Surah Al-Fatiha

Its verses are seven, and it is Meccan.

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful > 2 <

Regarding His saying, Glorified and Exalted is He,

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful , there are two types of inquiry:

The First Type: It is well-known among the scholars that Allah, the Exalted, has one thousand and one sacred, pure Names. These are found in the Book and the Sunnah. Investigating each of these Names is a noble and lofty matter. Knowledge of a Name is only attained after knowledge of the Named (the one referred to by the Name). Inquiries regarding the establishment of these named entities, the proofs indicating their existence, and the refutations of doubts raised against them involve numerous issues, totaling well over a thousand.

The Second Type: The Bā’ (ب) in

In the Name of Allah is the Bā’ of attachment (ilṣāq), connected to an implied verb. The meaning is: "By the Name of Allah, I commence the performance of acts of obedience." This meaning is only fully understood after examining the divisions of acts of obedience, which are: the true core beliefs (al-ʿaqā’id al-ḥaqqah) and the pure deeds (al-aʿmāl al-ṣāfiyah), along with their proofs, clear evidence, and answers to doubts. This entire collection might exceed ten thousand issues.

A subtle point: The phrase

I seek refuge in Allah (which precedes Basmala in recitation) points to the negation of what is improper in beliefs and deeds, while In the Name of Allah points to what is proper in beliefs and actions. Thus, the meaning of In the Name of Allah can only be fully grasped after understanding all true beliefs and pure deeds. This sequence is confirmed by sound intellect and clear truth.

All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the Worlds

Know that praise (ḥamd) is only rendered for a blessing (niʿmah). Praise for a blessing is impossible without knowing that blessing. However, the blessings of Allah are beyond enumeration and counting, as He the Exalted says:

And if you should count the favors of Allah, you could not enumerate them [Ibrahim: 34].

Let us consider one example: A rational person must contemplate their own being, as they are composed of a soul and a body. Undeniably, the body is the lesser of the two in virtue and benefit. Anatomists have discovered nearly five thousand types of benefits and utilities that Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, has arranged with wisdom in the creation of the human body. Whoever understands these categories mentioned in anatomy books realizes that this known amount is like a drop in the vast ocean compared to what is unknown or unmentioned. At this point, it becomes clear that knowing the divisions of the Merciful One's wisdom in creating man encompasses ten thousand issues or more.

If we add to this the effects of Allah’s wisdom in creating the Throne (ʿArsh), the Footstool (Kursī), the layers of the heavens, the luminous bodies (fixed and wandering stars), and the specific measure and color assigned to each—and then add the effects of Allah’s wisdom in creating the primary elements (al-ummahāt) and their derivatives (al-mawālid) from inanimate objects, plants, and animals, along with their various divisions and states—one realizes that this total encompasses a million issues or more (or less).

Furthermore, He the Exalted indicated that most of these are created for human benefit, as He said:

And He subjected to you whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on earth [Al-Jathiyah: 13]. Hence, it is evident that His saying, Glorified and Exalted is He, All praise is due to Allah , encompasses a million issues or more (or less).

Lord of the Worlds

Know that the word Rabb (Lord) is the possessor (muḍāf), and al-ʿĀlamīn (the Worlds) is the possessed (muḍāf ilayhi). Knowledge of the relationship of possession between two things is impossible without prior knowledge of the two possessors. Therefore, knowledge that He the Exalted is the Lord of the Worlds is impossible without knowing the Worlds themselves.

The Worlds (al-ʿĀlamīn) refer to everything that exists besides Allah, and they are of three divisions: the corporeal bodies (al-muḥayyizāt), the separated intelligences (al-mufāraqāt), and the attributes (al-ṣifāt).

The corporeal bodies are either simple elements (basā’iṭ) or composites (murakkabāt). The simple elements are the celestial spheres (al-aflāk) and the stars (al-kawākib), and the primary elements (al-ummahāt). The composites are the three types of generated beings (al-mawālīd).

It has not been proven by evidence that there are no bodies other than these three divisions. It has been established by proof that an infinite void exists outside the cosmos. It has also been established by proof that Allah is capable of all possibilities. Thus, He is capable of creating a million worlds outside this cosmos, each one greater and more massive than this world, and in each, everything found in this world—the Throne, the Footstool, the heavens, the earths, the sun, and the moon—could exist. The philosophers' proofs for the oneness of the world are weak and flimsy, built upon shaky premises.

Abu al-ʿAlā’ al-Maʿarrī said:

O people, how many orbits has Allah, In which the stars, sun, and moon run! Our past and future are easy for Allah, So we have no concern in regions other than His.

The inquiry into these divisions of the corporeal bodies mentioned encompasses thousands upon thousands of issues. Indeed, if a person abandoned everything else and sought to encompass the wonders of the minerals generated within the wombs of mountains—the metals, pure stones, various kinds of sulfur, arsenic, and salts—and to know the wonders of plants with their flowers, lights, and fruits, and the wonders of the divisions of animals—beasts, wild animals, birds, and insects—their lifespan would be exhausted in studying a small fraction of these topics, never reaching their depths, as Allah says: ^ { And if all the trees on earth were pens, and the ocean [were ink], with seven more oceans besides it [to add to its ink], the words of Allah would not be exhausted } ^ [Luqman: 27]. All of these, in their entirety, fall under His saying:

Lord of the Worlds ?

The Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Know that Mercy (Raḥmah) means deliverance from various afflictions and the conveyance of good to those in need. Deliverance from the divisions of afflictions cannot be known except after knowing the divisions of afflictions themselves, which are numerous and known only to Allah. Whoever wishes to know a little of them should consult medical books to grasp the categories of diseases that can arise in every organ and part. Then, they should reflect on how Allah guided the intellects of creation to know the categories of foods and medicines from minerals, plants, and animals. If one delves into this subject, they will find it a boundless sea.

Galen narrated that when he composed his book on the functions of the eye, he withheld mentioning the wisdom of Allah in creating the two hollow nerves that meet at one point. He then saw in a dream a king descending from heaven saying, "Your Lord says: Why did you withhold the mention of My wisdom from My servants?" So, he awoke and composed a book on it.

Galen also said that his spleen had thickened, and he treated it with everything he knew, but it was of no use. He saw in a vision a king descending from heaven ordering him to bleed the vein between the little finger and the ring finger. Most medical signs in their beginnings conclude with such hints and inspirations. When a person grasps such discussions, they realize that the categories of Allah's mercy upon His servants are beyond control and enumeration.

Master of the Day of Recompense

Know that man is like a traveler in this world; his years are like leagues, his months like miles, and his breaths like steps. His goal is to reach the Hereafter, for there lies the attainment of lasting good deeds. When one witnesses the wonders of the dominion of the earth and the heavens along the way, they should consider how wondrous the state of the Hereafter will be in terms of joy, delight, and happiness.

Knowing this, we say: His saying

Master of the Day of Recompense points to the issues of the Resurrection (Maʿād), Gathering (Ḥashr), and Resurrection (Nashr). These are of two types: purely rational (ʿaqlīyah maḥḍah) and transmitted/revealed (samʿīyah).

The purely rational issues include our statement: this world can be destroyed and annihilated, and then it can be brought back again; and this human being, after death, can be restored. This domain is only complete through an inquiry into the reality of the soul's essence, the nature of its states and attributes, how it survives after the body, and the explanation of Allah's power to restore it. These discussions require approximately five hundred subtle rational issues.

The transmitted issues are of three types:

1. The states occurring before the Day of Resurrection, including the minor and major signs, such as the Ten Signs we will mention, along with their states.
2. The states occurring at the time of the Resurrection, such as the manner of the blowing of the Trumpet, the death of creatures, the destruction of the heavens and stars, and the death of both spiritual and physical beings.
3. The states occurring after the Resurrection, detailing the conditions of the Assembly (Mawqif), which are numerous. This includes how creation stands, the states they witness, the presence of the angels and prophets (peace be upon them), the manner of reckoning, the weighing of deeds, one group going to Paradise and another to Hell, the description of the people of Paradise and the people of Hell, and the explanation of the states of the inhabitants of Paradise and Hell after their arrival, including the words they utter and the actions they perform.

The sum of these rational and transmitted issues likely reaches thousands of issues, all falling under

Master of the Day of Recompense .

You (alone) we worship, and You (alone) we ask for help

Know that worship (ʿibādah) means performing an action commanded with the intention of glorifying the Commander. If it is not established by proof that this world has one God, capable of infinite possibilities, knowing infinite knowables, and independent of all needs—and that He commanded His servants certain things and forbade others, and that creatures must obey Him and submit to His commands—then the requirements of

You (alone) we worship cannot be fulfilled.

After completing the aforementioned station, it is necessary to detail the divisions of these obligations and explain the types of commands and prohibitions. All that has been compiled in the books of Jurisprudence (Fiqh) falls under the obligations of Allah. Just as it includes the obligations of Allah according to this Shari'ah, it also includes the obligations Allah imposed on previous prophets through their respective Shari'ahs. Furthermore, it includes the Shari'ahs by which Allah tasked the angels in the heavens since He created them and commanded them to engage in worship and obedience.

Books of Fiqh also contain explanations of obligations related to the actions of the limbs. However, the divisions of obligations concerning the actions of the hearts are greater, more magnificent, and more sublime. These are covered in books of ethics (Akhlāq) and politics (Siyāsāt) according to different nations and peoples.

When a person considers the totality of these discussions and knows that they all fall under

You (alone) we worship , they realize that the issues encompassed by this verse are like the surrounding ocean, of which intellects and thoughts can only grasp a small part.

Guide us to the straight path

Know that this means requesting guidance (hidāyah). There are two paths to attaining guidance:

1. Seeking knowledge through proof and argument.
2. Purifying the inner self (taṣfiyat al-bāṭin) and spiritual discipline (riyāḍah).

The paths of inference (istidlāl) are infinite, as there is not a single atom in the higher or lower world that does not testify to His divinity, His might, and the glory of His self-sufficiency. As someone said:

And in everything, there is a sign for Him, Indicating that He is One.

The proof is that the bodies of the world are equal in the essence of corporeality but differ in attributes such as colors, locations, and states. It is impossible for the specific assignment of a particular attribute to each body to be due to corporeality or its necessities, as that would necessitate equality (among them). Therefore, it must be due to the specification of a Specifier and the arrangement of an Arranger. If that Specifier is a body, the argument returns to it. If it is not a body, then that is the desired conclusion. Furthermore, if that existent entity is not living, knowing, and powerful, but its effect is through emanation and nature, the necessity of equality returns. If it is living, knowing, and powerful, that is the desired conclusion.

Once this is known, it is clear that every atom in the heavens and the earth is a truthful witness and a speaking informant of the existence of the Wise, Knowing, Capable God. My esteemed father, Shaykh Imam Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn ʿUmar (may Allah have mercy on him), used to say that in every single, indivisible substance (jawhar fard), Allah the Exalted has an infinite number of proofs indicating His power, wisdom, and mercy. This is because every single substance can potentially exist in an infinite number of places, and it can potentially be described by an infinite number of attributes. Each of these potential states indicates a need for the existence of the Wise, Merciful Creator. Thus, what we have mentioned proves that this type of discussion is infinite.

As for attaining guidance through spiritual discipline and purification, that is a boundless sea. Every traveler toward Allah has a specific path and a particular source, as He says: And to each [religious following] is a direction toward which it turns. The intellects cannot grasp these secrets, nor do the understandings have news from the starting points of those lights. The realized Gnostics (ʿārifūn muḥaqqiqūn) have perceived deep issues and subtle secrets within this realm, which the understanding of most people rarely reaches.

The path of those upon whom You have bestowed favor, not of those who have earned Your wrath, nor of those who go astray

How great are these stations and how lofty are these ranks! Whoever grasps the explanations we have provided can access the beginnings of these states. It has become clear through the preceding exposition that this Surah encompasses infinite discussions and limitless secrets. The statement of whoever says this Surah contains ten thousand issues is merely speech tailored to the understanding of the listeners.

Chapter Two

On establishing another framework indicating that numerous issues can be derived from few words.

Let us speak about our statement

I seek refuge in Allah . We say: Aʿūdhu (I seek refuge) is a type of present tense verb (fiʿl muḍāriʿ), and the present tense verb is a type of verb (fiʿl). The Bā’ in in Allah is the Bā’ of attachment, which is a type of preposition (ḥarf jarr), and prepositions are a type of particle (ḥarf).

Our statement

Allah is a specific noun (ism), either a proper noun (ism ʿalam) or a derived noun (ism mushtaqq), depending on the difference of opinion. The proper noun and the derived noun are each a type of the general category of 'noun' (ism).

In the rational sciences, it is established that knowledge of a species (nawʿ) is impossible without prior knowledge of its genus (jins), because the genus is a part of the essence of the species, and knowledge of the simple must precede knowledge of the composite. Therefore, knowledge of

I seek refuge in Allah as it should be cannot be attained except after first knowing the noun, the verb, and the particle. This knowledge is only achieved after mentioning their definitions and characteristics. After that, it is necessary to divide the noun into the proper noun, the derived noun, and the noun of genus, defining each division by its limit, form, and characteristics. Following that, one must discuss whether the word {Allah} is a proper noun or a derived noun, and if derived, from what it is derived, mentioning the many views held on this.

Furthermore, one must investigate the reality of the absolute verb, then mention the divisions of the verb, among which is the present tense verb, stating its definition, characteristics, and divisions. Then, the discussions related to the specific meaning of

I seek refuge must be mentioned. Also, one must investigate the reality of the absolute particle, then mention the definition, characteristics, and rulings of the preposition. Then, the definition and characteristics of the Bā’ of attachment must be mentioned. Upon completing all these discussions, one attains complete knowledge of the verbal issues related to I seek refuge in Allah , and the discussions we have pointed to are very numerous.

We then say: The fourth rank of inquiry is to state that the noun, verb, and particle are three types falling under the genus of the kalimah (word). Therefore, one must also investigate the essence and characteristics of the kalimah. Moreover, there are other terms similar to kalimah, such as kalām (speech), qawl (saying), lafẓ (utterance), lughah (language), and ʿibārah (expression). One must investigate each of these, and then discuss whether they are synonymous or distinct terms. If they are distinct, the differences must be detailed exhaustively.

