Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:178

Al-Baqarah (The Cow): Verse 178

{يا أيها الذين آمنوا كتب عليكم القصاص في القتلى} O you who have believed, prescribed for you is retribution [in cases of] the slain.

Before proceeding to the exegesis, it is necessary to mention the reasons for the revelation of this verse. There are four main views:

1. Abolishing Pre-Islamic Practices: The verse was revealed to abolish the laws that existed before the mission of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
   • The Jews mandated only killing (retribution).
   • The Christians mandated only pardon/forgiveness.
   • The Arabs sometimes mandated killing and sometimes mandated blood money (Diyya). However, they practiced extreme transgression in both rulings:
     • In Killing: If a killing occurred between two tribes, one nobler than the other, the nobles would insist on killing a noble person from the opponent's tribe for a slave, a man for a woman, or two men for one man. They would also double the compensation for injuries compared to their opponents, sometimes even more. It is narrated that when one person killed a noble, the killer's relatives approached the victim's father and asked what he wanted. He replied, "One of three things." They asked what they were. He said: "Either you revive my son, or you fill my house with stars from the sky (i.e., kill all your people), or you hand over your entire tribe so I can kill them, and even then, I would not consider it adequate compensation."
     • In Blood Money (Diyya): They would make the Diyya for a noble many times greater than that for a base person.
   • When God sent Muhammad (PBUH), He mandated justice and equality among His servants in the ruling of Qisas (retribution), and this verse was revealed.

2. Deviation by Jewish Tribes: This view is similar to the first. Al-Saddi reported that Banu Qurayza and Banu Nadir, despite adhering to the Scripture, followed the Arabs' path of transgression.

3. The Killing of Hamza (RA): Some say it was revealed concerning the incident of the killing of Hamza (RA).

4. Specification of Equality: Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari narrated from some people, citing Ali ibn Abi Talib and Al-Hasan al-Basri, that the purpose of this verse is to clarify that Qisas is established between free men for free men, slave for slave, and female for female, and that this is sufficient only in these equal cases.
   • If a free man kills a slave, or a slave kills a free man, Qisas is established, but additional compensation (reversion/repayment) is required.
   • If a free man kills a slave: Qisas is execution. If the slave's masters wish to execute the free man, they may, on the condition that they waive the price of the slave from the free man's Diyya, and return the remainder of the Diyya to the free man's guardians.
   • If a slave kills a free man: Qisas is execution. If the free man's guardians wish, they execute the slave, waive the slave's value from the free man's Diyya, and pay the remainder to the free man's guardians. Or, they may take the full Diyya and leave the slave.
   • If a man kills a woman: Qisas is execution. If the woman's guardians wish, they execute him and pay half the Diyya.
   • If a woman kills a man: Qisas is execution. If the man's guardians wish, they execute her and take half the Diyya, or they may take the full Diyya and leave her.
   • They concluded that God revealed this verse to clarify that limiting Qisas to equal parties (free/free, slave/slave, female/female) is legislated. When the categories differ, limiting Qisas is not legislated.

{كتب عليكم} (Prescribed for you): This means "obligated upon you." This phrase implies obligation in two ways:

1. The term {كُتِبَ} (prescribed) implies obligation in the terminology of Sharia. For example: {كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمُ الصِّيَامُ} (Fasting has been prescribed for you) and {كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمْ إِذَا حَضَرَ أَحَدَكُمُ الْمَوْتُ إِن تَرَكَ خَيْرًا الْوَصِيَّةُ} (Prescribed for you, when death approaches one of you...). The obligatory prayers are called Salawat Maktubat (prescribed prayers). The Prophet (PBUH) also said: "Three things have been prescribed for me but not for you."
2. The phrase {عَلَيْكُمْ} (upon you) suggests obligation, as in {وَلِلَّهِ عَلَى النَّاسِ حِجُّ الْبَيْتِ} (And [due] to Allah from the people is the Hajj to the House).

