Surah Al-Anbiya (The Prophets): Verses 21–25

Note: The discourse from the beginning of the Surah up to this point concerned Prophethood and related matters, presented through questions and answers. These verses, however, focus on establishing the Oneness of God (Tawhid) and refuting the existence of rivals or equals to Him.

On the verse: {Or have they taken gods from the earth who can bring forth the dead?} (21)

The author of Al-Kashshaf states that Am here is the disjunctive Am (meaning "but" or "rather"), indicating a shift from the previous topic and a strong denial of what follows. The denial targets the claim that they took gods from the earth who can resurrect the dead. This is deemed a great absurdity: that some dead things (idols) could resurrect other dead things.

Objection: How can they be rebuked for claiming their gods can resurrect the dead when the polytheists themselves denied resurrection, saying, {Who will give life to bones while they are turned to dust}? How then could they attribute the power of resurrection to inanimate objects utterly devoid of power?

Answer: Because by worshipping these idols, they implicitly attribute to them the power to grant reward. Their act of worship necessitates acknowledging that these idols possess the power over resurrection, reward, and punishment. Mentioning this power is thus a form of mockery and intellectual rebuke: If these idols cannot cause life and death, harm or benefit, what intellect permits taking them as gods?

This phrase is like saying, "So-and-so is from Mecca," meaning he is a Meccan. It signifies that these gods are those worshipped on the earth. Gods are generally of two types: earthly and heavenly. Alternatively, it could mean gods made of earth, as they are either carved from stone or fashioned from earthly minerals.

This carries a sense of exclusivity, as if to say: "Have they taken gods from the earth who alone possess the power of resurrection?"

Al-Hasan recited it as yanshurūn (with a damma on the ya), while the common recitation is yunshirūn (with a fatha on the ya). Both forms are linguistically valid: Anshara Allah al-mawta and Nashara Allah al-mawta (God brought the dead to life).

On the verse: {If there were therein any gods besides Allah, there would have been ruin in both.} (22)

Grammarians argue that Illā here means "other than" (ghayr). Thus, the meaning is: If the management and administration of the heavens and the earth were undertaken by anything other than the One who created them, they would have been ruined.

It cannot mean exception (istithnā’). If it were an exception, the meaning would be: "If there were gods in them not accompanied by Allah, they would be ruined." This implies, by way of mafhūm (negative implication), that if there were gods accompanied by Allah, ruin would not occur. This is false, because if there were multiple gods, ruin would be inevitable regardless of whether Allah was among them or not. Since the exception reading leads to falsehood, the meaning must be "other than."

Theologians argue that positing two gods leads to an impossibility, hence the assertion that believing in two gods is impossible.

We prove this impossibility by assuming two gods exist. Each must be capable of all possible actions. If so, each would be capable of moving Zayd and stopping him. If one wills to move him while the other wills to stop him:

1. Both wills are realized: Impossible, as it requires combining two opposites.
2. Neither will is realized: Impossible, because the prevention of one's will requires the will of the other, and vice versa. If both are prevented, they must both exist simultaneously, which is impossible.
3. The will of one is realized, and the other is not: Impossible for two reasons: a. If both possess infinite power, neither can be more powerful than the other; they must be equal. If they are equal, it is impossible for one's will to take precedence over the other's without an unweighed preference (tarjīḥ). b. If one's will is realized and the other's is not, the one whose will was realized is powerful, and the one whose will was thwarted is impotent. Impotence is a defect, which is impossible for God.

Objection: Ruin only necessitates disagreement in will. We only claim disagreement is possible, not necessary. If the consequence (ruin) is built upon a possibility (disagreement), then the consequence itself is only possible, not certain. Why then does God affirm the certainty of ruin?

Answer (Twofold):

1. God treats the possible as actual based on the apparent reality: The realm is corrupted by the conflict between two rulers.
2. (Stronger Argument): We demonstrate the necessity of ruin through another path. If two gods existed, each capable of all things, any single action would be attributable to two independent agents simultaneously. This is impossible because attributing an action to one agent implies its necessity for that agent's existence, yet if both are independent creators, the action becomes necessarily existent through both, making it impossible to attribute it solely to one. This leads to the contradiction that the action is independent of both, yet requires both—an impossibility.

