Surah An-Nur (The Light): Verses 4–5

Interpretation of Accusation (Qadhf)

The apparent meaning of the verse does not explicitly state that the accusation is specifically about adultery (zina). One might accuse chaste women of theft, drinking wine, or disbelief. Therefore, there must be an accompanying context (qarinah) indicating the specific nature of the accusation.

The scholars have reached a consensus that the intended meaning of the accusation here is adultery. Evidence for this includes:

1. Prior Mention of Adultery: Adultery was mentioned previously in the context.
2. Mention of Chaste Women (Al-Muhṣanāt): Since the verse refers to chaste women, the accusation must be regarding the opposite of chastity (i.e., adultery).
3. Requirement of Four Witnesses: The phrase, "Then they did not bring four witnesses," is a condition specifically required only for proving adultery.
4. Consensus on Punishment: Consensus exists that flogging is not required for accusing someone of anything other than adultery. Thus, the intended meaning must be the accusation of adultery.

With this established, the discussion concerning this verse revolves around three elements: the accusation (al-ramy), the accuser (al-rāmī), and the accused (al-marmī).

The First Inquiry: Concerning the Accusation (Al-Ramy)

The terms of accusation are divided into three categories: explicit (ṣarīḥ), implicit (kināyah), and allusion (taʿrīḍ).

1. Explicit (Ṣarīḥ): This is when someone directly says, "You are an adulteress," or "You have committed adultery," or "You have committed adultery before this," or "You have committed adultery anally."

• If one says, "Your body has committed adultery (zanā badanuk)," there are two views:
  • View 1 (Implicit): It is implicit, similar to saying, "Your hand has committed adultery," because the reality of adultery pertains to the private parts (farj), and other body parts are merely aids in the act.
  • View 2 (More Correct): It is explicit, because the act issues from the entire body, and the private parts are merely the instrument of the act.

2. Implicit (Kināyah): These are terms that imply the accusation but are not explicit, such as saying: "O wicked woman (fāsiqah)," "O evil woman (fājirah)," "O impure woman (khabīthah)," "O adulteress (mu'ājirah)," or "Daughter of ill-repute (ibnat al-ḥarām)." Also, saying of one's wife, "No hand that touches her is rejected," or vice versa. These only count as qadhf if the speaker intended it as such. Similarly, calling an Arab a nabatī (a derogatory term for a non-Arab) is not qadhf unless intended as such. If intended as slander against the mother of the person addressed, it is slander against the mother. If the speaker claims they meant the nabatī lineage or dialect, and the mother claims slander was intended, the claimant's word is accepted upon taking an oath.

3. Allusion (Taʿrīḍ): This is not considered qadhf even if intended as such. An example is saying, "O son of a lawful woman! As for me, I have not committed adultery, nor has my mother." This is the view of Shafi'i, Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, Zufar, Ibn Shubrumah, Ath-Thawri, and Al-Hasan ibn Salih.

• Malik held that the prescribed punishment (ḥadd) is due in this case.
• Ahmad and Ishaq held it is qadhf when spoken in anger, but not when spoken in contentment.

Argument for not imposing ḥadd for allusion: Allusion is susceptible to multiple interpretations (slander or otherwise). Since the default position is the acquittal of liability (bara'at al-dhimmah), one should not retract from it based on doubt. Furthermore, the Prophet (PBUH) said, "Ward off the ḥudūd with doubts." Also, the harm caused by explicit accusation is greater than that caused by allusion.

Counter-argument (for imposing ḥadd): Al-Awza'i narrated from Al-Zuhri, from Salim, from Ibn Umar, that Umar used to administer the ḥadd for allusion. It is also narrated that two men exchanged insults during Umar ibn Al-Khattab's time. One said to the other, "By Allah, neither I nor my mother is an adulteress." Umar consulted the people. Some said he was praising his parents, while others said he had praised them in other ways too. Umar flogged him eighty lashes.

Rebuttal: Umar's consultation of the companions regarding the ruling on allusion indicates that they did not have a definitive ruling (tawqif) on the matter, and their opinions were based on ra'y (opinion) and ijtihad (independent reasoning).

This is examined in two scenarios: accusing one person multiple times, or accusing multiple people.

A. Accusing One Person Repeatedly:

1. Same Act of Adultery: If the accuser intends the same woman to be an adulteress by repeating the accusation (e.g., "You committed adultery with Zayd," repeated several times), only one ḥadd is administered. If a second ḥadd is administered after the first, the second instance warrants taʿzīr (discretionary punishment).
2. Different Acts of Adultery: If the accuser accuses her of different acts of adultery (e.g., "You committed adultery with Zayd," then "You committed adultery with Amr"), there are two views:
   • View 1: The ḥadd is repeated, considering each utterance as a separate offense, as it pertains to the rights of individuals, which do not overlap like debts.
   • View 2 (More Correct): They overlap, and only one ḥadd is administered, as they are two punishments of the same kind for one recipient, thus they merge, similar to the ḥudūd for adultery itself.
3. Accusing One's Own Wife Repeatedly: The more correct view is that one liʿān (mutual cursing) suffices, regardless of whether the ḥadd is considered multiple or singular for outsiders.