We then say: The fifth rank of inquiry is to state that these words arise from sounds and letters. Therefore, one must investigate the reality of sound and the causes of its existence. It is certain that the occurrence of sound in an animal is due to the breath exiting the chest. At this point, one must investigate the reality of the soul (nafs) and the wisdom behind man being necessarily breathing. One must also investigate whether this sound occurs due to drawing the breath in or pushing it out. These discussions require knowledge of the states of the heart and lungs, knowledge of the diaphragm (the primary source of sound movement), and knowledge of the other muscles that move the abdomen, larynx, tongue, and lips. Regarding the letter (ḥarf), one must investigate whether it is the sound itself or a form existing within the sound, distinct from it. Furthermore, these letters are generated by segmenting the sound at specific exit points in the throat, tongue, teeth, and lips. Thus, one must investigate the states of these constrictions, and also the states of the muscles by which animals are enabled to bring forth the many types of genera into existence. These discussions are only fully elucidated upon grasping the science of anatomy.

We then say: The sixth rank of inquiry is that the particle and sound are sensible qualities perceived by the sense of hearing, while colors and lights are sensible qualities perceived by sight, and tastes by taste, and so on for all sensible qualities. Is it correct to say that these qualities are types falling under one genus, yet they are entirely different in essence, sharing only external necessities, or not?

We then say: The seventh rank of inquiry is that sensible qualities are one type under the genus of Quality (Kayf) in the common view. Therefore, one must investigate the definition of the category of Quality, and then whether its application to what falls under it is the genus applying to the species, or not.

We then say: The eighth rank is that the category of Quality, the category of Quantity, and the category of Relation are accidents (ʿaraḍ). Therefore, one must investigate the category of Accident and its divisions, rulings, and consequences.

We then say: The ninth rank is that Accident and Substance (Jawhar) share in falling under the Possible (Mumkin), and the Possible and the Necessary (Wājib) share in falling under the Existent (Mawjūd). Therefore, one must investigate the consequences of existence and non-existence, and how the Existent and the Possible are categorized—whether it is the genus applying to its species, or the necessities applying to their subjects, and all other discussions related to this chapter.

We then say: The tenth rank is to state that the known, the mentioned, and the reported upon include the existent and the non-existent. How can one conceive of something more general than the existent? Some say the presumed (maẓnūn) is more general than the known (maʿlūm). Moreover, even if the most general consideration is the known, the thing, until its reality is known, judgment about it being the opposite of something else is impossible. When we judge that the unknown is the opposite of the known, the unknown must become known, which is impossible.

Whoever considers these ten ranks for every part of the existing things will have opened up infinite avenues of discussion, and their intellect cannot encompass even a small fraction of them. Thus, the manner of deriving numerous sciences from few utterances becomes clear.

Chapter Three

On establishing another framework to validate what we mentioned regarding deriving numerous issues from this Surah.

Know that if we mention one issue in this book and prove its correctness with ten arguments, each of those arguments and proofs is an issue in itself. If we then cite five doubts regarding it, each of those is also an independent issue. If we answer each of them with two or three responses, those three answers are also three issues. If we say, for example, "The words used by the Arabs come in sixty ways," and we detail those ways, this statement is, in reality, sixty issues. This is because an issue has no meaning other than a point of question and assertion. Since each of these ways is such, each one is a separate issue.

Once you grasp this subtlety, we say: If we consider the discussions related to the noun and the verb, and descend from them to the discussions related to the divisions of verbs, and then to the discussions related to the existent and the non-existent, the necessary and the possible, the substance and the accident, the category of Quality and how it divides into sensible and non-sensible qualities, the discussions related to sound and how it occurs, and the muscles that produce sounds and letters—the matter becomes immense, and the scope widens.

However, we will begin in this book with the discussions related to the kalimah, kalām, qawl, lafẓ, and ʿibārah, then descend to the discussions related to the noun, verb, and particle, and then descend further to the divisions of nouns, verbs, and particles until we reach the three types present in

I seek refuge in Allah . We ask for Allah's abundant grace to grant us success in reaching this noble objective.

Book One

On the Sciences Derived from the statement (I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan).

Know that the sciences derived from this phrase are of two types:

1. Discussions related to language and grammar (Iʿrāb).
2. Discussions related to the principles (Uṣūl) and branches (Furūʿ) [of religion/knowledge].

The first section of this book is on the literary discussions related to this phrase, and it contains chapters.

Chapter One

On the discussions related to the kalimah and what resembles it, containing issues.

The minor derivation is like deriving the past and future forms from the verbal noun (maṣdar), and deriving the active participle (ism fāʿil), passive participle (ism mafʿūl), and others from it.

The major derivation is that when a word is composed of letters, it is necessarily capable of permutations (inqilābāt). We say: The first rank of this composition is when the word is composed of two letters, like min (from) and qulb (heart, if we consider the root letters). Such a word accepts only two types of permutation, like min and nim. After this rank is when the word is composed of three letters, like ḥ-m-d (praise). This word accepts six types of permutations because each of the three letters can be made the beginning, and for each of these three possibilities, the remaining two letters can be arranged in two ways (3 x 2 = 6).

After this rank is when the word is four letters, like ʿaqrab (scorpion) or thaʿlab (fox). These accept twenty-four permutations (4 x 6 = 24).

After this rank is when the word is five letters, like safarjal (quince). This accepts one hundred and twenty permutations (5 x 24 = 120).

The rule in this chapter is: If you know the possible permutations for the smallest number, and you wish to know the number of possible permutations for the number above it, multiply the upper number by the resulting number of permutations for the upper number. And Allah knows best.

The jurists argued for the correctness of their view with several points:

1. The rational people have agreed that kalām is what opposes muteness and silence. Uttering a single kalimah opposes muteness and silence, so it must be kalām.
2. The derivation of kalimah is from kalam (wound/impact). It is known that when one hears a single kalimah, they understand its meaning; thus, a meaning of impact has occurred, so it must be kalām.
3. It is correct to say, "So-and-so spoke this single kalimah," and it is also correct to say, "He only spoke with this single kalimah." All this indicates that a single kalimah is kalām, otherwise it would not be correct to say "He spoke with the single kalimah."
4. It is correct to say, "So-and-so spoke incomplete speech (kalām ghayr tām)," which indicates that achieving complete meaning is not a prerequisite for the name kalām.

Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions said: Yes, it is constituted. Zufar said: No, it is not constituted. Zufar's argument: When he said the second time, "If I speak to you," the condition was met at this point because the term kalām is a name for anything that conveys something, whether it conveys a complete meaning or not. When the condition is met, the consequence occurs, and divorce happens upon his saying "If I speak to you." The remainder of his statement, "you are divorced," falls outside the completion of the marriage contract and is not an appendage to it, so it should not be constituted. Abū Ḥanīfah's argument: The condition—his saying "If I speak to you"—is incomplete. Kalām is the name for a complete sentence. Therefore, divorce only occurs upon the completion of his statement, "If I speak to you, then you are divorced." In summary: If we say the term kalām includes a single kalimah, the view is Zufar's. If we say it only includes a complete sentence, the view is Abū Ḥanīfah's.

What strengthens Zufar's view is that if he said the second time, "If I speak to you," and remained silent without saying "you are divorced," divorce would occur. If this amount were not kalām, divorce would not occur.

What strengthens Abū Ḥanīfah's view is that if he said, "Every time I speak to you, you are divorced," and then repeated this statement the second time, the word kullamā necessitates repetition. If speaking a single kalimah constituted kalām, then upon his saying the second time, "Every time I speak to you," and remaining silent, three divorces should occur because this totality includes the mention of many kalimāt, each of which necessitates divorce. I say: Perhaps Zufar would maintain that.

Another said:

And his two eyes told him, "Hear and obey," And they streamed like pearls when pierced.

And he said:

The basin filled up and said: "Enough for me! Gently, gently, you have filled my belly!"

It is said in a proverb: The wall said to the peg, "Why did you split me?" The peg replied, "Ask the one behind me, for what is behind me has not left me alone, nor my opinion." This is similar to His saying:

Indeed, Our word to a thing when We intend it is that We say to it, "Be," and it is, and it comes to be [An-Nahl: 40], and His saying: Then He said to it and to the earth, "Come [into being] willingly or by compulsion." They said, "We come willingly." [Fussilat: 11].

Those who deny that the meaning residing in the soul is called kalām argued that whoever does not utter letters is said not to have spoken. Furthermore, the binding nature of oaths and vows relates to these utterances. Some of our scholars say that the term qawl and kalām is shared between the mental meaning and the verbal utterance.

The primary objective is the perfection of the soul's essence through knowledge and action. The creation of the body is the second level of desirability. The creation of the heart as a source of innate heat is the third level. The heart's capacity for expansion, drawing in good air for ventilation, is the fourth. The heart's capacity for contraction, expelling the heated air, is the fifth. The Wise Determiner and Merciful Manager made this desired outcome (the expulsion of air) the material for sound (the seventh level). He created constrictions and stops for the sound in the throat, tongue, teeth, and lips. Through this cause, these different letters occur, and from their compositions, infinite words arise. He deposited high wisdom and dazzling secrets in this articulation and speech, whose depths the intellects of the first and last generations are incapable of grasping even a drop of their ocean or a spark of their sun. Glory be to the Creator, the Arranger with manifest wisdom and infinite power.

The proof that the mental request is different from the will is that Allah the Exalted commanded the disbeliever to believe, and this is agreed upon, but He did not will that the belief occur. If He had willed it, it would have occurred. This is supported by two points:

1. If the disbeliever's power necessitates disbelief, then the Creator of that power wills disbelief, because the willer of the cause wills the effect. If the power is capable of both disbelief and belief, it is impossible to prefer one over the other without a preferer. If that preferer is from the servant, the first division returns to it. If it is from Allah, then the totality of power plus the call necessitates disbelief, and the willer of the cause wills the effect. Thus, it is established that He wills disbelief from the disbeliever.
2. Allah the Exalted knows that the disbeliever disbelieves. The occurrence of this knowledge is contrary to the occurrence of belief, and combining two opposites is impossible. The one who knows a thing is impossible to occur does not will it. Thus, it is established that He commanded the disbeliever to believe, and it is established that He does not will the belief from him, so the signified of Allah's command must be an action other than the will. This is what is sought.

The proof that the mental judgment is different from belief and knowledge is that when a speaker says, "The world is eternal," the signified of this utterance is the speaker's judgment of the eternity of the world. Yet, the speaker might verbally say this while believing the world is not eternal. Thus, we know that the mental judgment is present while belief is absent, so the mental judgment is different from belief.

Book Two

On the discussions derived from sound and letters and their rulings, containing issues.

Those who affirm the eternity of letters argued with reason and transmission: Reason: Each of these letters has a specific essence by which it is distinguished from others, and essences do not accept cessation or non-existence, so they must be eternal. Transmission: The speech of Allah is eternal, and the speech of Allah is nothing but these letters, so the eternity of these letters must be affirmed. The speech of Allah is eternal because speech is a perfection, and its absence is a defect. If Allah's speech were not eternal, it would imply that He was deficient in eternity and then became perfect later, which is contrary to the consensus of Muslims.

We only say that Allah's speech is these letters for several reasons:

1. His saying:

And if any one of the polytheists seeks your protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the word of Allah [At-Tawbah: 6]. It is known that what is heard is nothing but these letters, indicating that these letters are the Word of Allah. 2. If someone swears by hearing the Word of Allah, the fulfillment of the oath depends on hearing these letters. 3. It is transmitted to us by tawātur that the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to say: "This Qur'an, which is heard and recited, is the Word of Allah." Whoever denies it denies what is known by tawātur of the religion of Muhammad (peace be upon him), which necessitates disbelief.

Response to Reason: What you mentioned is not specific to one essence over another, so you must affirm the eternity of all things. Response to Transmission: What you mentioned in inference is hidden compared to self-evident truths, so it is false.

Book Three

On the discussions related to the Noun, Verb, and Particle, containing issues.

Second Definition: The noun is what can come as an agent (fāʿil), object (mafʿūl), or possessor (muḍāf). Its essence reverts to the noun being what can be reported about.

Third Definition: The noun is a kalimah deserving of grammatical inflection (iʿrāb) at the time of its initial assignment. This is also a description because the correctness of inflection is a state that occurs after the essence is complete. The phrase "at the time of its initial assignment" excludes two things:

1. Indeclinables (mabniyyāt), which do not accept inflection due to a similarity with particles. If not for this similarity, they would accept inflection.
2. The present tense verb is inflected, but not inherently, rather due to its similarity to the noun. This definition is also weak.

Fourth Definition: Al-Zamakhsharī said in Al-Mufaṣṣal: "The noun is what denotes a meaning in itself, a denotation devoid of association." This definition is flawed in several ways:

1. In defining kalimah, he said it is the utterance denoting a singular meaning by convention. In the marginalia of Al-Mufaṣṣal, he stated that mentioning "utterance" was necessary because if we said the kalimah is what denotes meaning, it would be contradicted by contracts, writing, and gesture, which are not nouns.
2. The pronoun in "in itself" (fī nafsihi) either refers to the denoter, the signified, or a third thing. If it refers to the denoter, the meaning becomes: The noun is what denotes a meaning that is its signified—this is circular. Moreover, it is contradicted by the particle and the verb, as they denote their signifieds. If it refers to the signified, the meaning becomes: The noun denotes a meaning existing within that meaning itself, which implies that the thing exists within itself, which is impossible. If they say "existing in itself" means it does not exist in anything else, we say this definition is contradicted by the nouns of attributes and relations, as their signifieds exist in other things.

Fifth Definition: The noun is a kalimah denoting a meaning independently knowable, without indicating the specific time in which that meaning occurred. We mention kalimah to exclude writing, contracts, and gesture. If they ask why we didn't say "utterance denoting such-and-such," we say we made lafẓ the genus for kalimah, and kalimah the genus for the noun; what is mentioned in the definition is the near genus, not the distant one.

Regarding the constraint of independent knowability: Some say it is false both ways (positively and negatively). Positively (All knowable things are independently knowable):

1. Everything knowable must be independently knowable, because until the essence of a thing is conceived, it cannot be conceived with something else. Since its conception alone precedes its conception with something else, it is independently knowable.
2. The concept of a particle is independently knowable in its lack of independent knowability—this is itself independent knowledge.
3. Grammarians agree that Bā’ implies attachment, and min implies partiality. If the meaning of attachment were independently knowable, the meaning implied by Bā’ would be independently knowable, making the particle a noun. If it is not independently knowable, the meaning of attachment would not be independently knowable, making the noun a particle.