Therefore, positing two gods leads to the impossibility of any single action being realized by either one. If this is the case, nothing can ever occur, and ruin becomes certain.

Alternatively, if two gods exist, they either agree or disagree:

• Agreement: If they agree on one thing, that thing is their shared potential and will. Realizing it through both simultaneously is impossible (as shown above).
• Disagreement: Leads to the three impossible scenarios already mentioned (both wills realized, neither realized, or only one realized).

Thus, ruin is necessary under all assumptions.

Objection: What if they agree on an action, and neither wills to be the sole originator? If each wills that one specific one of them be the originator, then ruin is avoided, as the creation is not between two independent creators.

Answer: The originator being "one of them" must be defined:

1. If it is the power/will itself: This implies shared power and will, and shared origination.
2. If it is the resulting effect: Then the effect occurring through the power of one is no more prioritized than through the power of the other, as each has an independent will to effect.
3. If it is a third entity: If this entity is eternal, it cannot be the object of will. If it is contingent, it is the effect itself, reducing to case (2).

By understanding this, you realize that everything in the upper and lower worlds—all contingent things and creations—is proof of God's Oneness. Even the existence of every single substance and accident is proof of Tawhid based on the argument presented. God mentioned this proof in several places.

Other Proofs for God's Oneness:

1. The Strongest Proof (Argument from Necessary Existence): If two beings were necessarily existent by their very essence (wājib al-wujūd li-dhātihī), they must share in existence but be distinguished by something unique to each. What they share must be different from what distinguishes them. Thus, each would be a composite entity (sharing part + distinguishing part). Every composite entity requires its parts, and its parts are other than itself; hence, every composite entity requires something else, making it contingent (mumkin) in essence. This contradicts the premise that it is necessarily existent. Therefore, the Necessary Existent can only be One. Everything else is contingent and dependent on Him. Everything dependent on another is contingent (muḥdath). This argument can be interpreted as the meaning of the verse: assuming two necessary beings leads to the impossibility of either being necessary, meaning nothing exists, hence ruin ensues.
2. Argument from Shared Divinity: If there were two gods, they must share the attribute of divinity. They must also be distinguished by something. If this distinguishing factor is a perfection, the one lacking it is imperfect and thus not a god. If it is not a perfection, the one possessing it is described by something non-perfect, making him imperfect. If the distinguishing factor is essential to divinity, the one lacking it is not a god. If it is not essential, its possession is not necessary, requiring an external determiner, making the possessor dependent.
3. Argument from Distinction: If there were two gods, they must be distinguishable by something. Distinction in our minds occurs through difference in space, time, or necessity/contingency. All these are impossible for God, so distinction is impossible.
4. Argument from Sufficiency: If one god were sufficient to manage the universe, the second would be superfluous, which is a defect, and the defective cannot be a god.
5. Argument from Contingency: Contingent things require an agent. There is no logical barrier to a single agent managing the entire universe. If we posit two, there is no reason to prefer two agents over three, four, or an infinite number, which is impossible.
6. Argument from Self-Revelation: One god must either be able to reveal a sign unique to himself or not. If he can, the signs of creation (muḥdathāt) do not distinguish between them. If he cannot, he is incapable of defining himself uniquely, making him impotent, and thus not a god.
7. Argument from Knowledge: One god must either be able to conceal some of his actions from the other or not. If he can conceal, the one kept ignorant is unknowing. If he cannot conceal, he is impotent.
8. Argument from Combined Power: The combined power of two gods would be greater than the power of either alone. If each power is finite, their sum is finite. (This point seems to conclude that if they are both infinite, they must be one).
9. Argument from Number: Number is deficient because it requires unity (the number one). The number one, being a genus, is deficient because it is exceeded by other numbers. The deficient cannot be God; thus, God must be One.
10. Argument from Creating a Contingent Being: If we posit two gods and a possible non-existent thing: If neither can create it, both are impotent. If one can and the other cannot, the latter is not a god. If both can create it independently: If one creates it, the other's power to create the already existent ceases, which is impossible. If the second god's power vanishes, the first god has overpowered and disabled the second, meaning the second is not a god.
    • Rebuttal to the objection that the first god's power also ceases: When the One God executes His power, His power is fully realized (nāfidh), which is not impotence. But when one partner executes their will, the other partner's power is removed by the first's power, which constitutes disabling them.
11. Argument from Motion/Rest: We posit a body. Can each god create motion in it instead of rest, or vice versa? If not, they are impotent. If yes, when one creates motion, the other cannot create rest. The first has removed the second's power, making him impotent. (This focuses on power, whereas the previous argument focused on will.)
12. Argument from Knowledge: Since both gods know everything, the knowledge of each must relate to the exact object known by the other. Their knowledge must be identical. Since the entity capable of one instance of knowledge is capable of the other, the specialization of each god to a specific knowledge/power, while being capable of the alternative, requires an external determiner, making each dependent and imperfect.
13. Argument from Sovereignty: Partnership is a defect; singularity is perfection. Kings hate sharing even minor rule. The greater the king, the stronger the aversion to partnership. If one god tried to seize sole dominion, the defeated one would be poor and impotent, not a god. If he failed to seize it, he would be in extreme distress, not a god.
14. Argument from Need: Two gods must either need each other, be independent of each other, or one needs the other while the other is independent. If they need each other, both are deficient. If they are independent of each other, the one who is not needed is deficient (like a ruler whose people achieve their welfare without recourse to him). God is He who is needed but never needs another. If one needs the other, the needy one is deficient, and the needed one is God.

