Tafsir of Al-Anfal 8:51

• "That is for what your hands have sent forth."

"That" (i.e., the striking and the punishment, which are the subject) is a subject whose predicate is His saying, the Almighty: "for what your hands have sent forth." The "ba" (in bima) is for causality, and the attribution to the hands is a metaphor for earnings and deeds. It means: "That is occurring because of what you have earned of disbelief and sins."

And His saying, the Almighty: "And that Allah is not ever unjust to the servants."

It is said this is the predicate of a deleted subject, and the sentence is an appended parenthetical remark confirming the meaning of what preceded it. That is: "The matter is that He, the Almighty, is not one who punishes His servants without a sin from them." Expressing this by negating injustice—even though punishing them without a sin is not, according to the established rule of the Ahl al-Sunnah, injustice at all, let alone being an extreme injustice—is to manifest the perfection of His transcendence, the Almighty, by depicting it in the form of what is impossible to emanate from Him: injustice.

Al-Baydawi—may Allah whiten his countenance—said: It is a conjunction to "what" (in bima) to indicate that its causality is restricted by being joined to it [the negation of injustice], for if it were not for it, it would be possible for Him to punish them without their sins, not that He would not punish them for their sins—for refraining from punishing one who deserves it is not injustice according to Sacred Law or reason, so that the negation of injustice could rise to be a cause for punishment. He intended by this a rebuttal to al-Zamakhshari—may Allah deal with him according to His justice—who made each of the two matters a cause based on his doctrine regarding the obligation of what is most conducive to the well-being (al-aslah). His saying "not that He would not punish them" is a conjunction to "that He would punish them." The meaning is that the cause of this restriction is to repel the possibility that He would punish them without sins, not the possibility that He would not punish them for their sins, for that is a good thing. His saying "to indicate..." pertains to the meaning that its specification for causality is only realized through this restriction; for with the possibility of punishing them without a sin, it could be possible that the cause of punishment is the will to punish without a sin.

The summary of the meaning of the verse is that this punishment of yours only arose from your sins, not from anything else. Thus, the objection—that Allah the Almighty's punishment of servants without a sin being injustice does not align with the doctrine of the community—does not hold. Similarly, the objection that this contradicts what is in [Surah] Al 'Imran—that its causality for punishment is in the sense that the negation of injustice necessitates justice, which requires rewarding the doer of good and punishing the doer of evil—is refuted by the fact that the negation of injustice has two meanings: one is what was mentioned regarding rewarding the doer of good, etc., and the other is the absence of punishment without sin. Both of these lead to the meaning of justice, so there is no contradiction between his two statements. As for making it a cause there and a restriction to the cause here, this also does not necessitate a contradiction; for the intent—as we mentioned previously regarding the cause—is pure means, and it is a means whether considered an independent cause or a restriction to the cause. Our master, the Shaykh al-Islam, has words on this subject whose refutation will not be hidden from you after grasping what we have mentioned, and the detailed discussion of it has already preceded you.

Some have explained the statement of the Judge (al-Qadi) "to indicate..." by saying: He means that the causality of sins for punishment is dependent upon the negation of injustice from Him, the Almighty. For if it were permissible for it to emanate from Him, the Almighty, it would be possible for Him to punish His servants without their sins, so it would not be fit for the sin to be a cause for punishment, neither in this case nor in any other. Then he said: "If you say: Nothing follows from this except the negation of the exclusivity of the cause of punishment to sins, not the negation of their causality for it. The argument remains, for it is possible that the punishment in the hypothesized case occurs due to a cause other than sins, and this does not contradict their being a cause for it in other cases, such as the people of Badr, so the approximation does not hold."

I say: The cause hypothesized in the aforementioned case, if it necessitates the deserving of punishment, then it is inevitably a sin—and the hypothesis is to the contrary. And if it does not necessitate it, it is not conceivable for it to be a cause, for there is no meaning to a thing being a cause other than its requiring the deserving of it. So when this is negated, that is negated. In summary, the result of the punishment being without sin is its being without a cause, because the cause is restricted to it. [End quote]

This was refuted by saying: His statement "if it does not necessitate it, it is not conceivable for it to be a cause" is rejected, for the necessitating cause is that which is effective in the attainment of a thing, whether it be from deserving or not. Does one not see that striking unjustly and killing similarly are causes for pain and death, even though they are not from deserving? Thus, the objector’s criticism is well-placed, and it is impossible to escape from it except by what was established previously regarding the meaning of the verse; for the context is one of specifying the causality and restricting it to sins, and that is not achieved except by negating the emanation of punishment without a sin from Him, the Almighty. From this, it is known that his statement "In summary..." is not sound, for its basis is that deserving is a condition for causality—and what is in that has already passed, along with the contradiction it holds with the words of the leading scholars that the negation of injustice is another cause for punishment, because the causality of the negation of injustice is stopped by the possibility of willing punishment without a sin and its being a cause for punishment. How then could the result of punishment without sin be its being without a cause? Reflect on this; the domain is a battleground of understandings.

Furthermore, the intent in the verse is to negate the essence of injustice; the [plural] form "zallam" (hyperbolic) is used for distribution among the individuals, as if it were said: "He is not unjust to so-and-so, and not unjust to so-and-so," and so on. Since these were gathered, He turned to "zallam." It is permitted that it is a gesture towards the magnitude of the punishment as a metaphor, because the act, by its outward appearance, indicates the utmost injustice since it did not attach to one who deserved it. So, if it emanates from Him who is the most just of the just, it indicates that he deserved the most severe punishment because he is the most severe of sinners. The author of al-Kashf said: "This is more consistent with the subtleties of the glorious Speech of Allah." It contains other aspects, some of which have already passed you.