Al-Baqarah (The Cow): (6) Indeed, those who disbelieve...

Know that this verse contains grammatical issues, and issues related to Usul al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence). We will address them, God willing. As for His saying: {ءان} (Inna), there are several issues concerning it:

Issue 1: The Grammatical Status of 'Inna'

Know that 'inna' is a particle, and particles fundamentally have no inherent operative power (in terms of changing case endings). However, this particle resembles a verb in both form and meaning. This resemblance necessitates that it be operative. This involves preliminary points:

Preliminary Point 1: Explaining the Resemblance This resemblance exists in both pronunciation (form) and meaning.

• In pronunciation: It is composed of three letters, its final letter is vocalized (with a fatḥa), and it is fixed in form like verbs. The nūn al-wiqāyah (the protective nūn) enters it, as in 'innanī' (indeed I) and 'akannī' (as if I), just as it enters verbs, like 'aʿṭānī' (he gave me) and 'akramanī' (he honored me).
• In meaning: It conveys the establishment of a meaning in the noun, which is the confirmation of its predication by the predicate. Just as when you say, “Zayd stood up” (Qāma Zayd), your saying “Qāma” conveys the establishment of a meaning in the preceding noun.

Preliminary Point 2: The Necessity of Resemblance in Operation Since it resembles verbs, it must resemble them in operation, which is evident based on the principle of analogy (dawarān).

Preliminary Point 3: Why does it govern the subject (noun) with Naṣb (accusative) and the predicate (khabar) with Rafʿ (nominative)? The argument is structured as follows: Since it became operative, it must either:

1. Govern both the subject and the predicate with Rafʿ. (This is false because the subject and predicate were already in Rafʿ before 'inna' entered; thus, its entry would show no effect. Furthermore, verbs do not govern two subjects with Rafʿ.)
2. Govern both with Naṣb. (This is also false because it contradicts the operation of the verb, as a verb cannot govern two objects while lacking an agent to govern with Rafʿ.)
3. Govern the subject with Rafʿ and the predicate with Naṣb (or vice versa). (This is false because it leads to equality between the original [verb] and the derivative [particle]. A verb first governs the fāʿil with Rafʿ and then the mafʿūl with Naṣb. If the particle did the same, it would equate the derivative with the original.)

Since the first three options are invalid, the fourth option must be true: It governs the subject with Naṣb and the predicate with Rafʿ. This indicates that these particles are secondary in operation, not primary, because placing the accusative before the nominative, in contrast to the verb's structure, signifies a deviation from the original principle, suggesting the particle's operation is accidental (ʿāriḍ), not inherent (aṣlī).

Issue 2: The Grammatical Operation (Basrans vs. Kufans)

The Basrans hold that this particle governs the subject with Naṣb and the predicate with Rafʿ. The Kufans hold that it has no effect on the predicate; rather, the predicate remains in the case it was in before 'inna' entered.

Argument of the Basrans: These particles resemble verbs completely, as previously explained. Verbs have an effect in both Rafʿ and Naṣb, so these particles must also have such an effect.

Argument of the Kufans (Two aspects):

1. The meaning of predication (khabariyyah) remains in the predicate of the subject. This meaning is more deserving of Rafʿ than the particle. If predication is the cause of Rafʿ, then the particle cannot cause Rafʿ.
   • Premise 1: Predication remains. (Obvious, as the predication is the attribution of the predicate to the subject, which remains after 'inna' enters.)
   • Premise 2: Predication here necessitates Rafʿ. (It necessitated Rafʿ before 'inna' entered, and the absence of the particle was not part of the necessitating cause, as absence cannot be part of a cause. If the full cause occurred and the particle had no effect, it would be due to an impediment, which contradicts the original state.)
   • Premise 3: Predication is more entitled to necessitate Rafʿ. (This is supported in two ways: a) Being a predicate is an inherent quality, while the particle is external and separate, with the noun intervening between them. b) The predicate truly resembles the verb in meaning by being attributed to something else, whereas the particle does not share this essential attribution.)
   • Conclusion: Since predication is stronger in necessitating Rafʿ, it is impossible for the particle to cause Rafʿ. If the Rafʿ is established by predication before the particle's influence, attributing the Rafʿ to the particle would be establishing what is already established, which is impossible.

