Tafsir of Muhammad 47:19

"So know that there is no god but Allah": This is a consequence of the entire story from the beginning of the Surah, not a consequence of His saying: "Are they waiting?" It is as if it were said: "Since you have known that the matter is as has been mentioned—the happiness of these [believers] and the wretchedness of those [deniers]—then remain firm upon what you are upon of the knowledge of Oneness, for it is one of the causes of happiness."

The "command" is interpreted as knowledge of remaining firm in it; for it is not permissible that the knowledge of the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) regarding Tawhid should be contingent upon the conditions mentioned by the Almighty, as he—peace and blessings be upon him—was a monotheist by knowledge at the very moment revelation came to him. Furthermore, the meaning is: "Hold fast to what you are upon of the causes of happiness, rather than seeking happiness [anew]."

Some scholars said: "Indeed, firmness is also attained by him—peace and blessings be upon him—and the command to him to do so is a reminder of what Allah has bestowed upon him, as a preamble to what follows." This was countered by the view that firmness implies continuity, which, in relation to future times—even if it is something inevitably obtained for him by virtue of infallibility—does not negate that the infallible one is commanded and forbidden, and thus he fulfills the commanded and avoids the forbidden; for there is necessity for infallibility and the command.

Regarding His saying: "And ask forgiveness for your sin, and for the believing men and believing women": It is said that this also carries the meaning of "firmness," and that asking for forgiveness is a metaphor for the humility, self-abasement, and admission of shortcoming that is incumbent upon him, because he (peace and blessings be upon him) is infallible, or forgiven, not a sinner oblivious to seeking forgiveness. Others say: "The investigation is that it is a preamble to the subsequent seeking of forgiveness for the believing men and women." Perhaps the most appropriate is to keep it in its literal sense without treating it as a preamble. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) used to seek forgiveness frequently.

Ahmad, Muslim, Abu Dawood, Al-Nasa’i, and Ibn Hibban recorded from Al-Aghar al-Muzani (may Allah be pleased with him) who said: The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Indeed, a veil is cast over my heart, and I seek forgiveness from Allah one hundred times a day." Al-Nasa’i, Ibn Majah, and others recorded from Abu Musa: The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "I have never woken up in a morning except that I asked Allah for forgiveness one hundred times." Abu Dawood, Al-Tirmidhi (who authenticated it), Al-Nasa’i, Ibn Majah, and a group recorded from Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them) who said: "We used to count for the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) in one sitting, saying: 'O Lord, forgive me and accept my repentance, for You are the Oft-Returning, the Merciful,' one hundred times." In another wording: "The Oft-Returning, the Forgiving," along with other authentic reports.

The "sin" in relation to him—peace and blessings be upon him—is the abandonment of what is most appropriate for his exalted status. Often, a thing that is a good deed for one person is a sin for another, as it is said: "The good deeds of the righteous are the sins of those brought near." It has been mentioned that for our Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), at every moment, there is an ascension to a station higher than the one he was in; thus, that from which he ascended is, in his noble view, a sin in relation to that to which he ascended, and so he seeks forgiveness for it. They attributed to this his saying: "Indeed, a veil is cast over my heart," and there are other sayings regarding this.

His saying "and for the believing men" involves the omission of an added word (mudaf) based on the context of what preceded, i.e., "and for the sins of the believing men and believing women." The preposition was repeated because their sins are a different category from his sin—peace and blessings be upon him—for theirs are major and minor disobedience, while his sin is the abandonment of the "more appropriate" in relation to his exalted status. It is not far-fetched that in relation to them, this is for the sake of their good deeds. It is also said that the omission of the mudaf and the attachment of the request for forgiveness to their persons signifies their extreme need for it, such that their persons are the very embodiment of sins; likewise, it signifies their abundance.

Some allowed that seeking forgiveness for the believers means requesting forgiveness for them and seeking its cause, such as commanding them to piety. This involves combining the literal and metaphorical, and there is debate regarding its validity; therefore, the apparent interpretation is to keep the word in its literal sense.

The prioritization of the command to Tawhid signifies the extreme honor of Tawhid, as it is the foundation of acts of obedience and the lighthouse of acts of worship. Within this "Good Word" (la ilaha illa Allah) are noble investigations and exquisite subtleties; there is no harm in mentioning some, even if something of this has already passed. We say: It is well known that illa is for exception, and the Majestic Name is a substitute for the position of the noun of la (the negator of genus), and the predicate of la is omitted.

The substitution was questioned from two sides: First, that it is a partial substitution (badal ba’d) and there is no pronoun with it returning to that which is substituted, which is a condition for it. The response is to deny that it is an absolute condition, but rather it is a condition where the partiality is not understood by context—and here, it is understood by the context of the exception. Second, that there is a contradiction between the substituted and the substitute, for the first is negative and the second is affirmative. Al-Sirafi answered that it is a substitute for the first in the act of the agent, and the contradiction in negation and affirmation does not prevent substitution, because the doctrine of substitution is that the first is treated as if it were not mentioned, and the second is in its place. The attribute and the described can sometimes differ in this, such as "I passed by a man, not generous, not intelligent." Besides, if it were said that the substitute in exception is a category unto itself, different from other substitutions, it would have validity.

The command of the predicate was questioned: If it is estimated as "possible" (mumkin), it necessitates not confirming the existence in actuality for the True One—exalted is His majesty—or "existing" (mawjud), which necessitates not clearing Him of the possibility of partnership; and there is no context for an estimate of a specific predicate. It is said: Because of the difficulty of this problem, the author of Al-Kashshaf and his followers went to the view that the word la does not require a predicate, and they made "illa Allah" the subject (mubtada') and "la ilaha" the predicate. The origin is "Allah is the god," i.e., worshipped in truth; but when it was desired to limit the attribute to the subject, the predicate was advanced, and the subject was paired with illa, since that which is limited is what follows illa, and the limited is what occurs in the context of negation. When the subject is paired with illa, its predicate must be advanced. This was countered by saying that, along with the artifice therein, it requires the construction of the predicate with la, whereas only the subject is constructed with it; also, if the matter were so, there would be no ground for the accusative case of the noun occurring after it, which a group has permitted.

