Tafsir of Yunus 10:99-100

Surah Yunus 10:100

ﱨ ﱩ ﱪ ﱫ ﱬ ﱭ ﱮ ﱯ ﱰ ﱱ ﱲ ﱳ ﱴ ﱵ ﱶ

And it is not for a soul to believe except by permission of Allah, and He will place defilement upon those who will not use reason.

Tafsir

Mafatih al-Ghayb

Verse range: 10:99-100

Open in Qurani

| Jonah: (99 - 100) And if your Lord had willed...

Know that this Surah, from its beginning up to this point, has been concerned with explaining the doubts of the disbelievers regarding the denial of prophethood, along with the responses to them. One of their doubts was that the Prophet (peace be upon him) threatened them with the descent of punishment upon the disbelievers. They also noted that after following him, God would grant them victory, elevate their status, and strengthen their position. Since the disbelievers did not see this happen, they used it as a point of contention against his prophethood. They were also excessively eager for this punishment to occur, doing so mockingly.

Then, God Almighty clarified that the delay of what was promised does not invalidate the truthfulness of the promise. He then provided examples for this: the incident of Noah and the incident of Moses (peace be upon them) with Pharaoh. These explanations extended to this point.

In this verse, it is clarified that the Prophet's effort in bringing them to faith, his insistence on presenting proofs, and his answering of doubts are of no avail, because faith is only achieved through God's creation, will, guidance, and direction. If this element is not present, faith will not be achieved.

In this verse, there are several issues:

Issue 1: The argument for God's Will concerning all creation.

Our companions (the Ash'arites) argued for the correctness of their position that all beings exist by the will of God. They said: The word "if" (لو) implies the negation of the consequent. Thus, His statement: {And if your Lord had willed, all who are on earth would have believed - all of them} implies that this will did not occur, and thus the belief of all people on earth did not occur. This indicates that the Almighty did not intend the belief of all.

Al-Jubba'i, Al-Qadi, and others responded by saying that the intended meaning is the will of compulsion (مشيئة الإلجاء). That is, if God had willed to compel them to believe, He would have been capable of doing so, and it would have been valid from Him, but He did not do so because faith resulting from compulsion does not benefit the servant.

Then Al-Jubba'i said: The meaning of God's compulsion (إلجاء) to them is that He makes it known to them by necessity that if they tried to abandon it, God would intervene and prevent them from doing so. At that point, they would inevitably do what they were compelled to do. Just as if someone knows that if he attempts to kill a king, the king will forcibly prevent him, his refraining from that act would not be a cause for deserving praise and reward, so too here.

Know that this statement is weak, and its weakness is evident in several ways:

  1. First: Was the disbeliever capable of disbelief, or was he incapable of belief? If he was capable of disbelief but incapable of belief, then the capacity for disbelief necessitates disbelief. Since God created that capacity, it must be said that He created in him a capacity that necessitates disbelief, so it must be said that He willed disbelief from him. However, if the capacity is equally suited for both opposites (as is the doctrine of our companions), then the preference of one side over the other, if it does not depend on a determining factor (مرجح), means that preference occurred without a determiner, which is false. If it depends on a determiner, that determiner is either from the servant or from God. If it is from the servant, the division recurs, leading to an infinite regress, which is impossible. If it is from God, then the combination of that capacity and that incentive necessitates that disbelief. Since God is the creator of both the capacity and the incentive, the obligation (that God willed it) returns.
  1. Second: His statement: {And if your Lord had willed} cannot be interpreted as the will of compulsion. This is because the Prophet (peace be upon him) was not asking for faith that would not benefit them in the Hereafter. God clarified that the Messenger has no power to bring about this faith, then said: {And if your Lord had willed, all who are on earth would have believed - all of them}. Therefore, the faith mentioned in this verse must be the beneficial faith, so that the discourse is coherent. Interpreting the text as the will of overpowering or compulsion is not appropriate for this context.
  1. Third: This compulsion (إلجاء) either means that terrifying signs appear before them, causing great fear upon seeing them, and then they come with faith at that moment. Or, it means the creation of faith within them. The first interpretation is false because God clarified before this verse that sending such signs is not beneficial, as He said: {Indeed, those upon whom the decree of your Lord has been justly pronounced will not believe, even if every sign should come to them, until they see the painful punishment} (Jonah: 96-97). He also said: {And even if We sent down the angels to them and the dead spoke to them and We gathered before them all things in front of them, they would not believe except if God willed} (Al-An'am: 111). If the second meaning is intended (creation of faith), then this is not compulsion towards faith, but rather it is an expression for the creation of faith within them. In that case, we say: But He did not create faith in them, which proves that He did not will the occurrence of faith for them—and this is precisely our doctrine.