2. Sībawayh agreed that the particle is not primary in operation, so its operation goes against the primary evidence (dalīl). What is established against the primary evidence is estimated only to the extent of necessity. Necessity is satisfied by its operation on the subject (ism), so it must not operate on the predicate (khabar).

Issue 3: The Meaning of 'Inna' (The Story of Al-Kindi and Al-Mubarrad)

Al-Anbārī narrated that the philosopher Al-Kindi visited Al-Mubarrad and said: "I find redundancy in the Arabs' speech. They say: 'ʿAbdullāh is standing' (ʿAbdullāh qā’im), then they say: 'Indeed, ʿAbdullāh is standing' (Inna ʿAbdullāh qā’im), and then they say: 'Indeed, ʿAbdullāh is surely standing' (Inna ʿAbdullāh la-qā’im)."

Al-Mubarrad replied: "No, the meanings differ due to the difference in words."

• “ʿAbdullāh is standing” is a simple report about his standing.
• “Inna ʿAbdullāh is standing” is an answer to an inquirer.
• “Inna ʿAbdullāh la-qā’im” is an answer to someone denying his standing.

ʿAbd al-Qāhir argued for the validity of Al-Mubarrad's view by stating that 'inna' is used as an answer to an inquirer. He countered this by pointing out that Arabs use it to emphasize a nominal sentence even when it is an answer to an oath, such as: “By God, Zayd is certainly proceeding” (Wallāhi inna Zaydan munṭaliq).

Evidence from the Qur'an supporting its use in response to inquiry/argumentation:

• {And they ask you about Dhul-Qarnayn. Say, "I will recite to you a mention of him." Indeed, We established him in the land} (Al-Kahf: 83-84).
• {We relate to you their story in truth. Indeed, they were youths who believed in their Lord} (Al-Kahf: 13).
• {But if they deny you, then say, "I am free from what you do"} (Ash-Shuʿarā’: 216).
• {Say, "I have been forbidden to worship those you call upon besides Allah"} (Al-Anʿām: 56).
• {And say, "Indeed, I am the clear warner"} (Al-Hajj: 89). And similar verses where the Prophet (PBUH) is commanded to answer disbelievers in their debates. Also:
• {So go to Pharaoh and say, "Indeed, we are messengers from your Lord"} (Ash-Shuʿarā’: 16).
• {And Moses said, "O Pharaoh, indeed I am a messenger from the Lord of the worlds"} (Al-Aʿrāf: 104).
• In the story of the magicians: {Indeed, to our Lord we will return} (Al-Aʿrāf: 125), which is clearly an answer to Pharaoh's question: {He said, "Do you believe in him before I give you permission?"} (Ṭā-Hā: 71).

ʿAbd al-Qāhir further stated that the essence of 'inna' is emphasis (ta’kīd). If the predicate concerns something the listener does not suspect, 'inna' is unnecessary. It is needed only when the listener suspects the contrary. It sounds better when the predicate concerns something unlikely, like Abu Nuwas's verse:

“So rely on despairing of people, Indeed, the richness of your soul lies in despair.”

Its placement is excellent because people usually do not force themselves into despair. Using it with the lām (as in la-qā’im) as a response to a denier is good, as the need for emphasis is stronger when confronting denial. Furthermore, the denial might come from those present, not just the listener.

'Inna' can also be used when the speaker suspects something to be absent when it is actually present: For example, “Indeed, it was from me that I showed him kindness, so he treated me with evil.” Here, you are refuting your own previous assumption or mistaken belief. This applies to:

• The statement of Mary, mother of Jesus: {She said, "My Lord, indeed I have given birth to her a female," and Allah knew best what she gave birth to} (Āl ʿImrān: 36).
• The statement of Noah (PBUH): {He said, "My Lord, indeed my people have denied me"} (Ash-Shuʿarā’: 117).

