Al-Baqarah: (116-117) And they said, "Allah has taken a son..."

This is the tenth category of the reprehensible actions of the Jews, Christians, and polytheists.

The apparent meaning of the Almighty's saying, {And they said, "Allah has taken a son"}, is that it refers back to His saying: {And who is more unjust than one who prevents the mosques of Allah...} (Al-Baqarah: 114). We have previously mentioned that some interpreted this as referring to the Christians, and others as referring to the Arab polytheists. We, however, interpreted it as referring to the Jews. All these groups affirmed a son for Allah Almighty: the Jews said, 'Uzayr is the son of Allah; the Christians said, the Messiah is the son of Allah; and the Arab polytheists said, the angels are the daughters of Allah. Thus, this narration is valid under all interpretations.

Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) said that this verse was revealed concerning Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf, Ka'b ibn Asad, and Wahb ibn Yahuda, as they claimed that 'Uzayr was the son of Allah.

As for His saying, {Exalted is He} (Subhanahu), it is a word of purification, by which He purifies Himself from what they said, just as He said elsewhere: {Exalted is He above having a son} (An-Nisa: 171). Sometimes He states it explicitly, and sometimes He suffices with the context to indicate it.

He supported this purification with His saying: {Nay, to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth}. The way this serves as proof against the corruption of their doctrine is through several aspects:

The First Argument: Everything other than the Necessarily Existent Being (Wajib al-Wujud) is possible in itself (mumkin li-dhatihi). Every being possible in itself is created (muhdath), and every created being is a product of the Necessarily Existent Being. A created thing cannot be a son.

• Proof that what is other than the Necessarily Existent Being is possible in itself: If there were two beings necessarily existent in themselves, they would share in the necessity of existence. Each one would need a distinguishing factor to differentiate it from the other, in addition to the factor of shared necessity. This would necessitate that each one is composed of two components (the shared and the distinguishing). Every composite thing requires its parts, and every part requires something else (to constitute it), thus every composite thing requires something external to it. Everything that requires something external is possible in itself. Therefore, each of these two necessarily existent beings would be possible in itself, which is a contradiction.
• Furthermore, if each of those two parts were necessarily existent, the same division would apply, leading to an infinite regression of parts, which is impossible. Even if we concede it is not impossible, the point is established: any multiplicity requires unity. If those units were necessarily existent in themselves, they would be composite, as established, meaning the simple is composite—a contradiction. If they were possible, the composite thing requiring them would be more deserving of being possible.
• Thus, it is proven by this argument that everything besides the Necessarily Existent Being is possible in itself. Every being possible in itself requires an Agent. The effect of that Agent upon it occurs either in its state of non-existence or in its state of existence. If the former, that possible being is created (muhdath). If the latter, the need of that being for the Agent is either for its subsistence or its origination. The former is impossible because it implies the creation of existence itself. Thus, the latter is determined, which implies that the possible being is created.
• Therefore, it is established that everything other than Allah is created, preceded by non-existence, and its existence is only achieved through Allah's creation, origination, and invention. Hence, everything other than Him is His servant and property, making it impossible for anything else to be His son. This proof is derived from His saying: {Nay, to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth}, meaning everything other than Him belongs to Him by way of ownership, creation, origination, and invention.

The Second Argument: That which is attributed to Him as His son is either eternal (qadim) or created (muhdath).

• If it were eternal, our judgment to make one the father and the other the son would be no more valid than the reverse, making that judgment arbitrary without proof.
• If the son were created (hadith), it would be created by that eternal being and its servant, and thus not its son.

The Third Argument: A son must be of the same genus as the parent. If we were to suppose He had a son, that son would share some attributes with the parent and be distinguished by others. This necessitates that each one is composite and created, which is impossible. Therefore, similarity of genus is impossible, and sonship is impossible.

The Fourth Argument: A son is typically taken out of need in old age and in hope of benefiting from his assistance when the father is incapable of managing his own affairs. According to this, the creation of a son is only appropriate for one to whom poverty, incapacity, and need apply. Since all these are impossible for Allah, the creation of a son for Him is impossible.

Know that the Almighty has recounted in many places the saying of those who attribute sons to Him and refuted them with this very argument: that everyone in the heavens and the earth is His servant, and that when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.

He said concerning Mary: {That is Jesus, the son of Mary—the word of truth about which they are doubting. It is not for Allah to take a son; Exalted is He! When He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.} (Maryam: 34-35).

He also said at the end of this Surah: {And they say, "The Most Merciful has taken a son." You have certainly done a grave thing. The heavens are almost to break apart from it, and the earth splits open, and the mountains collapse in [great] falling, That you should attribute to the Most Merciful a son. And it is not appropriate for the Most Merciful that He should take a son. There is no one in the heavens and the earth except that he comes to the Most Merciful as a servant.} (Maryam: 88-93).