Some scholars said: "La ilaha illa Allah" according to this school is a proposition with modified sides, similar to "the non-living is not a knower," meaning "the living is a knower." It does not repel the objection, as is obvious.

Some said: The predicate is illa Allah, meaning illa with the Majestic Name. It was objected that the genus is different from each of its individuals, so how then can the negation of difference for an individual be true? Unless it is said that this is based on including the meaning of min (from), and that what is understood from it is that others of this genus are negated except for this individual. The view, as it is said, is to say: "The negated difference is the difference in existence, not the difference in concept, so that it would not be true." There is no doubt that the meaning intended by the genus negated by this la is the concept, without considering its occurrence in all individuals or some; thus, it is a predicate, not in the sense of considering its lack of occurrence in them at all, so that its predication would not be correct—for it does not follow from the lack of consideration of something that it is non-existent. Whenever predication is realized, the lack of difference in existence is realized; reflect on this.

Some said: There is no predicate for this la at all, according to what the Banu Tamim said about it. It was objected that this necessitates the negation of judgment and contract, which is definitely false, as Tawhid necessitates it. It is not far-fetched to say that the saying of the lack of need of la for a predicate does not exclude the compound of it and its noun from the contract; this is because the meaning of the compound like "no man" according to this estimate is "this genus is negated." So when we say "no man but Hatim," its meaning is "this genus is negated in other than this individual." This is marred by the fact that the composition of speech from a particle and a noun is not possible. Perhaps this is repelled by what is said in the vocative, such as "O Zayd," that it stands in the place of "I call." The noble scholar—sanctified be his mystery—declared in the explanation of what was transmitted from Banu Tamim regarding the non-establishment of the predicate of this la that it is possible it is based on what is understood from the structure, as mentioned earlier, of the negation of this genus. Then the word illa according to this estimate means "other than"; there is no room for it being for exception, not because of the contradiction imagined—based on the fact that the negation of the genus from every individual contradicts its establishment for one of its individuals—for that is repelled by the likes of what Najm al-A'imma chose in repelling the imagined contradiction in such as "The people did not stand except Zayd," due to the obligation of the inclusion of the people from whom the action is negated for Zayd for whom it is confirmed. In what is suggested, it is said: "The genus from which this individual is excluded is negated within everything else." Nor [is there room for the objection] that the negated genus might not encompass what is after illa, which is a condition of the exception, because of what you know of the difference between the genus without considering its occurrence in individuals and between it with the consideration of its lack of occurrence in them. Rather, because if it were for exception, the speech would not convey Tawhid, because its result then would be that this genus—on the assumption that this individual is not included in it—is negated; thus, it would be understood from it that it is not negated in individuals not excluded by that individual, so where is the Tawhid? Therefore, it is necessary to carry it on the meaning of "other than" and to make it follow the position of the noun of la as a substitute for it or an adjective, as in his saying: "And every brother, his brother departs from him, by the life of your father, except the individuals." Thus I have seen it in some old copies, and one of our shaykhs' shaykhs, the scholar Al-Tabaqchali, mentioned it in his treatise explaining the Good Word and did not counter it with anything. In my view, what was mentioned in negating that illa is for exception according to that estimate is not free from scrutiny.

Then it is said: If the content of the compound according to that estimate is that this genus is negated in what is other than this individual, the proposition is specific and has a consequent which is a universal proposition, i.e., our saying: "Everything considered an individual for it other than this individual is negated." There is no strangeness in any of that.

Many went to the estimation of the predicate "existing" and answered the problem by saying that it necessitates the negation of the general possibility from the side of existence regarding gods other than Allah the Almighty. This is based on a definitive premise known to the rational: that the one worshipped in truth cannot be but the Necessary Existent. Thus, the meaning becomes: "There is no god worshipped in truth existing except Allah." And since there is no existing one that is not possible—for if it were possible, it would be necessary, based on the definitive premise—it would be existing, and the Good Word has informed that it is not existing; so it is not possible, for the negation of the consequent indicates the negation of the antecedent. It was objected that the definitive premise, even if true in itself, is not conceded by the polytheists, because they worship idols and believe they are gods while admitting they are possible and in need of a Creator ("And if you ask them who created the heavens and the earth, they will surely say Allah"). Thus, a morally responsible person could admit the Good Word and believe that the negation of existence does not necessitate the negation of possibility, so it is possible for him that gods exist other than Allah; thus, uttering the Word is not a text on his faith. Even if the mentioned premise were conceded by all, it would be possible to estimate the predicate from the beginning as "existing by essence," i.e., "There is no god existing by essence except Allah." And since there is nothing other than Him—the Almighty—existing by essence, it is not deserving of worship, because the one deserving of it cannot be but necessary by essence.

The answer has been established in two other ways: First, "No god exists" is a categorical negative proposition that must have a direction, which is the general possibility. So the meaning is that the side contrary to negation—which is the affirmation of existence—is not necessary for the gods except for Allah the Almighty, for He exists with the general possibility; i.e., the side of negation is not necessary for Him—the Almighty—so existence is necessary for Him—the Glorified—to realize the contradiction between the exception and the excepted. Second, "No god exists" by general possibility is a universal negative general possible; thus, what is obtained by exception, which is the opposite, is a necessary partial affirmative, i.e., "Allah exists necessarily."

It was objected to both approaches that they are only valid if each side of the excepted and the exception is an independent proposition, which is denied. The correct view among the people of Arabic is that they are one statement restricted by exception, so the rules of contradiction do not apply to them unless it is interpreted by the linguistic meaning. Also, making "Allah exists necessarily" a partial proposition involves laxity. It is said: It is possible to say the estimated predicate is "existing absolutely," whether in actuality or in possibility, by using the shared term in both its meanings, or by interpreting it by what the name "existing" is applied to; it is as you see. It is said: It is permissible to estimate it as "possible," and the negation of possibility necessitates the negation of existence because the god is the Necessary Existent, and the possibility of a thing's being characterized by the necessity of existence necessitates its being characterized by it in actuality necessarily. So if its possibility is benefited from the Good Word, its existence is also benefited, since everything that does not exist, it is impossible for it to be the Necessary Existent. You know what is in that from what has passed, so do not be heedless.

