Tafsir of Al-An'am 6:19

Al-Kalbi narrated that the disbelievers of Makkah said to the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace): "O Muhammad, has Allah not found a messenger other than you? We do not see anyone who believes what you say, and we have asked the Jews and the Christians about you, and they claimed that you have no mention with them. So show us someone who will testify that you are the Messenger of Allah." Thus, this verse was revealed.

Ibn Jarir and others narrated from Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) that al-Nahham bin Zayd, Qardam bin Ka'b, and Bahri bin Amr came and said: "O Muhammad, do you know of any god with Allah other than Him?" The Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said: "There is no god but Allah; with this I was sent, and to this I call." Thereupon, Allah the Exalted revealed this verse. The first [account] is more consistent with the beginning of the verse, while the second is more consistent with the end of it.

Ay (what) is the subject (mubtada'), akbaru (greatest) is its predicate (khabar), and shahadatan (in testimony) is a specifying noun (tamyiz). A shay' (thing) in the language is that which is valid to be known and informed about. Sibawayh mentioned it in the chapter titled "The Chapter on the Flows of Word Endings." Femininity is distinguished from masculinity [in language]; do you not see that the word "thing" applies to everything that is informed about, before it is known whether it is male or female? "Thing" is masculine.

Whether it applies to Allah the Exalted or not is a matter of disagreement. The view of the majority is that it is applied to Him, the Exalted, so they say: "A thing, not like other things." They derive evidence for this from the question and answer occurring in this verse, and from His, the Exalted, saying: "Everything will perish except His Face" (28:88), where He excepted the "Face" from "everything," and the Face, to them, means the Essence. They also argue that it is the most general of expressions, thus encompassing the Necessary and the Contingent.

The Imam reported that Jahm denied the validity of this application, arguing with the verse: "And to Allah belong the best names" (7:180), saying: Nothing should be applied to Him, the Exalted, except that which indicates an attribute of perfection, and "thing" is not such. In al-Mawaqif and its commentary, it is stated that a "thing," according to the Ash'arites, applies only to the existent; thus, to them, every thing is existent, and every existent is a thing. Thereafter, people’s schools of thought on this are presented, and then it is said: The dispute is linguistic, related to the word "thing" and what it refers to. The truth is what language and transmission support, as there is no room for the intellect in establishing languages. What is apparent is what we follow: language scholars in every era apply the word "thing" to the existent; if one were to say to them "the existent is a thing," they would accept it, and if one were to say "it is not a thing," they would deny it. Expressions like His saying: "And I created you before, when you were nothing" (19:9), deny its application as a reality to the non-existent, because reality cannot exist in such a state.

In the commentary of al-Maqasid, it is stated that the investigation into whether the non-existent is a "thing" in reality or not is linguistic, to be referred back to transmission and usage. Differences have occurred therein based on usages. To us, it is a name for the existent, as we find it commonly used in this meaning, and there is no dispute regarding its usage for the non-existent in a metaphorical sense. Then he said: What is reported from Abu al-Abbas that it is a name for the Eternal, and from the Jahmiyyah that it is a name for the originated, and from Hisham that it is a name for the body, is very remote, given that the people of language do not accept it.

All of this is open to investigation. The claim of the Ash'arites of the equivalence between "thing" and "existent" linguistically, or their synonymy—as is understood from the aforementioned two generalizations—has no evidence to rely upon. As for the claim that "language scholars in every era..." this only indicates that every existent is a thing. It does not prove that everything to which the word "thing" is applied as a linguistic reality is existent, because it does not follow from the fact that the word "thing" is applied to the existent (as opposed to "nothing") that the "thing" is linguistically restricted to the existent. It is possible that "thing" is applied to both the non-existent and the existent as a linguistic reality, while the existent is distinguished by the application of "thing" and "not-nothing," and the rejection by language scholars of one who says "the existent is not a thing" is due to it being a negation of the general by the specific, which is invalid if they are synonyms or equivalents.

Furthermore, it has been applied to the non-existent in the Book and the Sunnah. Allah the Exalted said: "And do not say of a thing, 'I will do that tomorrow,' except [when adding], 'If Allah wills'" (18:23-24). And He, the Exalted, said: "Our word to a thing when We intend it is only that We say to it, 'Be,' and it is" (16:40). Al-Tabarani narrated from Umm Salamah that she heard the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), when a man asked him: "I talk to myself about a thing; if I were to speak of it, my reward would be nullified." He said: "No one encounters that speech except the believers." A similar narration exists from Mu'adh bin Jabal.

The fundamental rule in application is reality, so one should not deviate from it unless there is a diverting factor (sarif), and common usage is not a valid diverting factor after the validity of the transmission from Sibawayh. Perhaps the reason for this commonality is that the concern in dialogues is more often directed toward the states of existents, not because "thing" is linguistically restricted to the existent.

As for His, the Exalted, saying: "And I created you before, when you were nothing," it only necessitates the denial of its application as a reality to the non-existent. This would harm our position if the claimant were restricting the application of "thing" linguistically, which is not the case. The truth, in our view, is that "thing" means that which is "willed" (mashi'), or that which is known and informed about. It is a universal concept that applies to the existent and the non-existent, the Necessary and the Contingent. Restricting its application to some of its instances when there is context does not contradict its scope over all its instances as a linguistic reality when no restricting context exists. Otherwise, its inclusion of the non-existent and the existent together in His saying: "And Allah is Knowing of all things" (4:101) would be a combination of reality and metaphor, which is a disputed matter. There is no disagreement that this verse acts as evidence for the universality of Allah’s knowledge of things in an absolute sense, so it is proof that its inclusion of the non-existent and the existent together is a linguistic reality. Some scholars of rank, after claiming that "thing" is restricted to the existent, mentioned that it is originally an infinitive used in the sense of "willed" (sha'a) or "that which is willed" (mashi'). If it is in the sense of "willed," it is valid to apply it to Him, the Exalted; otherwise, it is not.

