Al-Baqarah: (80) And they say, "The Fire will not touch us except for a few numbered days."

This verse addresses the third category of their reprehensible sayings and actions: their assertion that God Almighty will only punish them for a few days.

This assertion cannot be reached by reason under any circumstances:

1. According to our view (Ahl al-Sunnah): God does what He wills and decrees what He intends; no one can object to His actions. Therefore, knowledge of the duration of punishment can only come through transmitted evidence (Sam'i).
2. According to the Mu'tazila view: Reason dictates that sins warrant eternal punishment from God. Since reason establishes this, determining a finite duration for the punishment and its cessation afterward requires transmitted evidence to specify it.

Thus, under both doctrines, knowledge of this duration is only possible through transmitted evidence. Where such evidence is absent, asserting a specific duration is impermissible.

Herein lie two issues:

Issue 1: Interpretation of "A Few Numbered Days" (أياماً معدودة)

There are two main interpretations mentioned:

1. The linguistic interpretation: The word ayyām (days) is typically used only for numbers up to ten (e.g., five days, ten days) and not for numbers exceeding ten. This interpretation is challenged by the verse: {Fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may become righteous. A specified number of days (أياماً معدودات)} (Al-Baqarah: 183-184), which refers to the entire month, exceeding ten days.
   • The Qadi (Judge) suggested that if "days" is limited to ten or fewer, then the meaning should be interpreted as either the minimum or the maximum possible number. Those who suggest three days can argue for the minimum reality, and those who suggest ten can argue for the maximum. However, choosing an intermediate number (more than three but less than ten) has no basis unless a sound narration specifies it.
   • Many exegetes estimated this number to be seven days. Mujahid reported that the Jews believed the world would last seven thousand years, and God would punish them one day for every thousand years, hence their claim of seven days of punishment. Al-Asamm narrated from some Jews that they worshipped the calf for seven days, so they claimed their punishment would be seven days.
   • Critique of these two views: The first lacks necessary correspondence between the world's lifespan and the punishment duration. The second is flawed because the duration of a sin (worshipping the calf for seven days) does not necessitate the duration of its punishment. For us (Sunnis), God does what is best (according to Malikite principles). For the Mu'tazila, the sinner deserves eternal punishment unless repentance or pardon occurs.
   • Objection: Does not God forbid exceeding the penalty in {The recompense of a bad deed is one bad deed like it} (Ash-Shura: 40)? Thus, the punishment should not exceed the sin.
   • Response: The magnitude of sin increases proportionally to the blessings received. Since God's blessings upon His servants are boundless, their sin is immensely great.

2. The second view: Ibn Abbas interpreted these days as forty days, corresponding to the period they worshipped the calf. The critique here is similar to that applied to the interpretation of seven days.

3. The third view: The meaning of ma'dūdah (numbered) is few, similar to His saying: {And they sold him for a cheap, counted price} (Yusuf: 20). And God knows best.

Issue 2: The Minimum and Maximum Duration of Menstruation

The Hanafi school holds that the minimum duration of menstruation is three days and the maximum is ten days. They cite the Prophet's saying: "Leave prayer during the days of your Iqrā’ (period/flow)." The duration referred to as "days" (ayyām) must have a minimum count (three) and a maximum count (ten), as established previously. This is subject to the same linguistic issues raised above.

Issue 3: The Difference between Maa'dūdah and Maa'dūdāt

The verse here states: {The Fire will not touch us except for a few numbered days (ayyāman ma'dūdatan)}. In Al 'Imran, it states: {except for a few numbered days (ayyāman ma'dūdātin)} (Al 'Imran: 24).

One might ask: Why is the first instance singular feminine (ma'dūdatan) while the second is plural feminine (ma'dūdātin), when the noun being described (ayyāman) is the same?

Answer: If the noun is masculine, the default plural form of its adjective is with a tā’ (e.g., kūz becomes kīzān broken, thiyāb maqtū'ah). If the noun is feminine, the default plural form of its adjective is with alif and tā’ (e.g., jarrah becomes jirār maqtū'āt, khābiya becomes khawābī maqtū'āt).

However, sometimes the plural form with alif and tā’ is used for a masculine singular noun in rare cases (e.g., hamām and hamāmāt, jimāl sabr and sabtarāt).

Based on this, the verse in Al 'Imran uses the plural adjective form: {in numbered days (fī ayyāmin ma'dūdātin)} and {in known days (fī ayyāmin ma'lūmātin)}. God Almighty used the default form in Surah Al-Baqarah: {numbered days (ayyāman ma'dūdatan)} and the secondary form in Al 'Imran.

