Tafsir of Al-Insan 76:30

(And you do not will, i.e., any thing or [you do not] take the path, unless Allah wills.) That is, at the time the will of Allah the Exalted is attached to your will. Al-Zamakhshari said: "That is, you do not will obedience unless Allah the Exalted wills that He compel you to it." This is a distortion of the verse without evidence. It necessitates—based on what is in al-Intisaf—that the servant's will does not exist unless it is negated [by Him], and this is far removed from the school of the Mu'tazila and is the most distant position.

The manifest meaning is what we have established, for the omitted object is the one mentioned first, just as you would say, "If you willed, you would have killed Zayd," meaning "if you willed the killing," not "if you willed Zayd." It is not possible for the Mu'tazila to dispute with the People of Truth regarding this, because the will itself is not among the voluntary actions—otherwise, it would lead to an infinite regress—but rather the action is that which is conjoined with it. Thus, the claim of the servant’s independence is sheer stubbornness, and likewise, the claim of absolute predestination is an artifice. The truth is "a matter between two matters," establishing both wills.

The essence of this, according to what al-Kurani verified, is that the servant is a chooser in his actions, but not a chooser in his choosing; reward and punishment are for the soundness of the soul’s preparation for a matter that will [eventually] afflict it. So, "Each works according to his manner" (17:84), and glorified is He who gave everything its creation, then guided.

In al-Tafsir al-Kabir, it is stated: This verse is among those in which the waves of Qadar (predestination) and Jabr (compulsion) have clashed. The Qadari holds to the first clause and says that its import is that the servant's will necessitates the action, which is my [their] school. The Jabri holds to the addition of the second clause and says that its import is that the will of Allah the Exalted necessitates the will of the servant. It is thus concluded from the two clauses that the will of Allah the Exalted necessitates the will of the servant, and the will of the servant necessitates the action of the servant—as the conditional sentence indicates. Therefore, the will of Allah the Exalted necessitates the action of the servant, because that which necessitates the necessary is itself necessary. This is pure Jabr, which is explicitly my [their] school.

This was countered by stating that this is not pure Jabr, which would strip away choice entirely, but rather it returns to "a matter between two matters." Some of the notables posited that the object of "wills" is "taking [the path] and attaining [it]," referring the speech back to the beginning. They said: His saying—Glorified is He—"And you do not will..." is a verification of the truth by clarifying that their mere willing is insufficient to take the path, as is understood from the manifest meaning of the conditional sentence. That is: You do not will to take the path, even if you were able to attain it at any time, except at the time of His—the Exalted—willing the taking and attaining of it for you, since the servant’s will has no entry except in the acquisition (kasb), whereas the influence and the creation belong to the will of Allah, the Might and Majesty. This contains a type of opposition to the apparent meaning, as is not hidden.

Yes, it has been said that the manifest meaning of the conditional sentence is that the servant’s will absolutely necessitates the action, which implies that whenever he wills an action, he performs it, even though reality is otherwise. Therefore, what this group said is necessary, making the second clause a verification of the truth. It was answered that it is from another aspect: the first clause implies the necessity, and the second clarified that this necessitating will does not materialize except at the time of Allah’s will for it. It is as if it were said: "And you do not will a will that necessitates the action except at the time that Allah the Exalted wills your [that] will."

You should know that this issue is one of the labyrinths of understanding and the slipping of feet for generations after generations. The strongest argument of the Jabriyyah is that it has been established that a thing does not exist until it becomes necessary (wajib). If the occurrence of the action is necessary, then there is no choice; if it is not, then the outcome could fail to follow its complete cause—or worse, it would imply preference without a preferrer. It has been said that this is akin to the doubt of Ibn Kammuna regarding the Oneness, which is difficult to resolve. The poor, helpless one—may Allah the Exalted compensate for his poverty and ease his affair—has resolved to author a treatise on this, if Allah the Exalted wills, following therein the best of paths by His success, even though al-Kurani—may his secret be sanctified—did not leave much to be said, and he nearly left those who come after him dependent upon him in this. And Allah the Exalted is the Granter of success.

The two Arabs [Ibn Kathir and Abu 'Amr] and Ibn Kathir read "you do not will" (tasha'una) with the 'ya' of absence [third person]. Ibn Mas'ud read "except what Allah wills," and "what" is the subject [masdar]. It is as if the reading of the group—and we have indicated that the masdar (infinitive) is in the place of an accusative acting as an adverb of time, by estimating the omitted noun—is the one that replaces it. This is what more than one has chosen. Abu Hayyan countered this by saying that nothing stands in the place of an adverb except the explicit masdar, so it is not permissible to say "I will come to you [in] the rooster crows," but rather it is only permissible to say "I will come to you [in] the crowing of the rooster." It is as if for this reason it was said that "that He wills" (an yasha'a) is by estimation of a preposition, and the exception is from the most general of causes: "And you do not will because of any of the causes, except that Allah the Exalted wills."

"Indeed, Allah is Knowing"—exaggerating in knowledge, so He knows the wills of the servants regarding the actions they have asked for with the tongues of their preparedness—"Wise"—exaggerating in wisdom, so He bestows upon each what is most appropriate for his preparedness and what he is upon in the reality of the matter regarding his will. Or, He—the Exalted—is exaggerating in knowledge and wisdom, so He knows what each person deserves of obedience and otherwise, so He does not will for them except what His knowledge—Glorified is He—requires and His wisdom—Majesty is His—demands. It has been said that "Knowing" means He knows the deeds to which the servants' wills are attached, and "Wise" means He does not will except in accordance with His wisdom: which is that the servant wills, and then the Lord—Glorified and Exalted is He—wills, not the reverse, so that accountability may come to pass without either of the two wills being isolated from the other. In this, there is deliberation. His saying...