Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:67-73

Tafsir of Surah Al-Baqarah (Verses 67-73)

This section discusses the second type of severity imposed upon the Children of Israel.

It is narrated from Ibn Abbas and other commentators that a man from the Israelites killed a relative to inherit from him, then threw the body in the middle of the road. He then complained about this to Moses (peace be upon him). Moses exerted himself to find the killer, but when the killer was not revealed, they asked him: "Ask your Lord to clarify it for us." So Moses asked, and Allah revealed to him: {Indeed, Allah commands you to slaughter a cow} (Al-Baqarah: 67).

They were astonished by this command. Then, they intensified the matter upon themselves through successive questioning and were exhaustive in seeking its description. When the cow was finally specified, they could not find one matching that description except with a specific person, who would only sell it for many times its price. They bought it, slaughtered it, and Moses commanded them to take a piece of it and strike the slain man with it. They did so, and the murdered man came back to life and named his killer—the very one who had initiated the complaint. They then killed him in retribution.

Herein lie several issues:

The slaughtering commanded by Allah is good, otherwise, Allah would not have commanded it.

• Our View: It is good because Allah is the Owner of all dominion, and no one has the right to object to Him.
• The Mu'tazila View: It is only good because of the compensation involved.

Allah commanded the slaughter of a cow from the cows of this world. This proves the validity of our doctrine of the Obligatory Choice (al-Wājib al-Mukhayyar).

There is a consensus among the majority that the statement {Indeed, Allah commands you to slaughter a cow} means: "Slaughter whichever cow you wish." This phrasing implies generality.

However, those who deny generality presented arguments:

1. The concept derived from the statement "Slaughter a cow" is ambiguous. It can mean either "Slaughter a specific cow with such-and-such characteristics" or "Slaughter any cow you wish." The meaning common to both does not necessitate either one specifically. Thus, "Slaughter a cow" does not necessitate the meaning "Slaughter any cow you wish." If it implied generality, then saying "Slaughter any cow you wish" would be redundant, and saying "Slaughter a specific cow" would be a contradiction. Since neither is the case, this view is flawed.
2. The statement {Indeed, it is a cow} is like the opposite of our statement, "Do not slaughter a cow." The latter implies a universal negation. Therefore, the command "Slaughter a cow" only needs to lift the universal negation by establishing the act in one specific way. Thus, the statement implies the command to slaughter only one cow. The permission to slaughter any cow they wished is not necessary to lift the negation, so it cannot be derived from the wording.
3. The word {cow} (baqarah) is an indefinite singular noun. An indefinite singular noun in a declarative statement refers to a specific, yet undetermined, individual. It does not imply any individual whatsoever, as seen in the statement: "I saw a man" (which refers to one specific, though unnamed, man). If this holds true in declarative statements, it must hold true in commands.

The Argument for Generality: If they slaughtered any cow, they would fulfill the obligation, which necessitates generality. The Rebuttal: This is begging the question, as it assumes that "Slaughter a cow" means "Slaughter any cow you wish," which is the very point under dispute.

Having established this, people differed on whether the command {Indeed, it is a cow} referred to a specific, determined cow, or any cow whatsoever.

• Those who permit delaying clarification: They said it was a command to slaughter a specific cow, but its specification was not yet revealed.
• Those who forbid delaying clarification: They said that although the initial command meant any cow, the obligation changed when they asked questions, because the initial command was sufficient if they had obeyed, and choice among cattle was the best course then. When they disobeyed and returned with questions, the best course changed, which is observable in worldly affairs (e.g., a guardian might initially allow a child freedom, but upon disobedience, impose stricter rules).

Arguments for the First View (Specific Cow Initially):

1. Their subsequent questions—{Ask your Lord for us that He may make clear to us what it is} and {what is its color}—and Allah’s answers referring to it with pronouns ({Indeed, it is a cow...}) indicate that what was commanded was a specific cow, not just any cow.
2. The attributes mentioned in the answers must either describe the cow commanded initially, or describe a new cow replacing the previous obligation. If the former, it supports the view of a specific cow initially. If the latter, it implies the initial obligation was dropped, but Muslims agree that all the mentioned attributes were required, invalidating the second possibility.