Some said the estimated predicate is "deserving of worship." So the meaning is: "There is no god deserving of worship except Allah," and there is no obstacle in that. It was objected that this is a specific attribute and must be omitted from context, and there is no context; thus, the omission is not correct. The response is that it is as clear as a signpost because "god" means "the worshipped," and its deservingness is supported by noting the context and considering the state of the addressees, for this Good Word was revealed to reject the belief of the polytheists who claimed that idols deserve worship.

It was also objected that it does not indicate the negation of plurality absolutely, i.e., neither in possibility nor in actuality, because of the permissibility of the existence of a god other than Him—the Almighty—who does not deserve worship. Also, it can be said: The intent is either the negation of a god deserving of worship other than Him—the Almighty—in actuality or in possibility. According to the first, the possibility of a god deserving of worship other than Him—the Mighty and Majestic—is not negated; and according to the second, it does not indicate His—the Almighty—deservingness in actuality.

It was refuted that the necessity of existence is the beginning of all perfections, and that is why they derived many of them from it; so there is no doubt that it necessitates the deservingness of veneration and reverence, and there is no meaning for the deservingness of worship except that. So if other than Him—the Almighty—does not deserve worship, there is no Necessary Existent other than Him—the Glorified—otherwise it would have deserved worship definitively. And if it does not exist, it would not be possible either. Thus, it is proven that the negation of the deservingness of worship necessitates the negation of plurality, certainly. This was countered by the fact that it is based on "the god cannot be but the Necessary Existent," and you have heard that although it is definitively true in itself, it is not conceded by the polytheists. Some investigators said: "No attention is paid to their non-concession due to their obstinacy regarding what might be self-evident." Indeed, it may be said: The Good Word according to that estimate only indicates the negation of the worshipped in actuality, based on what is established in logic that the essence of the subject must be characterized by the title in actuality. It is answered by denying the obligation of that; rather, characterization by possibility is sufficient, as Al-Farabi explicitly stated. As for what was transmitted from the Shaykh, its meaning is its being according to rational supposition, not according to the reality of the matter, as his expression in Al-Shifa and Al-Isharat indicates; thus, it returns to the meaning of possibility.

The difference between the two schools is that in the Shaykh's school there is an additional consideration not in Al-Farabi's school, which is that the Shaykh considered, along with possibility according to the reality of the matter, the supposition of characterization in actuality, and Al-Farabi did not consider it. In sum, characterization in actuality is not necessary; so everything that can be characterized by being worshipped is included in the judgment that it does not deserve worship. And since the proposition is negative, it is true even if the subject does not exist.

Perhaps the investigation in this context is that the Good Word is current among people according to the common understanding of language and custom, not according to logical terminologies and philosophical scrutinies. It is a statement revealed in rejection of the belief of the polytheist who believed that gods other than Allah—the Almighty—deserve worship. So when the polytheist admitted its content, that there is no god deserving of worship except Allah the Almighty, his state of faith was known from the appearance of faith, and that is why the Lawgiver—peace and blessings be upon him—was content with it. As for the disbeliever who believes in the possibility of the existence of a being that deserves worship afterward, this Good Word is not sufficient for his faith, just as it is not sufficient for the faith of someone who denied prophecy or the resurrection or the like of what one must believe in; rather, there must be an admission of the judgment he denied. And there is no obstacle in that. And since the disbelievers who believe that gods other than Allah—the Almighty—deserve worship are the well-known ones, rather than those who believe in the possibility of their existence afterward, the Word was considered a sign for Tawhid in relation to them.

From this, it is known that if the omitted predicate were estimated from the beginning as "existing," it would be possible to repel the objection by this path, i.e., the common understanding of language and the custom of people from the masses. As for the fact that the negation of existence does not necessitate the negation of possibility, then the negation of the possibility of gods other than Allah the Almighty does not follow from the Good Word—that is something that does not occur to understandings, and one hardly finds a disbeliever who believes in the negation of the existence of a god other than Him—the Almighty—while believing in the possibility of the existence of a god other than Him—the Glorified—after that.

Among people are those who supported the estimation of the predicate likewise, because the apparent [meaning] is that la is the negator of genus and the negation of the essence itself without considering existence and its characterization by it, like the negation of blackness itself, not the negation of its existence from it, is far-fetched. Just as the making of a thing is by considering existence—for there is no meaning for the making of a thing and its becoming itself—so is its negation and its lifting also by considering the lifting of existence from it. This was countered by the fact that this is what is necessitated by the exalted view, whereas the precise view might judge the opposite, because the negation of essence by considering existence ends in the end to the negation of a certain essence by considering itself, and this is because the negation of its characterization by existence would not be by considering the characterization of that characterization by it, for there is no end; so it must end in a characterization characterized by itself, not by considering its characterization by existence, to repel infinite regress.

It is said: The apparent [meaning] is that the negation of essences, as in the Good Word, is only by considering that; as for other than it, it is sometimes [one way] and sometimes [another]; reflect on this. And illa according to the mentioned estimate is for exception, and the Majestic Name is nominative according to what you heard from the majority. It is said: It is therein in the sense of "other than," an adjective of the noun, not by considering the position, i.e., "There is no god other than Allah existing." It was objected that the purpose of the statement is two matters: the negation of divinity from other than Him—the Almighty—and its affirmation for Him—the Glorified. This is only completed if la therein is for exception, for the negation and affirmation are then benefited by the literal utterance (mantuq). As for if it were in the sense of "other than," it does not benefit by its literal utterance except the negation of divinity from other than Him—the Almighty—and the fact that its affirmation for Him—the Almighty—is by the concept (mafhum) is a matter of debate, because if that were a concept of title (mafhum laqab), there is no account taken of it according to those who [accept] the concept according to the correct view, contrary to Al-Daqqaq and Al-Sayrafi of the Shafi'is, Ibn Khuwayz Mandad of the Malikis, and Mansur ibn Ahmad of the Hanbalis. And if it were a concept of attribute, it is clear that it is not agreed upon; rather, Abu Hanifa—may Allah be pleased with him—did not say anything about any concepts of contradiction at all. And you know that what he mentioned of the Good Word's benefiting the affirmation of divinity for Allah—the Almighty—and its negation from what is other than Him—the Mighty and Majestic—on the assumption that illa is for exception is also not agreed upon, for the exception from negation is not affirmation according to Abu Hanifa—may Allah be pleased with him. And making the affirmation in the word of Tawhid is by the custom of the Law, and in the empty exception like "No one stood but Zayd" is by the general custom; and what is for it and what is against it is in the books of Usul; so do not be heedless. The completion of the talk regarding what relates to the grammar of this Good Word is in the books of Arabic; we have mentioned that in our commentaries on Al-Suyuti's explanation of the Alfiyya.

