Tafsir of Al-An'am 6:111

"And even if We had sent down to them the angels..."

This is an explicit statement of what was indicated by His saying—Exalted is He—(And what will make you perceive), etc., regarding the wisdom that calls for refusing their requests and demonstrating the falsity of their claims to faith in the most eloquent and emphatic manner. That is: even if We did not limit ourselves to what they requested here, but rather sent down the angels to them as they asked for in their saying: "Why are not the angels sent down to us?" and their saying: "Why do you not bring us the angels?"; and the dead spoke to them by Us reviving them, and they bore witness to the truth of the faith as they proposed by saying: "Then bring our forefathers"; and We gathered ('ala)—meaning collected and drove—everything (kulla shay'in) before them Qubulan—that is, face-to-face and visibly—so that they would confront them, as has been narrated from Ibn Abbas and Qatada.

Qubulan here is a verbal noun (masdar), as stated by more than one scholar, and Ibn Zayd held this view. It is said, "I met so-and-so Qablan (face-to-face), Muqabalatan (confrontation), Qubulan, Qublan, and Qubaylan—all of which carry the same meaning: direct confrontation. Al-Raghib reported that it is the plural of Qabil, meaning "confronting their senses." It has also been said that it is the plural of Qabil, meaning "guarantor" (kafil), like Raghib and Raghaf, Qadib and Qadab; it is from your saying: "I accepted the man and took charge of him" (qabiltu ar-rajul wa-tabaltu bihi) when you become responsible for him, and from this is the Qabala (bond/contract) for a covenant or deed. This was narrated from Al-Farra’. Mujahid interpreted it as "the group," based on it being the plural of Qabila, as Al-Raghib said. Interpretations of it as "guarantor," "group," as well as "visible confrontation" and "meeting," have been cited in His saying—the Exalted—(or bring Allah and the angels before them face-to-face [Qubulan]).

That is: even if We brought before them everything capable of providing a guarantee and testimony to the truth of the faith—not individually, but collectively—or if We gathered everything before them in groups in a single arena, "they would not have believed"—meaning, faith would neither be valid nor upright for them. The accusative state (nasb) of Qubulan—according to these interpretations—is that it is a circumstantial qualifier (hal) for "everything." This is permissible according to the view that "everything" is a collective, because with "everything," it is permissible to consider both its meaning and its word, as the grammarians have stipulated, citing as evidence the poem of Antarah: "Every rich cloud poured upon it, and they left every garden like a dirham." When he said tarkan (they left [feminine plural]) instead of tarakt (you left [masculine singular]), there is no need for what was said regarding this being based on its necessary quality, which is the collective whole.

Nafi’ and Ibn ‘Amir read Qibalan with a kasra on the Qaf and a fatha on the Ba’; it is a verbal noun meaning "confrontation" and "observation," and its being in the accusative case is as a circumstantial qualifier, as stated by Al-Farra’, Az-Zajjaj, and many others. From Al-Mubarrad, it is reported that it means "direction" or "side," so its accusative case is based on it being a preposition of place (zarf), like their saying, "I have such-and-such before (qibal) so-and-so." It was also read Qublan with a damma and a sukun.

"They would not have believed..." is the response to the Law (if). Since it is in the negative, the lam particle does not enter upon it, contrary to those who were mistaken and assumed it was there. This ruling is explained by their inherent lack of aptitude, established eternally in the knowledge of Allah—the Exalted—which relates to things as they are in reality. Some have explained it as the pre-existence of the decree of disbelief upon them, though some noble scholars objected, saying that this involves explaining events by the eternal decree, the corruption of which is not hidden. Some have explained it as the nullification of their aptitude and the alteration of their innate nature (fitra)—which was capable of belief—due to their own evil choice. The Sheikh al-Islam followed this view. Others have explained it by their persistence in disobedience, their extremism, and their rebellion in transgression, objecting to what was mentioned by saying it is one of the rulings that follow persistent blame, as indicated by His saying—the Exalted—(and We leave them in their transgression, wandering blindly).

Al-Shihab critiqued this, saying: "This is invalid, because what was mentioned is according to the view of the Ash’ari, who says that the servant’s choice has no effect, even if it coincides with the action in his view; and it does not necessitate compulsion (jabr), as is imagined, according to what the scholars of jurisprudence have established. There is no doubt that the eternal decree is a cause for the occurrence of events, and there is no corruption in that. As for the servant’s evil choice, it is a cause for the eternal decree." The realization of this is as has been said: that while evil choice is sufficient for the non-occurrence of faith, it is not definitive, for it is possible for the choice to be improved by diverting it toward faith instead of disbelief. Thus, their evil choice in the "future" (fi ma la yazal) was the cause for the decree of their disbelief in the "eternal past" (fi al-azal). After the decree, the disbelief that proceeds from them becomes inevitable, as He—the Glorified—said: (And if We had willed, We could have given every soul its guidance).