• Objection: Could the pronouns refer to the story or matter rather than the cow?
• Rebuttal: This is false for several reasons:
  1. If the pronouns referred to the story, the subsequent descriptions (like "yellow cow") would be meaningless without assuming an unstated object, which violates the principle of economy.
  2. It violates the rule that a pronoun must refer back to something already mentioned, and the "story" had not been mentioned.
  3. The pronoun in {what is it} clearly refers to the commanded cow, so the pronoun in {Indeed, it is a yellow cow} must also refer to that same cow for the answer to match the question.

3. If they were merely defiant questioners, the initial command (a yellow cow of medium age and strength) would still leave many possibilities open. Their silence upon receiving this answer indicates they were not being defiant.

Arguments for the Second View (Any Cow Initially):

1. {Indeed, Allah commands you to slaughter a cow} implies generality (any cow), meaning the subsequent specification of attributes was a new command.
2. If a specific cow was intended, they deserved praise for seeking clarification, not censure. Since Allah rebuked them with {So do what you are commanded} and {And they almost did not do it}, this implies their failure to fulfill the initial command, which must have been simpler (i.e., any cow).
3. It is narrated from Ibn Abbas that if they had slaughtered any cow they wished, it would have sufficed, but they made things hard on themselves, so Allah made things hard on them.
4. They needed the cow slaughtered at that time. If a specific cow was required but not specified, it would constitute delaying clarification beyond the time of need, which is impermissible.

• Rebuttal to 1: We already argued that the initial wording does not imply generality.
• Rebuttal to 2: {And they almost did not do it} could refer to their hesitation after the full specification was given, not their failure in the initial stage.
• Rebuttal to 3: This narration is singular (āhād) and cannot contradict the Book of Allah.
• Rebuttal to 4: Delaying clarification beyond the time of need is only required if the command implies immediate action, which we dispute.

If we adopt the view that the initial command was for any cow, then the obligations were successive and different:

1. First: Slaughter any cow.
2. Second: It must be neither too old (fāriḍ) nor too young (bikr), but ʿawān (middle-aged).
3. When they failed this, they were commanded that it must also be yellow.
4. When they failed this, they were commanded that, in addition, it must not be one used for plowing or watering crops.

Sub-dispute within this view:

• Some say the final command requires all preceding attributes (middle-aged, yellow, not used for labor).
• Others say only the last attribute is required. The latter seems more aligned with successive commands, though the former aligns better with the narrations emphasizing their severity upon them during hesitation.

This sequence proves that obligations can change, the easier can be replaced by the harder due to disobedience, and abrogation can occur before the act, though not before the time of the act. It also confirms abrogation occurred in the Law of Moses (peace be upon him) and addresses whether an addition to an abrogated ruling constitutes a new abrogation. It also validates imposing a second obligation on one who disobeyed the first.

It is recited as huzu'an (with ḍammah on the hā’ and zāy) or huzū'an (with sukūn on the zāy), similar to kufu'an and kuf'an. Ḥafṣ recited it as huzu'an (with ḍammah on both hā’ and zāy).

Al-Qaffāl said the question {Will you take us...} is an inquiry expressing denial and mockery. The object of the ridicule (maḥzū' bihi) can be implied, similar to saying: "This was in Allah's knowledge" (meaning, in what Allah knows), or "Allah is our hope" (meaning, what we hope for). This is analogous to {Then you took them in mockery} (Al-Mu'minun: 110). The author of Al-Kashshāf suggests it means: "Will you make us a target of ridicule, or worthy of ridicule, or an object of ridicule?" Huzū' itself means extreme jesting.

When they asked Moses to specify the killer, and he replied, "Slaughter a cow," they saw no connection between the question and the answer. They thought he was joking because it was conceivable that Moses commanded them to slaughter a cow without telling them that striking the dead man with a part of it would revive him. Thus, his statement seemed like ridicule. Alternatively, even if he had explained the mechanism, they were astonished how the dead man could be revived by striking him with a part of the cow, leading them to think this claim was merely jesting.