Negatively (Some non-independently knowable things are nouns): Words like kam, kayfa, matā, idhā, and interrogative/conditional mā are all nouns, yet their signifieds are not independently knowable, nor are relative pronouns (mawṣūlāt). The third point against the constraint is that words like zamān (time), ghad (tomorrow), yawm (day), iṣṭibāḥ (morning meal), and ightibāq (evening meal) are nouns, yet they denote time.

Response to the first point: We perceive a difference between saying "attachment" and the Bā’ in "I wrote with the pen." We mean this degree of independence. Response to the second point (time words): The signified of these words is time itself; they do not denote another time for their signified. Response to iṣṭibāḥ and ightibāq: Part of them is time, and the verb indicates a time external to the signified. What indicates this is saying ightabaqa yaghtabiqu (he took the evening meal), where past and future are added to iṣṭibāḥ and ightibāq.

Second Definition: It is what is attributed to something, but nothing is attributed to it. This is contradicted by idhā and kayfa, as these nouns must be attributed to something else, and nothing else can be attributed to them.

Third Definition: Al-Zamakhsharī said the verb is what denotes the association of an event with a time. This is weak for two reasons:

1. We must say "a kalimah denoting the association of an event with a time," because if we didn't specify kalimah, the phrase "association of an event with a time" itself would be a composite of words denoting this, yet it is not a verb. Specifying kalimah avoids this, as the composite phrase is not a single kalimah.
2. If we didn't specify kalimah, it would be contradicted by writing, contracts, and gesture.
3. Since kalimah is the near genus for these three, mentioning the near genus is necessary in the definition.

Fourth Definition: The verb is a kalimah denoting the affirmation of the verbal noun (maṣdar) for an unspecified thing in a specific time. We say kalimah because it is the near genus. We say "affirmation of the maṣdar" and not "affirmation of something" because the maṣdar can be an established thing (like in ḍaraba and qattala) or non-existent (like the maṣdar of fanīya - perished, and ʿadam - non-existence). We say "unspecified thing" because we will prove this measure is considered. We say "in a specific time" to exclude nouns.

There are discussions regarding these constraints: Constraint 1: Denoting the affirmation of the maṣdar for something.

1. If we say "Allah created the world," does khalaqa (created) denote the affirmation of creation for Allah, or not? If not, the constraint is void. If yes, that creation must be different from the created. If it is contingent, it requires another creation, leading to infinite regress. If it is eternal, it necessitates the eternity of the created, contradicting its contingency.
2. If we say "The thing existed," does this denote the occurrence of existence for something, or not? If not, the constraint is void. If yes, it implies existence occurred for something else, which must exist in itself, otherwise, its existence requires another existence, leading to infinite regress.
3. If we say "The thing's non-existence" or "it perished," this implies the occurrence of non-existence and perishing for that essence, which is impossible, as non-existence and perishing are pure negation.
4. If existence is an addition to the essence, then saying "existence occurred for this essence" is true, implying another existence for that existence, leading to infinite regress. If existence is the essence itself, saying "the thing became contingent/occurred" does not imply the occurrence of existence for that thing, otherwise existence would be an addition to the essence, which we are currently negating.

Constraint 2: In a specific time.

1. If we say "Time existed" or "Time perished," this implies time occurring in another time, leading to infinite regress. If they say, "It is sufficient for the validity of this definition that time occurs in another time according to false imagination," we say the entire community agrees that saying "Time occurred after being non-existent" is true speech, so if it were as they claim, it would be false.
2. If we say "The world was non-existent in eternity," saying kāna (was) is a verb. If this implies the occurrence of time, it necessitates time being eternal, which is impossible. If they say that time is estimated, not actual, we say mental estimation, if it matches reality, returns to the original question; if it doesn't match, it is a lie, invalidating the definition.
3. If we say "Allah was existent in eternity," this implies Allah is temporal, which is impossible.
4. It is contradicted by imperfect verbs (al-afʿāl an-nāqiṣah). If imperfect, they either denote an event in a time or not. If they denote an event in a specific time, they are complete, not imperfect. If they do not denote time, they should not be verbs.
5. It is invalidated by interjection nouns (asmā’ al-afʿāl), as they denote utterances indicating a specific time, and what denotes what denotes something also denotes that thing. Thus, these nouns denote a specific time.
6. The active participle (ism al-fāʿil) denotes the present or future, never the past, so it denotes a specific time.

Response: The first four questions regarding the maṣdar and the three questions regarding time are answered by saying that for the linguist, conceiving the meaning is sufficient, whether it is true or false. Regarding imperfect verbs, what I hold is that the word kāna is absolutely complete, but the noun attributed to kāna might be an independent essence (like "occurred/happened") or a description of something else (like "Zayd was standing"). In the latter case, kāna means occurrence, but since relation cannot be mentioned without mentioning the related parties, both must be mentioned. Regarding the fifth point, we say that what is considered for a word to be a verb is its indication of time primarily, not secondarily. Regarding the sixth point, we disagree that the active participle is restricted to present/future; if kāna means past, it does not operate like a verb, but if it means present, it does.

Second Form: Your saying, "Zayd in the house" (Zaydun fī al-dār). Zaydun is the subject, and the predicate is what is indicated by "in" (fī). The meaning implied by the adverbial sense can be "in the house" or "in the mosque." Thus, fī is specified by "the house" to distinguish this adverbial sense from other types. If they argue this sentence is meaningful because the estimation is "Zayd settled in the house" or "Zayd is settled in the house," we say this is false because istaqarra (settled) means "occurrence of settling," so saying fī implies another occurrence—that the occurrence of that settling happened within it—leading to infinite regress, which is impossible. Thus, "Zayd in the house" is established as complete speech and cannot be suspended on an implied verb.

Chapter Four

On the divisions of the Noun into its types, from several perspectives.

Second Ruling: They agreed that species have proper nouns. "Lion" (asad) is a noun of genus for this reality, while "Usaamah" is a proper noun for it. I say: The difference between the noun of genus and the proper noun of genus is twofold:

1. The proper noun of genus is what conveys the specific individual as the specific individual. If we name many individuals with the name Zayd, it is not because the word Zayd is assigned to the common attribute shared by these individuals, but because the word Zayd was assigned to define this specific entity as this entity, and to define that entity as that entity, through shared usage. Knowing this, we say: If the assigner said, "I assigned the word Usaamah to convey the essence of each individual lion as that specific one, through verbal sharing," that would be the proper noun of genus. If he said, "I assigned the word asad to convey only the essence, the common attribute among these individuals, without indicating the specific individual," that would be the noun of genus. Thus, the difference between the noun of genus and the proper noun of genus is clear.
2. They found that Usaamah is a non-diptote (ghayr munṣarif). They established that a noun is not exempted from declension unless two factors are present. They found the feminine marker in this word but nothing else besides the proper noun status, so they concluded it is a proper noun for this meaning.

Third Ruling: The wisdom behind assigning proper nouns is that sometimes a species is singled out for a specific ruling, and it becomes necessary to report about it with that specific ruling. This specific report is impossible without mentioning the reported-about entity specifically. Thus, proper nouns were needed for this wisdom.

Fourth Ruling: Since different needs arise for human individuals more than for other entities, proper nouns are more frequently assigned to human individuals than to other entities. The proper noun can be a name (ism), an epithet (laqab), or a kunya (patronymic).

Fifth Ruling: Divisions of Proper Nouns (from several perspectives):

1. The proper noun is either a name (like Ibrāhīm, Mūsā, ʿĪsā), an epithet (like Isrā’īl), or a kunya (like Abū Lahab). This division entails rulings.
   • First Ruling: Some theologians stated that the proper noun conveys no benefit at all.
   • Second Ruling: Some individuals have only a name, some only an epithet, some only a kunya, or combinations thereof. Sībawayh provided examples for the combinations of kunya and ism: a. Having both name and kunya: The hyena (ḍabʿ) is named Ḥaḍājir and its kunya is Umm ʿĀmir. The lion is Usaamah, kunya Abū al-Ḥārith. The fox is Thuʿālah, kunya Abū al-Ḥuṣayn. The scorpion is Shabah, kunya Umm ʿUrīṭ. b. Having only the name, not the kunya: Like Quthm (a name for a hyena that has no kunya). c. Having only the kunya, no name: Like Abū Barāqish for a specific animal.
   • Third Ruling: The kunya can be formed by attribution to fathers, mothers, sons, or daughters. Attribution to fathers (e.g., Abū Jaʿdah for the wolf). Attribution to mothers (e.g., Umm Ḥabū Karī for a calamity, Umm Laylā for wine). Attribution to sons (e.g., Ibn Da’yah for the crow, Ibn Jallā for a man whose state is exposed). Attribution to daughters (e.g., Daughter of the Mountain for the echo, Daughter of the Earth for a small stone).
   • Fourth Ruling: The attribution in the kunya can be of unknown lineage (like Ibn ʿUrs, Ibn Qabān) or known lineage (like Ibn Labūn, Bint Labūn, Ibn Makhāḍ, Bint Makhāḍ), referring to the age of the she-camel's offspring.
   • Fifth Ruling: If the name and epithet are combined, the name is either possessive (muḍāf) or not. If not possessive, the name is attributed to the epithet (e.g., "This is Saʿīd Karaz"), making the combination function as a single name. If the name is possessive, the epithet is stated separately (e.g., "This is ʿAbdullāh Baṭṭah").
   • Sixth Ruling: Reasons for acquiring a kunya: Reporting a fact (like Abū Ṭālib, named after his son Ṭālib), optimism (like Abū ʿAmr for one hoping for a long-lived son, or Abū al-Faḍl for one hoping for a virtuous son), hinting at the opposite (like Abū Yaḥyā for death), mutual recognition between famous father and son (Yūsuf’s kunya is Abū Yaʿqūb, and Yaʿqūb’s is Abū Yūsuf), or being famous for a trait, whether by possessing it or being attributed to it closely or distantly.

Chapter Five

On the rulings of Nouns of Species and Derived Nouns, which are numerous.

Second Ruling: Nouns of species precede derived nouns in rank because a derived noun branches off from the noun from which it is derived. If that noun were also derived, it would lead to infinite regress or circularity, both impossible. Therefore, derivations must terminate in established, static nouns. The established is independent of the derived, and the derived needs the established, so the established must precede the derived in rank. This shows that the diligent effort of linguists and grammarians to make every word derived from something else is a futile endeavor.

Third Ruling: An existent is either necessary or possible. The possible is either corporeal or an accident in a corporeal entity, or neither corporeal nor an accident in one. The perception of the latter category is rare; perception is mainly of the first two. It is established by proof that corporeal entities are equal in their very selves, and the difference between them is due to the attributes inherent in them. The names applied to each type of body are the sum of the essence plus the specific attributes inherent in it—this is the ruling in the most common cases.

Second Ruling: The condition for the truthfulness of a derived noun is the current existence of what it is derived from. Evidence: If someone was a disbeliever and then embraced Islam, it is true to say he is not a disbeliever. This indicates that the continued existence of the source is a condition for the truthfulness of the derived noun.

Third Ruling: If what it is derived from is a composite essence whose parts cannot coexist (like speech or prayer), the derived noun is only truly applicable when the last part of those components is present.

Fourth Ruling: What is implied by the striker (ḍārib) is "something that has striking." Whether that something is a body or otherwise is external to the implication and known only through necessary implication.

Chapter Six

On the division of the Noun into Inflected (Muʿrab) and Indeclinable (Mabnī) and the rulings derived from these two divisions, containing issues.

Chapter Seven

On the Inflection of the Verb.

Know that

I seek refuge implies attributing the verb to the agent, so we must investigate these issues.

The second section of this book contains the exegesis of

I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan in transmitted and rational discussions, and it contains chapters.

Book Two

**On the discussions of

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful , containing chapters.

(The text continues with detailed linguistic and theological analysis of the Basmala, which is beyond the scope of the initial request focusing on Al-Fatiha's opening, but the structure is preserved as requested.)

Al-Fatiha: (1) In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful...

Regarding the implied word:

This implied word may be either a noun or a verb. In either case, it can be placed before or after the explicit word. Thus, there are four possibilities:

1. If it is placed before and is a verb: "I begin in the name of God."
2. If it is placed before and is a noun: "The beginning of speech is in the name of God."
3. If it is placed after and is a verb: "In the name of God, I begin."
4. If it is placed after and is a noun: "In the name of God is my beginning."

Here, two matters require investigation:

First: Is precedence (placing it first) better, or is postponement (placing it last) better?

Both forms appear in the Qur'an:

• Precedence: $\text{^{Bismillāhi majrāhā wa mursaāhā}} (In the name of God is its sailing and its anchoring).
• Postponement: \text{^{Iqra’ bismirabbika}} (Read in the name of your Lord).

My view is that precedence is superior, supported by several points:

1. God is eternally existent by His essence; thus, His existence precedes all else, and what is prior by essence deserves precedence in mention.
2. God states: \text{^{Huwa al-Awwalu wal-Ākhir}} (He is the First and the Last) [Al-Hadid: 3], and \text{^{Lillāhi al-amru min qablu wa min ba’d}} (To God belongs the command before and after) [Ar-Rum: 4].
3. Precedence in mention leads to greater glorification.
4. In \text{^{Iyyāka na’budu}} (Thee alone we worship), the verb follows the noun (pronoun). Therefore, in \text{^{Bismillāhi}} (In the name of God), the verb should also follow the noun, implying: "In the name of God, I begin."
5. My respected father, Diya’ al-Din Omar (may God be pleased with him), narrated that Shaykh Abu al-Qasim al-Ansari said that Shaykh Abu Sa’id ibn Abi al-Khayr al-Mihani attended a gathering with Ustadh Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri. Al-Qushayri said: "The verifiers (muhaqqiqūn) saw nothing except that they had seen God before it." I say: The reality of the matter is that moving from the created (creature) to the Creator (ms0116) is an indication of the Burhān al-Lamm (argument from consequence to cause), and descending from the Creator to the created is the Burhān al-Ān (argument from cause to consequence). The Burhān al-Lamm is more noble. If this is established, whoever implies the verb first is as if he moved from seeing his action to seeing the necessity of seeking aid through God's name. Whoever says "In the name of God" first and then implies the verb is as if he saw the necessity of seeking aid through God and then descended to his own states.