According to the Sufi masters—sanctified be their mysteries—it is comprehensive of all ranks of Tawhid and indicates them, either by literal utterance or by implication. There are four ranks: the first is the Tawhid of Divinity; the second is the Tawhid of Actions; the third is the Tawhid of Attributes—and if you wish, you can say: Tawhid of Essential Necessity, for it necessitates all other attributes of perfection, as some investigators have derived; the fourth is the Tawhid of Essence—and if you wish, you can say: Tawhid of True Existence, for the outcome is one among them. The proof of that is that "La ilaha illa Allah," its literal utterance—according to what occurs to minds and what the majority have gone to—is the limitation of divinity to Allah—the Almighty—a true limitation, i.e., its affirmation for Him—the Almighty—necessarily and its negation from everything other than Him—the Glorified—likewise. And this necessitates the Tawhid of Actions, the Tawhid of Attributes, and the Tawhid of Essence.

As for the first, which is the limitation of creation to Him—the Almighty—it is because the requirement of the limitation of divinity to Him—the Almighty—by a true limitation is that Allah—the Mighty and Majestic—is the one who deserves that every creature worship Him; so He is the Beneficial and Harmful absolutely. Thus, He—the Glorified and Almighty—is the Creator of everything, for everyone who is not the creator of everything is not beneficial and harmful absolutely, and everyone who is not such does not deserve that every creature worship Him, because worship is obedience, submission, and humility, and he who possesses no benefit or harm in relation to some creatures does not deserve that that part worship, obey, and submit to him; for he who is unable to deliver a benefit to a person or repel harm from him, he does not hope for him, and he who is unable to deliver harm to him, he does not fear him. And everyone who is neither feared nor hoped for at all does not deserve to be worshipped, and this is obvious. But that which is required by the limitation of divinity to Him—the Almighty—by a true limitation is that Allah—the Almighty—is the one who deserves that every creature worship Him; so He is the Beneficial and Harmful absolutely, and He is the Creator of everything, and this is the goal.

As for the second, it is because the Good Word indicates that divinity is established for Him—the Almighty—in a continuous establishment that is impossible to detach, and negated from other than Him likewise. And everything that is so, it indicates that He—the Mighty and Majestic—is the Necessary Existent, and that every existent other than Him—the Almighty—is a possible existent. And everything that is so, the necessity of existence is limited to Him—the Almighty—and this necessitates all other attributes of perfection, and this is the goal. As for its indication that He—the Mighty and Majestic—is the Necessary Existent, it is because divinity is not but for an existent in truth by consensus. And everything that is not an attribute except for an existent, if a statement indicates that it is established for a thing in an establishment that is impossible to detach eternally, then it has indicated that existence is established for that thing in an establishment that is impossible to detach eternally. And it cannot be so unless it exists by itself, and this is what is meant by the Necessary Existent by essence. And since it indicated the establishment of divinity in a continuous establishment that is impossible to detach, it has indicated the necessity of His existence—the Almighty—and this necessitates all other attributes of perfection, and this is the goal.

As for its indication that every existent other than Him is a possible existent, it is because an existent other than Him, if it were the Necessary Existent by essence, it would be deserving to be worshipped, but it has indicated that no one deserves to be worshipped except Allah. Thus, it has indicated that there is no Necessary Existent by essence except Allah—the Almighty—so everything other than Him is possible, and this is the goal. Or it is said: It has indicated that He—the Almighty—is the Beneficial and Harmful absolutely, so He is the gatherer of the attributes of majesty and honor, so He—the Glorified—is characterized by all the attributes of perfection, and this is the goal.

As for the third, the Proof of Islam, Al-Ghazali, said in the chapter of Sincerity from the Ihya': "Everything that a slave is attached to, he is a slave to it," as Jesus—peace be upon him—said: "O slaves of the world," and our Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said: "Wretched is the slave of the dinar, the slave of the dirham, the slave of the garment, and the slave of the velvet." He called everyone whose heart is attached to something a slave to it. He also said in the chapter on asceticism: "Whoever seeks other than Allah—the Almighty—has worshipped him, and every sought object is a worshipped object, and every seeker is a slave in relation to his seeker." He said in the third chapter of the book of Knowledge: "Whoever follows his desires has taken his desire as a worshipped object." The Almighty said: "Have you seen him who took his desire as his god?" And our Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said: "The most hated god worshipped on earth in the sight of Allah—the Almighty—is desire." End quote.