Know that after mentioning this, God said: {So will you then compel the people until they become believers?} The meaning is that you have no power over anyone's actions. The purpose here is to clarify that overwhelming power and effective will belong only to the Truth, the Exalted.

Issue 2: The argument that no ruling applies to things before the revelation of the Law.

Our companions argued for the correctness of their position that no ruling applies to things before the advent of the Law (الشرع) using His statement: {And it is not for a soul to believe except by the permission of God}. They argued that "permission" (الإذن) means release in action and removal of constraint. The explicit meaning of this verse indicates that before this meaning is obtained, the soul cannot proceed with this belief.

They further argued that reason supports this in several ways:

  1. First: Reason does not indicate that knowing God, being occupied with thanking Him, and praising Him yields any benefit. Therefore, reason must not necessitate it. The explanation is that this benefit either accrues to the one being thanked or to the one giving thanks. The first is false because, in observable instances, the one being thanked benefits from the thanks—the thanks pleases him and ingratitude displeases him. Thus, thanks are good and ingratitude is ugly. As for God Almighty, thanks neither please Him nor does ingratitude displease Him; thus, He does not benefit from this thanks at all.
  1. Second: This is also false because the thankful person exerts himself in the act of thanks and offers service, while the one being thanked gains absolutely no benefit from it. It cannot be argued that this thanks is the cause of reward, because deserving reward from God is impossible. Deserving something from another is only conceivable if that other party, if they withheld what is due, would result in a deficiency in their status. Since the Exalted is pure from deficiency and excess, this concept is not conceivable regarding Him. Thus, it is established that engaging in belief and thanks yields no benefit according to pure reason. Whatever is like that cannot be necessitated by reason. Therefore, the correctness of His statement {And it is not for a soul to believe except by the permission of God} is established by this decisive proof.

Al-Qadi said: The meaning is that belief does not originate from the soul except through God's knowledge, or His command, or His enabling power over it.

Our response is: Interpreting "permission" (الإذن) as you mentioned is abandoning the apparent meaning, which is not permissible, especially since we have demonstrated that decisive rational proof supports our position.

Issue 3: Recitation variant.

Abu Bakr read {And We will make} (ونجعل) with the letter Nun (indicating "We"), while the rest read it with the letter Ya (implying God's name, "He will make").

Issue 4: The argument that God is the Creator of disbelief and faith.

Our companions argued for the correctness of their position that God is the Creator of disbelief and faith using His statement: {And He makes the filth (الرجس) fall upon those who do not reason}. The argument is that Al-Rijs (filth/impurity) can refer to ugly deeds. God says: {God only intends to remove from you the impurity, O people of the [Prophet's] household, and to purify you with [complete] purification} (Al-Ahzab: 33). Here, Al-Rijs refers to ugly deeds, whether disbelief or sin. Through purification, the servant is moved from the filth of disbelief and sin to the purity of faith and obedience. Since God mentioned before this verse that faith is not achieved except by God's will and creation, He mentioned afterward that Al-Rijs is not achieved except by His creation and formation. The Rijs that opposes faith can only be disbelief. Thus, this verse indicates that both disbelief and faith are from God.

Abu Ali al-Farsi, the grammarian, responded by saying: Al-Rijs admits two other interpretations:

  1. That it means punishment. Thus, {And He makes the filth fall upon those who do not reason} means punishment befalls them, as He said: {And to punish the hypocrite men and hypocrite women and the polytheist men and polytheist women} (Al-Fath: 6).
  2. That God judges them as being Rijs (filthy), as He said: {Indeed, the polytheists are unclean} (At-Tawbah: 28). The meaning is that the purity established for the Muslims was not attained by them.

Our response: We have already demonstrated by rational proof that ignorance/disbelief cannot be an act of the servant because he does not intend or aim for its formation; rather, he intends its opposite. If it were up to him, only what he intended would occur. We have raised questions regarding this argument and answered them earlier in this book. As for interpreting Al-Rijs as punishment, it is false, because Al-Rijs means the corrupt, the repulsive, and the detestable. Interpreting this word for their ignorance and disbelief is more appropriate than interpreting it for God's punishment, even though punishment is true, real, and correct. As for interpreting Al-Rijs as God's judgment of their filthiness, this is extremely far-fetched, because God's judgment of that is one of His attributes. How can it be permissible to say that an attribute of God is Rijs? Thus, the proof we mentioned is clear.

7 < { Say, "Look at what is in the heavens and on earth." But signs and warners are of no benefit to a people who do not believe." } > 7 !