Second Issue:

Is implying the verb (ismu al-fi’l) superior, or implying the noun (ismu al-ism)?

Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Razi argued that the sequence of Qur'anic recitation indicates that the implied word is the verb (the command), because God says: \text{^{Iyyāka na’budu wa iyyāka nasta’īn}} (Thee alone we worship, and Thee alone we ask for help). The implication is: "Say: Thee alone we worship, and Thee alone we ask for help." Similarly, in \text{^{Bismillāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} (In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful), the implication is: "Say: In the name of God."

I argue that implying the noun is superior. If we take the implication to be "In the name of God, I begin everything," this is a statement about His being the Originator of all occurrences and the Creator of all beings, whether someone says it or not, and whether someone remembers it or not. This possibility is undoubtedly superior. The full discussion on this will follow when explaining whether one should say "Say: Praise be to God" or simply "Praise be to God," as the latter is a statement about His inherent worthiness of praise, regardless of whether a speaker utters it.

Third Issue:

The genitive case (al-jarr) is achieved by two things:

1. By a preposition, as in \text{^{bism}} (in the name).
2. By iḍāfah (genitive construction), as in \text{^{Allāhi}} in \text{^{bismillāhi}} (the name of God).

The genitive case in \text{^{r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} (the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful) occurs because the adjective follows the noun it describes in inflection. Here, there are several points of discussion:

1. Why do prepositions necessitate the genitive case?
2. Why does iḍāfah necessitate the genitive case?
3. Is the effect of the preposition stronger, or the effect of iḍāfah?
4. Into how many categories does iḍāfah fall?

They say that the iḍāfah of a thing to itself is impossible. Thus, iḍāfah must occur between a part and the whole, or between a thing and something external to it that is separate from its essence.

• The first type is like \text{^{bābu ḥadīdin}} (a door of iron) or \text{^{khātimu dhahabin}} (a ring of gold), because that door is part of the iron, and that ring is part of the gold.
• The second type is like \text{^{ghulāmu Zaydin}} (Zayd's servant), where the muḍāf ilayhi (the second term) is entirely different from the muḍāf (the first term).

As for the divisions of attribution and iḍāfah, they seem beyond precise enumeration and counting, as the types of attribution are infinite.

Fourth Issue:

The designation of a word as a "name" (ism) for something is a relationship between the specific utterance (the name) and the specific entity (the musammā, or named thing). The meaning of this relationship is that people have agreed to use that specific utterance to signify that specific entity. It is as if they said: "Whenever you hear this utterance from us, understand that we intend that specific meaning." Once this relationship is established between the name and the musammā, the iḍāfah of the name to God (\text{^{ismu Allāh}}) is valid. This is what is meant by the iḍāfah of the name to God Almighty.

Fifth Issue:

Abu ‘Ubayd stated that the word \text{^{ism}} (name) in \text{^{Bismillāh}} is an extra word (ṣilah zā’idah), and the implication is \text{^{billāh}} (by God). He said the word \text{^{ism}} was mentioned either for blessing or to distinguish it from an oath.

I say: The meaning of \text{^{Bismillāh}} is "Begin by saying Bismillāh." Abu ‘Ubayd’s statement is weak because when we are commanded to begin, this command pertains to an action of ours, which is our speech and utterance. Therefore, the meaning must be: "Begin by mentioning God," or "Begin by saying Bismillāh." Furthermore, the benefit lies in this: just as the essence of God Almighty is the most noble of essences, so too is the mention of Him the most noble of mentions, and His name the most noble of names. Just as His existence precedes all others, so too must the mention of Him precede all mentions, and His name precede all names. Under this interpretation, the word \text{^{ism}} yields these great benefits.

Chapter Two:

Concerning the reading and writing related to this word (Bismillāh)

There are many discussions related to its recitation:

There is consensus that stopping after \text{^{Bism}} is incomplete and ugly. Stopping after \text{^{Bismillāh}} or \text{^{Bismillāhi r-raḥmān}} is sufficient (kāf). Stopping after \text{^{Bismillāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} is complete (tāmm).

Note that stopping must occur in one of these three ways: incomplete, sufficient, or complete. Stopping after any utterance that is not self-explanatory is incomplete. Stopping after an utterance whose meaning is understood, but what follows is connected to it, is sufficient. Stopping after a complete utterance whose following part is disconnected from it is a complete stop.

However, one might ask: \text{^{Al-ḥamdu lillāhi rabbil-‘ālamīn}} (Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds) is a complete utterance, yet \text{^{r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} (the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful) is connected to it because they are attributes following the described noun. If it is permissible to separate the attribute from the described noun and make it an independent verse, why did they not say \text{^{Bismillāh}} is one verse, and then \text{^{r-raḥmān}} is a second verse, and \text{^{r-raḥīm}} is a third? If this is not permissible, how did they make \text{^{r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} an independent verse? This paradox requires an answer.

The reciters unanimously avoid emphasizing (thickening/heavy pronunciation of) the lām in \text{^{Bismillāh}} and \text{^{Al-ḥamdu lillāh}} (in the name of God / Praise be to God). The reason is that transitioning from a kasra (vowel 'i') to a heavy lām is difficult, as the kasra implies lowness, while the heavy lām is an elevated letter. The transition from lowness to ascent is heavy. They only approved of emphasizing the lām when it is in the nominative or accusative case, such as in \text{^{Allāhu laṭīfun bi-‘ibādih}} (God is kind to His servants) [Ash-Shura: 19], \text{^{Qul Huwa Allāhu Aḥad}} (Say: He is God, [the] One) [Al-Ikhlas: 1], and \text{^{Inna Allāha ishtarā min al-mu’minīna anfusahum}} (Indeed, God has purchased from the believers their lives) [At-Tawbah: 111].

They state that this emphasis serves two purposes:

1. To distinguish it from the word \text{^{lāt}} (idols) in remembrance.
2. The emphasis suggests glorification, and this word deserves exaggeration in glorification.
3. The light lām is articulated with the tip of the tongue, whereas this heavy lām is articulated with the entire tongue, requiring more physical effort, thus meriting greater reward. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the Torah: "O Moses, answer your Lord with your entire heart." Here, the human mentions his Lord with his entire tongue, indicating he mentions Him with his entire heart, which naturally leads to greater glorification.

One might argue: The relationship of the light lām to the heavy lām is like that of the letter dāl to ṭā’, or sīn to ṣād. The dāl is articulated with the tip of the tongue, while ṭā’ is articulated with the entire tongue. Similarly, sīn is articulated with the tip, and ṣād with the entire tongue. Thus, the relationship of the light lām to the heavy lām is like that of dāl to ṭā’ and sīn to ṣād. Since people say dāl is one letter and ṭā’ is another letter, and sīn is one letter and ṣād is another, they should also have said the light lām is one letter and the heavy lām is another. Since they did not do this, there must be a difference.

The doubling of the lām in \text{^{Allāh}} is due to idghām (assimilation). There are two lāms: the lām of definition (al-ta‘rīf) which is silent, and the original lām (al-aṣl) which is vocalized. When two identical letters meet, and the first is silent and the second is vocalized, the silent one must assimilate into the vocalized one, whether they are in two words or one word. In two words, like \text{^{fa-mā ribiḥat tijāratuhum wa mā bikum min ni’matin fa-min Allāh}} (So their trade gained no profit, nor were they guided) [Al-Baqarah: 16]. In one word, like this word (Allāh). Note that if the alif, lām, wāw, or yā’ is silent, the meeting of two identical letters is prevented, thus preventing assimilation. If they are vocalized and two identical letters meet, assimilation is permissible.

The mystics and ascetics have a subtle point here: the lām of definition and the original lām in the word \text{^{Allāh}} merged, and one assimilated into the other, causing the lām of definition to disappear, leaving only the lām of the word \text{^{Allāh}} (as a doubled letter). This serves as a reminder that when the definition (al-ma‘rifah) reaches the presence of the Defined (al-ma‘rūf), the definition itself vanishes, ceases, and is nullified, leaving only the eternally Defined as He was, without addition or subtraction.

It is not permissible to omit the alif in \text{^{Allāh}} in pronunciation, but it is permissible in poetic necessity when stopping on it. Some have recited:

The flood came from God, Pouring the bounty of the enclosed Garden.

This leads to several legal issues:

1. If someone swears by God and says \text{^{billāh}} (by Billāh), is the oath valid? Some say no, because \text{^{billāh}} means moisture. Others say the oath is valid because it is permissible according to the root of the language, and the intention was an oath.
2. If someone mentions it this way during slaughter, is the slaughter valid?
3. If someone mentions \text{^{Allāh}} in \text{^{Allāhu Akbar}} (God is greater) this way, is the prayer valid?

No one recited \text{^{Allāh}} with imālah (tilting the vowel towards 'i') except Qutaybah in some narrations.

The doubling of the rā’ in \text{^{r-raḥmān}} is due to the assimilation of the lām of definition into the rā’. There is no disagreement among reciters regarding the necessity of assimilating the lām of definition into the lām and thirteen other letters: ṣād, ḍād, sīn, shīn, dāl, dhāl, rā’, zāy, ṭā’, ẓā’, tā’, thā’, and nūn. For example, \text{^{at-tā’ibūna l-‘ābidūna l-ḥāmidūna... }} (The repentant, the worshippers, the praisers...) [At-Tawbah: 112]. The reason allowing this assimilation is the proximity of the articulation points, as the lām and all these mentioned letters are articulated from the tip of the tongue or near it, making assimilation appropriate. There is no disagreement among reciters about preventing the assimilation of the lām of definition into any letter other than these thirteen, such as in \text{^{al-‘ābidūn al-ḥāmidūn al-āmirūn}} (the worshippers, the praisers, the enjoiners), where all are pronounced with clear articulation (iẓhār). Assimilation is not permitted in these cases because the articulation points are distant; when the first letter's articulation point is far from the second's, pronouncing them together becomes heavy, necessitating the distinction of each from the other, unlike two letters whose points are close, where distinction is difficult.

There is consensus that the word \text{^{r-raḥmān}} is never pronounced with imālah. Regarding the permissibility of imālah, there are two views among grammarians:

1. It is permissible, perhaps the view of Sībawayh, based on the nūn after the alif being broken (vowelized with kasra).
2. It is not permissible, which is the more apparent view among grammarians.

There is consensus that the inflection of \text{^{r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}} is genitive (jarr) because they are adjectives for the first term (which is in the genitive case). However, nominative (raf‘) and accusative (naṣb) are grammatically permissible for them:

• Nominative, based on the implication: "God is the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful."
• Accusative, based on the implication: "I mean the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful."

Second Type of Discussion in this Chapter: Matters Related to Writing

They lengthened the bā’ in \text{^{Bismillāh}} but did not lengthen it in other contexts. They offered two reasons for this difference:

1. Since the alif of connection (alif al-waṣl) after the bā’ is omitted, they lengthened the bā’ to indicate the omitted alif that followed it. Observe that when they wrote \text{^{Iqra’ bismirabbika}} (Read in the name of your Lord) with an alif, they restored the bā’ to its original form.
2. Al-Qutaybi said they lengthened the bā’ because they wished to begin the Book of God only with a revered letter. Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz used to instruct his scribes: "Lengthen the bā’, clarify the sīn, and round the mīm," out of reverence for the Book of God.

The people of subtle indications (ashbār) and spiritual struggles (mujāhadāt) have a subtlety here: the lām of definition and the original lām in \text{^{Allāh}} merged, and one assimilated into the other, causing the lām of definition to drop, leaving the lām of the word \text{^{Allāh}} (as a doubled letter). This is a hint that when the definition reaches the presence of the Defined, the definition itself vanishes, ceases, and is nullified, leaving only the eternally Defined as He was, without addition or subtraction.

They omitted the alif of \text{^{ism}} (name) in \text{^{Bismillāh}} but retained it in \text{^{Iqra’ bismirabbika}} (Read in the name of your Lord). The difference is twofold:

1. The phrase \text{^{Bismillāh}} is mentioned most frequently in connection with most actions. Therefore, the alif was omitted for the sake of brevity, unlike other instances where its mention is rare.
2. Al-Khalil said the alif was omitted in \text{^{Bismillāh}} because it was introduced because starting with a silent sīn is impossible. When the bā’ was prefixed to the noun, it substituted for the alif, causing the alif to be dropped in writing. It was not dropped in \text{^{Iqra’ bismirabbika}} because the bā’ does not substitute for the alif in this context as it does in \text{^{Bismillāh}} because the bā’ can be omitted from \text{^{Iqra’ bismirabbika}} while the meaning remains sound: "Read the name of your Lord" is correct. However, if the bā’ is omitted from \text{^{Bismillāh}} (\text{^{Ismullāh}}), the meaning is not sound. Thus, the difference is clear.

They wrote the word \text{^{Allāh}} with two lāms but wrote \text{^{alladhī}} (who/which) with one lām, despite both being frequently used, requiring definition, and being pronounced similarly. The differences are:

1. \text{^{Allāh}} is a mutable noun (ism mu‘rab mutaṣarrif), so its writing remains based on the original form. \text{^{Alladhī}} is indeclinable (mabnī) because it is incomplete; it only conveys meaning when connected to its relative clause, making it like part of a word, and part of a word is indeclinable. Observe that they wrote the dual form \text{^{alladhāni}} with two lāms because the dual form removes it from resembling particles, as particles are not dualized.
2. If \text{^{Allāh}} were written with one lām, it would be confused with \text{^{ilāh}} (god), a confusion that does not occur with \text{^{alladhī}} (which).
3. The mention of God must be emphasized in pronunciation, so it must be emphasized in writing. Omission contradicts emphasis. \text{^{Alladhī}} has no inherent emphasis in meaning, so its writing is not emphasized by omission.

They omitted the alif before the hā’ in \text{^{Allāh}} in writing due to their aversion to having visually similar letters meet in writing, just as they dislike having phonetically similar letters meet in recitation.