It is known that there is nothing in existence but that it is sought by some seeker, and it has been verified by what passed the application of "god" to it, and [with] "La ilaha illa Allah," there is nothing in existence in truth but Allah. Among them are those who established the indication of the Good Word to the Tawhid of Essence and the negation of the existence of anyone other than Him—the Mighty and Majestic—by another way, which is that illa in the sense of "other than" is a substitute for the negated "god," so the negation in reality is directed to the "other," and the negation of the "other" is Tawhid according to them. And when its indication to all ranks of Tawhid becomes clear to you, it appears to you that the Lawgiver, for a reason, made it the key to Islam, the foundation of the religion, and a gift to mankind. In a hadith recorded by Abu Nu'aym from 'Iyad al-Ash'ari, he—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said: "La ilaha illa Allah is a noble word, and it has a place with Allah. It has gathered and facilitated; whoever says it sincerely from his heart will enter Paradise." In a hadith recorded by Ibn al-Najjar from Dinar from Anas, he—peace and blessings be upon him—said: "La ilaha illa Allah is a great, noble word with Allah the Almighty; whoever says it sincerely deserves Paradise." Muslim recorded from Abu Hurayrah: The Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said: "Go with these two sandals of mine, and whoever you meet behind this wall who testifies that there is no god but Allah, with his heart being certain of it, give him the glad tidings of Paradise." And the hadith of the Card is more famous than to be mentioned, and likewise the Sacred Hadith reported from Ali al-Rida from his fathers—peace be upon them. And it came: "Whoever his last speech in the world is 'La ilaha illa Allah' enters Paradise," meaning without reckoning; otherwise, what is the difference between that and one who said it and it was not his last speech in the world? In sum, its virtue is uncountable, and it conveys its speaker to the ultimate station. Books have been authored on its virtue, the manner of pronouncing it, and the etiquette of using it, so we will not lengthen the discussion on that.

There remains a debate here: that the Muslims have unanimously agreed on the obligation of knowing Allah—the Almighty—even if they differed on whether it is legal or rational. As for looking into knowing Him—the Almighty—for the sake of obtaining it according to human ability, the scholar Al-Taftazani said in Sharh al-Maqasid: "There is no disagreement among the people of Islam in its obligation, because it is an act within power, and the absolute obligation, which is knowledge, depends on it. And every act within power on which an absolute obligation depends is legally obligatory if the obligation of the absolute obligation is legal, as is the opinion of the companions, or rationally if it is rational, as is the opinion of the Mu'tazilah, lest the imposition of the impossible be necessitated." As for it being within power, it is obvious. As for the dependence of knowledge upon it, it is because it is not necessary, but theoretical, and there is no meaning for theoretical except what depends on looking and is obtained through it. The appearance of the words of the Master, the Authority, in Sharh al-Mawaqif is the consensus of all Muslims on that also.

The truth is the occurrence of disagreement in the obligation of looking, as indicated by the words of Ibn al-Hajib in his Mukhtasar, Al-'Adud in his commentary, the words of Al-Taj Al-Subki in Jam' al-Jawami', Al-Jalal Al-Mahalli in his commentary, and the statement of the Shaykh of Islam in his marginalia upon it: "The place of disagreement in the obligation of looking is in the principles of religion, and its non-obligation is in other than the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—among them. As for looking into it, it is obligatory by consensus, as mentioned by Al-Sa'd Al-Taftazani like others." This was countered by the investigator Ibn Qasim Al-'Abbadi in his marginalia Al-Ayat Al-Bayyinat by saying: "The apparent [meaning] is that what Al-Sa'd reported of the consensus on the obligation of looking into the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—is not conceded by the commentator and others. Do you not see the commentator's representation of the place of disagreement by his saying: 'Like the origination of the world and the existence of the Creator—the Almighty—and what is obligatory for Him—the Glorified—and what is impossible for Him—the Almighty—of attributes'? For his saying: 'And the existence of the Creator—the Almighty—' etc., relates to knowing Him—the Glorified—until the end of what he said." Indeed, many said—and Imam Al-Razi and Al-Amidi preferred it—that looking into the issues of belief is obligatory, and the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—is its foundation, so it is obligatory therein a fortiori. They said regarding that: "Because the goal is certainty, according to His saying—the Almighty—to His Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—: 'So know that there is no god but Allah,' and he already knew that. And the Almighty said to the people: 'And follow him so that you may be guided.' And other than Oneness is measured upon it, and the argumentation is not completed except by adding the dependence of obtaining certainty on looking." These did not permit imitation (taqlid) in the principles, and it is one of the sayings in the issue.

The second is the saying of Al-'Anbari that imitation is permissible therein with firm contract, and looking is not obligatory for it, because he—peace and blessings be upon him—used to be content in faith with firm contract, and other than faith is measured upon it. The intent is that he—peace and blessings be upon him—used to be content with that by looking at the appearance of the situation, for the report—as stated by the investigator 'Isa Al-Safawi in his commentary on Al-Fawa'id Al-Ghiyathiyya according to what his student Ibn Qasim Al-'Abbadi reported from him in Al-Ayat Al-Bayyinat—is indicative by convention of a mental image in a manner of submission that tells the factual situation. There is no doubt that "La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammad Rasul Allah" is of the category of the report; so they are indicative by convention that their speaker, even under the shadows of swords, is a believer in their content in a manner of submission, and his not being a believer in reality is a rational possibility. And the one who is informed of what is in the hearts is the Knower of the Unseen.

The third of the sayings is that imitation with firm contract is obligatory and looking is forbidden, because it is a place for falling into doubt and error due to the difference of minds, unlike imitation. This is nothing at all. And what compelled looking among the investigators did not mean looking by the way of the theologians; rather, it was stated explicitly—as in the Al-Jawab Al-'Atid by Al-Kurani—that what is considered is looking by the way of the common people, and the apparent [meaning] is that it is not a place for falling into what was mentioned.