You know that according to the investigation we have mentioned, there is no prohibition against applying "thing" to Him, the Exalted, without needing this distinction, because it is in the sense of "that which is willed, known, and informed about," and so applying "thing" in this sense to Him, the Almighty, is like applying "the Known," for example. The meaning of "greatest in testimony" is the most majestic and truthful.

"Say, 'Allah'"—a command for him (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) to undertake the answer himself, due to what passed shortly before. The Majestic Name is a subject for which the predicate is omitted, i.e., "Allah is the greatest in testimony." The opposite is also permissible. It is Sibawayh's school of thought that when an indefinite noun is an interrogative noun or an elative, it serves as a subject whose predicate is a definite noun. His, the Exalted, saying: "is a witness between me and you" implies a new start to the speech; it is also permissible for it to be the predicate of "Allah," and the whole, according to al-Zamakhshari, is the answer, as it indicates that if Allah, the Almighty, is the witness between him and them, then the greatest thing in testimony is the Witness for him. It is reported in al-Kashshaf that if the answer is completed at His saying: "Allah," then it is for the transition from proving monotheism to proving prophethood, as this Witness—than whom there is none more truthful—testified for me by revealing this Qur'an. If the speech in its totality is the answer, then it is of the "wise style," because doubt does not go toward the idea that this Witness could be other than Him, the Exalted; rather, the discourse is about whether He testifies to his prophethood or not. So understand this.

"And this Qur'an has been revealed to me"—by Him, the Exalted—(this) great (Qur'an, testifying to the validity of my message). "That I may warn you thereby"—by what it contains of threats. He sufficed with mentioning the warning rather than the good tidings because it is what is appropriate for the context. It has been said: The discourse is with the disbelievers, and there is none among them to receive good tidings. It is stated in al-Durr al-Masun that the speech is of the kind of "garments that protect you from heat."

"And whoever it reaches"—conjoined to the pronoun of the addressed, i.e., "that I may warn you thereby," O people of Makkah, and everyone whom the Qur'an reaches and comes to, from the black and the red, or from both the Jinn and Mankind, or "that I may warn you thereby," O you who exist and whoever will exist until the Day of Resurrection. Ibn Jarir said: "Whoever the Qur'an reaches, it is as if he saw Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace)." Abu Nu'aym and others narrated from Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) that he said: The Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said: "Whoever the Qur'an reaches, it is as if he spoke with me." The verse is used as evidence that the rulings of the Qur'an encompass those who existed on the day of its revelation and those who will exist afterward until Allah inherits the earth and those upon it. There is disagreement whether this is via the expression for all, or by consensus for those who do not exist or those who are not legally responsible. The Hanbalis went to the first, and the Hanafis to the second, and its verification is in the [books of] Principles (Usul). It is also established that whoever the Qur'an has not reached is not held accountable for abandoning the Sharia rulings. This is supported by what Abu al-Shaykh narrated from Ubayy bin Ka'b, who said: The Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) was brought captives, and he said to them: "Were you called to Islam?" They said: "No." So he released them, then he recited: "And this Qur'an has been revealed to me..." the verse. This is based on the [validity of the] "concept" (mafhum), as the Shafi'is maintained. It was objected that the verse has no indication of that in any way, because its concept is the negation of the warning by the Qur'an for those it has not reached, and that is not the same as the negation of accountability—this is obvious—nor does it necessitate it, especially according to those who hold to the [theory of] intellectual Good and Evil, unless one considers His, the Exalted, saying: "And We would not punish until We send a messenger" (17:15). However, it is argued that the non-necessitation of the negation of warning by the negation of accountability is denied, and the [notion of] intellectual Good and Evil has had the carpet pulled from under its rejection.

It is also possible that "whoever" is a conjunction to the hidden agent in "I warn you," due to the separation by the object, i.e., "that I may warn you myself with the Qur'an, and whoever the Qur'an reaches may also warn you with it." Al-Tabarsi narrated what implies this from al-Ayyashi, from Abu Ja'far and Abu 'Abd Allah (may Allah be pleased with them both), but it is not hidden that this is contrary to what immediately comes to the mind.

"Do you truly testify that with Allah there are other gods?"—a sentence that is an independent start, or included in the command of the "Say," and the interrogation is for confirmation or for denial, or it is said: for both, and in this, there is a combination of metaphorical meanings. "Other" is an adjective for "gods," and it is an adjective for a plural of non-rational things, just as Abu Hayyan said, like the adjective for the feminine singular, such as "other needs." To Allah belong the best names; and since the gods were stones and wood, for example, it was treated in this manner to belittle them. "Say"—to them—"I will not testify [to that]"; even if you testify to it, it is pure falsehood.

"Say"—repetition of the command for emphasis—"Indeed, He is but one God"—i.e., rather, I only testify that He, the Exalted, has no god but Him. "Ma" is restrictive. Abu al-Baqa' permitted it—and claimed it is more appropriate to what precedes it—that it is a relative pronoun, but the fact that it is a relative pronoun makes it weak, and upon it, "one" would be a predicate, which is contrary to the apparent meaning. "And indeed, I am free of what you associate"—of the idols, or of your associating.