{القصاص} (Retribution): This means doing to a person what was done to him. It comes from the root iqtaṣṣa, as in "So-and-so followed the track of So-and-so" (i.e., did like him). God says: {فَارْتَدَّا عَلَى آثَارِهِمَا قَصَصًا} (So they both followed their tracks). It is called Qisas because the recounting (story) equals the recounted event, and Qasas (narratives) are so named because they recount people's histories. The Miqass (shears) is named so because its two sides balance each other.

{في القتلى} (In the slain): Meaning, because of the slain. The preposition fī (in/concerning) can sometimes indicate causality, as in the Prophet's (PBUH) saying: "For a believing soul, there are one hundred camels."

Interpretation: The verse means: "O you who believe, retribution is obligatory upon you because of the slain."

The apparent meaning suggests the obligation of Qisas upon all believers for the killing of all slain persons. However, the consensus is that the killer is excluded from this generality. Furthermore, the killer is also excluded in many specific cases: when a father kills his son, a master kills his slave, when a Muslim kills an enemy combatant or a treaty-bound non-Muslim, and when a Muslim kills by mistake (manslaughter). Nevertheless, the general ruling remains authoritative for cases not covered by the exceptions.

Objection 1: If Qisas is obligatory, it must be obligatory upon: (a) the killer, (b) the heir (guardian of the slain), or (c) a third party. All three are invalid:

• (a) It is not obligatory upon the killer, as he is forbidden from killing himself.
• (b) It is not obligatory upon the heir, as the heir has the choice to act or refrain; in fact, refraining is recommended by {وَأَن تَعْفُوا أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَى} (And that you forgive is nearer to righteousness).
• (c) A third party is irrelevant to the killing.

Response to Objection 1 (Two Views):

1. The obligation is upon the Imam (ruler) or his representative. When the conditions for Qisas are met, it is not permissible for the Imam to abandon it, as he is one of the believers. The meaning is: "O Imams, retribution is prescribed for you if the heir desires its implementation."
2. The address is directed at the killer. The meaning is: "O killers, it is prescribed for you to surrender yourselves when the heir demands Qisas." Unlike the adulterer or thief who may flee punishment or seek concealment, the killer cannot refuse or deny when the heir demands Qisas, because this right belongs to a human being (the heir).

Objection 2: Since Qisas means equality, the verse mandates observing equality. This does not necessarily mandate killing itself, but only mandates equality in the killing that is legislated. Thus, the verse does not prove that killing is legislated due to the killing.

Response to Objection 2: The apparent meaning of the verse mandates equality in killing. Equality in killing is a quality of the act of killing. Mandating a quality necessitates mandating the entity possessing that quality. Therefore, the verse implies the obligation of killing.

Issue 1: The Required Consequence of Intentional Killing

• Abu Hanifa's View: The required consequence of intentional killing is Qisas.
• Al-Shafi'i's View (One Opinion): The consequence is either Qisas or Diyya.
• Argument: Abu Hanifa used this verse. However, the argument is weak because, whether the addressee is the Imam or the heir, the obligation is conditional upon the heir specifically desiring execution. If the heir desires execution, Qisas is determined. The dispute is whether the heir can waive Qisas for Diyya, and the verse does not indicate he is prevented from doing so if he desires Diyya.

Issue 2: The Manner of Equivalence (Muthālāt) The scholars differed on the manner of equivalence mandated by the verse:

• Al-Shafi'i's View: The initial method of killing must be observed. If the first killer cut off a hand, the killer's hand is cut off. If the victim died from that injury, the matter ends; otherwise, the neck is severed. If the first victim was burned, the killer is burned. If he dies from the burning, the matter ends; otherwise, the neck is severed.
• Abu Hanifa's View: Equivalence means taking the life in the most definitive way possible. Therefore, Qisas is only by the sword, severing the neck.

Al-Shafi'i's Evidence: God mandated equality between the two acts, requiring equivalence in all possible aspects.