Some said that by saying this to Moses, they committed disbelief:

1. If they doubted Allah's power to resurrect the dead, it is disbelief.
2. If they doubted that Moses was speaking by Allah's command, they accused him of falsifying revelation, which is also disbelief.

Others argue it does not constitute disbelief:

1. Jesting/playfulness is permissible for prophets, so perhaps they thought he was engaging in permissible jesting.
2. The meaning of {Will you take us...} could be: "How strange is this answer! It is as if you are mocking us," rather than a firm accusation of mockery against Moses.

There are several interpretations:

1. Engaging in mockery stems only from ignorance. Since prophecy cannot tolerate mockery, Moses sought refuge not from the act itself (which he would never do), but from its cause (ignorance/passion). This is the strongest view, using the effect metaphorically for the cause (like saying, "I seek refuge in Allah from lack of intellect").
2. He sought refuge from being ignorant of the severe punishment and great warning associated with mocking religious matters. Knowing this prevents him from mocking.
3. Some linguists state that mockery (huzū') itself is sometimes termed ignorance (jahl), just as ignorance is sometimes defined as the opposite of forbearance (ḥilm), rather than the opposite of knowledge.

This statement by Moses indicates that mockery is a grave major sin, as discussed previously in verses 14-15.

Allah recounts that the people asked Moses about three things concerning the cow:

Moses replied: {Indeed, He says, "It is a cow, neither old, nor virgin; [but] between that [age]"} (Al-Baqarah: 68).

First Inquiry: If we hold that the initial command {slaughter a cow} referred to a specific, yet unspecified, cow, then their question is appropriate because the command was ambiguous (mujmal). If we hold it meant any cow (generality), what prompted them to seek specification?

1. They were astonished by the cow's unique property (reviving the dead) and assumed such a cow must be specific, like Moses' staff having unique properties among all staffs. They were mistaken, as this was a miracle, not an inherent property of the cow.
2. Perhaps they intended any cow, but the killer, fearing exposure, introduced doubt by claiming the command referred to a specific cow, leading them back to Moses.
3. Even if the initial command was general, they sought precaution and further clarification to remove all possibilities. However, the divine wisdom changed, necessitating the command for a specific cow.

Second Inquiry: The question {what is it?} (mā hiya) seeks the essence (māhiyyah), which is defined by its constituent parts, not external attributes. Age is an external attribute. Thus, the answer seems mismatched to the question.

• Rebuttal: The context indicates they were not seeking philosophical essence, but the distinguishing attributes that differentiate one cow from another. Hence, mentioning external attributes was appropriate.

Third Inquiry: Al-Fāriḍ (old/aged), Al-Bikr (young/virgin), and ʿawān (middle-aged).

• Al-Fāriḍ: Old, having completed its age.
• Al-Bikr: Young. Some say immature, others say never having given birth, or having given birth once. Al-Mufaḍḍal said it means young, like the bākūrah (first fruit) or bukrat an-nahār (early morning). The most apparent meaning is one that has not given birth, as bikr among women means one not yet impregnated.
• ʿAwān: Middle-aged, having given birth repeatedly. A severe war is called ḥarb ʿawān if fought repeatedly.

Fourth Inquiry: Scholars use {between that [age]} to argue for the validity of Ijtihād (reasoned judgment) and reliance on strong probability in rulings, as knowing the intermediate age requires such effort.

1. The word bayna (between) implies two or more things. Rebuttal: It refers to the two mentioned states (old and young).
2. How can the demonstrative pronoun dhālik (that) refer to two feminine nouns (old and young)? Rebuttal: It refers to the concept or the situation, or it is used elliptically for brevity.

Regarding {So do what you are commanded}:

1. Do what you are commanded (as in, "I commanded you good").
2. Do your command, meaning "what you are commanded," using the object noun (mafʿūl) as the source noun (maṣdar), like ḍarb al-amīr (the striking of the commander).

The main purpose of this answer was that the cow should be in its peak condition: too young is deficient, too old is past its peak, but the middle ground is perfection.

