Tafsir of An-Nisa' 4:82

This is perhaps an answer to a question that arose from God, the Exalted, having declared Himself a witness. It is as if it were said: "The testimony of God, the Exalted, is beyond doubt, but from where is it known that what you have mentioned is indeed the testimony of God narrated from Him?" He, the Glorified, answered by saying: Do they not then contemplate the Qur’an?

The root of tadabbur (contemplation) is to look at the adbar (the ends or consequences) of affairs. Then, it was used for any reflection, whether it is an examination of the reality of a thing and its parts, or its precedents and causes, or its sequels and aftermaths.

The fa (in fala) is for conjunction to a suppressed clause, meaning: Do they doubt that what has been mentioned is the testimony of God, such that they do not contemplate the Qur’an—which this Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) brought, and for whom witness has been borne—in order to know that it is from God, so that it might be a proof, and what a proof, for the intended purpose?

It is also said the meaning is: Do they turn away from the Qur’an and refuse to contemplate it, so that they might know it is from God, the Exalted, by observing the evidences within it—among which is this truthful revelation and the explicit text regarding their hypocrisy, reported exactly as it is?

{And if it had been from other than Allah}—that is, the Qur’an, as they claim—{they would have found within it much contradiction}. This is because some of its predictions of the unseen—such as the disclosure of what the hypocrites hide—would not correspond to reality, for the unseen is not known to anyone except God, the Exalted. Since truthfulness has been consistent throughout it and no such failure has ever occurred, it is known that it is through His information, the Exalted, and from Him. This is what is indicated by the words of al-Asamm and al-Zajjaj.

In a narration from Ibn Abbas, it is meant that they would have found in it much inconsistency (tanāquḍ). This is because human speech, if it is lengthy, does not—according to customary habit—remain free from inconsistency. As for what is thought to be "contradiction" (ikhtilāf)—as in many of the verses, including what was mentioned previously—it is not truly "contradiction" according to those who contemplate.

It is also said—and this is a view to which there is no objection, contrary to what its claimant suggests—that the meaning is: Much of it would have been inconsistent and contradictory; its composition and eloquence would have varied. Some of it would have reached the limit of inimitability (i‘jāz), while some would have fallen short of it, making it possible to be contested. Some of it would be an account of the unseen that agreed with what was told, while some would be an account contradicting it. Some would indicate a meaning deemed correct by the scholars of rhetoric, while some would indicate a corrupt, incoherent meaning. Since the entirety of it resonates with a superior, miraculous eloquence, and supports the truth of meanings and the veracity of accounts, it is known that it is only from One capable of that which others are incapable of, and One who is All-Knowing of that which none other than He knows.

This is based on the idea that the aspect of inimitability, according to the scholars of the Arabic language, is that the Qur’an is in the highest rank of eloquence, and that the intention of the verse is to establish that the whole of the Qur’an, as well as its parts, is from God, the Exalted. In this case, it is not possible to describe the "contradiction" as "much," because contradiction would then only exist if some of it were miraculous and some were not, which is but one instance of contradiction. Thus, wajadū (they would have found) was made transitive to two objects: the first being "much" (kathīran) and the second being "contradiction" (ikhtilāfan), meaning "differing" (mukhtalifan). His saying, "much of it would have been inconsistent" (lakāna al-kathīru minhu mukhtalifan), points to this.

The requirement that it be "from other than Allah" only necessitates that "much" of it be inconsistent—despite the fact that it would logically necessitate that the "whole" be inconsistent—by way of limiting it to the lesser amount, just as in the saying of the Exalted: "...some of what He promises you may befall you." This is a fair manner of speech. This refutes the objection that "much" is an adjective for "contradiction," and "contradiction" is an adjective for the "whole" in terms of structure, and that he made "much" the adjective for the "whole." For we do not concede that "much" is an adjective for "contradiction"; rather, they are the two objects of wajadū.

Likewise, the objection that his saying "some of it would reach the limit of inimitability" implies that others possess the power to produce miraculous speech is invalid. We do not concede this, for the intention is that the Qur’an, as a whole and in its parts, is from God, the Exalted—that is, the "part" through which the challenge was issued, which is the amount of the shortest surah of it. If some of its parts were from other than God, the Exalted, they would have found the aforementioned contradiction, which is that some of it would not reach the limit of inimitability. This was stated by some investigators.

Some say there is no escape from the latter objection except to construe the speech as a hypothesis and supposition—that is, if there were a rank of inimitability, it would be only in some parts, on the condition that this amount be taken from the speech of God, the Exalted, as in iqtibās (quotation) and similar instances. However, its far-fetched nature is not hidden.

Abu Ali al-Jubba’i leaned toward interpreting "contradiction" as variation in eloquence, between being eloquent and not eloquent.

It is reported from al-Zamakhshari that there are benefits in the verse: the obligation of reflection upon proofs and indications; the invalidity of blind imitation (taqlīd); the invalidity of the statement of those who say that religious knowledge is necessary/intuitive (ḍarūrī); the indication of the validity of analogy (qiyās); and the indication that the actions of servants are not the creation of God, the Exalted, due to the existence of contradiction within them.

It is not hidden that its indication of the obligation of reflection in general, and the invalidity of blind imitation for all, and the position of those who say that religious knowledge is entirely intuitive, is clear. As for the validity of analogy according to the terminological definition of the principles of jurisprudence, it is not. Regarding the confirmation of the latter point, as stated in al-Kashf: the requirement is that every contradiction is from other than God, the Exalted, according to their saying, "if reversed, then if it were, and if the actions of servants were of His creation, then it would be from Him by necessity." The proposition would be falsified, or "some contradiction is from other than God, the Exalted," as established by Shaykh Ibn al-Hajib and is famous among the logicians. Thus, some actions of servants would not be created by Him, the Exalted, and this suffices for the argument, since no one claims a difference between "some" and "some" if it is voluntary.

He responded to this by saying that the requirement is "all contradiction is a Qur’an from God, the Exalted," according to the first view, and thus the argument is not completed. He mentioned that the meaning of "if it were from other than God, the Exalted" among the group is "if it were established by other than God, the Exalted," and that creation has no role in this necessity. You know that this is not an obvious intention here. Likewise, the verse is used to argue against the corruption of the claim of those who assert that the meaning of the Qur’an cannot be understood except through the explanation of the Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) or the infallible Imam, as some Shi'a have said.