Al-Isra: (15) Whoever is guided, is guided for himself...

There are several issues in this verse:

Issue 1: Reinforcement of Individual Accountability

When the Almighty said in the first verse: {And We have fastened every man's fate (or bird of ill-omen) to his neck} (Al-Isra: 13), meaning that every person is exclusively responsible for their own deeds, He expressed this meaning using another phrase that is closer to understanding and further from error: {Whoever is guided, is guided for himself; and whoever goes astray, goes astray to his own detriment}.

This means that the reward for righteous deeds is exclusive to the doer and does not extend to others. This is further confirmed by His saying: {And that man shall have nothing but what he strives for * And that his striving will be seen} (An-Najm: 39-40).

Al-Ka'bi said: This verse indicates that the servant is capable of both good and evil, and is not compelled to any specific action whatsoever. This is because the statement, {Whoever is guided, is guided for himself; and whoever goes astray, goes astray to his own detriment}, is only appropriate for one who is capable of action and able to perform it as he wills and intends. It is not fitting for one who is compelled to one extreme and prevented from the other.

Issue 2: Reiteration of Non-Transferability of Sin

The Almighty reiterated that everyone is exclusively responsible for the consequences of their own actions by saying: {And no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another}.

Al-Zajjaj said: The verb wazara (to bear a burden) yields wāzir (one who bears) and the verbal noun wizr or wizrah, meaning a sin for which one is sinful. There are two interpretations of the verse:

1. The sinner is not held accountable for the sin of another, nor is another held accountable for his sin; rather, everyone is exclusively responsible for their own sin.
2. It is not appropriate for a person to commit sin because others have committed it, as the disbelievers said: {And thus We have not sent before you any warner into a town except that its affluent ones said, "Indeed, we found our fathers following a religion, and indeed we are, in their footsteps, following"} (Az-Zukhruf: 32) [Note: The quote provided in the source text for the second interpretation seems slightly mismatched with the context of justifying sin based on others' actions, but the core idea is about not following others into sin].

Know that people have relied upon this verse to establish many rulings:

Al-Jubba'i said that the verse indicates that the Almighty does not punish children for the disbelief of their fathers, because if He did, the child would be held accountable for the sin of his father, which contradicts the apparent meaning of this verse.

It is narrated from Ibn Umar that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Indeed, the deceased is tormented by the weeping of his family."

'A'ishah challenged the authenticity of this narration and used the Almighty's saying as evidence against its validity: {And no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another}, because tormenting the deceased due to the weeping of his family implies holding a person accountable for the crime of another, which contradicts this verse.

Al-Qadi said that this verse indicates that the burden (wizr) and sin are not actions of God Almighty. This is evident in several ways:

1. If sin were God's action, it would be impossible for the servant to be held accountable for it, just as he is not held accountable for the sin of another.
2. The burden should be lifted entirely, because the bearer (wāzir) can only be correctly described as such if he is choosing and capable of avoiding it. For this reason, a child is not described with this term.

A group of early jurists refrained from imposing the diya on the aqilah (the paternal relatives of the offender), arguing that this implies holding a person accountable for the action of another, which contradicts this verse.

The response to this: The one who erred is not held accountable for that action, so how can another be held accountable because of that action? Rather, this is an obligation imposed by God Almighty as an initial decree.

Issue 3: The Obligation of Thanking the Benefactor

Our scholars maintain that the obligation to thank the Benefactor (God) is not established by reason ('aql) but by revelation (sam').

The evidence for this is the Almighty's saying: {And We would not punish until We sent a messenger}.

The way to derive the proof is that the essence of obligation (wujūb) is only established by the consequence of punishment for its abandonment. And there is no punishment before the Law (Shar'), according to this verse, so the obligation must not be established before the Law.

They further reinforced this verse with: {Messengers bringing good tidings and warnings, so that mankind will have no plea against Allah after the messengers} (An-Nisa: 165), and: {And if We had destroyed them with punishment before it, they would have said, "Our Lord, if only You had sent us a messenger so we could follow Your verses before we were humiliated and disgraced"} (Taha: 134).

Someone might argue: This line of reasoning is weak, and this is evident in two ways:

First: If the rational obligation (wujūb 'aqli) were not established, the legal obligation (wujūb shar'i) would never be established. This is false, so the premise is false. The necessity of this connection is shown in several ways:

1. If a legislator comes claiming to be a prophet from God and displays a miracle, must the listener heed his words and contemplate his miracles, or not? If not, the claim of prophethood is void. If yes, this obligation must be either rational or legal. If it is rational, then rational obligation is established. If it is legal, this is false, because that law is either the claim itself or another. If it is the claim itself, the argument returns to the man saying: "The proof that my statement must be accepted is that I say my statement must be accepted," which is proving a thing by itself. If the legislator is someone else, the discussion is as in the first case, leading to either circularity or infinite regress, both of which are impossible.
2. When the Law comes and obligates some actions and prohibits others, there is no meaning to the obligation and prohibition unless one says: "If you abandon this and do that, I will punish you." We ask: Is it obligatory to guard against punishment or not? If guarding against punishment is not obligatory, the meaning of obligation is never established, which is false, so the premise is false. If guarding against punishment is obligatory, this obligation is either rational or revealed. If it is rational, that is the goal. If it is revealed, the meaning of this obligation is only established by the consequence of punishment, and then the first division returns, leading to infinite regress, which is impossible.
3. The doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunnah is that it is permissible for God to forgive punishment for abandoning an obligation. If this is the case, the essence of obligation exists even without punishment. Therefore, it must be said that the essence of obligation is established only by the presence of fear of punishment. This fear is present by mere reason. Thus, it is established that the essence of obligation is established by mere reason.

If they say: The essence of obligation is established by the presence of fear of blame?

We reply: If God forgives, the blame is removed. Based on this, the essence of obligation is established only by the presence of fear of blame, and this fear is present by mere reason. Thus, by these means, it is established that rational obligation cannot be refuted.

If this is established, we say: There are two views regarding the verse:

1. We take the verse at its apparent meaning and say that Reason is the messenger of God to creation, or rather, the messenger without whom the message of no prophet could be established. Thus, Reason is the original messenger, and the meaning of the verse is: "We would not punish until We sent the messenger of Reason."
2. We restrict the generality of the verse and say: The meaning is, "We would not punish regarding actions whose obligation can only be known through the Law, except after the arrival of the Law." Although departing from the apparent meaning by restricting generality is a deviation, it must be adopted when evidence is established. We have demonstrated three pieces of evidence. Furthermore, if we negate rational obligation, we must negate legal obligation. And Allah knows best.

Know that what we prefer and adhere to is that mere reason is the cause for it being obligatory upon us to do what benefits us and avoid what harms us. However, mere reason does not indicate that anything is obligatory upon God Almighty. This is because we are naturally inclined to seek benefit and avoid harm, so reason alone is sufficient for obligation concerning us. God Almighty is transcendent from seeking benefit and fleeing harm, so it is impossible for reason to decree an obligation upon Him to do or refrain from an action. And Allah knows best.

Verse 17: Destruction of the Corrupt

{And when We decide to destroy a town, We command its affluent ones, and they commit transgression therein. So the word is justified against it, and We destroy it with utter destruction. * And how many generations have We destroyed after Noah? And sufficient is your Lord as regards the sins of His servants—Acquainted, Seeing.}