After learning the age, they inquired about the color. Allah answered: {Indeed, He says, "It is a yellow cow, intensely yellow"} (Al-Baqarah: 69). Fāqiʿ means the most intense and pure shade of yellow. (e.g., aṣfar fāqiʿ, aswad ḥālik, abyaḍ yaqiq, aḥmar qāni', akhḍar nāḍir).

First Inquiry: How can fāqiʿ (intense) be an adjective for color when it seems to function as a predicate?

• Rebuttal: It is not a predicate for the color itself but an emphasis on aṣfar (yellow). The color is the subject, and fāqiʿ is its cause/attribute, making "intensely yellow" equivalent to "its color is intensely yellow."

Second Inquiry: Why not just say "intensely yellow cow" (aṣfar fāqiʿah)? What is the benefit of mentioning the color (lawn)?

• Rebuttal: The benefit is emphasis (tawkīd). Color (lawn) is the name of the state (yellowness). It is like saying, "Its yellowness is intensely yellow," similar to jadda jaddahu (his seriousness was serious). It is narrated that when one looked at it, it seemed as if sunlight emanated from its skin.

Regarding {pleasing to the beholders}: Its beautiful color pleases those who look at it. Al-Ḥasan suggested that "yellow" here means black, as Arabs sometimes use aṣfar for black (like the description of smoke in Surah Al-Mursalāt).

• Objection: Yellow does not inherently mean black, and black is not described as fāqiʿ (intense yellow); it is described as ḥālik (intense black).

Pleasure (surūr) is a psychological state arising from the belief or knowledge that something desirable or beneficial will occur.

It is narrated from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "By the One in Whose Hand is my soul, if they had not said, 'If Allah wills,' they would never have found it." This indicates that uttering this phrase is recommended for every intended action, as seen in the command to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in Surah Al-Kahf (23). It signifies seeking aid from Allah, delegating the matter to Him, and acknowledging His power and will.

Our scholars use this to argue that all events are willed by Allah. The Mu'tazila argue that since Allah commanded them, He necessarily willed their guidance, rendering "If Allah wills" meaningless. Our view holds that Allah may command what He does not will, thus giving meaning to the phrase.

The Mu'tazila argue that Allah's will is created (muḥdath) based on two points:

1. The particle an following in implies creation/occurrence.
2. Allah linked the attainment of guidance to the occurrence of the will to guide. Since guidance is not eternal, the will to guide cannot be eternal.

Returning to interpretation: The question {make clear to us what it is} was answered with external attributes, which we addressed earlier.

Regarding {Indeed, cows look alike to us} (tashābah ʿalaynā): This means that cows matching the description (middle-aged, yellow, not used for labor) are numerous, so they were confused as to which one to slaughter. It is also recited as tashābah (omitting the tā’ and merging it into the shīn), tashābahat, mutashābihah, and mutashābih.

Regarding {and indeed we, if Allah wills, will be guided}: Al-Qaffāl mentioned several meanings:

1. By Allah's will, we will be guided to the specific cow upon acquiring its distinguishing attributes.
2. By Allah's will, He will clarify it further for us, guiding us to it.
3. By Allah's will, we are on the right path in our exhaustive questioning about its attributes, hoping we are not misguided in this pursuit.
4. By Allah's will, we will be guided to the killer once this cow is described in a way that distinguishes it from others.

Allah answered their final question with: {Indeed, it is a cow that has not been subjected to labor, neither plowing the earth nor watering the crops} (Al-Baqarah: 71). {Not subjected to labor} (lā dhalūl) is an attribute of the cow, meaning it has not been broken in for plowing or watering crops. The first lā is for negation, and the second lā is for emphasis. The meaning is: "It is not a cow that plows and waters." Since a cow used for labor must be deficient, Allah specified that this one does neither, as these actions reveal deficiency.

Regarding {unblemished} (muslimah):

1. Free from all defects generally.
2. Free from the effects of the aforementioned labor.
3. Muslimah meaning wild, left unrestrained from confinement.
4. Free from shiyah (a mixture of colors). This last view is weak, as it would make the next phrase redundant. The first meaning (complete safety from ailments and defects) is preferred and used by scholars to argue for the permissibility of acting upon the apparent meaning, even if the hidden reality might differ.

