Tafsir of Al-Mulk 67:2

Regarding "death"—according to the view held by many of the Sunnis, it is an existential attribute that opposes life. Its existential nature is argued by the fact that the act of creation is connected to it, and creation cannot be connected to that which is non-existent, given the pre-eternity of non-existence. As for what has been narrated from Ibn Abbas—that He created death in the form of a variegated ram that passes nothing without causing it to die, and created life in the form of a piebald mare that passes nothing and of which nothing smells its scent without coming to life—this is more akin to the discourse of the Sufis; its literal meaning is not rationalized. It has been said that it is presented by way of analogy and imagery.

The Qadariyyah and some of the Sunnis held that it is a non-existential matter, being the absence of life from that which is capable of it; this is the most immediate and likely interpretation. The argument based on the verse was answered by stating that "creation" here signifies "decreeing," which pertains to non-existent things just as it pertains to existential ones. Or, that death is not absolute, pure non-existence, but rather the absence of a specific thing; creation and bringing-into-being can pertain to such a thing, based on the principle that it is the granting of existence (even if to another), not the granting of existence to a thing in itself. Or, that creation signifies "origination and establishment" rather than "bringing into existence," and in this sense, it applies to non-existential matters. Or, that the speech assumes an added term—that is, "He created the causes of death." Or, that the intention behind the creation of death and life is the creation of a specific time and duration for them, which none knows save Allah, Exalted is He; thus, bringing them into existence is, metaphorically, the creation of their time. The status of these probabilities is evident.

It is strange that it has been said that "death" is a metonym for the worldly life, as it takes place within it, and "life" for the Hereafter, since there is no death therein; as if it were said, "He who created the worldly life and the Hereafter." The truth is that both have their real meanings, and death is as you have heard, while life is an existential attribute without dispute. It is that by the existence of which sensation becomes valid, or a meaning additional to knowledge and power that confers upon the one described by it a state that was not present before—namely, the capacity for knowledge and power.

The precedence of death—assuming it is absolute non-existence, i.e., the absence of life from that which is capable of it—is manifest because it precedes existence. And assuming it is the subsequent non-existence—as is more appropriate for the will here, i.e., the absence of life from one who was characterized by it—there is in it greater admonition, remembrance, and deterrence from committing sins, and an exhortation toward good deeds. Hence it was said, "Increase your remembrance of the Destroyer of pleasures." Although life is also an incentive for this—necessarily, because whoever knows it is a great blessing and possesses insight will act in gratitude to Allah, Exalted is He, for it—it is not of the same rank as death in that regard. Whoever claims it has no incentive at all, and was only mentioned because work depends upon it, has not scrutinized the view. The al- (definite article) in both places is a substitute for the possessive pronoun; that is, "He who created your death, which is impending, and your life, O you who are held accountable."

The intended meaning of "deed" includes the work of the heart and the work of the limbs. Hence, the Prophet (may the blessings of Allah be upon him) said regarding the verse: "The best of you in intellect, the most pious regarding the forbidden things of Allah, and the fastest in the obedience of Allah, Exalted is He"—meaning, the most perfect in understanding what emanates from the Presence of Allah, Exalted is He, and the most complete in controlling what is taken from His speech, Glorified is He. The employment of the superlative form—despite the fact that the trial encompasses all who are held accountable, considering their deeds which are divided into good and evil (not only good and better)—is to signal that the primary intent and original purpose of the trial is the manifestation of the perfection of the benevolence of the benevolent, with the existence of the core of faith and obedience in the rest as well, due to the perfection of the concurrence of its causes. As for turning away from that, it is far from being included, let alone being ordered in the chain of the goal or the supposition for those who view it as applying to the actions of Allah, Exalted is He; rather, it is a deed that emanates from its doer due to his poor choice, without any justification or approximation. In this there is an incentive to ascend to the high levels of knowledge and degrees of obedience, and a deterrence from engaging in their deficiencies, the extent of which is clear.

Treating this as a case of absolute increase, or as "which of the two parties is better in position," is not that significant. "أيكم أحسن" (which of you is best) is a subject and predicate, and the sentence is in the position of the second accusative object for "ليبلوكم" (to test you), because it contains the meaning of knowledge. Whether this is called "suspension" (ta'liq) or not is a matter of disagreement. In Al-Bahr by Abu Hayyan, it is related from his school that it is so called; he said: "When a verb is transitive to two objects, the first is in the accusative, and it is followed by an interrogative sentence, or one accompanied by the lam of inception, or a negative particle, the sentence is said to have suspended the verb, and it is in the place of the two objects."

In Al-Kashshaf here, it is not called suspension; suspension is only when one places after the verb that which fills the place of both objects, such as your saying "I knew which of them is Zayd" and "I knew whether Zayd is departing." But if one of the two objects is mentioned after it, such as "I knew the people—which of them is best," it is not suspension. The verse is of this kind. The author of Al-Taqrib objected to this by saying that the knowledge is implied, and that is what is suspended, as Al-Farra' and Al-Zajjaj said. It is not necessary to mention the object with it; rather, the estimation is "to test you so He may know which of you is best." Also, the interrogative sentence does not occur as a second object for "I knew"; it only occurs in the place of both objects in "I knew which of them left" because the meaning is "I knew the answer to this question," and there is no meaning in assuming the like of that in "I knew him [as to] which of them left."

It was answered that inclusion (tadmin) suffices for implication. The claim that the interrogative sentence cannot occur as a second object is weak, because if it occurred as a first object in [the verse] "We shall surely tear out from every sect which of them is strongest," in the sense of "We shall surely tear out those of whom it is said 'which of them is strongest,'" as Al-Khalil said, then it is not impossible for it to occur as a second object by interpreting it as "so that He may know of you those of whom it is said 'which of you is best.'" Al-Tibi went to this, then said: "The author of Al-Intisaf was fair when he said: 'Suspension upon one of the two objects is a matter of disagreement, and the most correct is that which Al-Zamakhshari chose.'"