**"And We ordained for them therein..."**
(And We ordained) is a conjunction linked to "We revealed the Torah." The meaning is: We decreed and imposed (upon them)—that is, upon those who were Jews. In the codex of Ubayy [it is written]: "And We revealed to the Children of Israel." (therein)—that is, in the Torah. The prepositional phrase relates to "We ordained." It is also said that it relates to an omitted word acting as a state (hal), meaning: We imposed these matters, explained therein. It is also said that it is an adjective for an omitted verbal noun: We ordained, an explanation ordained therein.
(that a soul for a soul)—that is, taken, killed, or subjected to retaliation for it, if one kills it without right. In every subsequent phrase in the saying of the Exalted, (and the eye for the eye, and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear, and the tooth for the tooth), one must supply the appropriate verb, such as: gouging for the eye, cutting for the nose, severing for the ear, and extracting for the tooth. Some have supplied a general existential verb, saying: This is what is intended; meaning, the taking of it [the soul] for the eye and the like is established.
Al-Kisa’i read "the eye" and what follows it in the nominative case. Abu Ali al-Farisi justified this by stating that the sentences are then coordinate to the sentence "a soul for a soul," not in terms of the grammatical structure, but in terms of meaning. The meaning of "We ordained upon them" is "a soul for a soul," so the [subsequent] sentences are subsumed under what was ordained for the Children of Israel. Ibn Atiyyah categorized this as conjunction based on an assumption (al-’atf ’ala al-tawahum), which is not a standard analogy. It is also said that it is taken as an inception (isti’naf), meaning the sentences are nominal and coordinate to the verbal sentence, thus constituting the beginning of a new legislation and a declaration of a new ruling not included in what was ordained in the Torah. Others say it is included therein as well under this interpretation, with the intended meaning being "And likewise, the eye for the eye, etc.," so that the two readings are reconciled.
Al-Khatib said: There is no conjunction; it is an inception in its apparent sense, and the speech is an answer to a question—as if it were asked: "What is the status regarding other than the soul?" So He, the Exalted, said: "The eye for the eye, etc." Others said that "the eye" and the other nominative nouns are coordinate to the implied nominative pronoun in the prepositional phrase that serves as the predicate, and the prepositional phrase that follows is a state clarifying the meaning. This is weakened by the fact that it requires conjunction to a connected nominative pronoun without separation or emphasis, which is not permitted by the Basrans except in cases of necessity. It was answered that it is separated by estimation, for its origin is: "The soul is taken or subject to retaliation, it [the soul] for the soul," because the pronoun is hidden in the attached element that precedes the prepositional phrase by origin, even if it was delayed after the deletion and its transition to the prepositional phrase. This is what is said, and it requires that the estimated separation is sufficient for conjunction, but there is contemplation therein. One must estimate the attached element generally for the conjunction to be correct; for if one estimated "the soul is killed for the soul, and the eye [is killed for the eye]," the meaning would not be sound, as is not hidden. So understand.
Know that "soul" (nafs) in their speech, when intended to mean the human being himself, is masculine; one says "three souls" (thalathat anfus) in the sense of three persons. When intended to mean the spirit, it is feminine and nothing else, and its diminutive is nufaysa and nothing else. "Eye" (’ayn) in the sense of the specific sensory organ is feminine. A general statement of its femininity does not show a basis, for it is not correct to say, "This is the eye of these men," intending the choice ones. The ear (udhun) is its counterpart. The nose (anf) is masculine and nothing else. The tooth (sinn) is feminine and not masculine, even if the tooth [signifies] old age. However, Ibn al-Shihna mentioned that "sinn" is used for the molar and the canine, and they have textually stated that these are masculine; the same applies to the back molar, the bicuspid, and the wisdom tooth. Ibn Usfur held that for the molar, both are permissible.
And wounds are subject to retaliation (in the accusative case, as a conjunction to the name of inna, and "retaliation" is the predicate). Because it is a verbal noun like "fighting" (qital) and is not identical to the thing being informed about, it is interpreted through one of the known interpretations for such cases. Al-Kisa’i, just as he read with the nominative in what preceded, read it with the nominative here as well. Ibn Kathir, Ibn ‘Amir, and Abu ‘Amr, even if they used the accusative in the previous [verses], used the nominative here, as it is a summation of the ruling for wounds after having detailed the ruling for the other organs. This ruling applies when there is a way to determine equality, as detailed in the books of jurisprudence.
Those who said that a Muslim is killed for an infidel, a free man for a slave, and a man for a woman, used the generality of "a soul for a soul" as proof. Those who differed used His saying: "The free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female," and the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "A believer shall not be killed for an infidel." Some of our companions answered that the text is a specification by mention, and therefore does not indicate the negation of what is other than it. The intended meaning of what was reported by al-Harbi is the one in the state of war, not a protected subject (dhimmi) in his covenant. Conjunction necessitates differentiation, and it has been reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) killed a Muslim for a dhimmi. Ibn al-Faras mentioned that the verse is concerning free Muslims, because the Jews for whom this was ordained in the Torah were one nation—not divided into Muslim and infidel—and they were all free, with no slaves among them, because the covenant of protection and enslavement was only permitted for the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) among all the prophets; for enslavement is from the spoils of war, which were not lawful for anyone other than him (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and the covenant of protection was for the survival of the infidels, which did not occur in the era of a [previous] prophet; rather, the deniers were all destroyed by punishment, and this was delayed for this nation out of mercy.