Regarding {and no blemish} (wa lā shiyah fīhā): This means its yellowness is pure, not mixed with other colors. A yellow cow might be described as such if yellow predominates, but Allah clarified its purity by saying {and no blemish} (wa lā shiyah fīhā). Washy means a mixture of colors. It is narrated that its hooves and horns were yellow.

They stopped at this explanation and said: {He said, "Now you have brought the truth"} (Al-Baqarah: 71). This means: "Now this cow is distinguished from others because it is middle-aged, yellow, and not subjected to labor." Al-Qāḍī suggested that saying {He said, "Now you have brought the truth"} implies disbelief on their part, as it suggests they believed the previous commands were not the true requirement. This is weak, as it could mean: "Now the reality of what we were commanded has become clear, distinguishing it from others," which is not disbelief.

Regarding {So they slaughtered her, and they could hardly do it} (Al-Baqarah: 72)

This means: They slaughtered the cow, and they almost failed to slaughter it.

Grammatical Discussion on Kāda (Almost):

1. View 1: Negation of kāda is affirmation, and affirmation of kāda is negation. Thus, "He kāda did it" means he was close but did not do it. "He mā kāda did it" means he was close and did it.
2. View 2 (Al-Jurjānī): Kāda always means proximity. "Kāda did it" means he was close to doing it. "Mā kāda did it" means he was not close to doing it.

The first view is supported by this verse: If mā kāda meant "he was not close," then "they were not close to slaughtering her" contradicts the fact that they did slaughter her. Therefore, it must mean: "They were close to slaughtering her, and they succeeded."

Inquiries on this verse:

First Inquiry: It is narrated that a righteous elder among the Israelites dedicated a cow to his son, which grew up to be the finest. They sought it for forty years until they found it, and they bought it for its weight in gold, while the cow was worth only three dinars at the time.

Second Inquiry: Al-Ḥasan narrated that the cow must be slaughtered, not ritually sacrificed (naḥr). ʿAṭā’ said naḥr is sufficient. The apparent meaning of the verse suggests they were commanded to slaughter (dhabḥ) and performed what is called slaughtering. If naḥr sufficed, its form differs from dhabḥ, and without evidence that it substitutes dhabḥ, it should not suffice.

Third Inquiry: The reason they hesitated (mā kādū):

1. The high price. If so, paying the high price became obligatory, as what is necessary for an obligation becomes obligatory, unless evidence dictates otherwise.
2. Fear of notoriety and shame. This does not remove obligation. If retribution (qawād) was due, he must surrender himself to the victim's guardian. He might even be obliged to identify himself to remove suspicion from the community near where the body was found.

Fourth Inquiry: Those who argue that a command implies obligation use this verse. Since only the command was given, yet Allah censured their hesitation, the obligation must stem from the command itself. Al-Qāḍī argues that if the purpose of the command is to remove evil/sedition (revealing the killer), then it is obligatory. Furthermore, perhaps in their law, vows (qurbān) were only obligatory.

• My response: The core issue is that we do not claim a command always implies obligation, nor do we claim it negates obligation. The obligation here might stem from another factor, such as the context (removing harm is obligatory) or the nature of the vow in their law. However, the censure following the bare command implies the obligation arose directly from the command itself, as ordering a consequence implies the cause.

Fifth Inquiry: Those who argue a command implies immediacy (fawr) use this verse. Since censure followed the bare command, it implies immediacy.

Regarding {And [recall] when you killed a person and then disputed among yourselves concerning it} (Al-Baqarah: 72)

The killing must have preceded Allah's command to slaughter the cow. However, reporting the killing and the subsequent striking with the cow part does not need to precede the report of the cow story in recitation order. The event itself had to precede the command. The order in recitation is flexible: sometimes the cause precedes the effect, sometimes the reverse. Here, after the incident occurred, Allah commanded the cow slaughter, and upon their completion, He said: "When you killed a soul previously and disputed, I will reveal the killer by striking the dead man with part of this slaughtered cow." This structure is sound.

• Objection: If the reverse order was used, would it not still be one story?
• Response: If it were one continuous narrative, the purpose of the structure (where the cow story is the means for the revelation of the killer) would be lost.

