Tafsir of At-Tawbah 9:5

"So when the sacred months have passed" (i.e., when they have expired). Its root is from al-salkh (flaying/stripping), as in the expression: "I stripped the hide from the sheep," meaning I peeled it off and removed it. It also occurs in the sense of 'bringing out,' as when it is said, "I stripped the sheep from its hide," meaning I brought it out from it. Abu al-Haytham mentioned that it is said: "We have heralded (ah-lalna) such-and-such a month," meaning we have entered into it. We then continue to add garment upon garment every night until its midpoint, then we strip it off from ourselves piece by piece until it expires. He recited:

When I have stripped the month, I herald the next, Sufficient as a killer is my stripping of the months and my heralding.

The 'stripping' (insilakh) in the context we are discussing is an apt metaphor. Its underlying reality is that time encompasses what is within it, containing the temporal events just as a hide contains an animal. Likewise, every part of its extended duration, such as days, months, and years, when it passes, it is as if it has been stripped away from what was contained within it. There is an additional subtlety in this, as it hints that those months were a protection for those who had treaties, shielding them from the onslaught of the Muslims' hands; thus, their being fought was made contingent upon the passing of these months. From this, one understands that interpreting this as a metaphor derived from the first meaning of salkh (stripping/peeling) is better than interpreting it from the second (bringing out/exiting), because when the time expires, it is as if it were brought out from the things that exist—this nuance is not as apparent in the second meaning as it is in the first.

The Alif-Lam in al-ashhur (the months) is for ‘ahd (reference to a known entity). Thus, it refers to the four months mentioned previously in His (the Exalted) saying: "So travel freely in the land for four months." This is what has been narrated from Mujahid and others. In al-Durr al-Masun, it is stated that when the Arabs mention a word in the indefinite form and then wish to mention it a second time using a pronoun or a noun defined with Alif-Lam, it is not permissible to describe it with an adjective that implies a difference. For instance, if one said, "I saw a man, and I honored the tall man," one would not intend the first man by the second. If one describes it with something that does not imply a difference, it is permissible, as in saying, "I honored the aforementioned man." The verse is of this category, for "the sacred" (al-hurum) is an adjective understood from the context of the speech, so it does not imply a difference. It is as if the point of opting for the explicit noun instead of the pronoun, and placing this adjective, is to serve as an emphasis on what the permission to travel freely implies—namely, the sanctity of molesting them—along with the added care for the status of the described noun.

According to this, the intent behind "the polytheists" in His (the Exalted) saying: "Then kill the polytheists" refers to the treaty-breakers. Thus, the purpose is to clarify their ruling after drawing attention to the completion of the term for those who did not break their treaties. The ruling for the others is not understood from the wording of the text itself, but from its implication. Some have permitted that the reference be to those four months, along with what is understood from His (the Exalted) saying: "So fulfill for them their treaty until their term," regarding the remainder of the term left for those who did not break the treaty. Upon this interpretation, the ruling for the others is understood from the wording, as "the polytheists" then encompasses both them and the treaty-breakers. However, the stripping and the fighting made contingent upon it would be piece by piece, not all at once. It is as if it were said: "When the term for each group is completed, kill them."

It has been said that the intent is the known months that rotate every year, which are Rajab, Dhu al-Qa'dah, Dhu al-Hijjah, and Muharram. This, however, is flawed in terms of the noble order, because the sequence marked by the particle fa (then/so) rejects it, and it contradicts the context, which requires these months to follow one another. It is also said that it contradicts consensus, as it has been established that fighting is permitted during these months and that their sanctity has been abrogated. To interpret them as such would imply that their sanctity remains, and nothing has yet been revealed to abrogate it. This is rebutted by the fact that it is not necessary for the Quran to be abrogated only by the Quran; rather, it may be abrogated by the Sunnah, as has been established in the foundations of jurisprudence (usul). Even if it were necessary—as is the opinion of some—it is possible that the abrogating text from the Quran was withdrawn from recitation. This has been countered by the claim that this is a mere possibility that yields no benefit and is not to be heard; for if it were so, it would have been transmitted, and possibility alone does not suffice for abrogation. Others have said that when consensus has been reached that they are abrogated, that is sufficient without the need for a transmitted chain of authority. It has been authenticated that the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) besieged Ta’if ten days before the end of Muharram. Just as that is sufficient to abrogate their sanctity, it suffices to abrogate what occurred in the authentic Hadith: "Time has rotated as it was the day Allah created the heavens and the earth; the year is twelve months, of which four are sacred: Dhu al-Qa'dah, Dhu al-Hijjah, Muharram, and Rajab." Thus, it cannot be said that this creates a problem for us due to a lack of knowledge of what abrogates it, as some have erroneously supposed.

