike its status with "the Messenger," and necessity necessitates heaviness; thus, it was lightened by idgham where the Majestic Name accompanied it, unlike where the word "Messenger" accompanied it. In the Al-Anfal verse, the conjoined and the conjunction became as one thing. What we have mentioned is more appropriate.

The reference to the title of "Messengership" is to demonstrate the ugliness of the opposition and defiance they dared to commit, and to provide a rationale for the ruling that follows. The verse was revealed—as we previously mentioned—regarding the thief of the armor or the one who was entrusted with it. It is also said: It was revealed regarding the people of Tu'mah when they apostatized after having embraced Islam. Regardless, the lesson lies in the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the cause, so this and other instances of opposition are included in it.

After the guidance has become clear to him (meaning: the truth has become manifest to him regarding what the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—judged, or regarding what he claims—peace be upon him—by way of verifying the miracles confirming his prophethood).

And follows other than the way of the believers (meaning: other than what they are persistently upon in terms of belief and practice, thus covering principles and branches, the whole and the part).

We will let him have what he has taken (meaning: We will appoint him as a guardian for what he has taken upon himself of misguidance, and it leads to the meaning: We will lead him astray. It is also said: It means We will leave him between himself and what he chose for his own self. It is also said: In the Hereafter, We will consign him to that which he relied upon and sought support from in the world, such as idols).

And roast him in Hell (meaning: We will cause him to enter it). It has been mentioned previously. It is also read with a nun [i.e., nuslihi] from salahu.

And evil it is as a destination (meaning: Hell, or the guardianship).

Imam Al-Shafi'i—may Allah be pleased with him—used this verse as evidence for the authority of Ijma' [consensus]. It is narrated from Al-Muzani that he said: I was with Al-Shafi'i one day when an old man came to him wearing wool and carrying a staff. When he saw him, out of reverence, he sat up straight, whereas he had been leaning against a pillar, and he adjusted his clothes. The man said to him: "What is the evidence in the religion of Allah?" He said: "His Book." He said: "And what else?" He said: "The Sunnah of His Prophet." He said: "And what else?" He said: "The agreement of the Nation [Ummah]." He said: "From where [comes] this last one? Is it in the Book of Allah?" He pondered for a moment, silent. The old man said: "I grant you three days and nights; if you bring [proof from] a verse, otherwise, isolate yourself from the people."

He remained for three days without going out, and he emerged on the third day between the Dhuhr and Asr prayers, his color having changed. The old man came to him, greeted him, sat down, and said: "My request?" He said: "Yes. I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan: In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful: 'And whoever opposes the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him...' to the end. He shall not be cast into Hell for opposing the believers except that following them is obligatory." The man said: "You have spoken the truth," and he stood up and left.

It is also narrated from him that he said: "I read the Quran every day and every night three times until I found it." The Imam reported from him that he was asked about a verse in the Book of Allah that indicates that consensus is evidence, and he read the Quran three hundred times until he found this verse.

This was challenged by Al-Raghib, who argued that "the way of the believers" is faith, just as one might say: "Follow the way of those who fast and the Muslims," meaning in fasting and prayer. Therefore, there is no evidence in the verse for the authority of consensus or the obligation of following the believers in matters other than faith. This was refuted in Al-Kashf by stating that this is a specification [of the meaning] which the initial condition [the verse's context] rejects. Furthermore, if it were the habit of those who fast to perform I'tikaf, for example, the command to follow them would include that as well; likewise, it includes what is required by faith in the matter at hand. Thus, "the way of the believers" here is general, according to what we have pointed out.

It was also challenged by stating that the conjoined [i.e., the one following other than the way of the believers] is restricted by "after guidance has become clear," and therefore this restriction must apply to the conjoining. If so, there is no benefit in consensus, because guidance is general to all guidance, including the evidence of consensus. And if the evidence is obtained, there is no benefit in the thing evidenced. The answer given was to deny the necessity of the restriction in the conjoined part. Even if it were conceded, the intended meaning of guidance is the evidence for Tawhid [monotheism] and prophethood. Thus, the verse signifies that opposing the believers after the evidence of Tawhid and prophethood is forbidden, making consensus beneficial in branches after the principles have become clear.

The Judge [Al-Qadi] clarified the method of inferring from it the authority of consensus and the prohibition of opposing it by saying: Allah has arranged a severe threat in it for opposition and following other than the way of the believers. This is either because of the prohibition of each one of them individually, or one of them, or the combination of both. The second is invalid, for it is ugly to say: "Whoever drinks wine and eats bread deserves a penalty." The third is likewise, because opposition is forbidden whether or not other things are added to it. And since following other than their way is forbidden, following their way is obligatory, because refraining from following their way—for one who knows their way—is following other than their way.

If it is said: "We do not concede that refraining from following the way of the believers equates to following other than the way of the believers, because it is not impossible that one neither follows the way of the believers nor the way of the non-believers." The answer: Following is the act of performing an action similar to another. Since it is the nature of non-believers not to follow the believers in their actions, whoever among the believers does not follow the way of the believers has performed the action of the non-believers and followed in their footsteps; therefore, he must be a follower of them. In other words, refraining from following the way of the believers is following other than the way of the believers, because a responsible person [mukallaf] cannot be devoid of following some way.

It was also challenged that this proof is not definitive, because "other than the way of the believers" admits to various possibilities of specification, such as the possibility that it refers to their way in following the Messenger, or in supporting him, or in imitating him—peace be upon him—or in matters by which they became believers. When the possibility arises, its utmost is probability [zann], and relying on the apparent meaning is only established by consensus; if it were not for consensus, it would be obligatory to act upon the evidences that forbid following conjecture. Thus, it would be proving consensus by what its authority is only established by, which is circular reasoning.

This is difficult to escape, and Ibn Al-Hajib mentioned it in Al-Mukhtasar. Similar to it is the statement of Al-Isfahani regarding "following their way": since it admitted what was mentioned and others, it became general, and its indication of any one of its individuals is not definitive due to the possibility of specifying it with what excludes it, alongside the circular reasoning it contains. He answered the circularity argument by saying that it only applies if no other evidence for it exists, and there is other evidence: that it is probable, and acting upon it is necessary, because if we do not act upon it alone, we must either act upon it and its opposite, or not act upon either, or act upon its opposite. In the first case, a combination of contradictions results; in the second, the removal of both; and in the third, acting upon the weaker evidence while the stronger exists. All are invalid, so acting upon it is definitively required.

It was also challenged by denying the prohibition of following other than the way of the believers absolutely, but rather [only] on the condition of opposition. The scholars answered this with arguments that are not devoid of weakness, and that the inference depends on specifying "the believers" as the "people of binding and loosening" in every era, and the indication for that is not apparent, along with other matters mentioned by Al-Amidi, Al-Tilimsani, and others, to which they responded. In sum, this inference is hardly free from dispute, and the authority of consensus is not dependent upon it, as is not hidden.