Is the one who says it is obligatory among those a maker of it a condition for the validity of faith or not? There is disagreement on that. It is understood from some expressions of the commentary on Al-Arba'in by Ibn Hajar that he is a maker of it as such; so the faith of the imitator is not valid according to him. Rather, it is understood from it that the looking considered according to that is the looking by the way of the theologians. The words of Al-Jalal Al-Mahalli in Sharh Jam' al-Jawami' are explicit that those who say looking is obligatory, other than Abu Hashim, are not makers of looking a condition for the validity of faith, nor are they claiming the invalidity of the imitator's faith; rather, it is valid according to them along with the sin of abandoning the obligatory looking. Indeed, it will come—if Allah the Almighty wills—the reporting of the Imam, the Proof of Islam, in his book Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa, reporting the conditioning from a group of theologians along with his refutation of it. As for what was reported from the Shaykh Al-Ash'ari of the conditioning and that the imitator's faith is not valid, it is a lie against him, as the teacher Abu Al-Qasim Al-Qushayri said. Al-Taj Al-Subki said: "The investigation is that if imitation is taking the saying of another without proof while there is a possibility of doubt or fancy, then it is not sufficient; but if it is firm, it is sufficient, contrary to Abu Hashim." The apparent [meaning] is that the one who says the sufficiency of imitation with firmness prevents the saying that knowledge is not obtained except by looking and says: "It may be obtained by inspiration, or teaching, or purification. So whoever obtains the firm contract with what he must believe in, his faith is valid without sin because the goal is obtained. And whoever does not obtain that, initially or by imitation or by necessity, then looking is determined for him ('And who is more unjust than him who is reminded of the verses of his Lord and then turns away from them?')."

It is sufficient as a proof for validity the contentment of the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and his companions—may Allah be pleased with them—with the commoners of non-Arabs like the boors of the Arabs, even if one of them embraced Islam under the shadow of the sword, by mere declaration of "La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammad Rasul Allah," which indicates according to the appearance of their state that they believe in the content of that and submit to it. If argumentation were an obligation, they would have been commanded to it after pronouncing the two words, or taught the proof and prompted with it, as they were prompted with them, and as they performed other obligations. If that had occurred, it would have been transmitted to us, for it is of the most important tasks of the religion. It has not been reported that they commanded anyone of them who embraced Islam to repeat looking, nor did they ask him about the proof of his belief, nor did they postpone his matter until he looked. If looking were obligatory on individuals, even if summarily by the way of the commoners, the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—would not have been content with those commoners and boors with mere declaration, because the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—and his companions would not approve anyone in abandoning an individual obligation without an excuse. So his abandoner would not be a sinner, let alone that his faith would not be valid by his abandoning it. This is witnessed by what he—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said to Usamah ibn Zayd when he apologized for killing Mirdas ibn Nahik from the people of Fadak, and other frequent reports.

What is in Al-Mawaqif, Al-Maqasid, Sharh al-Mukhtasar al-'Adudi, and other books of theology and principles, that the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and his companions used to know that they—i.e., the commoners and boors of the Arabs—knew the proofs summarily, as the Bedouin said: "The camel dung indicates the camel, and the traces of feet indicate the journey. So, does a heaven with towers and an earth with pathways not indicate the Subtle, the Aware?" i.e., therefore they did not oblige them to look, nor did they ask them about it, nor did they postpone their matter. Everything that is so, their contentment with mere declaration is not a proof that looking is not obligatory on individuals, nor that its abandoner is not a sinner—that is a claim for which there is no proof. The story of the Bedouin, even if it were driven for argumentation, does not indicate—at most—that that Bedouin was knowing of a summary proof. It does not follow from it that all boors and commoners were knowing of summary proofs in the era of prophecy and otherwise, otherwise it would have been a proof that there is no imitator in existence. Besides, some attributed that saying to Quss ibn Sa'ida, and he was in the interval period. Al-Jalal Al-Mahalli mentioned it for a Bedouin who said it in response to Al-Asma'i, and he was in the time of Al-Rashid.

Rather, it may be said: The apparent [meaning] of many verses and reports indicates that many of the polytheists in his era—peace and blessings be upon him—were not knowing of the proofs of Tawhid at all. That is like His saying—the Almighty—narrating from them: ("Has he made the gods one god? Indeed, this is a strange thing." "They were, when it was said to them: 'La ilaha illa Allah,' they would be arrogant and say: 'Shall we leave our gods for a mad poet?'") And the saying of some of them in some wars: "Rise Hubal, rise Hubal." What the investigator Al-'Adud mentioned in Sharh al-Mukhtasar of the proof for the non-permissibility of imitation, where he said: "The nation unanimously agreed on the obligation of knowing Allah—the Almighty—and that it is not obtained by imitation for three reasons: the first, that lying is permissible for the reporter, so knowledge is not obtained by his saying; the second, that if it benefited knowledge, it would have benefited it like the origination of the world from the issues that are differed upon, so if one imitated in origination and the other in eternity, they would both be knowing of them, so their truth is necessitated, and that is impossible; the third, that if imitation obtained knowledge, then knowledge that he is truthful in what he reported is either necessary or theoretical. There is no path to the first necessarily, so he must have a proof, and it is assumed that there is no proof, for if he knew his truthfulness by his proof, it would not remain imitation."

This was countered by the scholar Al-Kurani, who said: "It has a debate. As for the first reason, because he who permitted imitation likened the imitator to one who grew up on the summit of a mountain and did not look into the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, and another informed him of what he must believe in, and he believed him by mere informing without thinking or reflecting. And it is explicit that the talk is in an imitator informed by another of what he must believe in; and what he must believe in cannot be but truth, for lying does not necessitate that anyone believe it. As for him who was informed of lies and believed them, he did not believe but lies, and lies are not of the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—in anything, so how can any of the rational judge him to be a believer in Allah—the Almighty—knowing Him, while he did not believe but lies? And this is obvious. As for the second reason, it is for the same as what passed, because we do not say: 'Every imitation is beneficial for knowledge,' nor 'Every imitator is knowing.' How [could it be], when not every looking is beneficial for knowledge, nor is every looker correct? So if it were not necessitating knowledge absolutely, but the correct looking is what necessitates, likewise we say: 'Not every imitation is beneficial for knowledge, but the beneficial is correct imitation,' which is that he imitates a knowing scholar in the issues of the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—truthful in what he informs him of, for the talk is only in the validity of the faith of such an imitator, not absolutely. As for the third, because we choose that his knowledge that he is truthful in what he informed of is necessary. Your saying 'There is no path to it necessarily,' we say: 'Denied,' according to His saying—the Almighty—: ('So whoever Allah wants to guide, He expands his chest for Islam.') It has been reported in a marfu' manner that he—peace and blessings be upon him—was asked about the expansion of the chest, and he—peace and blessings be upon him—said: 'A light that Allah casts into the heart of the believer, so it expands.' He stated explicitly—peace and blessings be upon him—that it is a light that is not obtained from a proof, but rather Allah—the Almighty—casts it into his heart, so he cannot repel it without thought, or reflection, or looking, or argumentation. Some of the greatest investigators have explicitly stated that the Tawhid of the prophets—peace and blessings be upon them—is by necessary knowledge they found in their souls and could not repel, and that among the people of the interval are those who found likewise. Rather, it has been stated explicitly that faith is necessary knowledge that the believer finds in his heart and cannot repel. So how many have believed without proof, and who has not believed with proof? And one rarely trusts in the faith of one who believed by proof, for it is exposed to doubts that invalidate it."