Some of us hold the view that the Quran may be abrogated by consensus. In al-Nihayah Sharh al-Hidayah, it is stated that it is permissible to augment the Quran by consensus, which Imam al-Sarakhsi explicitly stated. Fakhr al-Islam said that some of our companions permitted abrogation by consensus on the grounds that consensus necessitates certain knowledge just like the text (nass); therefore, it is permissible for abrogation to be established by it. Consensus, in being a proof, is stronger than a famous report (mashhur), and since abrogation by [a famous report] is permissible, it is more so by consensus. As for the requirement that the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) be alive for the validity of abrogation, this is not a condition according to that group of companions. You should know that the matter is a subject of disagreement among us. Furthermore, there is debate regarding consensus itself, for it has been said that the sanctity of fighting during these months remains unless the Muslims are fought, and this is narrated from ‘Ata’. However, it is an opinion that is not given weight. The statement that the prohibition of fighting in the sacred months was only for that year—and thus does not imply a prohibition for every year that resembles it, leaving the latter silent and not conflicting with consensus—is baseless. The obvious conclusion is that whoever claims consensus claims it for the permissibility in that year as well. In short, there is no reliance on this interpretation. As al-Jalal al-Suyuti said, this is the "Sword Verse" which abrogated the verses of pardon, forgiveness, turning away, and peacefulness.

The scholar Ibn Hajar said: "The Sword Verse is 'And kill the polytheists wherever you find them.'" It is also said that both are. The majority have used its generality as evidence for fighting the Turks and the Abyssinians, as if it were said: "Kill the disbelievers absolutely, wherever you find them," whether in a place of permissibility or sanctity. "And seize them" (it is said: meaning take them captive). The 'seized' is the captive. Captivity has been interpreted as binding, not for the purpose of enslavement, for the polytheists of the Arabs are not to be enslaved. It is also said that the intent is to grant them respite to choose between death and Islam. Others say it means to harm them in every possible way. It has become common in usage that 'taking' implies seizing the enemy's wealth, as in saying: "So-and-so's tribe took so-and-so's tribe," meaning they seized their wealth after overcoming them. "And besiege them" (it is said: meaning imprison them).

Al-Khazin narrated from Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) that the intent is to prevent them from leaving if they have fortified themselves against you in a fortress. Others narrated from him that the meaning is to stand between them and the Sacred Mosque. "And sit in wait for them at every place of ambush" (i.e., every path and thoroughfare they use in their travels). According to al-Zajjaj and his followers, its grammatical position [as an accusative] is that of an adverbial expression of place (zarf). Abu Ali rejected this, arguing that the marsad (place of ambush) is a specific place where the enemy is observed, so it is a specific location where the deletion of 'in' (fi) is not permissible, nor its use as an adverbial expression, unless by hearing (direct linguistic precedent). Abu Hayyan countered him, stating that there is no obstacle to its being an adverbial expression, because His (the Exalted) saying: "And sit in wait for them" does not mean the reality of sitting, but rather observing them and watching for them; thus, the meaning is: "Watch for them at every place of ambush where one watches." An adverbial expression generally takes the accusative by omitting the preposition 'in' from a verb of the same root or meaning, such as: "I sat (the sitting of) the prince's assembly." What is restricted to hearing is only what is not of this kind. Even though "every" (kull) is not a zarf (adverb), it has the rule of that to which it is attached because it is an expression of it. Ibn al-Munir allowed that marsad could be a verbal noun of place (or time/infinitive), making it a cognate accusative (maf'ul mutlaq), and the operator is the verb that carries its meaning, as if it were said: "Observe them every observation." This is obviously far-fetched. From al-Akhfash, it is said that it is in the accusative because of the removal of the preposition, the original being "on every place of ambush," so when 'on' was removed, it became accusative. You know that the accusative by removal of the preposition is not a standard rule, especially if the preposition is 'on' (‘ala), as it is rarely removed, to the extent that some say it is specific to poetry.

"But if they repent" from polytheism by believing, due to what reaches them from you, "and establish prayer and give Zakah," in confirmation of their repentance and belief—he sufficed with mentioning these two because they are the heads of bodily and financial worship—"then let them go on their way," meaning leave them and their affairs, and do not molest them with anything of what was mentioned. It is also said the intent is: leave the way between them and the House, and do not prevent them from it. The first is more appropriate. "Letting go on the way" has come in the speech of the Arabs as a metonymy for leaving someone alone, as in the saying: "Let the way for the one who builds the lighthouse/landmark, and set out with a resolute heart where fate has compelled you." Then, in every situation, the meaning intended is that which is appropriate for it. It is narrated from al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) that he used the verse as evidence for the killing of the one who abandons prayer and the fighting of the one who refuses Zakah. This is because Allah (the Exalted) permitted the blood of the disbelievers by all means and in all circumstances, then forbade it upon repentance from disbelief, the establishment of prayer, and the giving of Zakah. Thus, as long as this totality does not exist, the permissibility of shedding blood remains based on the original principle. Perhaps Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) used it as evidence for fighting those who refused Zakah.