1. It is permissible to say: "Equality in the slain is prescribed, except in the manner of killing." The exception proves that the manner of killing was initially included in the general ruling.
2. If we did not rule that this verse implies equality in all aspects, the verse would be ambiguous (mujmal). If we rule by generality, the verse is beneficial, but since it is specified in some cases, specification is preferable to ambiguity.
3. If the verse only implied obligation in some aspect of equality, since any two things share some equality, the verse would yield no specific ruling. This is close to point 2.

Therefore, the verse implies equivalence in all aspects. This is further confirmed by other texts mandating similarity, such as {وَجَزَاءُ سَيِّئَةٍ سَيِّئَةٌ مِّثْلُهَا} (And the recompense for a bad deed is its like) and {فَمَنِ اعْتَدَىٰ عَلَيْكُمْ فَاعْتَدُوا عَلَيْهِ بِمِثْلِ مَا اعْتَدَىٰ عَلَيْكُمْ} (So whoever transgresses against you, then transgress against him like what he has transgressed against you). These texts are reinforced by the famous Hadith: "Whoever burns, we burn him; whoever drowns, we drown him." It is also narrated that a Jew crushed a boy's head with stones, so the Prophet (PBUH) ordered the Jew's head to be crushed with stones.

Abu Hanifa's Evidence: He relied on the Hadith: "There is no Qisas except by the sword," and "None shall be punished by fire except its Lord."

Reconciliation: When the Hadiths conflict, the implication of the verses remains free from contradiction. (And God knows best.)

Issue 3: Qisas for a Repentant Killer There is consensus that if the killer does not repent and insists on sinning, Qisas is legislated against him as a punishment from God. However, if he is repentant, they agree that Qisas cannot be a punishment from God, because the evidence shows repentance is accepted: {وَهُوَ الَّذِي يَقْبَلُ التَّوْبَةَ عَنْ عِبَادِهِ} (And He is the one who accepts the repentance from His servants). Once repentance is accepted, the repentant person cannot justly deserve punishment. The Prophet (PBUH) said: "Repentance erases sin."

• Difference in View: Our companions (Ahl al-Hadith/Shafi'is) say God does what He wills, and there is no objection to His decree. The Mu'tazila argue that Qisas is legislated only as a favor (lutf) to him. They then ask themselves: How can this killing be a favor to him when there is no compulsion after the killing? They answer: This killing benefits the heir (through satisfaction) and benefits other responsible people (as a deterrent), and it benefits the killer himself, as knowing he will certainly be killed might motivate him toward good deeds and abandoning persistence in sin.

{الحر بالحر والعبد بالعبد والأنثى بالأنثى} The free man for the free man, and the slave for the slave, and the female for the female.

There are two main opinions regarding this clause:

Opinion 1: Restriction (Hassr) This verse implies that Qisas is legislated only between equals: free for free, slave for slave, female for female.

• Evidence:
  1. The definite article al- (the) in {الْحُرُّ} implies generality. "The free man for the free man" means every free man must be killed by a free man. If a free man were killed for a slave, that free man would not be killed by a free man, contradicting the requirement that every free man be killed by a free man.
  2. The preposition bā' (for/by) must relate to a verb. The meaning is: "The free man is killed by the free man." The subject cannot be more general than the predicate; it must be equal or more specific. This implies every free man is killed by a free man, contradicting the possibility of a free man being killed by a slave.
  3. God mandated equality in the beginning of the verse {كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْقَتْلَى}. Following this with {الْحُرُّ بِالْحُرِّ وَالْعَبْدُ بِالْعَبْدِ} indicates that equality in freedom/slavery is considered. This latter phrase is an explanation of the former. Killing a free man for a slave neglects equality in this aspect, so it should not be legislated.

• Rebuttal to Counter-Evidence: If the opponent cites {وَكَتَبْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِيهَا أَنَّ النَّفْسَ بِالنَّفْسِ} (And We ordained for them therein: a life for a life) (Al-Ma'idah: 45), we reply: Our position is stronger for two reasons:
  1. The verse cited was legislated for those before us, while the verse we rely on is legislated for us, and our law is stronger in implication.
  2. The verse we rely on contains detailed rulings on souls, and the specific (our verse) takes precedence over the general (the previous verse).