In chapters 172, 177, and 277 of the Futuhat al-Makkiyya is what supports that. The Imam, the Proof of Islam, said in Faysal al-Tafriqa: "Among the most extreme and deviant of people is a group of theologians who excommunicated the commoners of the Muslims and claimed that whoever does not know theology as we know it, and does not know the legal proofs with our proofs that we have refined, he is a disbeliever. These have narrowed the vast mercy of Allah—the Almighty—for His servants first, and made Paradise a possession for a small group of theologians. Then they remained ignorant of what the Sunnah transmitted as mutawatir second, for it appeared from the era of the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—and the era of the companions—may Allah be pleased with them all—their judging the Islam of groups of the boors of the Arabs who were occupied with worshipping idols and did not occupy themselves with learning the proofs; and if they had occupied themselves with them, they would not have understood them. Whoever thinks that the means of faith is theology, refined proofs, and arranged divisions has gone far. No, rather faith is a light that Allah—the Almighty—casts into the heart of His servant, a gift and guidance from Him, sometimes by an alertness in the inner self that cannot be expressed, sometimes by a vision in a dream, sometimes by witnessing the state of a religious man and the spreading of his light to him when accompanying and sitting with him, and sometimes by context of state. For a Bedouin came to the Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—denying him, rejecting him; but when his sight fell on his bright appearance and his shining, noble face, and he saw the light of prophecy sparkling from it, he said: 'By Allah, this is not the face of a liar,' and asked him to present Islam to him, so he became Muslim. Another came and said: 'I adjure you by Allah, did Allah send you as a Prophet?' He said—peace and blessings be upon him—: 'Yes, I, by Allah, Allah sent me as a Prophet,' so he believed him by his oath and became Muslim. This and the likes of it are more than can be counted, and not one of them ever occupied himself with theology and learning proofs; rather, the lights of faith would appear first by the likes of these contexts in their hearts as a white spot, then it would continue to increase in clarity and brightness by witnessing those great states, by reciting the Quran, and by purifying the hearts. Would that I knew who reported from the Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and from the companions his bringing a Bedouin who embraced Islam and saying to him: 'The proof that the world is originated is because it does not lack occurrences, and what does not lack occurrences is originated, and that Allah—the Almighty—is knowing by knowledge and powerful by power, both of which are removed from the essence, neither he nor other,' to other such customs of the theologians. I do not say: 'These words did not occur,' but [I say] that what has the meaning of these words did not occur. Rather, a campaign would not be uncovered but that it was over a group of boors embracing Islam under the shadows of swords, and a group of captives embracing Islam one by one after a long time or shortly. And when they pronounced the word of testimony, they were taught prayer and zakat and returned to their professions of tending sheep or otherwise. Indeed, I do not deny that it is permissible that mentioning the proofs of theologians is one of the causes of faith in relation to some people, but that is not limited to it, and it is rare also." And he carried the talk until he said: "The clear truth is that everyone who believed that what the Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—came with, and what the Quran included, is true, with a firm belief, he is a believer, even if he does not know its proofs. For faith borrowed from theological proofs is very weak, exposed to shaking by every doubt; rather, the firm faith is the faith of the commoners obtained in their hearts in childhood by continuous hearing, and obtained after puberty by contexts that cannot be expressed." End quote.

In it are various benefits, and that is why we reported it in full. Whenever it is permissible that Allah—the Almighty—casts into the heart of the servant the light of faith, so he believes without looking and argumentation, it is permissible that He—the Glorified—casts into his heart the truthfulness of the reporter such that he cannot repel it and does not know from where it came, especially if the reporter is the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—for it is of the necessity of casting the light of faith into the heart of the believer in him—peace and blessings be upon him—that He casts into his heart his truthfulness—peace and blessings be upon him—because faith is not valid except by that. Thus, it has appeared that the claim of necessity that there is no path to knowledge of the truthfulness of the reporter in what he informed of, a necessary knowledge—if it is not obstinacy—then denying it is also not obstinacy, because the proof has been established on the permissibility of obtaining necessary knowledge of his truthfulness, rather on its occurrence. So that claim is not of the necessary premises whose denial is obstinacy not listened to. It has become clear from all that was mentioned that what Al-Sa'd said in Sharh al-Maqasid—that the truth is that knowledge by a summary proof that lifts the looker from the abyss of imitation is an individual obligation from which no one among the morally responsible can escape, and by a detailed proof by which he can remove doubts, compel deniers, and guide the seekers is a collective obligation that must be performed by some—is not free from scrutiny, according to what is said.