Regarding His saying: {Indeed, those who disbelieve...}

This phrase contains several issues:

Theologians find it difficult to define disbelief precisely. The definitive view is: Everything transmitted from Muhammad (PBUH) as his teaching or belief is categorized based on how its transmission is verified:

1. Verified by Necessity (Ḍarūrah): If something is known necessarily to have come from the Prophet (PBUH), whoever believes in all of it is a believer (mu’min). Whoever does not believe in it—either entirely or partially—is a disbeliever (kāfir).
   • Therefore, disbelief is the absence of affirming the Messenger in anything known necessarily to be part of his message.
   • Examples: Denying the existence of the Creator, His being Omniscient, Omnipotent, Volitional, Unique, or free from defects; denying the prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH); denying the truth of the Qur'an; or denying necessary religious laws like the obligation of Prayer, Zakat, Fasting, Hajj, or the prohibition of Riba and Khamr. Such a person is a disbeliever because they failed to affirm the Messenger in what is necessarily known to be his religion.

2. Verified by Inference (Istidlāl): Matters known to be part of his religion only through inference (e.g., whether God is characterized by knowledge bi-dhātihi or not, whether He is visible or not, or whether He creates human actions). Since the Prophet (PBUH) did not transmit one of two opposing views through definitive mass narration (tawātur), but rather the truth of one view is known only through inference, neither affirming nor denying it constitutes disbelief.
   • If it were part of the essence of faith, the Prophet (PBUH) could not affirm anyone's faith until he knew their stance on that specific inferred issue. If this were the case, that stance would have been transmitted by mass narration, which it was not. Thus, knowledge of it is not part of faith, and denying it does not cause disbelief. This is why no one from this Ummah is declared a disbeliever based on such issues, nor do we declare those who hold interpretive views (ahl al-ta’wīl) to be disbelievers.

3. Verified by Singular Reports (Āḥād): It is obvious that disbelief and faith cannot depend on matters transmitted only by singular reports.

This is our position on the reality of disbelief.

Objection: This definition is refuted by examples like wearing the ghiyār (a specific garment) or the zinār (a belt worn by non-Muslims), which are acts of disbelief, yet they are not the denial of what is necessarily known from the Prophet (PBUH). Reply: These acts are not disbelief in their essence. Affirmation and denial are internal matters hidden from creation. The Lawgiver (Sharʿ) typically bases rulings on apparent signs rather than the hidden essence, as the latter is inaccessible. The ghiyār and zinār are not exceptions; rather, whoever truly affirms the Messenger would not perform these acts. Their performance indicates a lack of affirmation, so the Lawgiver bases rulings on these external signs, not because the signs themselves constitute disbelief.

The saying {Indeed, those who disbelieve} uses the past tense, which implies that the disbelief preceded this statement. The Muʿtazilah used this and similar past-tense statements (e.g., {Indeed, We sent down the Reminder...}, {Indeed, We sent Noah...}) to argue that God's speech is created (muḥdath).

• Their Argument: A statement in the past tense can only be true if the event it describes preceded the statement. Since the Eternal (Qadīm) cannot be preceded by anything else, this speech cannot be eternal; thus, it must be created.

The Defenders of the Eternity of Speech (Ahl al-Sunnah) offer two replies:

1. God eternally knew that the world would come into existence. When the world came into existence, the knowledge of a future event transformed into knowledge of a past event, without God's knowledge itself being newly created. Similarly, God's speech eternally stated that they will disbelieve. When their disbelief occurred, that statement became a report that they have disbelieved, without God's speech being newly created.
2. God said: {You will surely enter the Sacred Mosque} (Al-Fatḥ: 27). When they entered, this statement necessarily transformed into a report that they have entered, without the original statement changing. If this is possible, why not in our case?