• Conclusion of Opinion 1: The apparent meaning dictates that a slave is only killed for a slave, and a female only for a female. However, we deviate from this apparent meaning due to consensus (Ijmā') and the meaning derived from the sequence of the verse. This deviation applies to the killing of a slave for a free man (where it is permissible) and a female for a male (where it is permissible). This is because when a slave is killed for a slave, killing him for a superior (free man) is more appropriate. Conversely, when a free man is killed for a free man, it is not necessary that he be killed for an inferior (slave). As for killing a male for a female, this is based solely on consensus.

Opinion 2: Specification, Not Restriction The phrase {الْحُرُّ بِالْحُرِّ} does not imply restriction at all. It only legislates Qisas between the mentioned parties without indicating anything about other categories.

• Evidence:
  1. The phrase {وَالْأُنثَىٰ بِالْأُنثَىٰ} implies Qisas for a free woman for a slave woman. If {الْحُرُّ بِالْحُرِّ وَالْعَبْدُ بِالْعَبْدِ} prevented this, it would lead to contradiction.
  2. {كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْقَتْلَى} is a complete, independent sentence. {الْحُرُّ بِالْحُرِّ} is a specification of some instances within that general statement. When the independent general statement precedes, specifying some instances does not prevent the ruling from applying to other instances. This specification might be for reasons other than negating the ruling for other cases.

• Purpose of Specification (Two Views):
  1. Majority View: The purpose is to invalidate the practices of the Jahiliyyah (Ignorance), as narrated in the occasion of revelation: they used to kill a noble person from the killer's tribe for a slave. The purpose of this specification is to forbid them from that.
  2. View of Ali and Al-Hasan (Narrated by Al-Tabari): These specified cases are those where Qisas is sufficient alone. In other cases (free for slave, male for female), Qisas is not sufficient; additional repayment/reversion is required. (We explained this view in the section on the occasion of revelation.) However, many scholars doubt the authenticity of this narration from Ali ibn Abi Talib, and it is weak upon reflection because it is established that a group is killed for one person without reversion, so similarly, a male should be killed for a female without reversion. Furthermore, Qisas is the ultimate penalty for killing; it is not permissible to mandate something else alongside it.

{فَمَنْ عُفِيَ لَهُ مِنْ أَخِيهِ شَيْءٌ فَاتِّبَاعٌ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَأَدَاءٌ إِلَيْهِ بِإِحْسَانٍ} But if forgiveness is granted to him from his brother anything [of the right to retribution], then [the payment of] the blood money is to be made according to what is customary, and its delivery to him in kindness.

Those who hold that the consequence of intentional killing is either Qisas or Diyya rely on this verse. They argue:

• The verse indicates that in this situation, there is a forgiver ('āfī) and one who is forgiven (ma'fūw lahu). There is no one else besides the heir and the killer. The forgiver must be the heir, as forgiveness means waiving a right, which only the guardian of the slain possesses.
• The meaning is: "If the heir forgives the killer anything concerning the obligation of Qisas, then the killer must follow that forgiveness with customary practice, and deliver payment to him kindly."
• The word {شَيْءٌ} (anything) is vague, so it must refer to the previously mentioned obligation: Qisas. Thus, the meaning is: "If the killer is forgiven the obligation of Qisas, the killer must follow the forgiver customarily and pay him money kindly."
• By consensus, nothing other than Diyya is obligatory here. Therefore, the obligatory payment must be the Diyya. This proves that the consequence of intentional killing is either Qisas or money (Diyya). If it were not so, money would not be obligatory upon forgiveness of Qisas.
• This is reinforced by God's statement: {ذَٰلِكَ تَخْفِيفٌ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ وَرَحْمَةٌ} (That is a concession from your Lord and a mercy). Establishing the choice for you between Qisas and Diyya is a mercy, because the ruling for the Jews was fixed Qisas, and for the Christians, fixed forgiveness. This Ummah was given the choice, which is ease and facilitation. The heir might prefer Diyya if he needs money, or Qisas if he desires satisfaction and protection from the killer's future harm. Granting him the choice is mercy.