But the apparent [meaning] to me is that the truth is with Al-Sa'd from the side that faith, in the sense of confirmation, is morally imposed, and the condition of the imposed is its being optional. They have stated explicitly that the imposition of what is not optional is in reality an imposition of the optional matters on which it depends, and that confirmation itself, because it is not optional, the imposition of it was in reality an imposition of the optional looking on which it depends. So the faith that is obtained by His—the Almighty—casting the light into the heart without thought, or reflection, or looking, or argumentation is not optional by itself nor by considering what it is obtained from; so how is it morally imposed? What is the goal of Al-Sa'd and those who agreed with him of knowledge, except knowledge from the aspect that it is morally imposed, as his saying indicates: "And no one among the morally responsible can escape from it," and that being morally imposed is by considering an optional matter other than looking, like obtaining the readiness for the outpouring of light and the creation of necessary knowledge in the heart of the servant, is not obvious. Indeed, I do not deny that of knowledge is what does not depend on looking into a proof, summary or otherwise, like the knowledge of the prophets—peace and blessings be upon them—according to what you heard from some of them, and like the knowledge of whom Allah—the Almighty—willed of His servants other than them. And I do not call such knowledge "imitative." Likewise, I do not deny that the knowledge obtained from the casting of light is above the knowledge obtained from looking into the proof, for it is feared for it from the storms of doubts. And I go to that looking into the proof absolutely is obligatory on whoever firm contract is not obtained for him except by it. As for whoever obtains that by any path whatsoever, it is not obligatory on him. Likewise, he does not sin by abandoning it. And the story of the consensus on his sinning by it, what is in it is not hidden. The directing of that by the fact that the firmness of the believer is not trusted—for if a doubt were presented to him, it would perish and he would remain hesitant, unlike the firmness arising from argumentation, for it does not perish by that—is not obvious. Because if it is conceded that his firmness is obtained without looking, then he has performed the duty of faith, so there is no aspect for his sinning by abandoning looking based on a mere possibility of the occurrence of a confusing doubt to his firmness. Because if it is conceded that the duty upon him is not but that he be firm, and he is firm, then he has performed the duty of the time and did not leave anything of it. And everyone who did not leave a specific duty in a specific time, there is no meaning for his sinning in that time from the side of that duty. And just as it is possible rationally that a doubt might occur to him that confuses his firmness due to the lack of proof, likewise it is possible rationally that he might obtain the proof for what he is firm upon before the occurrence of a doubt, and perhaps this possibility is stronger and closer to occurrence.

And when you have encompassed knowledge of all that we have mentioned, you know that argumentation by His saying—the Almighty—: ("So know that there is no god but Allah") on the obligation of looking into it is a matter of debate, because it depends on the correctness of their saying: "Knowledge is not obtained by looking," and you have heard what is in it. This is strengthened if we say: "His knowledge—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—of Oneness is necessary," for it would mean the command to firmness and continuity upon what he—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—is upon of avoiding what invalidates knowledge. Sometimes it may be said: It is permissible that the argumentation is by looking at the appearance of the literal utterance, in that it is a command to know Oneness, so it must be within power by itself or by considering what it is obtained from, and since it is negated that it is within power by itself, it is determined that it is by considering what it is obtained from, and the apparent is that it is looking.

You know that if imitation were a cause of the causes of knowledge, this would not be completed, and if it were not a cause, it would be completed; so ponder. Then know that the looking that they spoke of in the issues of belief is broader than looking into rational proofs and looking into legal proofs, for among them is what is established by legal evidence, like the affairs of the Hereafter, and the entry of the intellect therein is not but that they are possible matters that the Truthful informed of their occurrence, and every possible matter the Truthful informed of its occurrence is occurring; so those matters are occurring. As for looking into the knowledge of Allah—the Almighty—i.e., confirming His—the Almighty—existence and His exalted attributes—it is said: It is determined that the intent is looking into rational proofs only, and it is not permissible that looking into legal proofs is a path to it, for it necessitates a circle (dawr). In Al-Jawab Al-'Atid, the circle is necessary, but not absolutely; rather, in relation to every goal whose knowledge of the truthfulness of the Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—depends on it. That is because looking into legal proofs is only a path to knowledge if they are truthful according to the looker in them, and their truthfulness in the knowledge of the looker depends on his knowledge that this one who claims that he is the Messenger of Allah who brought them is truthful in his claim of messengership, and his knowledge of that depends on the knowledge that Allah—the Almighty—has shown miracles at his hand as a confirmation for him in his claim, and his knowledge of that depends on the knowledge that there is a god characterized by an attribute by which he can send a messenger, like His being living, knowing, willing, powerful, and that is of the knowledge of the God—the Glorified. So if we benefited the knowledge of the existence of Allah—the Almighty—and those attributes from the legal proofs that depend on the truthfulness of the Messenger—peace and blessings be upon him—the circle is necessitated, as you see. Indeed, when it is said: "The morally responsible person, after he believed in the Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—and believed with a firm belief in his truthfulness in everything he brought from Allah—the Almighty—by any path, whether that firmness was by necessity, or by looking, or by imitation, then he may take his belief from the Quran without interpretation nor inclination, without looking into a rational proof," that would be a correct statement with no dust upon it. And it does not necessitate the obtaining of the obtained in relation to what he obtained first of the issues on which the truthfulness of the Messenger—peace and blessings be upon him—depends, because the obtaining from the aspect that the bringer of its proofs is truthful in them, and the first obtaining was by rational looking without considering the truthfulness of the Messenger—peace and blessings be upon him—so the aspect differed; so understand. And Allah—the Almighty—knows best.

"And Allah knows your place of movement" in the world "and your place of residence" in the Hereafter. The place of movement was specified for the world and the place of residence for the Hereafter, because everyone is moving in the world always towards his return, not settled; and in the Hereafter, he is resident, having no movement towards a home beyond it. The intent of His—the Almighty—knowledge of that is to warn them of His—the Glorified—recompense and punishment, or to encourage the fulfillment of what He—the Mighty and Majestic—commands them, and the frightening from what He—the Mighty and Majestic—forbids them, by way of metaphor. Ibn Abbas—may Allah be pleased with them both—said: "Your place of movement is your exertion in your worldly life, and your place of residence is in your graves and your Hereafter." 'Ikrimah said: "Your place of movement is in the loins of fathers to the wombs of mothers, and your place of residence is your settlement in the earth." Al-Tabari and others said: "Your place of movement is your exertion in your wakefulness, and your place of residence is your sleep." It is said: "Your place of movement is in your livelihoods and your trades, and your place of residence is where you settle from your homes." It is said: "Your movement in your deeds, and your place of residence is of Paradise and Hell."

Abu Hayyan chose their generality in every movement and in every settlement. Similar to it is what is said: "The intent is [He] knows all your states, so nothing of them is hidden from Him—the Glorified." Ibn Abbas recited "mutaqallabakum" with a nun.