If it is asked: What is the wisdom in Allah using the ownership of what is in the heavens and the earth as proof in this verse, while in Surah Maryam He used the ownership of those in the heavens and the earth, as in {There is no one in the heavens and the earth except that he comes to the Most Merciful as a servant}?

We reply: His saying in this Surah, {Nay, to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth}, is more comprehensive, because the word mā (whatever) encompasses all things.

As for His saying: {All are devoutly obedient to Him} (Ar-Rum: 26), there are several issues concerning it:

The root of Qunūt originally means permanence. It is then used in four ways:

1. Obedience, as in His saying: {O Mary, be devoutly obedient to your Lord} (Al 'Imran: 43).
2. Standing for a long time, as in the Prophet's saying when asked which prayer is best: "The one with long Qunūt."
3. Silence, as Zayd ibn Arqam said: "We used to speak during prayer until the verse {And stand up devoutly obedient to Allah} (Al-Baqarah: 238) was revealed, so we stopped speaking."
4. Permanence.

Knowing this, we say: Some commentators said: {All are devoutly obedient to Him} means everything in the heavens and the earth is obedient. The indefinite marker (tanwīn) in kull (all) is a substitute for the possessive pronoun (i.e., all of them), which is the view of Mujahid and Ibn Abbas. They said to these disbelievers: "They are not obedient."

In response, others said the meaning is that they will be obedient on the Day of Resurrection, which is the view of As-Suddi. To them, it is replied: This is a description applicable to the accountable beings (mukallafīn), whereas His saying {to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens} includes those who are not accountable. Therefore, they interpreted Qunūt in other ways:

1. Bearing witness to the existence of the Creator Almighty through the traces of His craftsmanship, signs of contingency, and evidence of His Lordship within them.
2. Being under His ownership and dominion, where He acts as He wills, which is the view of Abu Muslim. Under these two interpretations, the verse is general.
3. It refers to the angels, 'Uzayr, and the Messiah—meaning all those whom they claimed were sons are devoutly obedient to Him. It is narrated that Ali ibn Abi Talib said to some Christians: "If Jesus had not rebelled against the worship of Allah, I would have followed his religion." The Christian replied: "How can this be attributed to Jesus, given his utmost devotion to Allah's obedience?" Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) said: "If Jesus were a god, how could a god be worshipped by another? Only the servant deserves worship." The Christian was silenced.

Since Qunūt in its linguistic root signifies permanence, the meaning of the verse is that the permanence and subsistence of contingent beings are by Him and for Him. This implies that the universe, in its continued existence, requires Him Almighty. Thus, it is established that the contingent being requires that its need for the Agent does not cease, neither at its origination nor during its subsistence.

It is asked: Why did He use mā (which refers to inanimate things or non-rational beings) with qānitūn (which is plural for rational beings)? The answer is: Perhaps He used mā to diminish their status.

As for His saying: {Originator of the heavens and the earth} (Badi' al-Samāwāti wa al-Ard), there are several issues:

Badi' and Mubdi' have the same meaning. Al-Qaffal said: It is like alīm (painful) meaning mu’lim (causing pain), and ḥakīm (wise) meaning muḥkam (well-established). However, Badi' implies exaggeration and indicates the deservingness of the attribute even when not actively performing the action, similar to how sāmi' (hearing) can mean samī' (one who hears habitually). Badi' can also mean Mubdi'. Ibdā' (origination) is creation, and the opposite of Ibdā' is invention based on a pre-existing model. This is why people call someone who says or does something unprecedented an innovator (mubtadi').

This is a continuation of the previous statement. Allah said: {Nay, to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth}, thereby establishing His ownership of what is in the heavens and the earth. Then He clarified that He also owns the heavens and the earth themselves. Then He explained how He originates things: {And when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.} There are issues concerning this:

Some literary scholars said that Qaḍā’ is originally a verbal noun (maṣdar) that has become a noun, which is why its plural is aqḍiyah, like ghiṭā’ (cover) and aghṭiyah. It is synonymous with qaḍiyyah (decree), plural qaḍāyā. Its pattern is fa'āl from the root Q-Ḍ-Y. Its origin was qaḍāy, but the yā’ became afflicted when it was at the end after an extra alif, so it turned into an alif. When this alif met the alif of the fa'āl pattern, it turned into a hamza to avoid the phonetic meeting of two alifs. Examples include al-muḍā’ and al-atā’ (from maḍaytu and ataytu), al-siqā’ and al-shifā’ (from saqaytu and shafaytu). The proof that the yā’ is original, not the hamza, is its stability in most conjugations: qaḍaytu, qaḍaynā, qaḍayta ilā qaḍaytun, qaḍayā, qaḍayna, yqḍiyān, hiya wa anta taqḍī, al-mar’atān wa antumā taqḍiyān, hunna yaqḍīna. As for anti taqḍīna, the yā’ there is the pronoun for the second person feminine singular.