Note: These fourteen rational arguments are persuasive (ẓanniyyah). Reliance should be placed on the preceding arguments.

Scriptural Proofs (Sam'iyyah):

1. {He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden} (Al-Hadid: 3): Al-Awwal (The First) means the singular, preceding entity. If one said, "My first slave bought is free," and he bought two slaves simultaneously, he would not fulfill the oath because the first must be singular. Since God describes Himself as the First, He must be singular and preceding, thus having no partner.
2. {And with Him are the keys of the unseen, none knows them but He} (Al-An'am: 59): This explicitly negates the existence of a partner who shares in this knowledge.
3. Explicit Affirmation of Oneness: God explicitly stated, {There is no god but He} in thirty-seven places, and affirmed unity elsewhere, such as {And your God is One God} (Al-Baqarah: 163) and {Say, "He is Allah, [who is] One"} (Al-Ikhlas: 1).
4. {Everything will perish except His Face} (Al-Qasas: 88): This decrees the perishing of everything besides Him. That which is not eternal cannot be God.
5. {If there were therein any gods besides Allah, there would have been ruin in both} (Al-Anbiya: 22): This is supported by {then some of them would have overpowered others} (Al-Mu'minun: 91) and {If there were therein any deities other than Allah, there would have been corruption in both} (Al-Isra: 42).
6. {And if Allah should touch you with harm, none can remove it except Him. And if He intends for you good, none can repel His favor} (Yunus: 107). Also, {Say, "Have you considered that if Allah should intend for me harm, are the ones you invoke besides Allah able to remove His harm? Or if He intends mercy for me, can they avert His mercy?} (Az-Zumar: 38).
7. {Say, "Have you considered: if Allah should take away your hearing and your sight and set a seal upon your hearts, what god other than Allah could bring it back to you?"} (Al-An'am: 46): This restriction proves the negation of a partner.
8. {Allah is the Creator of all things} (Az-Zumar: 62): If a partner existed, he would not be the Creator, rendering him useless.

Note: Any issue whose truth does not depend on confirming the messengers' truthfulness can be established by scriptural evidence. Tawhid falls into this category, so scriptural proofs are valid.