B. Accusing Multiple People:

1. Each Person Accused Separately: If the accuser accuses each person with a separate statement, a full ḥadd is due for each person.
   • Abu Hanifa's View: Only one ḥadd is due in total.

Abu Bakr Al-Razi's Argument for Abu Hanifa's View (based on Quran, Sunnah, and Analogy): * Quran: The verse uses plural forms: "And those who accuse chaste women (al-muḥṣanāt)." This implies that anyone who accuses chaste women deserves flogging, suggesting that accusing a group of chaste women does not warrant more than one flogging. Those who mandate more than one ḥadd contradict the verse. * Sunnah: In the story of Hilal ibn Umayyah, who accused his wife along with Shurayk ibn Sahma', the Prophet (PBUH) only required one ḥadd (or liʿān for the wife) despite the accusation involving two people, until the verse of liʿān was revealed. * Analogy (Qiyās): Other punishments (ḥudūd) do not multiply upon repetition (e.g., repeated adultery or drinking). The unifying principle is preventing excessive harm.

Rebuttal to Abu Hanifa's Arguments: * Quran: The plural "those who accuse" (al-ladhīna yarumūna) meeting the plural "chaste women" (al-muḥṣanāt) implies a one-to-one correspondence: each individual accuser against each individual accused warrants a ḥadd. This supports Al-Shafi'i's position. The phrase, "fajladūhum thamanīna jaldatan" (flog them eighty lashes), links the flogging to the description of accusing chaste women, suggesting the description itself is the cause (ʿillah). If accusing one person incurs the ḥadd, accusing a second person must incur a second ḥadd. The second penalty cannot be the first ḥadd (which is already due), so a second ḥadd must be administered. The analogy to ḥudūd of adultery is weak because the ḥadd for adultery is more severe, and the difference in severity prevents merging the rulings. * Sunnah: The narration regarding Hilal involved a single utterance accusing both parties simultaneously. * Analogy: The ḥadd for slander is a right of the individual (ḥaqq al-ādami), which does not overlap, unlike the ḥadd for adultery, which is a right of God (ḥaqq Allāh).

2. Accusing Multiple People with One Statement: If the accuser says, "You all are adulterers (antum zunāh)" or "You have committed adultery (zanaytum)," there are two views:
   • More Correct View (New School of Shafi'i): A full ḥadd is due for each person, as it concerns individual rights and does not overlap. Furthermore, each person has suffered individual disgrace, making it equivalent to accusing them separately.
   • Old School View: Only one ḥadd is due, based on the singular utterance.

If one says to a man, "O son of two adulterers (yā ibna al-zāniyayn)," this is an accusation against both parents with one word, thus incurring two ḥudūd.

Accusation is categorized as forbidden (maḥẓūr), permissible (mubāḥ), or obligatory (wājib). Generally, if there is no child whose paternity needs to be negated, the accusation is not obligatory.

When is it permissible (mubāḥ)?

If the husband:

• Witnesses her committing adultery with his own eyes.
• She confesses the act to him.
• He hears it from someone whose word he trusts.
• The rumor is widespread, and he sees the man leaving her house, or sees them together in a room.

In these cases, accusation is permissible due to the strong suspicion (ta'akkud al-tuhmah). However, he may choose to remain silent and conceal her fault. (This is supported by the narration where a man complained his wife did not reject an intruder, and the Prophet told him to divorce her, but when the man said he loved her, the Prophet told him to keep her.)

When is it not permissible?

If he hears the rumor from someone untrustworthy, or if the rumor is widespread but the husband did not witness her with the man, or vice versa. This is because the untrustworthy source might spread the rumor, or the man might have entered her house for a legitimate reason (theft, seeking illicit relations but being refused), and the woman rejected him. (Referencing the verse about the slanderers: "Indeed, those who brought the slander were a group among you.")

When paternity negation is involved (if there is a child):

1. Certainty of Non-Paternity: If the husband is certain the child is not his (e.g., he had no intercourse with her, or she gave birth less than six months after intercourse, or more than four years after intercourse), he must negate paternity via liʿān. He is forbidden from claiming the lineage of others, just as he is forbidden from negating his own lineage. (Based on the Hadith: "Any woman who introduces someone who is not of her people, she is not of Allah in anything, and Allah will not admit her to Paradise.")
2. Possibility of Paternity: If it is possible the child is his (e.g., born between six months and four years after intercourse):
   • If he did not seek istibrāʾ (waiting for one menstrual cycle) or sought it but she gave birth less than six months after istibrāʾ, he is not permitted to accuse or negate paternity, even if he suspects adultery. (Based on the Hadith: "Any man who denies his child while looking at him, Allah will veil Himself from him on the Day of Resurrection and disgrace him before the first and last.")
   • If he sought istibrāʾ and she gave birth more than six months after istibrāʾ, accusation and negation are permissible. However, it is better not to do so, as she might have seen blood during pregnancy.
3. Child Resemblance: If his wife bears a child who does not resemble him (e.g., they are both white, but the child is black):
   • If he does not suspect her of adultery, he is not permitted to negate paternity. (Based on the Hadith of Abu Hurayrah where the Prophet (PBUH) compared the unlikely birth to a rare color appearing in a herd of camels.)
   • If he does suspect her of adultery, and the child resembles the suspected man, there are two views:
     • View 1: No, he cannot negate paternity because the resemblance might be due to shared ancestry (ʿaraq).
     • View 2 (More Correct): Yes, he can, because the suspicion of adultery is strengthened by the physical resemblance.