Objection 1: We do not accept that the forgiver is the heir, nor that forgiveness means waiving a right, which only suits the heir.

Response: We dispute that forgiveness means waiving a right. {عَفَا} can mean "to facilitate." The phrase {خُذِ الْعَفْوَ} (Take what is easy/readily available) supports this. The meaning would be: "If any money becomes easy for the heir to obtain from his brother [the killer], the heir should pursue that money customarily, and the killer should deliver it kindly without delay." This means God urges the heirs, if they are called to reconciliation over blood money (all or part of it), to accept it and forgive the Qisas.

Objection 2: Even if the forgiver is the heir, why can't it mean that Qisas is shared between two partners, and one forgives, turning his share into money? God then commands the silent partner to follow the killer customarily, and the killer to deliver kindly.

Response: Even if the forgiver is the heir (with or without a partner), why can't it be conditional on the killer's consent? God did not mention the killer's consent because it is inherently present: every agent will offer everything in the world to avoid being killed (losing life and wealth) in exchange for paying wealth (saving life). Since this consent is overwhelmingly present, it was omitted.

Final Answer to Objections: Interpreting "forgiveness" here as waiving the right to Qisas is stronger than interpreting it as the killer offering money easily.

1. The essence of 'Afw is waiving a right. Since {كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْقِصَاصُ} preceded it, interpreting {شَيْءٌ} (vague) as referring to the previously mentioned Qisas is more appropriate.
2. If the meaning were the easy delivery of money, the subsequent command {فَاتَّبَاعٌ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَأَدَاءٌ إِلَيْهِ بِإِحْسَانٍ} would be futile, as money delivered easily requires no pursuit, and the giver needs no command to deliver kindly.

Addressing Objection 3 (Condition of Consent): If consent is either impossible to remove (making Diyya always available) or possible to remove (making the restriction against the apparent meaning of the verse), then the premise is flawed.

Point 1: Structure of {فَمَنْ عُفِيَ لَهُ مِنْ أَخِيهِ شَيْءٌ} The structure is: "So whoever has from his brother something of forgiveness." It is like saying, "Zayd traveled some distance and a group of distances."

Point 2: Transitivity of {عَفَا} ‘Afā is usually transitive with ‘an (from) regarding the perpetrator or the sin (e.g., God forgave you). When it relates to the sin, one says, "I forgave him for what he committed," similar to "I forgave him his sin and overlooked it." This verse follows this pattern: "So whoever has something forgiven for him from his crime," making the mention of the crime unnecessary.

Point 3: Why the word {شَيْءٌ} (something)?

1. This is only problematic if the right is only Qisas, which is indivisible. However, since the right is either Qisas or money, the total right is divisible: one can forgive Qisas but keep the money, or forgive all. Thus, saying "something" is appropriate.
2. The indefiniteness of shay' carries a great benefit: one might think forgiveness only counts if it is total (waiving Qisas entirely). The verse clarifies that forgiveness of a part (e.g., some heirs forgiving their share) is like forgiveness of the whole, leading to the establishment of Diyya.

Point 4: The Meaning of Brotherhood {أَخِيهِ} Ibn Abbas used this verse to argue that a major sinner (fāsiq) remains a believer in three ways:

1. God addresses him as a believer while prescribing Qisas, which is only obligatory for intentional, aggressive killing (a major sin by consensus). This proves the perpetrator of a major sin is a believer.
2. God established brotherhood between the killer and the victim's guardian. This brotherhood is due to religion, as {إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ} (The believers are but brothers). If faith did not remain despite sin, the brotherhood based on faith would not remain.
3. God encourages forgiveness of the killer, which is fitting only for a believer.