I say—and let those who like to pry object if they wish—that the one who explains it by the "lack of aptitude" is the one who follows the path of correctness. The realization of this is that many of the established scholars and those of perfect unveiling have confirmed that the essences (mahiyyat) of possible beings, known to Allah—the Exalted—eternally, are non-existent entities, distinguished in themselves by an essential distinction that is not "made" (ghayr maj’ul), for the knowledge of them depends on that distinction. What is "made" are their existential forms that come into being, and they possess essential aptitudes that are not "made," the requirements of which differ. Among them are those that require the choice of faith and obedience, and among them are those that require the choice of disbelief and disobedience. Divine knowledge relates to them, uncovering them as they are in themselves regarding the differences in their aptitudes—which are among the keys of the Unseen that no one knows but Him—and the differences in the requirements of those aptitudes. When Divine knowledge relates to them as they are, in terms of what their aptitude requires of choosing one of the two possible paths—namely, faith and obedience or disbelief and disobedience—Divine Will relates to that which the servant chose while in a state of non-existence, according to the requirements of his aptitude, out of grace and mercy, not by necessity. For He is inherently independent of the worlds, which validates the redirection of the servant’s choice to the other path—which is essentially possible—if He wills. Thus, the "desired" of the servants, after the relation of the Divine Will, becomes the "desired" of Allah—the Exalted.

From this, it becomes clear that their eternal choice, according to the requirement of their aptitude, is followed by knowledge, which is followed by the Will, in consideration of wisdom and grace; and that their choice in the "future" is subject to the eternal Will that relates to their choosing what they have chosen. Thus, they are "compelled" in the future while at the same time being "choosers"—that is, they are driven to do what proceeds from them by their own choice, not by force or coercion. From this, the meaning of the statement of the Commander of the Faithful, Ali—may Allah ennoble his face—becomes clear: "Allah did not command disobedience out of being overcome, nor did He command obedience out of coercion, nor did He leave the kingdom to delegation." They were not compelled in their eternal choice because it is prior in rank to the knowledge which precedes the relation of the Will, and compulsion is subject to the Will, which is subject to knowledge, which is subject to the "known," which is here their eternal choice. Therefore, it is impossible for it to be subject to that which is, in rank, subsequent to it. Whoever finds goodness, let him praise Allah, for He—the Exalted—is gracious in bringing about what they chose; He is not obliged to observe wisdom. And whoever finds other than that, let him not blame anyone but himself, because His Will—Glorified be He—did not relate to the actions that proceeded from them except because they had chosen them eternally according to the requirement of their aptitude. So He decreed it in consideration of wisdom and grace. The servants are "earners" (kasibun) through Allah—the Exalted—for there is no earning except by power, and there is no power except by Allah, the High, the Almighty. Allah—the Exalted—is the Creator of their actions through them, because He—the Exalted—informed us that He is the Creator of their actions while attributing the action to them, the immediate understanding of which is that they proceeded from them by their choice. This necessitates that what is created for Allah in the servant is identical to what is "earned" by the servant through Allah. There is no contradiction between the actions being created by Allah and them being earned by them through their power and choice. What is commonly attributed to Al-Ash’ari—that the servant’s power has no effect at all, and that it is merely a coincidence with the action, and that it is solely by the power of Allah—is something that is hardly accepted by the verifying researchers. In their view, the servant’s power is effective by the permission of Allah, not independently as the Mu’tazila claim, nor is it ineffective as attributed to Al-Ash’ari, nor is it denied entirely as the Jabriyyah say. This is a settled discussion, and we have pointed to it in the beginning of the commentary. Our purpose here is only to verify that the disbelief of the disbelievers is due to their eternal, "non-made" lack of aptitude, which is followed by knowledge, which is followed by the Will, for he who understands what is in the words of Al-Shihab and others. This has been achieved, by His grace, for those who contemplate and are fair.

"Except that Allah wills..." This is an exception from the most general of conditions. For if one considers that all their conditions include the state of the Will relating to them, then it is connected. But if one does not consider it—because the state of the Will is not one of their states—then it is disconnected. That is: "But if Allah wills, they will believe." Abu Hayyan deemed this unlikely. It is also said: it is an exception from the most general of times, but this is contrary to the apparent meaning. The shifting to the Majestic Name is to foster awe and inspire dread. That is: "They would not have believed after the gathering of what was mentioned of the matters requiring belief, in any condition, except in the state where His—the Exalted—Will ordains their belief." The intention is to declare the impossibility of their belief occurring, based on the impossibility of the Will occurring, as indicated by the context.

"But most of them are ignorant." This is an exception from the content of the conditional sentence after the exception has arrived. The plural pronoun refers to the Muslims or to the oath-takers. The meaning is that their state is as explained, but most of the Muslims are ignorant of their non-belief upon the arrival of the signs, because of their ignorance that His—the Exalted—Will does not incline toward their belief at that time. Thus, they swear by Allah—the Exalted—their most solemn oaths regarding that which will never happen at all. On the first view, the sentence—as some researchers have said—is a confirmation of the content of His saying—the Exalted—(And what will make you perceive), etc., according to the well-known reading. On the second view, it is an explanation of the source of the oath-takers' error and the basis of their oaths, according to that same reading; and it is a confirmation for the reading of (la tu'minun) with the ta (addressing the listener), and likewise for the reading (wa ma yush’iruhum annaha idha ja'at la yu'minun). The People of the Sunnah used this verse as evidence that Allah—the Exalted—wills the disbeliever's disbelief, and they substantiated this by saying that since He—the Glorified—mentioned that they will not believe unless Allah wills their belief, it indicates that He—the Glorified—did not will their belief, but rather their disbelief.

The Mu’tazila answered this by saying that the meaning is "except that He wills a compulsion and coercion," and their non-belief necessitates the absence of a compulsory will, but it does not necessitate the absence of will absolutely. Al-Jubba'i used this verse to argue for the temporal emergence (huduth) of His—the Exalted—Will, otherwise the pre-existence (qidam) of that which sense shows to be emergent would be necessitated. The People of the Sunnah evaded this by claiming that its relation to the bringing about of that emergent thing at the moment is an emergent addition. So contemplate all of that.