The Muʿtazilah reply to the first defense: According to Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers, knowledge changes when the known object changes. If knowledge that the world will exist remained while the world did exist, that knowledge would become ignorance. Thus, the knowledge must change, invalidating this counter-argument.

The Muʿtazilah reply to the second defense: God's speech consists of specific sounds. {You will surely enter the Sacred Mosque} means God spoke these words at a time preceding their entry, not after. Similarly, {Indeed, those who disbelieve} means God spoke it after their disbelief occurred. However, this admission means God’s speech was not eternal, which is what the Muʿtazilah intended.

The Defenders of Eternity reply to the Muʿtazilah: If we accept that knowledge changes with the known object, then the knowledge that the world will exist was either eternal or not. If it was not eternal, this implies ignorance on God's part, which is disbelief. If it was eternal, then its cessation implies the cessation of something eternal, which closes the door to proving the world's creation.

The phrase uses the plural form with the definite article (al-lāh), which seemingly implies universal scope (istiġhrāq). However, there is no dispute that this literal universality is not intended, as many disbelievers later embraced Islam. This means God sometimes uses a general form to mean a specific group. This is permissible for two reasons:

1. The context indicating the specific meaning was clear during the Prophet's time, making the usage acceptable due to the absence of deception. (Example: If a man has specific enemies in a city and says, "The people are harming me," everyone understands he means those specific enemies.)
2. Using the general form for a specific meaning is permissible even without immediate contextual clarification, according to those who allow delaying the specification of a general statement.

If this is established, one cannot definitively rely on general forms of threat (waʿīd) to prove universal application, as the specific context might have been present during the Prophet's time. The argument that if the context existed, we would know it, and since we don't know it, it didn't exist, is weak, as arguing from absence of evidence to evidence of absence is one of the weakest forms of inference, let alone certainty. Thus, the Muʿtazilah's reliance on general threatening verses for absolute certainty of eternal punishment is very weak.

A Muʿtazilah attempt to counter this: They argue that {Indeed, those who disbelieve will not believe} is the contradictory opposite of {Indeed, those who disbelieve will believe}. The latter requires everyone in the group to believe. Therefore, for the negative statement to hold universally, it suffices that not one of them believes. If not one believes, then the group as a whole did not believe. Thus, the statement {Indeed, those who disbelieve will not believe} is satisfied if not one believes, let alone if many do not believe. Reply: Both phrases use the plural form. When plural meets plural, the individual is distributed to the individual. Thus, the meaning is that each one of them will not believe, returning us to the original problem.

Exegetes differ on the intended group:

• Some say they are the obstinate Jewish leaders who conceal the truth while knowing it (the view of Ibn ʿAbbās).
• Others say they are specific polytheists, like Abū Lahab, Abū Jahl, and Al-Walīd ibn Al-Mughīrah, who rejected the evidence after recognizing it. This aligns with God describing them as having hearts covered and ears deaf. The Prophet (PBUH) was eager for his people to believe, but God informed him they would not believe, so he could cease his distress over them, as despair is one of two reliefs.

Regarding His saying: {It is all the same to them whether you warn them or do not warn them; they will not believe}

This contains several issues:

The author of Al-Kashshāf says Sawā’ is a noun meaning "equality," used as an adjective, similar to His saying: {Come to a word that is equitable between us and you} (Āl ʿImrān: 64) and {equal for those who ask} (Fuṣṣilat: 10), meaning "equalized." Thus, it is as if He is saying: For those who disbelieve, your warning and its absence are equal.

There are two views on the Rafʿ (nominative case) of Sawā’:

1. It is the predicate (khabar), and the phrase {whether you warn them or do not warn them} (a-an-dhortahum am lam tundhirhum) is in the position of the subject (fāʿil) in the nominative case. It is like saying: “Indeed, Zayd, his brother and cousin are disputing.”
2. The phrase {whether you warn them or do not warn them} is the **subject (mubtada’)**, and Sawā’ is the advanced predicate (khabar muqaddam), meaning: "Your warning and its absence are equal to them." The entire sentence is the predicate of 'inna'.