Regarding {and you disputed among yourselves concerning it} (fa-dāra'tum fīhā):

1. You differed and argued about it, as disputants push and shove each other (yadra'u).
2. You accused each other (ādara'tum), deflecting the killing from yourselves onto others.
3. You pushed each other away from innocence and suspicion. In essence, dar'u means pushing away. When they argued, each pushed the accusation away from himself, refuted his opponent's argument regarding the act, and pushed away his opponent's claim of innocence. Al-Qaffāl suggests the pronoun hā (it) refers to the soul, meaning you disputed concerning the soul, or concerning the killing (since qattaltum implies the verbal noun).

Regarding {but Allah brings out that which you were concealing} (wa-llāhu mukhrijun mā kuntum taktumūn): Allah will inevitably reveal what you concealed about the killing.

• Objection: How can the verb mukhrijun (bringing out) be in the past tense form when it refers to the future?
• Response: It reports a future event as if it were present or past, similar to {spreading out his two arms} (Al-Kahf: 18). This sentence is an interjection between the coordinated clauses (ādara'tum and fa-qulnā).

Issue 1 (Mu'tazila View): {Allah brings out that which you were concealing} means He must reveal it because dispute and concealment regarding murder lead to sedition and corruption, which Allah does not love. Thus, He must remove the concealment to remove the corruption, implying He does not will or approve of corruption.

Issue 2: The verse proves Allah's complete knowledge of all things, otherwise, He could not reveal what they concealed.

Issue 3: It proves that whatever a servant conceals, good or evil, Allah will reveal it if it persists. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "If a servant obeys Allah behind seventy veils, Allah will reveal it on people's tongues," and similarly for disobedience. It is narrated that Allah revealed to Moses: "Tell the Children of Israel: They hide their deeds, but it is upon Me to reveal them."

Issue 4: The verse proves that a general term can be intended for a specific instance, as {what you were concealing} covers all hidden things, yet Allah intended this specific incident.

Regarding {So We said, "Strike him with a part of it"} (Al-Baqarah: 73)

Ibn Abbas narrated that the owner of the cow sought it for forty years. This contradicts the apparent meaning of the verse, as the fā’ (then) in {So We said} implies immediate succession following the command to slaughter the cow.

The pronoun in {Strike him} refers either to the person (using masculine form to imply the human being/soul) or to the slain man, which is supported by {what you were concealing}.

Allah commanded the slaughter because a benefit achievable only through slaughter was attached to it.

• Question 1: Why command striking the dead man with part of the cow when Allah could resurrect him directly?
• Answer: To make the proof stronger and remove suspicion of sorcery. If he revived upon being struck by a piece of the slaughtered cow, the suspicion that Moses used magic or trickery is dispelled. It proves the revelation comes from Allah, not human deception. Furthermore, presenting a sacrifice (qurbān) elevates the status of the sacrifice.
• Question 2: Why not command the slaughter of a different animal?
• Answer: The discussion would be the same for any other animal. However, this specific act involved: 1) Offering a sacrifice, which was customary; 2) This sacrifice was considered among the greatest, carrying immense reward due to the hardship of obtaining this specific cow at a high price; and 3) The owner of the cow gained great wealth.

Scholars differed on the specific part used for striking. The closest view is that they were given a choice among the parts, as the command was to strike him "with a part of it," and any part they used would fulfill the obligation. Specific parts mentioned include: its tongue, its right thigh, its tail, the bone near the ear cartilage, or the piece of flesh between the shoulders. The Qur'an does not specify, so if no authentic narration exists, silence is required.

There is an omitted phrase: "So We said, 'Strike him with a part of it,' and they struck him with a part of it, and he was revived." This is omitted because Allah’s statement {Thus does Allah give life to the dead} implies the action was completed. It is like {Strike the rock with your staff, and it burst forth} (Al-Baqarah: 60), implying "so it burst forth." It is narrated that when struck, he stood up, blood flowing from his veins, and said, "So-and-so killed me," naming his cousin, then fell down dead again.