Alternative Interpretation of the Argument of Impediment: Some critics interpret the verse {If there were therein any gods besides Allah, there would have been ruin in both} to mean: If the idolaters' gods (which are inanimate) were truly gods, the universe would be ruined because they cannot manage it. This interpretation is preferred by some because it immediately follows the verse refuting their idols: {Or have they taken gods from the earth who can bring forth the dead?}.

On the verse: {So exalted is Allah, Lord of the Throne, above what they describe.} (23)

After establishing the conclusive proof for Tawhid, God says: {So exalted is Allah, Lord of the Throne, above what they describe}. This means He is transcendent, based on these proofs, above their description that He has a partner. This indicates that engaging in glorification (Tasbīḥ) is only beneficial after establishing the proof that God is transcendent, and that the path of mere imitation (taqlīd) is abandoned.

Why not simply say, {So exalted is Allah above what they describe}?

The debate here was specifically with idol worshippers. However, the proof God presented is general to all opponents. After presenting the general proof, God highlights a specific point relevant to idolaters: How can a rational person make an inanimate object—devoid of intellect and sensation—a partner to the Creator of the Great Throne, the originator of the heavens and earth, the manager of all creatures (light, darkness, tablet, pen, substance, attributes, inanimate things, plants, and all animals)?

On the verse: {He is not questioned about what He does, while they are questioned.} (24)

This verse contains two points:

1. God is not questioned about any of His actions; no one asks Him, "Why did you do that?"
2. Creation will be questioned about their actions.

Issue 1: Connection to the preceding verses.

The basis for those who affirm a partner for God (Dualists, Zoroastrians) is the demand for the reason (limmiyyah) behind God's actions. They observe good and evil, pleasure and pain, life and death in the world. They argue that the agent of good must be good, and the agent of evil must be evil. It is impossible for one agent to be both good and evil. Therefore, there must be two agents: one for good and one for evil.

This objection boils down to demanding the reason for God's actions. Since the foundation of ascribing partners rests on demanding the limmiyyah, God, after proving Tawhid, addresses the core of the opponents' doubt. The proper order in debate is to first present the proof for the desired conclusion (Tawhid), and then present the answer to the opponent's doubt.

Issue 2: Proof that God is not questioned about His actions.

The Sunni Position (Eight Proofs):

1. If everything required a cause ('illah), that cause would require another cause, leading to infinite regress (tasalsul). To stop this, the first entity must be self-sufficient, needing no external cause or determiner. This applies to God's essence, attributes, and actions.
2. If His action required a cause, that cause would be either necessary or contingent. If necessary, His action would be necessary by nature (mūjib bi-dh-dhāt), not by choice (ikhtiyār). If contingent, that cause is itself an act of God, requiring another cause, leading to infinite regress.
3. If the cause of His action were eternal, the action itself would be eternal (implying the world is eternal). If the cause were contingent, it requires another cause, leading to infinite regress.
4. If someone acts for a purpose (gharaḍ), they are either capable of achieving that purpose without the intermediary or not. If capable, the intermediary is futile. If incapable, they are impotent, which is impossible for God (though possible for us, hence our actions are goal-oriented).
5. If His action had a purpose, that purpose would either relate to God or to the creatures. Relating to God is impossible as He is free from need for benefit or harm. If it relates to creatures, their only goal is obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain. God is capable of granting these directly without any intermediary. Thus, it is impossible for Him to act for a purpose.
6. If His action had a purpose, the existence or non-existence of that purpose must be either equal in relevance to Him or not. If equal, it cannot be a purpose. If not equal, it implies God is inherently deficient, needing something external to complete Him, which is impossible. (The objection that it is equal for God but preferable for creatures leads back to the same division.)
7. The existent is either God or His creation. One who acts upon one's own property is not questioned, "Why did you do that?"
8. The question "Why did you do that?" is only appropriate when the questioner has the potential to prevent the action. A creature cannot prevent God's action, either by threatening punishment (impossible for God) or by threatening blame/deviation from wisdom (as the Mu'tazila claim). Since God's attributes of wisdom and majesty are inherent, they cannot change due to external contingent factors.