Mu'tazila Response:

• Regarding Point 1: If the addressee is the Imam, the question vanishes. If the addressee is the killer, he was a believer before the act, so God addresses him as such. Alternatively, the killer might repent afterward and become a believer, and God includes the non-repentant under the general term through predominance (taghlib).
• Regarding Point 2 (Brotherhood): (a) The verse was revealed before anyone killed anyone, and believers are brothers before committing murder. (b) The sinner is likely to repent, making the victim's guardian his brother upon repentance. (c) It could refer to kinship, as in {وَإِلَىٰ عَادٍ أَخَاهُمْ هُودًا} (And to 'Ad [We sent] their brother Hud). (d) It establishes a connection/relation sufficient to use the term brotherhood, like calling a close acquaintance "brother." (e) Brotherhood is mentioned to encourage mutual concession based on their shared religious identity.

Refutation of Mu'tazila: All these points imply restricting brotherhood to a specific time or state, whereas God established brotherhood absolutely.

Point 1: Grammatical Status of {فَاتِّبَاعٌ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ} It is in the nominative case (Rafa') because it is the predicate of an omitted subject (i.e., "Its ruling is pursuit"), or it is the subject of an omitted predicate (i.e., "He owes pursuit customarily").

Point 2: Distribution of Duties

• View of Ibn Abbas, Al-Hasan, Qatadah, Mujahid: Pursuit customarily falls upon the forgiver (heir), and delivery kindly falls upon the forgiven (killer).
• Alternative View: Both duties fall upon the forgiven (killer): he pursues the heir's forgiveness customarily, and delivers the resulting payment kindly to him.

Point 3: Meaning of Customary Pursuit and Kind Delivery

• Customary Pursuit (Ittibā' bi-l-Ma'rūf): Not being harsh in demanding payment; following established custom. If the killer is insolvent, granting respite (nadhra). If he possesses the exact required asset but not cash, granting time to sell and exchange. Not preventing him from attending to more important obligations while pursuing this debt.
• Kind Delivery (Adā' bi-Ihsān): Not falsely claiming inability to pay when able, not delaying payment when able, not offering something other than what is due, and delivering the money with cheerfulness, pleasantness, and good speech.

{ذَٰلِكَ تَخْفِيفٌ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ وَرَحْمَةٌ} That is a concession from your Lord and a mercy.

1. View of Ibn Abbas: This refers to legislating both Qisas and Diyya being a concession. For the People of the Torah, Qisas was absolutely mandatory, and forgiveness/Diyya were forbidden. For the People of the Injil (Gospel), forgiveness was mandatory, and Qisas/Diyya were forbidden. This Ummah was given the choice, which is facilitation.
2. Alternative View: This refers to the ruling: {فَاتَّبَاعٌ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَأَدَاءٌ إِلَيْهِ بِإِحْسَانٍ}.

{فَمَنِ اعْتَدَىٰ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ} Then whoever transgresses after that [concession]...

This means exceeding the limits beyond what was permitted by the concession.

• Ibn Abbas and Al-Hasan: This means not killing after forgiveness and acceptance of Diyya. The people of Jahiliyyah, after accepting Diyya, would kill the perpetrator if they later gained power over him. God forbade this.
• Alternative View: It means killing someone other than the killer, killing more than one killer, demanding more than the due Diyya, or transgressing the limits after the manner of Qisas was explained. This should be taken generally to cover all transgressions.

{فَلَهُ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ} ...then for him is a painful punishment.

1. Majority View: A severe punishment in the Hereafter.
2. View narrated from Qatadah: The painful punishment is that he must be killed; no forgiveness or Diyya is accepted from him, based on the Hadith: "I do not forgive anyone who kills after taking Diyya," narrated from Al-Hasan and Sa'id ibn Jubayr.

Refutation of the Second View:

1. The absolute term "painful punishment" usually refers to the punishment of the Hereafter.
2. We established that Qisas can sometimes be punishment and sometimes a test (as for the repentant), so applying the name "punishment" exclusively to one case is flawed.
3. It is not permissible to restrict the guardian's right to forgive the killer who killed after receiving Diyya, as this right belongs to the guardian, and he has the right to waive it, just as he can waive other rights. (And God knows best.)