Regarding {Thus does Allah give life to the dead} (Al-Baqarah: 73)

1. It refers to the resurrection of that specific dead man.
2. It serves as proof for the validity of the Resurrection (al-I'ādah).

Is this proof directed at the polytheists or others?

1. Al-Aṣamm's View: It is directed at the polytheists. If they learned through repeated testimony (tawātur) that this resurrection occurred this way, they would know the Resurrection is true. If not by tawātur, it serves as a prompt for reflection. Al-Qāḍī favors this, noting that Allah mentioned the command (striking) as the cause for reviving this dead man, then generalized to {the dead} (al-mawtā), implying that Resurrection is as easy for Him as creation was initially.
2. Al-Qaffāl's View: Allah was telling the Children of Israel: "The resurrection of all the dead in the Hereafter will be like this resurrection you witnessed." Although they believed in the Hereafter, they believed based on inference, not direct witnessing. Witnessing it calmed their hearts and removed the doubt inherent in inference (like Abraham's request: {My Lord, show me how You give life to the dead... so that my heart may be reassured} [Al-Baqarah: 260]). Thus, Allah revived the slain man visibly, then said: "As I revived him in this world, so I will revive the dead in the Hereafter, without needing material, time, model, or instrument."

Some inferred from {Thus does Allah give life to the dead} that the slain man was truly dead. This is weak, as comparing the resurrection of this man to the resurrection of the dead does not necessitate the former being a complete death.

Regarding {and He shows you His signs} (Al-Baqarah: 73)

One might ask: Why is it phrased in the plural (āyāt) when it seems to be one event? Answer: This single event points to multiple proofs:

1. The existence of the Creator, capable of all things.
2. The truthfulness of Moses (peace be upon him).
3. The innocence of those who were not the killer.
4. The certainty of guilt upon the actual killer. Though one event, its many implications make it function as multiple signs.

Regarding {that you may understand} (laʿallakum taʿqilūn):

1. The word laʿalla (perhaps/so that) was previously explained (in relation to laʿallakum tattaqūn).
2. Since they were already rational beings, one cannot say: "I presented this sign so you become rational." Therefore, the literal meaning is impossible. It must be interpreted as: "So that you may act according to your intellects," meaning, since He can resurrect one soul, He can resurrect all souls, thus removing their denial of the Resurrection.

Many early scholars derived rulings from this story, particularly concerning whether a killer inherits from his victim.

• Some stated the killer is deprived of inheritance, citing a narration from ʿUbaydah as-Salmānī that the killer in this incident was deprived of inheritance due to his killing.
• Al-Qāḍī argued that this issue should not be derived from the verse, as the text does not clarify if the killer was an heir or if he was deprived of inheritance. Furthermore, we cannot assume their law is identical to ours, making the derivation forced.

The Juristic Dispute on Killer Inheritance:

• Al-Shāfiʿī: The killer inherits nothing, whether the killing was intentional, accidental, or even justified (e.g., a just ruler killing a rebel).
• Abū Ḥanīfah: The killer inherits nothing in intentional or accidental killing, unless a just ruler kills a rebel, in which case he inherits. If the killer is a child or insane, he inherits from the estate (but not the blood money), which is the view of ʿAlī, ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab.
• ʿUthmān al-Battī: Accidental killer inherits; intentional killer does not.
• Mālik: The killer does not inherit the blood money but inherits from the rest of the estate (view of Al-Ḥasan, Mujāhid, Al-Zuhrī, Al-Awzāʿī).

Al-Shāfiʿī argued based on the widespread Hadith: "The killer has nothing from the inheritance." However, this requires accepting the qualification of a general Qur'anic text by a solitary report (khabar wāḥid), which is debated in Usūl al-Fiqh.

This verse addresses the hardening of their hearts following the miracle of the cow. Their hearts became like stones, or even harder.

The verse then lists the qualities of stones:

1. Some stones split, and rivers burst forth from them.
2. Some stones crack, and water flows from them.
3. Some stones crack, and water issues from them.
4. Some stones fall down in awe of Allah.

This comparison highlights that even inanimate stones possess a capacity for yielding to divine power and awe, which their hearts lacked. Allah is not heedless of their deeds.