The second view is stronger because Sawā’ is a noun, and treating it as a verb (as in the first view) is abandoning the literal form without necessity. If the second view holds, the meaning is the equalization of warning and non-warning. Thus, Sawā’ must be the predicate, meaning the predicate is advanced. This demonstrates that advancing the predicate over the subject is permissible, similar to {Their life and their death are equal} (Al-Jāthiyah: 21). Sībawayh narrated the usage: “A Tameemi I am” (Tamīmiyyun anā). The Kufans, however, forbid this, arguing:

1. The subject is an entity (dhāt), and the predicate is a quality (ṣifah). The entity inherently precedes the quality, so it must precede it in speech, analogous to grammatical dependencies.
2. The predicate must contain a pronoun referring back to the subject. If the predicate precedes the subject, the pronoun would appear before the noun it refers to, which is impossible because a pronoun refers to a known antecedent, and reference is impossible before the antecedent is known.

The Basrans reply:

1. What you mentioned suggests advancing the subject is preferable, not mandatory.
2. Pronoun fronting before the antecedent does occur in Arabic, e.g., {In his house, judgment is brought} (Fī baytihi yu’tā al-ḥukm), and {So Musa felt in himself apprehension} (Ṭā-Hā: 67).

There is consensus that one cannot report on a verb (i.e., state that a verb is a verb), as saying “He went out, he struck” (Kharaja ḍaraba) does not form a coherent sentence. However, some criticize this consensus:

1. The phrase {whether you warn them or do not warn them} is a verbal construction, yet it is reported upon by Sawā’ (which functions as a predicate). Similar to {Then it seemed good to them after they saw the signs to imprison him for a time} (Yūsuf: 35), where the subject of badā (seemed) is the verbal clause li-yasjinanahu.
2. If what is reported upon as a verb must be a verb, then here, the verb is reported upon as a verb. If one argues that the reported item is the word itself (a noun), then reporting that a noun is a verb is a lie. If the reported item is a verb, then a verb has been reported upon.
3. If we state that verbs cannot be reported upon, we have reported that verbs cannot be reported upon. If the subject of this statement is a noun, we have reported on a noun that it cannot be reported upon (false). If the subject is a verb, then a verb has been reported upon.

Since there is no inherent impossibility in reporting on a verb, there is no need to deviate from the literal meaning (i.e., treating the clause as a verbal construction).

The Majority of Grammarians' View: They agree that reporting on a verb is impermissible. Therefore, the intended meaning must be: “Your warning and your non-warning are equal to them.” Question: Deviation from the literal meaning to the figurative requires an added benefit in meaning or form. What is the benefit here? Reply: Saying {whether you warn them or do not warn them} conveys that this equality was established after the people reached a state of extreme obstinacy where hope for acceptance was completely lost. If the verse had said, “Your warning and non-warning are equal to them,” it would not convey that this state was reached at this specific time, unlike the verbal construction, which implies the state was reached at this moment, thus conveying the cutting off of hope.

The author of Al-Kashshāf says the hamzah (interrogative particle) and am are stripped of their interrogative meaning entirely. Sībawayh said this occurs with interrogative particles just as it occurs with vocative particles (e.g., Allāhumma [O God], which is a vocative form without actual calling). Here, it follows the form of a question without actual inquiry.

There are six known recitations concerning the hamzah and the following alif (e.g., two hamzas realized, one hamza and one alif, etc.). The author of Al-Kashshāf considers changing the second hamzah to an alif to be linguistic error (laḥn).

Indhār means frightening someone from God's punishment by restraining them from sins. Warning was mentioned instead of good tidings (bashārah) because warning has a stronger effect on action and omission, as the drive to repel harm is stronger than the drive to attract benefit. This context required exaggeration, making indhār more appropriate.

Regarding His saying: {they will not believe}

This contains two issues:

The author of Al-Kashshāf suggests this clause is either:

1. A sentence confirming the preceding one.
2. The predicate of 'inna', with the preceding clause being an interjection (iʿtirāḍ).