Regarding His saying: {Say, "Have you taken a covenant with Allah? Then Allah will never fail His covenant."}

This verse contains several issues:

In this context, ʿahd functions like a promise (waʿd) or a report (khabar). God's report is termed a covenant because His report is more emphatic than covenants confirmed by oaths and vows. A covenant from God is only in this emphatic sense.

The author of Al-Kashshāf stated that {Then Allah will never fail His covenant} is connected to an implied phrase, meaning: "If you have taken a covenant with Allah, then Allah will never fail His covenant."

The phrase {Have you taken} is not an inquiry but a reproach/denial. It is not appropriate for God to question His Messenger to invalidate their claim. Rather, the intent is to draw attention to the method of reasoning: knowledge of this specific duration is only attainable through transmitted evidence (Sam'i). Since no transmitted evidence exists, asserting this duration is impermissible.

{Then Allah will never fail His covenant} indicates that God Almighty is transcendent above lying, both in His promises and His threats.

• Our scholars (Ahl al-Sunnah): Lying is a defect, and defects are impossible for God.
• The Mu'tazila: God knows the ugliness of falsehood and knows that He is self-sufficient (Ghani) regarding it. Since falsehood is ugly, and He knows its ugliness and His self-sufficiency, it is impossible for Him to commit it. Hence, falsehood is impossible for Him, which is why He says: {Then Allah will never fail His covenant}.

• Objection: A covenant is a promise. Specifying the promise implies the negation of others. Since He specified that He will not fail the promise, it implies that failing the threat is permissible. Reason supports this, as failing a promise is ignoble, while failing a threat is noble.
• Response: The indication mentioned applies to all forms of falsehood.

Al-Jubba'i argued that the verse proves God did not promise Moses or other prophets after him that He would remove sinners and major offenders from the Fire after they denied the truth. If He had promised them this, He would not have been justified in rebuking the Jews for their claim. Since it is established that God did not guide them to this, and it is established that He warned sinners of punishment to deter them, their punishment must be eternal, as the Wā'idiyyah (those who affirm eternal punishment) claim. This must apply to all nations because God's decree regarding promises and threats cannot differ among nations, as the magnitude of sin does not differ among them.

Critique of Al-Jubba'i's reasoning (which we find extremely forced):

1. We do not concede that God did not promise Moses that He would remove major sinners from the Fire.
2. Regarding his premise: Why must God have refrained from rebuking the Jews if He had promised them that? What evidence supports this necessary connection? Furthermore, we can show this connection is not necessary in several ways:
   • Perhaps God rebuked them because they minimized the duration of punishment. Their statement {The Fire will not touch us except for a few numbered days} implies a very short duration. God rebuked them for asserting this brevity, not for the cessation of punishment itself.
   • The Murji'ah assert general pardon, but they cannot be certain about any specific individual. When the Jews asserted mitigation for themselves definitively, God justly rebuked them.
   • They were disbelievers, and according to our view, the punishment of a disbeliever is eternal and unending.
3. Even if we grant that God did not promise Moses that He would remove the major sinners from the Fire, why do you conclude that He will not remove the sinners of this nation? It is different to say God did not promise Moses this, and to say God informed Moses that He will not remove them. The former is harmless, as God might still do it on the Day of Judgment. He only refuted the Jews because they asserted it definitively without evidence; they should have remained silent, neither affirming nor denying it.
4. Even if we grant that God will not remove the sinners of Moses's people from the Fire, why do you conclude that He will not remove the sinners of this nation? Al-Jubba'i's claim that God's decree regarding promises and threats cannot differ among nations is mere assertion, as punishment is God's right, and He may bestow the grace of remission upon some and not upon others. Thus, this line of reasoning is weak.

Regarding His saying: {Or do you say about Allah what you do not know?}

This verse completes the argument mentioned above. If knowledge of the specific duration is only attainable through transmitted evidence, and no transmitted evidence exists, then asserting that duration is speaking about God what is not known.

This verse indicates several benefits:

1. Since God criticized them for speaking without evidence, we learn that speaking without evidence is false.
2. Anything whose existence or non-existence is rationally possible cannot be affirmed or negated except through transmitted evidence (Sam'i).
3. Those who deny Qiyās (analogy) and the reports of a single trustworthy narrator rely on this verse. They argue that since Qiyās and a single narrator's report do not yield certainty (ʿilm), acting upon them is impermissible due to God's rebuke: {Or do you say about Allah what you do not know?}.
   • Response: When the evidence indicates the obligation to act upon a strong presumption (ẓann) derived from Qiyās or a single narrator, the obligation to act becomes a known matter (maʿlūm). Therefore, asserting this obligation is asserting what is known, not what is unknown.

! 7 < { Yes, whoever earns an evil deed and his sin encompasses him - those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally. } > 7 !