Therefore, God cannot be asked, "Why did you do this?" Every act He performs has no cause for its performance.

The Mu'tazila Position: They agree God is not questioned, but base this on their principle that God knows the ugliness of ugly deeds and is self-sufficient from them; therefore, it is impossible for Him to commit an ugly deed. Knowing this, we know everything He does is wise and correct, so the creature cannot ask Him why He did it.

This indicates that the accountable are questioned about their deeds.

Issue 1: The possibility of being tasked (Intellectual Possibility vs. Scriptural Occurrence).

Intellectual Possibility (Refuting those who deny accountability):

1. Accountability must be directed when the inclination to act and refrain is equal, or when one is favored. The first is impossible because the state of equality prevents preference, making the command to prefer impossible. The second is impossible because if one inclination is favored, the favored action is necessary, and the disfavored is impossible. Commanding the necessary is futile; commanding the impossible is commanding beyond capacity.
2. Everything God knows will occur is necessarily existent, so commanding it is futile. Everything He knows will not occur is impossible to perform, so commanding it is beyond capacity.
3. Questioning the servant must either have a benefit or not. If it benefits God, He is needy (impossible). If it benefits the servant, this is false, as questioning leads to punishment, which is harm, not benefit. If the questioning has no benefit, it is futile, which is impossible for a wise being, or it is harmful, which is impossible for the Merciful.

Rebuttal to these objections:

1. Your goal in raising these doubts is to force us to deny accountability, which means you are commanding us to deny accountability—a contradiction.
2. Your arguments hinge on the idea that all commands are beyond capacity. We have already established that God {is not questioned about what He does}. This establishes the principle that justifies the second part: {while they are questioned}.

Scriptural Occurrence: Some argue that {while they are questioned} contradicts {On that Day, no man or jinn will be asked about his sin} (Ar-Rahman: 39). The answer is that the Day of Judgment is long and has various stages (maqāmāt), so the negation and affirmation are assigned to different stages to avoid contradiction.

Issue 2: The Mu'tazila view on accountability.

1. If God created good and evil, He should be questioned about His actions and praised/blamed accordingly.
2. If He is the sole agent, He should not be questioned about the results.
3. They should not be questioned about their deeds if they have no deeds of their own (i.e., God is the sole actor).
4. Their actions cannot be avoided since God created and imposed them upon them (determinism/compulsion).
5. God explicitly states that He sends messengers so that people have no argument against Him after the messengers (implying they have an argument before them). Verses like {And if We had destroyed them with a punishment before it, they would have said, "Our Lord, why did You not send us a messenger so we could follow Your verses before we were humiliated and disgraced?"} (Taha: 134) show the servant has a valid argument against God.
6. Thumāmah (a Mu'tazilite) argued: If God asks the servant on Judgment Day, "What drove you to disobey Me?" and the servant replies based on determinism, "You created me a disbeliever and commanded me what I could not do," this statement would be true under determinism. Since God says, {This is the Day when the truthful will benefit from their truthfulness} (Al-Ma'idah: 119), this statement must benefit the servant. If God prevents the servant from speaking or arguing, He has prevented him from something that, had He not prevented it, would have won his case—a complete refutation of God's position.

Rebuttal to the Mu'tazila: These points are countered by the issues of the Dā'ī (the Caller/Incentive) and God's Knowledge, as well as the eight proofs already presented showing the impossibility of demanding the limmiyyah for God's actions.

On the verse: {Or have they taken besides Him gods? Say, "Bring forth your proof."} (25)

God repeats the phrase {Or have they taken besides Him gods} to emphasize the enormity of their disbelief. He is essentially saying: You claim God has a partner? Then bring your proof—either rational or transmitted. After establishing the proof for Tawhid (first), clarifying the basis of the opponents' doubts (second), He demands their proof (third).