The Ahl al-Sunnah use this verse and similar ones (e.g., {The word has already been decreed against most of them, so they do not believe} [Yā-Sīn: 7]; {Leave Me with the one whom I created alone} [Al-Muddaththir: 11-17]; {Perish the hands of Abū Lahab} [Al-Masad: 1]) to refute the doctrine of commanding the impossible (taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq).

The Argument: God has informed us about specific individuals that they will never believe. If they were to believe, God's true report would become a lie, which is impossible for God. Since the opponent (Muʿtazilah) deems lying ugly, and lying implies ignorance or compulsion (both impossible for God), the occurrence of faith from them is impossible. Therefore, commanding them to believe is commanding the impossible.

A Third Angle (Knowledge vs. Existence): The existence of faith is impossible when coupled with God's prior knowledge of its non-existence. For God's knowledge to be true, it must correspond to reality (non-existence of faith). If faith did occur alongside knowledge of its non-existence, it would mean faith simultaneously exists and does not exist, which is impossible. Thus, commanding faith while God knows it won't happen is commanding the conjunction of opposites, or the conjunction of existence and non-existence.

A Fourth Angle (Self-Contradiction): God commanded these individuals (about whom He decreed non-belief) to believe. Belief requires affirming everything God reports. God reported that they will never believe. Thus, they are commanded to believe that they will never believe—a command to affirm both negation and affirmation simultaneously.

A Fifth Angle (Changing God's Decree): God criticized the disbelievers for attempting to change His decree: {They intend to change the word of Allah. Say, "You will never follow us; thus has Allah said before"} (Al-Fatḥ: 15). If they attempt to believe when God decreed non-belief, they intend to change God's word. If they refrain from attempting belief, they disobey God's command to believe. Thus, they are blamed whether they act or refrain.

These arguments are considered devastating to the foundations of Muʿtazilite doctrine.

The Muʿtazilah Response: They address this in two main stages:

Stage 1: Proving God's Knowledge/Decree is NOT a Barrier to Faith. They cite numerous verses indicating no barrier prevents faith (e.g., {What prevented the people from believing when guidance came to them?} [Al-Isrā’: 94], {What would it have been for them if they had believed?} [Al-Aʿrāf: 12]). They argue that if God's knowledge were a barrier, these verses would be ugly. Furthermore, if God's knowledge were a barrier, the disbelievers would have a valid excuse against punishment, contradicting the purpose of sending messengers to remove excuses. They also cite the disbelievers' claim that their hearts are covered, arguing that if God's knowledge prevented faith, the disbelievers would be truthful in their claim, yet God condemns them for it.

Stage 2: The Rational Answer (Detailed Refutation of the Barrier Argument).

1. If God's knowledge of an event's non-occurrence were a barrier to its occurrence, God would have no power over anything. What He knows will happen is necessary (and thus not subject to power), and what He knows won't happen is impossible (and thus not subject to power). This implies God has no power, which is disbelief.
2. Knowledge relates to the known as it is: if the known is possible, the knowledge is of a possibility. If it becomes necessary due to knowledge, then knowledge affects the known object, which is impossible.
3. If knowledge were a barrier, the servant would have no power over anything, rendering their actions like those of inanimate objects, which contradicts immediate perception (we blame the thrower, not the brick).
4. If knowledge of non-existence prevents existence, God commanding faith would be commanding the annihilation of His own knowledge, which is nonsensical.
5. Faith is intrinsically possible. If God knew it as possible, and knowledge made it necessary, then the same thing would be both possible and necessary, which is impossible.
6. Commanding the impossible is foolishness. If permitted here, all forms of foolishness (like sending miracles through liars) would be permitted, destroying the reliability of prophecy and the Qur'an.
7. It would permit commanding the blind to read manuscripts or the paralyzed to fly.
8. It would permit sending messengers to inanimate objects.
9. If knowledge of existence implied necessity, it would negate God's power and will (the view of the Mūjibah philosophers).
10. Verses state God does not burden beyond capacity: {Allah does not charge a soul except [with that within] its capacity} (Al-Baqarah: 286).