In the Shahabiyyah annotations, it is mentioned that al-Muzani, one of the eminent Shafi'ites (may Allah be pleased with them), presented a challenge to the killing of the one who abandons prayer, which left them perplexed. He refutes it as al-Subki said in his Tabaqat, saying: It is not conceivable, because it is either about abandoning a prayer that has already passed or one that has not yet come. The first is invalid because one is not killed for abandoning a missed prayer. The second is also invalid because as long as the time has not expired, there is room for delay, so on what grounds is he killed? They followed various paths in answering:

First, this also applies to the opinion of discretionary punishment (ta'zir), beating, and imprisonment, as is the school of the Hanafites; therefore, the answer to the one is the answer to the other, though this is a dialectical response.

Second, it refers to the past prayer because he abandoned it without an excuse. This is rebutted by the fact that making up the prayer (qada') is not immediately obligatory, and that al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) explicitly stated that one is not killed for a missed prayer under any circumstances.

Third, that he is killed for the performed prayer at the end of its time. This entails that rushing to kill the one who abandons prayer is more appropriate than for the apostate, for the latter is asked to repent and is given time, while this one is not asked to repent nor given time; if he were given time, it would become a missed prayer, and that is a subject of debate. So, there is no need to answer from the side of Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him), as it is said that the Shafi'ite argumentation is built upon the assumption of the condition's causal effect, which is not relied upon. Even if he were to concede it, "letting go" means absolute release from everything that passed. Thus, it is said: the one who abandons prayer is not let go, and it is sufficient for not letting go that he be imprisoned. Moreover, this is refuted by the one who refuses Zakah according to him. Furthermore, it is permissible that "establishing them" be intended as "committing to them," and if he did not commit to them, he would be a disbeliever, although this is contrary to what is immediately apparent, even if some commentators said it.

You know that the Shafi'ite school holds that whoever abandons a single prayer out of laziness, on the condition of letting it leave the time of necessity—by not praying Dhuhr, for example, until the sun sets—is killed as a legal penalty (hadd). Some of their prominent late scholars used this verse and His (the Exalted) saying: "I have been commanded to fight the people..." as evidence. They clarified this by saying that these two are conditions for refraining from killing and fighting: Islam, establishing prayer, and giving Zakah. The Imam can take Zakah, even by fighting those who refuse it, and they fought us; so it is in its literal sense regarding them, unlike with prayer, for it cannot be performed through fighting; thus, it is in the sense of killing. He then said: "Thus, the clarity of the difference between prayer and Zakah is known." Likewise with fasting, for if it is known that he will be imprisoned all day, he intends it, so imprisonment is of avail for it, unlike prayer. Thus, killing is determined in its penalty. It is not hidden that the outward meaning of this is a combination of the literal and the metaphorical in the verse and the Hadith, because prayer and Zakah in each of them—and killing in the verse—are literal, but the literal sense does not apply to the one who refuses Zakah, and in the Hadith, "fighting" is literal, but its literal sense does not apply to the one who abandons prayer. Thus, there must be an intention for fighting alongside killing in the verse, and killing alongside fighting in the Hadith, so that the application to the one who abandons prayer and the one who refuses Zakah may follow. Combining the literal and the metaphorical is not permissible according to us. Moreover, interpreting the verse and the Hadith in that way is something that does not readily occur to the mind, so the refutation using the one who refuses Zakah is extremely strong.

He pointed to what was narrated from al-Muzani along with his answer, saying: "It is not said: there is no killing for the present prayer because he has not let it leave its time, nor for the one outside its time because there is no killing for missed prayers even if it were immediately obligatory; because we say: rather, he is killed for the present prayer when he is commanded by the Imam or his deputy—and no one else, as it appears—at the time of its constriction, and he is threatened for letting it leave its time, yet he stubbornly refuses until its time expires; because at that moment he is a defiant opponent to the Law, in a defiance that warrants killing similar to it. So it is not for the present prayer only, nor for the missed one only, but for the combination of the two matters: the command and the departure from the time with determination." Furthermore, they said: The one who abandons prayer is asked to repent immediately as a recommendation. The difference from the obligation in the case of the apostate is that abandoning his repentance entails eternal punishment in the Fire by consensus, unlike this one. They do not deem the one who kills him before repentance to be liable for compensation in any case, but he sins for encroaching upon the Imam's authority. The completion of this discussion is sought in its proper place.

The verse was also used as evidence, as al-Jalal al-Suyuti said, by those who hold to the disbelief of the one who abandons prayer and the one who refuses Zakah, but there is nothing to that. The correct view is that they are believers who have committed sin, and it does not imply disbelief; it is merely an expression of emphasis.

"Indeed, Allah is Forgiving, Merciful" (He forgives them what has passed of their sins and rewards them for their belief and obedience). This is the justification for the command to "let them go on their way."