On the verse: {This is a reminder for those who have understanding, and a reminder for those who came before.} (26)

1. Ibn Abbas, Al-Qaffal, Al-Zajjaj: {This is a reminder for those who have understanding} means this Qur'an revealed to those with me (Muhammad). {And a reminder for those who came before} means the Torah, Gospel, Psalms, and Scrolls revealed to previous prophets. None of these scriptures permit taking a god besides Me; they all contain only, {Indeed, I am Allah; there is no deity except Me, so worship Me} (as stated later in the verse: {And We sent not before you any messenger except that We revealed to him, "There is no deity except Me, so worship Me."}).
2. Sa'id ibn Jubayr, Qatadah, Muqatil, As-Suddi: {And a reminder for those who came before} is an attribute of the Qur'an itself, meaning it contains accounts of past nations just as it contains accounts of this nation.
3. Al-Qaffal's view: This book I brought you contains explanations of those who agree and disagree with me, and those who preceded me, both agreeing and disagreeing. Choose for yourselves. This implies a threat.

Al-Kashshaf notes several readings:

• Reading with tanwīn on dhikrun (a reminder): {This is a reminder...} where man ma'ī (those with me) is an object governed by the dhikr (reminder), similar to {or feeding on a day of severe hunger, an orphan} (Al-Balad: 14-15). The addition (genitive construction) is like adding the object to the verbal noun, similar to {The Romans have been defeated in the nearest land...} (Ar-Rum: 2-3).
• Reading with man ma'ī and man qablī (with the preposition min governing the following phrase): This is unusual, as min usually enters the prepositional phrase. The excuse is that ma'a (with) is treated like adverbs such as qabla (before) and ba'da (after), allowing the preposition min to enter it.
• Reading: Dhikrun ma'ī wa dhikrun qablī (A reminder with me and a reminder before me).

On the verse: {But most of them do not know the truth, so they turn away.} (27)

After establishing the proof for Tawhid, demanding their evidence, and showing they have none (rationally or scripturally), God states that their adherence to this false doctrine is not due to evidence leading them there, but because they lack the fundamental basis of all good: knowledge ('ilm). Their lack of knowledge leads directly to turning away from seeking and listening to the truth.

Al-Kashshaf notes that al-ḥaqqa (the truth) can be read with the nominative case (raf') as an emphatic subject placed between the cause (ignorance) and the effect (aversion), meaning: Their aversion is due to ignorance, which is the truth (i.e., the reality is that their aversion stems from ignorance).

On the verse: {And We sent not before you any messenger except that We revealed to him: "There is no deity except Me, so worship Me."} (28)

The readings yūḥā (passive) and nūḥī (active) are both famous. This verse confirms the preceding verses establishing Tawhid.

On the verse: {And they say, "The Most Merciful has taken a son." Exalted is He! Rather, they are honored servants.} (29)

When they claim the Most Merciful has taken a son, God responds: {Exalted is He! Rather, they are honored servants}.

The previous verse established transcendence based on the general proof of Tawhid. This verse specifically addresses the claim of sonship, which is a particular error of the idolaters.

The response {Rather, they are honored servants} serves to refute the claim of sonship by establishing their status: they do not precede Him in speech, they act only by His command, He knows what is before them and what is behind them, they intercede only for those whom He permits, and they are fearful of Him.

On the verse: {They do not speak before Him with [disagreeable] speech. They act only by His command.} (30)

This emphasizes their subservience and lack of independent authority.

On the verse: {He knows what is before them and what is behind them, and they offer no intercession except for whom He approves, and they, from fear of Him, are apprehensive.} (31)

This further details their limitations: complete knowledge belongs only to God, and their intercession is entirely dependent on His permission and approval.

On the verse: {And whoever should say among them, "Indeed, I am a god besides Him," then that We shall recompense with Hell. Thus do We recompense the wrongdoers.} (32)

This is the ultimate consequence for anyone, even among the angels or revered beings, who claims divinity alongside God. This is the recompense for the ẓālimūn (wrongdoers).