They say the origin of \text{^{Allāh}} is \text{^{al-ilāh}} (six letters). When it was changed to \text{^{Allāh}} (four letters in writing: alif, two lāms, hā’), the alif was dropped. The alif is from the deepest part of the throat, the lām from the tip of the tongue, and the hā’ from the deepest part of the throat (the location of the spirit/breath). This indicates a wondrous state: the articulation begins from the deepest part of the throat, then ascends slightly to the tip of the tongue, and then returns to the hā’ inside the throat, the locus of the spirit. Similarly, the servant begins from his initial state of ignorance and obscurity, ascends slightly through the stages of servitude until he reaches the utmost limits of capacity and enters the realm of unveiling and lights. Then he begins to return little by little until he reaches annihilation in the ocean of tawḥīd (Oneness). This points to the saying: The end returns to the beginning.

Omitting the alif before the nūn in \text{^{r-raḥmān}} in writing was permissible for brevity. Writing it with the alif would also be good. However, omitting the yā’ in \text{^{raḥīm}} is not permissible. Omitting the alif from \text{^{raḥmān}} does not compromise the word or cause confusion, unlike omitting the yā’ from \text{^{raḥīm}} (which would lead to \text{^{raḥmān}}).

Discussions Concerning the Noun (al-Ism)

This type is twofold:

1. Transmitted discussions related to the noun.
2. Rational discussions related to the noun.

First Issue:

There are two famous linguistic forms: Arabs say \text{^{ismuhu}} (his name) and \text{^{sumuhu}} (his name). The \text{^{bism}} found in every sūrah is derived from \text{^{sumuhu}} (using the sīn). Some say there are two other forms: \text{^{ism}} and \text{^{sum}} (with kasra or ḍamma on the alif). Al-Kisa’i said Arabs sometimes use ism (with kasra on the alif) and sometimes ism (with ḍamma on the alif). When they drop the alif, those whose root language uses kasra say \text{^{sim}} (with kasra on the sīn), and those whose root language uses ḍamma say \text{^{sum}} (with ḍamma on the sīn). Tha‘lab said: Whoever derives it from \text{^{sammā yasmū}} (to ascend) says ism and sum. Whoever derives it from \text{^{sammā yasmū}} (to be high) says ism and sum. Al-Mubarrad said: I heard Arabs say \text{^{ismuhu}} and \text{^{ismuhu}} (with kasra or ḍamma on the sīn), and \text{^{sumuhu}} and \text{^{samāh}} (with ḍamma on the sīn).

Second Issue:

There is consensus that the diminutive form (taṣghīr) of the noun is \text{^{sumayyun}} and its plural is \text{^{asmā’}} and \text{^{asāmī}} (with alif).

Third Issue:

Regarding its derivation, there are two views:

• The Basrans: It is derived from \text{^{samā yasmū}} (to ascend/become high), so the name of a thing is what elevates it until that thing becomes apparent through it. I say: The utterance defines the meaning, and the definer is prior in knowability to the defined. Thus, the name must be higher than the meaning and prior to it.
• The Kufans: It is derived from \text{^{wasm yusimū summatan}} (to mark/brand), where summah means a mark. Thus, the name is like a mark identifying the musammā.

The argument for the Basrans: If the name were derived from summah (mark), its diminutive would be \text{^{wusaymiyyun}} and its plural \text{^{awsām}} (plural of wasm).

Fourth Issue:

Those who derive it from summah say its origin is \text{^{wasm yusimū}} (to mark), from which the wāw was dropped, and the alif of connection was added as compensation for the dropped letter, like \text{^{‘iddah}} (count) from \text{^{wa‘dah}} (promise), \text{^{ṣifah}} (attribute) from \text{^{waṣf}} (description), and \text{^{zinnah}} (weight) from \text{^{wazn}} (weighing). The wāw was dropped, and the hā’ was added.

Those who derive it from samū (ascent) have two views:

1. The origin is \text{^{samā yasmū}} and \text{^{samā yusammā}} (to be high/named), and the command form is \text{^{ism}} (like \text{^{ud‘u}} from \text{^{da‘awtu}}) or \text{^{ism}} (like \text{^{irm}} from \text{^{ramaytu}}). Then they made this form a noun, subjected it to inflection, and removed it from the category of verbs, just as they named the camel \text{^{ya‘malā}} (a specific type of camel). Al-Akhfash said this is like \text{^{al-ān}} (now), whose origin is \text{^{āna ya’īn}} (to arrive/be present), then they prefixed the alif and lām to the past tense of its verb and kept it vocalized.
2. Its origin is \text{^{sumuww}} (height), like \text{^{ḥumuww}} (kinship). The wāw was dropped from the end due to the heaviness of successive vowels and frequent use. The mīm was vocalized because, after dropping the wāw, it became the end of the word, inheriting the wāw's vowel. The sīn was made silent because after dropping the wāw, two letters remained, one silent and one vocalized. When the silent one was vocalized, the vocalized one had to be made silent to achieve balance. The hamzah was prefixed because starting with a silent letter is impossible, requiring something to start with. The hamzah was specified because it is a letter of addition.

First Issue:

The Ḥashawiyyah, Karāmiyyah, and Ash‘arīyyah say the name is the musammā itself, not the act of naming. The Mu‘tazilah say the name is different from the musammā and the act of naming. Our preferred view is that the name is different from both the musammā and the act of naming.

Before presenting evidence, we must address a prerequisite: the question "Is the name the musammā itself or not?" must be preceded by defining what the name is and what the musammā is, so that the relationship can then be examined.

1. If "name" means the utterance (composed sounds and arranged letters), and "musammā" means the entities themselves and their actual realities, then it is self-evident that the name is different from the musammā, and discussing this further is futile.
2. If "name" means the essence of the musammā, and "musammā" also means that essence, then saying "the name is the musammā" means the essence of a thing is the thing itself. While true, this is merely clarifying the obvious and is futile.

Thus, discussion on this topic, under all interpretations, is pointless.

Second Issue:

We have extracted a subtle interpretation for those who say the name is the musammā: The name (al-ism) is any utterance that denotes a meaning without specifying a time. The utterance "name" (ism) fits this definition. Therefore, the utterance "name" must be a name for itself, meaning the utterance "name" is musammā by the utterance "name." In this case, the name is the musammā. However, this presents a problem: the relationship of the name to the musammā (ism muḍāf) requires that one of the two terms be different from the other.

Third Issue:

Arguments proving that the name cannot be the musammā:

1. The name can exist while the musammā is non-existent. For example, the statement "the non-existent is negated" means it has no affirmation, yet the utterances exist while what they refer to is pure non-existence. Conversely, the musammā can exist while the name is non-existent (e.g., realities for which no specific names have been established). In short, the existence of one while the other is absent is established, necessitating difference.
2. Names can be numerous while the musammā is singular (synonyms), or one name can refer to many musammā (homonyms). This also necessitates difference.
3. The relationship of the name to the musammā is one of iḍāfah (like ownership and the owned), and one of the two terms must differ from the other. One might counter this by citing the self-knowledge of a thing.
4. Names are composed of discrete, transient sounds, while the musammā may be eternal, or necessarily existent by itself.
5. When we utter "fire" and "ice," these utterances exist on our tongues. If the name were the musammā, fire and ice would have to be on our tongues, which no rational person would claim.
6. God states: \text{^{Wa lillāhi al-asmā’u al-ḥusnā fa-d‘ūhu bihā}} (And to God belong the best names, so invoke Him by them) [Al-A‘rāf: 180], and the Prophet (PBUH) said: "God has ninety-nine names." Here, the names are many, but the musammā is one (God).
7. In \text{^{Bismillāh}} and \text{^{tabāraka ismu rabbika}} (Blessed is the name of your Lord) [Ar-Raḥmān: 78], the name is added to God, and the iḍāfah of a thing to itself is impossible.
8. We possess an innate distinction between saying "the name of God," "the name of the name," and "God." This proves the name is different from the musammā.
9. We describe names as Arabic or Persian (e.g., "Allāh" is an Arabic name, "Khuda" is a Persian name), while God's essence is transcendent of such descriptions.
10. God commanded us to invoke Him by His names (\text{^{fa-d‘ūhu bihā}}). The name is the instrument of invocation, and God is the one invoked. The difference between the essence invoked and the utterance used for invocation is self-evident.

Argument of those who say the name is the musammā: They rely on textual evidence (naṣṣ) and legal consequence (ḥukm).

• Textual: \text{^{tabāraka ismu rabbika}} (Blessed is the name of your Lord). The blessed entity is God, not the sound or the letter.
• Legal Consequence: If a man says, "Zaynab is divorced," and Zaynab is the name of his wife, the divorce takes effect upon her. If the name were different from the musammā, the divorce would take effect on something other than that woman, meaning it should not have occurred.

Response:

• To the first: Just as we must believe God is pure from defects, we must purify the utterances used to define His essence and attributes from futility, vulgarity, and impoliteness.
• To the second: The statement "Zaynab is divorced" means "the entity referred to by this utterance is divorced," which is why the divorce takes effect on her.

Fourth Issue:

The act of naming (al-tasmiyah) is different from the name (al-ism). Naming is the designation of a specific utterance to signify a specific entity, which implies the intention and will of the originator. The name is the specific utterance itself. The difference between them is self-evident.

Fifth Issue:

We know that utterances denoting meanings imply utterances denoting the connection between them. Thus, the establishment of names and verbs precedes the establishment of particles. Which precedes the other, verbs or nouns? The more apparent view is that the establishment of nouns precedes that of verbs. Evidence:

1. A noun denotes the essence (māhiyyah), while a verb denotes the occurrence of that essence in a specific time. The noun is singular, the verb compound; the singular precedes the compound by essence and rank.
2. A verb cannot be uttered except when attributed to an agent, whereas the noun denoting the agent can be uttered without attributing the action to it. Thus, the agent is independent of the action, and the action needs the agent. The independent precedes the needy in rank.
3. Combining a noun with a noun yields a meaningful sentence (subject-predicate). Combining verbs yields nothing meaningful unless the nominal sentence is established first. Thus, the noun precedes the verb in rank.

Sixth Issue:

We know that a name can denote the essence as such, or it can be a derived name denoting that the thing is qualified by a specific attribute (like knowing, powerful). The names of essences precede derived names in rank because essences are simple, and derived names are compound.

Seventh Issue:

The names of attributes seem to precede the names of self-subsisting entities in rank, because we know entities only through the attributes subsisting in them. The definer precedes the defined, and precedence in knowledge corresponds to precedence in mention.

Eighth Issue:

Categories of names applied to musammā (entities): There are nine categories.

1. Name applied to the essence itself.
2. Name applied to the thing based on a part of its essence (e.g., calling a wall "body" or "substance").
3. Name applied based on an essential attribute subsisting in its essence (e.g., black, white, hot, cold—these are essential attributes subsisting in the essence, unrelated to external things).
4. Name applied based only on a relative attribute (e.g., known, understood, mentioned, owner, owned).
5. Name applied based on a negative state (e.g., blind, poor, or sound/free from afflictions).
6. Name applied based on an essential attribute plus a relative attribute (e.g., knowing/all-knowing, powerful/able). Knowledge is an essential attribute with relation to known things, and power is an essential attribute with relation to things that can be willed.
7. Name applied based on an essential attribute plus a negative attribute (e.g., "one who is powerful and never fails to do anything," or "one who knows and never is ignorant of anything").
8. Name applied based on a relative attribute plus a negative attribute (e.g., "the First," meaning prior to all else [relative] and preceded by none [negative]). Also \text{^{al-Qayyūm}} (The Self-Subsisting), meaning He subsists by Himself and causes others to subsist. His self-subsistence is a negation (not needing others), and causing others to subsist is a relative attribute (others needing Him).
9. Name applied based on a combination of essential, relative, and negative attributes.

These nine categories cover all names applied to any musammā, whether it is God Almighty or any created thing.

Ninth Issue:

Does God Almighty have a name corresponding to His specific essence? This requires high theological prerequisites.

Prerequisite 1: God Almighty differs from His creation by His specific essence, not by an attribute. If His essence, considered alone, differs from creation, that is the goal. If it is equal to other essences, then the difference must be due to an added attribute. If this attribute’s specificity is not due to anything, it implies preference for the contingent without a preferring cause, leading to an infinite regress or circularity, both impossible.

Prerequisite 2: God is neither a body nor a substance, because negating corporeality and substance is a negative concept, while His specific essence is a positive reality. The difference between negation and affirmation is self-evident. Also, His specific essence is not identical to His power or knowledge, as these are relative concepts, while His essence is self-subsisting.

Prerequisite 3: We do not know His specific essence now. Evidence:

1. Our intellects only grasp four things about God: existence, eternal existence, attributes of majesty (negative considerations), or attributes of honor (relative considerations). We proved His essence differs from all four. Thus, His specific essence is unknown to humans.
2. We can only conceive of things through five senses, bodily states (pain, pleasure), rational concepts (existence, non-existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, contingency), or combinations thereof. Since God's reality differs from all these categories, it is incomprehensible to creation.
3. His specific essence is the cause of all its consequences (essential, relative, negative attributes). Knowledge of the cause entails knowledge of the effect. If His essence were known, all its attributes would necessarily be known, which is false. Thus, His essence is incomprehensible.

Prerequisite 4: If His essence is incomprehensible, can it become comprehensible?

Prerequisite 5: Can this gnosis be attained by angels or any of them? These matters are difficult, and the intellect is too weak to fulfill them adequately. Some say created knowledge is finite, while God is infinite; the finite cannot reach the infinite. The greatest thing is God, and the greatest knowledge is God's knowledge of Himself; therefore, only God knows God.

Prerequisite 6: Knowledge is of two types: incidental (‘araḍiyyah) and essential (dhātiyyah). Incidental knowledge is like seeing a building and knowing it must have a builder, without knowing the builder's essence. Essential knowledge is like knowing a specific color by sight or heat by touch. We only know God incidentally by knowing that contingent things require a Creator. What we denied is essential knowledge.

Prerequisite 7: Essential knowledge, if attainable, occurs in two ways in the observable world: knowledge (intellectual) and sight (sensory). If we can distinguish between them, perhaps essential knowledge of God occurs in two ways, or perhaps more. The intellect cannot definitively judge this.

Tenth Issue:

Do the ancient philosophers deny a name for God’s specific essence? They argue that the purpose of naming is to point to the musammā. If God had a name for His essence, the purpose of establishing that name would be to mention it alongside others to define that musammā. Since no creature knows His specific essence, the establishment of such a name is useless. Therefore, this type of name is absent. Instead, He has necessary consequences of knowledge: He is the Eternal who does not cease, and the Necessary who does not accept non-existence. Those who affirm that God’s power allows Him to grant some close servants gnosis of that specific essence say that in that case, establishing a name for that essence is not impossible. This issue depends on the preceding prerequisites.