Its original meaning, derived from its structure, is cutting off (al-qaṭ')—hence a judge (qāḍī) is one who judges between two parties, as he separates the dispute. This is why a decisive judge is called faṣīl (separator). Ibn al-Anbārī narrated from linguists that al-qāḍī means the one who cuts off and finalizes matters. The saying inqaḍā al-shay’ (the matter concluded) means it finished and was cut off. Qaḍā ḥājatahu (he fulfilled his need) means he cut it off from the needy person and removed it. Qaḍā daynahu (he paid his debt) means he discharged it, as if he cut off the demand or the demand was cut off from him. Qaḍā al-amr (he completed the matter) means he finalized and perfected it, as in {Then He decreed them as seven heavens} (Fuṣṣilat: 12), because completing a work involves cutting it off and finishing it. A dir' qaḍā’ is one perfectly made.

As for qaḍā al-marīḍ (the sick person passed away) and qaḍā naḥbahu (he met his destined end), these are metaphorical extensions of the original meaning, the connection being apparent. The taqaḍḍī of a falcon is not from this root.

What supports the meaning of cutting off is the usage of related roots:

1. Al-Qayḍ: Qāḍahu fa-inqāḍa means he split it and it split open. This is related to the cracking of eggs (qayḍ al-bayḍ) when they break from their shells. Inqaḍā al-ḥā’iṭ means the wall collapsed without being struck. Cutting, splitting, breaking, and collapsing are close in meaning.
2. Al-Ḍīq (narrowness): The connection to cutting off is clear, as when something is cut, it becomes narrow, or vice versa.
3. Related roots also indicate cutting off: Qaḍīyah means cutting, hence al-qaḍabah al-murṭabah (a fresh twig) because it is cut (taqḍib). Al-qaḍīb (branch) is a fa'īl noun meaning maf'ūl (cut). Al-miqḍab is a tool used for cutting, like a sickle.
4. Al-Qaḍm: Nibbling with the tips of the teeth, as it involves cutting the food. A sayf qaḍīm is a sword whose edge is chipped.
5. Al-Qaḍf: Thinness. A thin man is called qaḍīf, as scarcity can result from being cut off.
6. Al-Qaḍā’ah: Corruption. Qaḍi’at al-qirbah means the waterskin became worn out and spoiled. Fī ḥisbihi qaḍā’ah means there is a defect in his lineage. All these relate to or result from cutting off. This is the original linguistic meaning.

The word Qaḍā’ is used in several ways in the Qur'an:

1. Creation: {Then He decreed them as seven heavens} (Fuṣṣilat: 12) means He created them.
2. Command: {And your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him} (Al-Isrā’: 23).
3. Judgment: This is why the judge is called al-Qāḍī.
4. Informing: {And We informed the Children of Israel in the Scripture} (Al-Isrā’: 4), meaning We informed them. This usage is often followed by ilā.
5. Completion/Finishing: {So when they had fulfilled what was due from them, they departed to their people as warners} (Al-Aḥqāf: 29), meaning when they finished. Also, {And the command was fulfilled, and the ark settled on [the mountain of] Al-Judi} (Hūd: 44), meaning the destruction of the disbelievers was completed. And {that they may accomplish their rites} (Al-Ḥajj: 29), meaning to finish them.

Knowing this, we say regarding {When He decrees a matter} (Al 'Imran: 47): It is said it means when He creates something, or when He judges that something must happen, or when He perfects a matter. A poet said:

And upon them are two coats of mail which David decreed [made] or the making of the perfect ones by Tubba'.

They agree that the word Amr is literally a specific utterance. Is it also literal for action and true reality? Yes, and this is what is intended by Amr here. A detailed discussion is found in Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence).

Ibn 'Āmir recited {Kun Fayakūn} (Be, and it is) with the accusative case (naṣb) throughout the Qur'an, except in two places: at the beginning of Al 'Imran: {Kun Fayakūn, al-Ḥaqq} (Al 'Imran: 59-60), and in Al-An'am: {Kun Fayakūn, qawl al-Ḥaqq} (Al-An'ām: 73), where he raised it (raf') to the nominative case. Al-Kisa'i recited it with naṣb in An-Nahl and Yā Sīn, and with raf' in the rest of the Qur'an. The rest of the reciters use raf' throughout.

• The naṣb reading is interpreted as the result of the command (jawāb al-amr), though some consider this distant.
• The raf' reading is interpreted as a new, independent sentence (isti’nāf), meaning "and it is."