You know that the expression is apparent in its generality, but they did not keep it upon that. The scholars have said: A Muslim is not killed for the one granted safe conduct (musta’man), nor is the dhimmi killed for him, because his blood is not protected permanently, and his disbelief is a motive for warfare, as he intends to return. Nor is the musta’man killed for the musta’man by way of istihsan (juridical preference) due to the presence of the permitter, though he is killed by analogy for equality. A man is not killed for his son due to his (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saying: "A father shall not be executed for his child." His absolute statement is an argument against Malik in his statement: "He is executed if he slaughters him in a slaughtering manner." Since [the father] is the cause of his life, it is impossible for him to be entitled to his annihilation. For this reason, he is not permitted to kill him even if he finds him in the enemy ranks fighting, or committing adultery while he is married. Retaliation is first entitled to the heir, then his heir succeeds him. The grandfather from the side of the men and women, even if he ascends, is in this place like the father; likewise the mother and the grandmother from the mother or father, near or far, as we have explained. Neither is a man killed for his slave, nor his mudabbar (slave promised freedom at owner's death), nor his mukitab (slave in a contract of emancipation), nor for the slave of his child, because he does not deserve retaliation for himself nor for his child against him. Likewise, he is not killed for a slave that is partially owned, because retaliation cannot be divided. So understand.
The verse was used as proof for what was reported from Imam Ahmad—may Allah be pleased with him—that a group is not killed for a single individual, due to His saying "a soul for a soul" in the singular. It was answered that the wisdom of retaliation—protecting blood and lives—demands the killing [of the group], and that the verse should be turned away from what was mentioned. For if it were as such, they would be killed collectively until retaliation drops from them; then blood would be shed with impunity and corruption would spread. That is what is said.
(So whoever gives it as charity)—that is, from those entitled to retaliation—(thereof)—that is, the retaliation, meaning whoever pardons him. Expressing it as "charity" is for the sake of exaggeration in urging [mercy]. (it is an expiation for him)—for the one who gives charity, as narrated by Ibn Abi Shaybah from al-Sha’bi, and this is the opinion of the majority of exegetes. Al-Daylami narrated from Ibn ‘Umar—may Allah be pleased with them both—that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) recited the verse and said: "It is the man whose tooth is broken or [a part] is removed from his body, and he pardons, so his sins are removed from him in proportion to what he pardoned from his body. If it was half the blood-money, then half his sins; if a quarter of the blood-money, then a quarter of his sins; if a third of the blood-money, then a third of his sins; and if the [entire] blood-money, then all his sins."
Sa'id ibn Mansur and others narrated from 'Adi ibn Thabit that a man's tooth was knocked out during the time of Mu'awiyah—may Allah be pleased with him. He was offered blood-money but refused, demanding retaliation, then he was offered two blood-moneys and refused, then three. Then a man from the companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) told him that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "Whoever gives blood or less than that as charity, it is an expiation for him from the day he was born until the day he dies." It is also said that the pronoun returns to the perpetrator, and Ibn ‘Abbas—may Allah be pleased with them both—went to this, as narrated by Ibn Jarir, as did Mujahid and Jabir, as narrated by Ibn Abi Shaybah. The meaning of it being an expiation for him under this estimation is that what was binding upon him is dropped. It is necessary for the predicate of the subject to be the aggregate of the condition and the conclusion, since the referent was not in the condition. The second eminent scholar held this view. It is also said that there is a referent in the conclusion as well, in the sense that "it" means "his giving as charity," so it includes in meaning the pronoun of the subject, thus the [stated] necessity is not conceded. Some said that the verse might mean that everyone who gives as charity and acknowledges what is required of him regarding retaliation and submits to it, it is an expiation for the sin he committed, and His saying: (And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed, then it is those who are the wrongdoers) fits this perfectly. The pronoun "for him" in that case returns to the one who gives charity, intending thereby the perpetrator himself, but this is clearly far-fetched. Ubayy read "it is his expiation for him," so the nominative pronoun is then for the one who gives charity, not for the act of giving. The same applies to the two genitive pronouns. The attribution is for specification, and the lam (for) emphasizes that, meaning: The one who gives charity, the expiation that he deserves by giving as charity is for him; nothing is deducted from it, because a part of a thing is not that thing itself. This is an aggrandizement of what he did, as it is made to necessitate the deserved entitlement without reduction. In it is an incitement to pardon. The verse was revealed, as more than one has said, when the Jews agreed that they would not kill the noble for the lowly, nor the man for the woman, and they did not do justice to the oppressed against the oppressor. From the Master and Authority [al-Alusi himself], it is said that retaliation was mandatory upon them in their law, so [the concept of] charity was something added in our law. Al-Dahhak said that there was no blood-money in the Torah for a soul or a wound; rather, it was either pardon or retaliation, and this is what the apparent meaning of the verse demands.