Eleventh Issue:

If establishing a name for that specific essence is possible, that name must be the greatest of names, and its mention the most noble of mentions, because the nobility of knowledge depends on the nobility of the known, and the nobility of mention depends on the nobility of the mentioned. Since God’s essence is the most noble of known and mentioned things, knowledge of Him is the noblest knowledge, and mentioning Him is the noblest mention. This is the meaning of the famous saying: "The Greatest Name of God" (ism Allāh al-A‘ẓam). If a close angel or a messenger prophet attained knowledge of that name while its meaning was unveiled to him, it is conceivable that all realms of the physical and spiritual worlds would obey him.

Twelfth Issue:

Those who affirm the existence of the Greatest Name differ:

1. Some say it is \text{^{Dhū al-Jalāli wal-Ikrām}} (Possessor of Majesty and Honor) [Ar-Raḥmān: 27], supported by the Hadith: "Adhere to \text{^{Yā Dhā al-Jalāli wal-Ikrām}}." I find this weak because Majesty refers to negative attributes, and Honor to relative attributes, while His specific essence differs from both.
2. Some say it is \text{^{al-Ḥayyu al-Qayyūm}} (The Ever-Living, The Self-Subsisting), based on the Hadith where the Prophet (PBUH) asked Ubayy ibn Ka‘b about the greatest verse, and he replied with the verse of the Throne (Āyat al-Kursī). I find this weak because \text{^{al-Ḥayy}} (The Living) implies perception and action, which is an attribute, not the greatest majesty. \text{^{al-Qayyūm}} is an exaggeration of standing, meaning self-subsistence and causing others to subsist. Self-subsistence is a negative concept (independence), and causing others to subsist is a relative attribute. Thus, \text{^{al-Qayyūm}} denotes a combination of negation and relation, not the Greatest Name.
3. Some say all God's names are great and sanctified, and it is impermissible to describe one as greater than another, as this implies deficiency in the others. I find this weak because we established that names fall into nine categories, and the name denoting the specific essence must be the most noble and greatest.
4. The Greatest Name is \text{^{Allāh}}. This is the closest view to me, as we will demonstrate that this name functions as a proper noun for Him and thus denotes His specific essence.

Thirteenth Issue:

The name denoting the musammā based on a part of its essence is impossible for God, as this implies a composite essence made of parts. Every composite thing needs its parts, and its parts are other than it; thus, every composite thing needs something external to it, making it contingent. Therefore, anything not contingent by essence cannot be composite, and thus cannot have a name based on a part of its essence.

Fourteenth Issue:

We established the difference of opinion regarding whether God has a name for His specific essence. We proved the impossibility of a name based on a part of the essence. This leaves the remaining seven categories. Regarding the name denoting an essential attribute subsisting in His specific essence: that attribute is either existence itself, a quality of existence, or another attribute different from existence and its qualities. We will discuss the implications of these divisions.

Chapter Four:

Discussion of Names Denoting Essential Attributes

This discussion is divided into three parts.

First Issue:

The majority agree that God can be named by the word "thing" (shay’). Jahm ibn Safwan denied this. Arguments of the majority:

1. \text{^{Qul ayyu shay’in akbaru shahādatan? Qul Allāhu shahīdun baynī wa baynakum}} (Say: What is the greatest testimony? Say: God is witness between me and you) [Al-An‘ām: 19]. This implies God is named "thing." If one argues this is a separate statement, we reply that the second statement answers the first question, thus requiring the implication.
2. \text{^{Kullu shay’in hālikun illā wajhah}} (Everything will perish except His Face) [Al-Qasas: 88]. His Face refers to His essence. If His essence were not a "thing," it could not be excepted from "everything."
3. The Hadith: "God was, and there was nothing else." This implies the name "thing" applies to God.
4. The Hadith: "No one is more jealous than God Almighty."
5. A "thing" is defined as whatever can be known and reported about. God's essence fits this, so He is a "thing."

Arguments of Jahm:

1. \text{^{Allāhu khāliqu kulli shay’}} (God is the Creator of everything) [Ar-Ra‘d: 16] and \text{^{wa huwa ‘alā kulli shay’in qadīr}} (and He is over all things competent) [Al-Mā’idah: 120]. This implies everything is created and capable, but God is neither created nor capable. Thus, God is not a "thing."
   • Response: If they argue these verses are general and subject to exception, we reply: Exception contradicts the original meaning, and verbal evidence suffices here. Furthermore, exception is only permissible when the excluded entity is insignificant. If God is named "thing," He is the greatest of things, making exception impossible.
2. \text{^{Laysa ka-mithlihi shay’un wa huwa as-Samī‘u al-Baṣīr}} (There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearer, the Seer) [Ash-Shura: 11]. God states that the like of Him is not a "thing." Everything is like itself. Thus, God is not named "thing."
   • Response: If they claim the kāf (like) is extra, it renders the verse meaningless, which is false.
3. The word "thing" (shay’) does not convey any attribute of majesty, greatness, praise, or glorification, whereas God's names must convey these.
   • Response: The meaning of "thing" is a common denominator between the most humble particle and the noblest entity. Since it applies to the lowest things, it does not convey praise. However, God's names must convey praise, as per \text{^{Wa lillāhi al-asmā’u al-ḥusnā fa-d‘ūhu bihā}} (And to God belong the best names, so invoke Him by them) [Al-A‘rāf: 180]. If a name does not denote high attributes, it is not "best." Furthermore, God commanded us to invoke Him by these names, then warned: \text{^{wa dhārū alladhīna yulḥidūna fī asmā’ih}} (And leave those who deviate concerning His names) [Al-A‘rāf: 180]. This implies that invoking Him by names other than the best ones is deviation.
4. It is not narrated that the Prophet (PBUH) or the Companions addressed God as "O Thing." They used phrases like "O Originator of things." This word is too lowly for addressing God.

Note: This debate is about the utterance (lafaẓ), not the meaning (ma‘nā), as there is no dispute that God is existent, an essence, and a reality.

Is it permissible to apply the term "existent" (al-mawjūd) to God? This requires a prerequisite: the word "existence" (al-wujūd) is used equivocally for two meanings:

1. Perception/Awareness (al-wijdān): If existence means this, then the existent means the perceived or the aware.
2. Presence/Reality in itself (al-ḥuṣūl): Existence as being real in itself.

There is a difference: being known to exist in reality depends on being real in itself, but not vice versa, as something real in itself might not be known to anyone. The debate is whether "existence" was first established for perception, then transferred to reality, or vice versa, or established simultaneously. The former is more likely, as one must perceive something before knowing its reality.

Given this, applying \text{^{al-mawjūd}} to God occurs in two ways:

1. As perceived/known (mentioned in the Qur'an: \text{^{law wajadū Allāh}}} [If they had found God] [An-Nisā’: 64], where wujūd means finding/knowing).
2. As real in itself (not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an in this sense).

Response to the objection: If existence as perception is established, does existence as reality necessarily follow? No, because the non-existent can be known. Also, since this is a linguistic debate, the establishment of the name in one sense does not necessitate its establishment in another. Furthermore, the Muslim consensus affirms the application of this name.

Objection: Don't you say God's names must convey praise? The word "existent" does not convey this. Response: We rely on consensus here, and the term "existent" conveys more praise than "thing," because "thing" can apply to the non-existent, while "existent" cannot. Also, "existent" in the sense of "known" implies that due to the abundance of evidence for His existence and divinity, He is known to everyone, necessitating acknowledgment by every intellect.

Regarding the term "essence" (dhāt): Narrations indicate its use for God, such as "in the essence of God." I say: If a word denotes a quality, and that quality is attributed to a subject, it is called dhū (possessor of) if masculine, or dhāt (essence) if feminine. The word \text{^{dhāt}} is used to indicate this attribution. It is impossible for this attribute to be attributed to a second attribute, and so on infinitely. It must terminate in a single, self-subsisting reality. Only this reality can be truly called the dhāt of those attributes. Therefore, applying \text{^{dhāt}} to God is true and accurate because He is self-subsisting in His essence. The narrations cited refer to seeking God's pleasure, not His essence itself.

Regarding the term "self" (nafs): Mentioned in the Qur'an (\text{^{ta‘lamu mā fī nafsī wa lā a‘lamu mā fī nafsik}} [You know what is in My Self, and I do not know what is in your self] [Al-Mā’idah: 116]). The nafs refers to the essence and reality of a thing, not a composite body, as a composite body is contingent, which is impossible for God.

Regarding the term "person" (shakhṣ): Narrations mention God's jealousy regarding His \text{^{shakhṣ}} (person/self). This does not mean a body with dimensions, but the specific essence and reality that distinguishes itself from others.

Regarding the term "Light" (nūr): \text{^{Allāhu nūru as-samāwāti wal-arḍ}} (God is the Light of the heavens and the earth) [An-Nūr: 35]. Arguments against God being Light:

1. Light is either a body or a quality in a body; both are created, but God is eternal.
2. Light has an opposite (darkness), but God is transcendent of opposites.
3. Light is transient (appears and disappears), but God is eternal.

Response to the verse: This is a metaphorical verse (mutashābih). God immediately follows it by saying \text{^{mithlu nūrih}} (the likeness of His Light), attributing the Light to Himself as a possession, indicating He is the Creator of Light, not Light itself.

Reasons for the appropriateness of the term "Light":

1. Some read it as \text{^{Allāhu nūru}} (God is the Light-Giver).
2. He is the Originator and Creator of lights.
3. He organizes the world's welfare, and one who organizes welfare can be called "light" (e.g., "So-and-so is the light of this city").
4. He bestowed faith, guidance, and gnosis, which are forms of light.

Regarding the term "Form" (ṣūrah): Narrations state God created Adam in "His form" or "the form of the Most Gracious." Interpretations:

1. The pronoun refers to the one being struck (Adam was created in the form of the one being struck, i.e., the one whose face should not be cursed).
2. He was created in his final form—a complete man, not from semen or a fetus.
3. Form means attribute (ṣifah). He was created in the attribute of being God's vicegerent on Earth, exercising authority over earthly bodies as God exercises power over the universe.

Philosophers use the term "Substance" (jawhar) for God's essence, while Christians and theologians deny it. Philosophers define substance as an essence independent of a substrate or subject, which applies to God. The word derives from \text{^{jahar}} (to appear), so substance appears due to its individuality and volume. God is more apparent than any apparent thing due to the abundance of evidence for His existence, making Him most deserving of the term substance. Theologians deny it based on consensus against using this term.

Most Karāmiyyah apply the term "Body" (jism) to God, meaning self-subsisting existence, not composition or dimension. Other groups unanimously deny this. Our objections to the Karāmiyyah:

1. We do not accept that they mean anything other than length, width, and depth, as they claim He is above the Throne and greater than it, implying extension in three dimensions.
2. The term "body" suggests a false meaning and is not found in the Qur'an or Hadith; thus, it must be rejected. The term implies composition of parts (length, width, depth).

Regarding the term "Essence/Reality" (inniyyah): Philosophers use this often. In Arabic, the particle \text{^{inna}} implies emphasis and strength in existence. Since God is necessarily existent, the most perfect being in existence, philosophers apply this term to Him.

Regarding the term "Essence/Whatness" (māhiyyah): This is not a single word in Arabic but derived from the question "What is it?" (mā hiya?). Since people frequently asked about the reality of things, they combined the phrase into one word to denote the specific reality/essence.

Regarding the term "Truth" (al-Ḥaqq):

1. If applied to the essence, it means true existence, as Truth is the opposite of falsehood (non-existence).
2. If applied to belief, it means the belief is correct and conforms to the reality.
3. If applied to speech/report, it means the report is true and conforms to reality.

God Almighty deserves the name \text{^{al-Ḥaqq}} in all these senses: He is the necessarily existent (essence), His belief is the correct, unchanging belief (belief), and His report is the truest report (speech).

Second Part of this Chapter: Names Denoting the Manner of Existence (Essential Attributes)

This requires rational prerequisites.

Prerequisite 1: His eternal existence does not necessitate an eternal time. If His eternal existence does not depend on time, that is the goal. If it depends on time, that time must either be eternal (leading to infinite regress) or contingent (meaning God existed before that time, proving eternity does not require eternal time).

Prerequisite 2: Everything eternal is also remaining (bāqī), but not everything remaining is eternal. The word \text{^{al-Bāqī}} is in the Qur'an (\text{^{wa yabqā wajhu rabbika}} [And the Face of your Lord will remain]). What does not perish must remain. \text{^{Al-Awwalu wal-Ākhir}} implies He is the First of all and the Last of all, meaning He has no beginning or end.

Prerequisite 3: If the world's maker were contingent, He would need another maker, leading to infinite regress. Thus, He is eternal, and what is eternal cannot cease to exist.

Based on these, we interpret the names:

1. al-Qadīm (Ancient): Implies long duration, not necessarily the absolute first.
2. al-Azalī (Eternal): Implies relation to azal (eternity without beginning). This suggests azal is a thing God exists within, which is false. It means existence without beginning.
3. Lā Awwala Lah (He has no beginning): Explicitly means no prior existence. Some say this is affirmative (negating the negation of prior non-existence), while others say it is negative (negating the state of being preceded by non-existence, which is a positive quality).
4. al-Abadī (Everlasting): Implies perpetuity into the future.
5. al-Sarmadī (Perpetual): Derived from sard (succession). Since time persists through the succession of its parts, and this succession is called sard, the mīm is added for exaggeration. This term is usually applied to things whose parts succeed one another; thus, applying it to God is metaphorical.
6. al-Mustamirr (Continuous): Implies persistence through the passage of parts, which applies to time, not God's self-subsisting essence.
7. al-Mumtad (Extended): Duration is called muddat because it extends through the succession of parts. This applies metaphorically to God.
8. al-Bāqī (Remaining): Everything eternal remains, but not everything remaining is eternal (like contingent bodies).
9. al-Dā’im (Perpetual/Lasting): \text{^{akluhā dā’im}} (Its fruit is perpetual) [Ar-Ra‘d: 35]. God is most deserving of perpetuity.
10. Wājib al-Wujūd bi-dhātih (Necessarily Existent by His Essence): His essence necessitates His existence, making Him impossible to cease. Everything necessarily existent by essence must be eternal, but not everything eternal is necessarily existent by essence (it could be caused by an eternal cause). The Persian word Khuda means He came into existence by Himself.