Muʿtazilah Detailed Responses (Two main paths):

1. Abū ʿAlī, Abū Hāshim, and Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār: They reject the claim that knowledge turns into ignorance, and they also reject the claim that knowledge remains unchanged. They insist on suspending judgment on both.
2. Al-Kaʿbī and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī: Knowledge follows the known object. If we posit the servant's action is faith, we posit God's eternal knowledge was of faith. If we posit disbelief, we posit His eternal knowledge was of disbelief. This is substituting one piece of eternal knowledge for another, not a change in knowledge itself.

These two responses form the core of the Muʿtazilah defense. The author notes that this debate led to great deviations, including strengthening the arguments of the Jabrīyah (fatalists) and providing ammunition for those attacking the Qur'an for containing apparent contradictions between verses affirming free will and verses affirming predestination.

Supplementary Persuasive Points (Five Points)

1. The Doubt of ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd: Narrations suggest ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd doubted the Qur'an when confronted with verses like {Perish the hands of Abū Lahab} in the context of God's eternal decree, implying that if the decree was eternal, Abū Lahab was not blameworthy. ʿAmr's response suggested the text should have been: "Perish the hands of whoever acts like Abū Lahab," indicating his doubt about the eternal nature of the text.
2. The Analogy of Sky and Earth: A narration describes someone complaining to Ibn ʿUmar that people commit sins while claiming it was in God's knowledge. Ibn ʿUmar angrily refuted this, citing a Hadith where the Prophet (PBUH) compared God's knowledge to the sky and earth: just as they do not compel you to sin, God's knowledge does not compel you. The author notes this Hadith is contradictory (asserting both Jabr and Qadar) and flawed, as the sky/earth analogy does not preclude compulsion, unlike the logical contradiction between affirming faith and affirming prior knowledge of non-faith.
3. The Hadith of Ibn Masʿūd: The famous Hadith stating that a person may perform the deeds of the people of Paradise until only a cubit separates them, but the decree overtakes him, and he performs the deeds of the people of Hellfire, and vice versa. The author notes ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd rejected this Hadith entirely.
4. The Debate of Adam and Moses (PBUH): Moses blamed Adam for bringing hardship upon people by leaving Paradise. Adam countered by asking if Moses found in the Torah that God had decreed it upon him. The Prophet (PBUH) stated that Adam "overcame" Moses in argument. The Muʿtazilah criticized this, arguing Adam's defense was invalid, as it would allow all disbelievers to use it. The correct interpretation, according to the author, is that Adam was arguing that his expulsion was not due to the sin itself, but because God had already decreed his descent to Earth as a vicegerent, a fact written in the Torah.

(7) {Allah has set a seal upon their hearts, and their hearing, and over their eyes is a covering. And for them is a great punishment.}

This verse contains several issues:

(This section seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on Sawā’.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on the grammar of Sawā’.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on reporting on verbal clauses.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on the hamzah and am.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on recitations.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on Indhār.)

Regarding His saying: {they will not believe}

This contains two issues:

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's discussion on the clause structure.)

(This section also seems misplaced, referring back to the previous verse's extensive discussion on commanding the impossible and the refutation of the Muʿtazilah.)

Regarding His saying: {Allah has set a seal upon their hearts...}

The sealing (khatm) means that the heart becomes impervious to accepting guidance. This is a metaphor for the finality of their disbelief.

The seal on the heart and the covering (ghishāwah) on the eyes indicate that the means of guidance (intellect and sight) have been rendered ineffective due to their persistent rejection.

The sealing is a consequence of their prior disbelief and rejection, not an arbitrary initial act. God only seals the hearts of those who have already chosen disbelief, as established in the previous verses.

This refers to the severe punishment in the Hereafter, which is great because it is eternal and severe, resulting from the complete blockage of the means of salvation (heart and sight).