Know that what is intended by {then He only says to it, "Be," and it is} is not that Allah says "Be" (Kun), and then the thing comes into being, as that is flawed. The evidence for this is manifold:

The First Argument: The phrase {Kun Fayakūn} is either eternal (qadīm) or created (muhdath). Both possibilities are flawed, invalidating the idea that the creation of things depends on "Be."

• Why "Be" cannot be eternal:
  1. The word Kun is composed of the letter Kāf followed by Nūn. Since Nūn follows Kāf, it must be created. Since Kāf precedes the created thing by one moment, it must also be created.
  2. The particle Idhā (when) only enters upon future events, so that decree must be created because Idhā entered upon it. The utterance "Be" (Kun) is linked to the decree by the particle Fā’ (then), indicating immediate succession, as He said, {then He only says to it, "Be"}. That which follows a created thing is created. Thus, it is impossible for "Be" to be eternal.
  3. Allah links the creation of the created thing to the utterance "Be" with the particle Fā’ of immediate succession. Therefore, "Be" precedes the creation by one moment. That which precedes a created thing by one moment must itself be created. Thus, the utterance "Be" cannot be eternal.
• Why "Be" cannot be created: If every created thing required the utterance "Be," and "Be" itself is created, this leads to the requirement of another "Be," resulting in either infinite regression (tasalsul) or circularity (dawr), both of which are impossible. Thus, it is proven that the origination of contingent events cannot depend on the utterance "Be."

The Second Argument: Allah either addresses the created thing with "Be" before it enters existence or as it enters existence.

• The first is false because addressing a non-existent thing while it is non-existent is foolishness.
• The second is also false because its outcome is that Allah commands the existing thing to become existent, which is pointless.

The Third Argument: The created thing might be inanimate matter, and commanding inanimate matter is futile and unfitting for the Wise.

The Fourth Argument: The capable being (al-Qādir) is one from whom action and inaction are possible according to volition. If we suppose the capable being, intending action, is separate from the utterance "Be," then either He is capable of origination, or He is not. If He is capable, then origination is not dependent on "Be." If He is not capable, then the capable being is only capable of action when uttering "Be." This reduces the matter to claiming that the power (qudrah) is heard through "Be," which is merely a dispute over terminology.

The Fifth Argument: If "Be" had an effect on creation, then when we utter this word, it must have that effect. Since we know by necessity that this is false, we know this word has no effect.

The Sixth Argument: "Be" (Kun) is a composite word of Kāf followed by Nūn. The agent of effect must be either one of these letters or their combination.

• If it is one letter, then the word "Be" has no effect; the effect belongs to one of the letters.
• If it is the combination, this is impossible because the combination does not exist simultaneously: when the first letter (Kāf) occurs, the second (Nūn) has not occurred, and when the second comes, the first has passed. If the combination never exists, it cannot have an effect.

The Seventh Argument: His saying concerning Jesus: {Indeed, the example of Jesus to Allah is like that of Adam. He created him from dust; then He said to him, "Be," and he was} (Al 'Imran: 59). This shows that the utterance "Be" (Kun) came after his creation, as that which comes after something cannot affect what preceded it. Thus, we know that the utterance "Be" has no effect on the existence of the thing.

These arguments prove the falsehood of this doctrine. If this is established, we must resort to interpretation, which has several forms:

1. The Strongest Interpretation: The intended meaning of this phrase is the speed of the execution of Allah's power in creating things, and that He creates things without thought, effort, trial, or experience. This is analogous to His description of the creation of the heavens and the earth: {Then He said to them and to the earth, "Come willingly or by compulsion." They said, "We come willingly"} (Fuṣṣilat: 11), without any utterance from Him, but rather reflecting the swiftness of His power in creating them without resistance or delay. This is analogous to the Arabs' saying: "The wall said to the peg, 'Why do you split me?' It replied, 'Ask the one who drives me, for what is behind me has not left me alone.'" This is also analogous to His saying: {And there is not a thing except that it exalts [Allah] with praise, but you do not perceive their exaltation} (Al-Isrā’: 44).
2. It is a sign that Allah makes for the angels when they hear it, they know that a matter has been initiated. This is narrated from Abu al-Hudhayl.
3. It is specific to those beings to whom He said: {Be apes, despised} (Al-Baqarah: 65), and those like them. This is the view of Al-Aṣamm.
4. It is a command for the living to die and for the dead to live. All these are weak, and the first interpretation is the strongest.

7 < {And those who have no knowledge say, "Why does Allah not speak to us, or why does not a sign come to us?" Thus said those before them like their saying. Their hearts resemble each other. We have certainly made clear the signs for a people who are certain.} > 7