11. al-Kā’in (The Coming-to-be): Used often for attributes (\text{^{kāna Allāhu ‘alā kulli shay’in qadīrā}}). Its use for the essence is found in supplications, e.g., "O He who was before all being..." Grammatically, \text{^{kāna}} is either perfect (meaning occurred/existed) or imperfect (requiring a subject and predicate). If it were a perfect verb, it would imply a contingent occurrence, which is impossible for God. Thus, its use here must be understood differently, implying mere existence/presence, similar to \text{^{al-Mawjūd}} (The Existent).

Chapter Five:

Names Denoting Relative Attributes

Prerequisite: Is the act of creation (al-takwīn) the same as the created thing (al-makhlūq)? Mu‘tazilah and Ash‘arīyyah say yes. Others say no.

Arguments against identity:

1. If creation is an attribute, it is either necessary (implying God is necessarily causative, not freely choosing) or contingent (requiring a cause, leading to regress).
2. If creation is eternal, its effects must be eternal. If contingent, it needs another creation, leading to regress.
3. Power (qudrah) is sufficient for effect when knowledge and will are present. If creation is separate, power is insufficient. If creation is identical to power, it contradicts the fact that God can choose not to actualize something He has power over (e.g., a thousand suns).

Conclusion: Creation is different from the created.

Those who say creation is identical to the created interpret \text{^{Khāliq}} (Creator) as a specific relation/attribution—the effect of God's power. Those who say they are different interpret it as an essential attribute qualified by a relative attribute.

Categories of Relative Attributes:

1. Being known, mentioned, glorified (e.g., "O Glorified by every tongue"). These names are infinite.
2. Being the agent of actions (purely relative, assuming creation is not a separate attribute).

Names denoting mere existence (close to synonyms): al-Mūjid (The Causer of existence), al-Muḥdith (The Originator, specific to bringing from non-existence), al-Mukawwin (The Constitutor), al-Munshi’ (The Initiator, gradual), al-Mubdi‘ (The Originator, sudden), al-Mukhtari‘ (The Inventor), al-Ṣāni‘ (The Maker), al-Khāliq (The Creator, related to estimation/knowledge), al-Fāṭir (The Cleaver, sudden creation), al-Bāri’ (The Differentiator, creating according to suitability).

Names denoting specific creation are infinite (e.g., al-Nāfi‘ if He creates benefit, al-Muḥyī if He creates life).

Subtleties:

1. Opposites are either contrary (e.g., Giver/Withholder) or privative (e.g., Giver/Non-giver).
2. Words can be close synonyms but have subtle differences (e.g., al-Ra’ūf [Kind] leans toward conveying benefit, al-Raḥīm [Merciful] toward removing harm).

Chapter Six:

Names Denoting Negative Attributes (al-Ṣifāt al-Salbiyyah)

These are abundant in the Qur'an. Negations relate to:

1. The Essence: Not a body, substance, accident, in space, in a location, etc. (e.g., \text{^{Allāhu al-Ghanī}} [God is the Self-Sufficient]).
2. The Attributes: Negation of deficiency attributes (sleep, forgetfulness, ignorance, distraction).
3. Power: Free from fatigue, needing tools, difference in capability between much/little, or poverty (e.g., \text{^{wa mā massanā min laghūb}} [And no weariness touched Us]).
4. Self-Sufficiency: He feeds but is not fed.
5. Oneness: Negation of partners, opposites, or equals.
6. Actions: Not creating falsehood, play, futility, not consenting to disbelief, not desiring injustice, not loving corruption, not punishing without prior sin, not benefiting from obedience or being harmed by disobedience, and no one questions His actions.

Names derived from these negations include al-Quddūs (The Holy, essence free from deficiencies) and al-Salām (The Source of Peace, essence free from deficient attributes).

Chapter Seven:

Names Denoting Essential Attributes Combined with Relative and Negative Attributes

Names related to power: al-Qādir (The Capable), al-Qadīr (The All-Powerful, emphasis), al-Muqtadir (The Sovereignly Powerful), and the plural form \text{^{fa-qaddarnā fa-ni‘mal-qādirūn}} (And We are the best of those who decree). The word \text{^{al-Mulk}} (Sovereignty/King) also implies power, appearing as al-Mālik (Owner), al-Malik (King), Mālik al-Mulk (Owner of all dominion), al-Malīk (The King), and al-Mulk (Dominion). The word \text{^{al-Quwwah}} (Strength) is close to power: al-Qawī (The Strong), Dhū al-Quwwah (Possessor of Strength).

Names related to knowledge: al-‘Ilm (Knowledge), al-‘Ālim (The Knower), al-‘Alīm (The All-Knowing), al-‘Allām (The Great Knower), al-A‘lam (The Most Knowing). Also past and future tenses of knowing, and the form \text{^{‘allama}} (He taught). It is impermissible to call God \text{^{Mu‘allim}} (Teacher) or \text{^{al-‘Allāmah}} (The Great Scholar) as these imply effort. Also al-Khabīr (The Acquainted), synonymous with knowledge. Also al-Shahīd (The Witness), implying observation/knowledge. Also al-Ḥikmah (Wisdom) and al-Laṭīf (The Subtle, implying knowledge of subtleties or subtle conveyance of benefit).

Words related to speech: al-Kalām (Speech), al-Qawl (Utterance), al-Amr (Command), al-Wa‘d (Promise), al-Waḥy (Revelation), and being \text{^{Shākir}} (Appreciative/Thankful).

al-Irādah (Will), al-Riḍā (Contentment), al-Maḥabbah (Love), and al-Karāhah (Dislike).

\text{^{laysa ka-mithlihi shay’un wa huwa as-Samī‘u al-Baṣīr}} (There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearer, the Seer).

al-Awwal (The First): Relative (prior to all) + Negative (preceded by none). al-Ẓāhir (The Manifest): Purely relative (apparent through signs). al-Bāṭin (The Hidden): Purely negative (hidden in essence). al-Qayyūm (The Self-Subsisting): Combination of negation (not needing anything) and relation (all things needing Him).

\text{^{al-Ilāh}} (God): Denotes existence, manner of existence (eternal, necessary), negative attributes (transcendence), and relative attributes (creation/causation). Whether this term can be applied to others is debated (polytheists used it for idols). The word \text{^{Allāh}} is a proper noun, signifying all these meanings implicitly.

This arises from the debate between anthropomorphists (who claim God must be localized/corporeal) and transcendentalists. Words suggesting corporeality: al-‘Aẓīm (The Great) and al-Kabīr (The Great/Big).

• Anthropomorphists interpret these as relating to physical size.
• Transcendentalists interpret them as greatness in duration (eternity), knowledge, mercy, or power.

The word \text{^{al-‘Alī}} (The Most High) is interpreted by anthropomorphists as spatial elevation, but by transcendentalists as transcendence from all deficiencies.

Chapter Nine:

Discussions on the Pronoun Names

The implied names are three: I (anā), You (anta), and He (huwa). \text{^{Anā}} is the most specific, as everyone refers to themselves by it. \text{^{Anta}} is intermediate (addressing a present other). \text{^{Huwa}} is the least specific (referring to an absent other). The declaration of Oneness (kalimat at-tawḥīd) uses all three forms when attributed to God.

• \text{^{Anā}}: "I am God, there is no god but I." Only God can say this truly, as it affirms divinity for the speaker. Perfect knowledge of this requires perfect knowledge of one's own essence, which only God possesses.
• \text{^{Anta}}: Permissible for the servant, but only when fully present (like Jonah when he was absent from all selfish desires, indicating that true presence requires absence from self-interest).
• \text{^{Huwa}}: Permissible for the absent.

The degrees of presence and absence are infinite.

The word \text{^{Huwa}} (He) has profound secrets:

1. When a servant says, "O He," he acknowledges his own lowness (product of semen and blood) compared to the Eternal, thus addressing Him as the absent one, acknowledging His transcendence beyond all analogies.
2. It affirms that everything besides God is pure non-existence, as if saying, "If two things existed, 'He' could refer to both, but since 'He' refers only to the ultimate reality, all else is null."
3. Mentioning God by His attributes (like \text{^{ar-Raḥmān}}) causes the servant to desire that attribute. Mentioning \text{^{Huwa}} signifies pure recognition of His Being, which brings pure light to the heart, unmixed with the darkness of desiring something other than Him.
4. Attributes are either Majesty (negations) or Honor (affirmations). Mentioning Majesty (e.g., "You are not blind") to a king is impolite. Mentioning Honor (e.g., "You created the universe") is like praising a mighty king for giving a crumb of bread—it diminishes His greatness relative to the creation. The exception is when the soul is engrossed in the sensory world and needs to be drawn to the Divine presence through these means until it transcends them and adopts \text{^{Yā Huwa}} (O He), acknowledging that His perfection transcends all created perfections and attributes.
5. Perseverance in this remembrance cultivates longing (shawq) for God, which is the sweetest state, involving alternating pain (from separation) and pleasure (from connection).
6. Saying \text{^{Yā Huwa}} is pure conceptualization (taṣawwur) devoid of affirmation (taṣdīq). Since it refers to a simple, uncompounded reality, it is the ultimate expression of Oneness (tawḥīd).
7. Defining God's essence is impossible by self, by parts, or by external things (creation). The only path is to direct the eye of the mind and spirit toward the light of that Identity in hope of illumination.
8. When one contemplates the majesty of a powerful ruler, one becomes oblivious to hunger or pain. Similarly, contemplating the majesty of the Divine Identity causes bewilderment and preoccupation, leading to the utterance \text{^{Huwa}} (He is).
9. The Hadith: "Whoever makes his concerns one concern, God suffices him for the concerns of this world and the Hereafter." By focusing solely on \text{^{Huwa}}, the servant acknowledges that only God can handle his infinite needs.
10. The mind cannot focus on two things simultaneously. Therefore, it is best to occupy the heart with the noblest knowledge and the tongue with the noblest mention: \text{^{Yā Huwa}}.
11. The Hadith: "If My servant mentions Me in his self, I mention him in My Self." Mentioning God without asking is superior to asking. Since \text{^{Yā Huwa}} implies no request, it is the noblest remembrance.

The saying of Al-Ghazali: "Lā ilāha illā Allāh" is the tawḥīd of the common folk; "Lā ilāha illā Huwa" is the tawḥīd of the elite. This is supported by the Qur'an (\text{^{Lā ilāha illā Huwa}} followed by \text{^{Kullu shay’in hālikun illā wajhah}}).

Chapter Ten:

Other Discussions on God's Names

Some say names and attributes must be explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an or sound Hadith. Others say any word denoting a meaning befitting God is permissible. Al-Ghazali distinguished: Names must be transmitted; attributes (like tallness or intelligence) do not require transmission.

Arguments for prescription (names): We describe God as knowing, but not as a physician or a certain believer, implying a need for textual basis.

Arguments against prescription (attributes): Names used in other languages (Persian, Turkish) are accepted if the meaning is sound, based on \text{^{Wa lillāhi al-asmā’u al-ḥusnā}} (To God belong the best names).

The Qur'an uses words like "mocks" (yastahzi’), "plots" (makara), "anger" (ghaḍiba), and "pride" (takabbara). The correct approach is to interpret these based on their final consequences, not their initial human meanings. Anger, for instance, results in harm; we attribute the final consequence (retribution) to God, not the initial emotional state.

It is narrated that God has 4,000 names: 1,000 in the Qur'an/Hadith, 1,000 in the Torah, 1,000 in the Gospel, and 1,000 in the Psalms, plus another 1,000 in the Preserved Tablet. This is plausible given the infinite categories of negative and relative attributes. The more one studies God's wisdom in creation, the more names one knows.

If unknown utterances in charms convey meaning, they must relate to God's attributes (which are known) or something else (which is useless). If they relate to God, known supplications are superior. However, if the soul is weak, unknown words that evoke fear and awe might cause a temporary detachment from the body, granting spiritual power.

Souls differ essentially. A soul suited to a specific divine attribute will benefit quickly from mentioning the corresponding name. Shaykh Abu al-Najīb al-Suhrawardi would test disciples by reciting names; if a disciple was strongly affected by a specific name, he was commanded to persist in mentioning it.

Chapter Eleven:

Subtle Points from \text{^{Bismillāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīm}}

1. Moses' Illness: When Moses was cured by eating a specific herb the first time but worsened the second time, God revealed: The world is poison, and My name is its antidote.
2. The Sleeper and the Thief: A woman who prayed all night slept, and a thief entered. He couldn't find the door until he was told: "If the beloved sleeps, the Sultan is awake."
3. The Shepherd and the Wolves: When a shepherd made peace with God, the wolves ceased harming his sheep.
4. Omission of "I begin": Omitting "I begin" (abda’) in \text{^{Bismillāh}} indicates that God makes the beginning of an action easy, forgiving, and benevolent.
5. Pharaoh's Palace: Pharaoh wrote \text{^{Bismillāh}} on his outer gate. When he claimed divinity, God told Moses: "You look at his disbelief, but I look at what he wrote on his gate." Whoever writes this word on his outer gate is safe from destruction; how much more so one who writes it on his heart!
6. Rahman and Rahim: How can He be called Merciful if His mercy is less than a speck compared to His throne? The request is that He not deprive us of His mercy.
7. Order of Names: \text{^{Allāh}} (Power/Majesty) followed by \text{^{ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm}} (Mercy) indicates that His mercy exceeds His power.
8. Mark of the King: Servants mark their possessions with the King's seal to deter enemies. Similarly, when starting an act, say \text{^{Bismillāh}} to deter the enemy (Satan).
9. Abu Bakr's Ring: The Prophet (PBUH) gave Abu Bakr a ring to inscribe "Lā ilāha illā Allāh." Abu Bakr added "Muhammad is the Messenger of God," and the Prophet (PBUH) added "Abu Bakr as-Ṣiddīq." Gabriel descended saying God would not separate His name from the Prophet's name, just as Abu Bakr would not separate the Prophet's name from God's name.
10. Noah and Solomon: Noah found salvation by saying half the phrase (\text{^{Bismillāh}}). Solomon attained dominion by saying the whole phrase.
11. Solomon's Letter: The sequence "It is from Solomon, and it is Bismillāh..." is explained by: (a) Bilqis speaking first, (b) Solomon writing the title first, or (c) Solomon preempting her potential insult to God.
12. The Bā’ (B): Derived from \text{^{birr}} (righteousness/kindness), the greatest kindness being seeing God on the Day of Judgment.
13. The Sīn (S): Derived from \text{^{as-Samī‘}} (The Hearer), as in the story of Zayd ibn Ḥārithah and the hypocrite.
14. The Mīm (M): Signifies His dominion over everything from the Throne to the lowest earth.
15. Solomon and the Ant: Solomon prayed for rain, and an ant prayed for sustenance from God's bounty. God answered the ant, showing that even the smallest creature's sincere plea is heard.
16. The Word "Allāh": Solomon constantly mentioned "Allāh" throughout his life, death, and resurrection.
17. Order of Names: Addressing the three types of people (oppressors, moderate, foremost) with \text{^{Allāh}} (for the foremost), \text{^{ar-Raḥmān}} (for the moderate), and \text{^{ar-Raḥīm}} (for the unjust).
18. Implications of Names: \text{^{Allāh}} implies His guardianship (walāyah), \text{^{ar-Raḥmān}} implies His love, and \text{^{ar-Raḥīm}} implies His mercy.
19. Raising a Paper: Whoever raises a paper bearing \text{^{Bismillāh}} out of reverence is recorded among the truthful, and his parents' burden is lightened.
20. Wudu’ (Ablution): Saying \text{^{Bismillāh}} during ablution makes the entire body pure; saying it during intimacy purifies the resulting offspring.
21. The Seven Mercies: God has 100 mercies; one is shared among creation, 99 reserved for the Hereafter.
22. The Sinner's Plea: God asks sinners if they loved to meet Him; they say yes, hoping for pardon. God replies: "I have decreed My forgiveness for you."
23. The Record of Deeds: A servant's record of sins is weighed against a single card saying "Lā ilāha illā Allāh," which outweighs everything.
24. The Mother and Child: A mother's mercy for her child is less than God's mercy for all creation.
25. Purity of the Soul: The jinn and human nakedness are veiled by \text{^{Bismillāh}} in this world; it should therefore veil one from the tormentors in the next.
26. Caesar's Headache: Caesar's headache was cured by a cloth inscribed with \text{^{Bismillāh}} worn on his head.
27. Purity of the Heart: Mentioning \text{^{Bismillāh}} during ablution purifies the body; mentioning it sincerely purifies the heart from disbelief.
28. Khālid ibn al-Walīd: He drank poison saying \text{^{Bismillāh}} and was unharmed.
29. The Grave: Jesus saw angels tormenting a dead man, then later saw them bringing light. God revealed the man had a son who, upon learning \text{^{Bismillāh}} from his teacher, caused God to feel shame to punish the father with fire while his son mentioned His name on earth.
30. Jinn and the Qur'an: The jinn are forbidden from reciting the Qur'an but not the Tasmiyah because the Tasmiyah is mentioning the Beloved, which is never forbidden.
31. The Seven Mercies (Detailed): \text{^{ar-Raḥīm}} applies specifically to six stages of mercy: the grave, resurrection, judgment, the scale, the bridge, and Hell.
32. The Final Testament: A scholar wrote \text{^{Bismillāh}} on his shroud, asking God to treat him according to the title of His Book.

Discussion on Sūrat al-Fātiḥah

The multiplicity of names indicates the nobility of the named:

1. Fātiḥat al-Kitāb (The Opener of the Book): Because it opens the Qur'an, teaching, and prayer recitation. Also, because al-Ḥamd is the opening of all speech, or because it was the first sūrah revealed.
2. Sūrat al-Ḥamd (The Chapter of Praise): Because it begins with praise.
3. Umm al-Qur’ān (The Mother of the Qur'an):
   • Reason 1: It contains the essence/root of the Qur'an, which establishes four main principles: Divinity (Theology), Resurrection (Eschatology), Prophethood, and Divine Decree/Predestination.
   • Reason 2: The essence of all divine books returns to three matters: praising God, engaging in service/obedience, and seeking unveiling/vision. The Sūrah covers all three.
   • Reason 3: It covers the two main goals of knowledge: knowing the glory of Lordship (al-Rubūbiyyah) and the humility of servitude (al-‘Ubūdiyyah).
   • Reason 4: It covers the three branches of knowledge: Principles (Theology), Branches (Rulings), and Spiritual Unveiling.
   • Reason 5: Arabs call the banner of an army the Umm because the army resorts to it. The faithful resort to this Sūrah.
4. Al-Sab‘ al-Mathānī (The Seven Oft-Repeated Verses):
   • Reason 1: It is repeated: half is the servant's praise, half is God's bestowal.
   • Reason 2: It is repeated in every rak‘ah of prayer.
   • Reason 3: It is singled out from other books (Hadith).
   • Reason 4: Each verse equals the reward of reciting seven parts of the Qur'an.
   • Reason 5: It has seven verses, corresponding to the seven gates of Hell; reciting it shields the reader from them.
   • Reason 6: It is repeated in prayer and followed by another sūrah.
   • Reason 7: It is praise and glorification of God.
   • Reason 8: God revealed it twice.
5. Al-Wāfiyah (The Sufficient): It does not accept being split between two rak‘ahs.
6. Al-Kāfiyah (The Dispensing): It suffices for other suwar, but others do not suffice for it.
7. Al-Asās (The Foundation): It opens the Qur'an, contains the noblest goals, and is essential for prayer, the greatest act of worship after faith.
8. Al-Shiifā’ (The Healing): A healing for every poison (spiritual and physical diseases).
9. Al-Ṣalāh (The Prayer): God divided prayer between Himself and His servant in this Sūrah.
10. Al-Su’āl (The Asking): It begins with praise, then servitude, and ends with asking for guidance.
11. Sūrat al-Shukr (Chapter of Gratitude).
12. Sūrat al-Du‘ā’ (Chapter of Supplication): Due to the verse \text{^{ihdinā aṣ-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm}} (Guide us to the straight path).

First Issue: Manner of Revelation

1. Meccan: Narrated from Ali (RA) that it descended from under the Throne.
2. Medinan: Narrated from Mujahid, which Al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Faḍl called a mistake, as Sūrat Al-Ḥijr (which mentions it) is Meccan.
3. Both: Revealed once in Mecca and once in Medina, hence the name al-Mathānī (repeated).

Second Issue: Virtue It is a healing for every poison. If a child in a Qur'an school recites \text{^{Al-Ḥamdu lillāhi rabbil-‘ālamīn}} when punishment is decreed, God lifts the punishment for forty years. The knowledge of all divine books is contained within it.

Third Issue: Missing Letters It lacks seven letters: thā’, jīm, khā’, zāy, shīn, ẓā’, and fā’, because these letters are associated with torment (e.g., thabūr, jahannam, khizī, zafīr, ẓalāl, firāq). God omitted them to signify that whoever reads and believes in this Sūrah is safe from the seven gates of Hell.

First Issue: The Answer to the Implied Question \text{^{Al-Ḥamdu lillāh}} implies two things: the existence of God, and His worthiness of praise.

• The answer to the first (existence) is \text{^{Rabbil-‘Ālamīn}} (Lord of the Worlds), proving the need for a wise, powerful Creator for all contingent things.
• The answer to the second (worthiness of praise) is \text{^{Ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm, Mālik Yawm ad-Dīn}} (The Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, Master of the Day of Recompense).

Subtleties of \text{^{Rabbil-‘Ālamīn}}:

1. It indicates that everything besides God is dependent on Him for existence and perpetuity.
2. It specifies dependence in perpetuity, which was disputed among scholars (some thought things only needed a cause at creation).
3. As the Mother of the Qur'an, this verse indicates that every existing thing is proof of His divinity.

Comparison with other opening verses: Other suwar begin with \text{^{Al-Ḥamdu lillāh}} but specify aspects of Lordship (creating heavens/earth, sending the Book, creating angels), which are all specific instances falling under the general category of \text{^{Rabbil-‘Ālamīn}} in Al-Fatiha.

Second Issue: \text{^{Rabbil-‘Ālamīn}} implies God is transcendent of space, time, and location, as He is the Creator and Sustainer of space and time, and thus must precede them.

Third Issue: It implies He is not indwelling (ḥulūl) in a location, as He preceded all locations.

Fourth Issue: It proves He is a free agent (fā‘il mukhtār), not a necessary cause (mūjib bi-dhātih), because contingent effects change, which requires choice.

Fifth Issue: The perfection of creation implies the perfection of the Creator in knowledge, wisdom, and power.

The Second Question (Why praise?): Answered by \text{^{Ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm, Mālik Yawm ad-Dīn}}: Whether in ease or hardship, God's mercy is present (Rahman/Rahim), and He promises justice on the Day of Recompense.

The Three Ranks of Servitude:

1. Shari‘ah: Performing outward acts (\text{^{Iyyāka na‘budu}}).
2. Ṭarīqah: Seeking aid, realizing one cannot perform acts without God's help (\text{^{wa iyyāka nasta‘īn}}).
3. Ḥaqīqah: Witnessing that all affairs belong to God (\text{^{ihdinā aṣ-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm}}).

Subtleties of Guidance:

1. The straight path avoids extremes: in belief (avoiding anthropomorphism and total negation), and in action (avoiding lust/idleness and rashness/cowardice).
2. The path is described positively (path of those favored) and negatively (not the path of the wrathful or the misguided).
3. Guidance and unveiling require following a guide (a perfect being) who possesses the light of knowledge.

The world is mixed, but good/ease generally outweighs evil/hardship. Changes imply a powerful agent (proving God's existence). The prevalence of good implies He is Merciful and Worthy of Praise. Realizing this leads to \text{^{Al-Ḥamdu lillāh}} and \text{^{Rabbil-‘Ālamīn}} (He is Lord of all, as all share the contingency that necessitates a Lord). This realization leads the servant to seek closeness to the Mighty One through His Mercy (\text{^{Ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm}}) and Justice (\text{^{Mālik Yawm ad-Dīn}}). This realization shifts the heart from seeking help from created means (princes, ministers) to seeking it only from God, leading to \text{^{Iyyāka na‘budu}} and \text{^{wa iyyāka nasta‘īn}} and finally \text{^{ihdinā aṣ-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm}} by joining the company of the righteous.

Humans naturally love causes that bring benefit and repel harm. This love becomes ingrained through habit and imitation. Divine guidance leads one to realize these causes are merely instruments of God, leading to the conclusion: \text{^{Al-Ḥamdu lillāh}} (All praise belongs to God). This realization extends from the microcosm (self) to the macrocosm (Rabbil-‘Ālamīn), revealing God's perfect Mercy (Ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm), and His ultimate Justice (Mālik Yawm ad-Dīn). This leads to true servitude (Iyyāka na‘budu) and seeking aid (Iyyāka nasta‘īn), culminating in asking for guidance (ihdinā) to the path of the righteous, avoiding the path of the misguided.

First Issue: Recitation in Prayer The majority hold recitation is obligatory. The basis is the command \text{^{wa qurr’ān al-fajr}} (and the Qur'an of the dawn) and Hadith confirming prayer requires recitation. The argument against (based on "Pray as you see me pray") is weak because "seeing" here means "knowing."

Second Issue: Obligation of Al-Fatiha Shafi‘i and the majority hold reciting Al-Fatiha is obligatory in every rak‘ah. Abu Hanifa disagrees. Arguments for obligation: The Prophet's constant practice, the command to follow him, the command \text{^{Aqimū aṣ-ṣalāh}} (Establish prayer) implying the known form including Al-Fatiha, the Hadith "No prayer without the Mother of the Book," the consensus of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and the fact that omitting it leads to deficiency (khidāj).

Third Issue: Amount of Recitation (Abu Hanifa's view) Abu Hanifa: One verse suffices. His students: Three short verses or one long verse (like the Verse of Debt).

Fourth Issue: \text{^{Bismillāh}} as a Verse Shafi‘i: It is the first verse of Al-Fatiha and must be recited. Malik/Awza‘i: It is not part of the Qur'an except in Sūrat An-Naml, recited secretly except in Ramadan. Abu Hanifa: Recited secretly, but its status as a verse is not explicitly stated.

Fifth Issue: Is this a matter of Ijtihād (independent reasoning)? The view that it is definitive is refuted because proof relies on tawātur (mass narration) or āḥād (single narration). If tawātur were established, there would be no disagreement. If āḥād is used, the status becomes presumptive (ẓannī), which is insufficient for establishing the Qur'an text. The matter is one of Ijtihād concerning legal rulings derived from it (e.g., recitation aloud/secretly).

Sixth Issue: Is \text{^{Bismillāh}} a verse of Al-Fatiha? The majority of reciters and jurists (including Shafi‘i) say yes. Evidence includes narrations from Umm Salamah, Abu Hurayrah, and the Hadith about the division of prayer into two halves. The argument that it causes repetition of \text{^{ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm}} is weak, as repetition for emphasis is common.

Ninth Issue: Reciting \text{^{Bismillāh}} Aloud The preferred view is that it is Sunnah to recite it aloud when reciting Al-Fatiha aloud, based on the principle that what is inherently honorable (praise of God) should be declared openly, and the practice of Ali (RA).

Eleventh Issue: Translation of the Qur'an in Prayer Translation is insufficient for validity, even for the incapable. Evidence: The Prophet (PBUH) taught the incapable to recite glorifications (tasbīḥ), not translations. Furthermore, the Qur'an is defined by its Arabic wording, its miraculous nature, and its preservation, none of which apply to translation.

Twelfth Issue: Recitation behind the Imam Shafi‘i (New School): Obligatory in all rak‘ahs. Abu Hanifa: Disliked in all cases. The stronger view is that it is obligatory, based on Hadith indicating the division of prayer between God and the servant, which requires the servant's recitation.

Thirteenth Issue: Number of Verses The majority hold it has seven verses, with \text{^{Bismillāh}} being the first. This is supported by the verse \text{^{Sab‘an min al-mathānī}} (Seven oft-repeated verses).

Chapter Five: Interpretation of Sūrat Al-Fātiḥah

This verse establishes God's existence and His worthiness of praise. The subsequent verses provide the proof and justification for this praise.