The Second Inquiry: Concerning the Accuser (Al-Rāmī)

If a minor or an insane person accuses his wife or a non-relative, no ḥadd or liʿān is administered, either immediately or after reaching puberty/sanity, due to the Hadith: "The pen is lifted from three..." However, they may receive discretionary punishment (taʿzīr) for discipline if they possess discernment. If taʿzīr is not administered to the minor until he reaches puberty, Al-Qaffal stated that the taʿzīr is dropped because its purpose was disciplinary, and a stronger deterrent (puberty) has now occurred.

If the mute person has intelligible gestures or known writing, and accuses via gesture or implication, the ** ḥadd is due**. His liʿān is also valid through gesture or implication.

• Abu Hanifa's View: The accusation and liʿān of the mute are invalid.
• Shafi'i's View (Closer to the apparent meaning of the verse): Since writing or gesturing towards the accusation constitutes an act of accusation that brings shame upon the chaste woman, it should be included under the general ruling. We also analogize his accusation and liʿān to other legal rulings.

Shafi'i, Abu Hanifa, Malik, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, Zufar, and Uthman held that the slave receives forty lashes. Al-Thawri narrated from Ja'far ibn Muhammad, from his father, that Ali (RA) said: "The slave is flogged forty times for slander." Ibn Umar narrated that he witnessed Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and subsequent Caliphs all flogging slaves forty times for slander.

• Al-Awza'i's View: He receives eighty lashes, narrated from Ibn Mas'ud. Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz also flogged a slave eighty times for slander.

Basis of the Dispute: The core issue is whether the general text of the verse (80 lashes) is restricted. Those who reduce it to forty lashes argue: God stated regarding the adulterous slave woman: "If they commit indecency, then upon them is half the punishment prescribed for chaste women" (Q 4:25). This explicitly sets the ḥadd for the slave woman in adultery as half that of the free woman. They then analogize the slave to the slave woman regarding the halving of the ḥadd for slander. Thus, the general text of the Book is restricted by this analogy.

Rebuttal:

• The verse uses plural forms for both the accusers and the accused, implying a one-to-one correspondence, meaning each instance of slander incurs a ḥadd.
• The ḥadd for slander is a right of the individual, which does not overlap, unlike the ḥadd for adultery, which is a right of God.

They agreed that a non-Muslim falls under the general scope of the verse, "And those who accuse chaste women," because the term encompasses them, and there is no barrier. Thus, if a Jew accuses a Muslim woman, he is flogged eighty times.

The Third Inquiry: Concerning the Accused (Al-Marmī), i.e., the Chaste Woman (Al-Muḥṣanah)

Abu Muslim stated that the term Iḥṣān (chastity) applies to both married women and chaste unmarried women, citing the verse about Mary: "And she guarded her chastity" (Q 21:91). This is derived from guarding the private parts. If married, she guards it except from her husband; if unmarried, she guards it from everyone.

The apparent meaning of the verse includes all chaste women, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, free or enslaved. However, the jurists stipulated five conditions for Iḥṣān: Islam, sanity, puberty, freedom, and chastity from adultery.

• Islam: Based on the Hadith: "Whoever associates partners with Allah is not chaste (muḥṣan)."
• Sanity and Puberty: Based on the Hadith: "The pen is lifted from three..."
• Freedom: Because a slave has a diminished status, the reproach of adultery is not magnified against him as severely.
• Chastity from Adultery: Because the ḥadd is established to refute the accuser. If the accused is an adulterer, the accuser is truthful. This also applies if the accused engaged in intercourse based on a doubtful premise (shubhah) or a void marriage (nikāḥ fāsid), as these carry a semblance of adultery (just as they carry a semblance of lawfulness). Just as one of these doubts negates the ḥadd for the perpetrator, the other negates it for the accuser.

If someone accuses a non-Muslim, an insane person, a minor, a slave, or a woman who has already committed adultery, no ḥadd is due, but taʿzīr is administered for the harm caused. Even if a person committed adultery once in youth, repented, reformed, and aged in piety, his accuser is not flogged. Similarly, if a non-Muslim or slave committed adultery, then embraced Islam and became free and reformed, his accuser is not flogged.

Contrast: If a person commits adultery during childhood or insanity, and then reaches maturity or regains sanity, and an accuser then attacks him, the ḥadd is administered, because the act of a minor or insane person is not considered zinā.

If the accused commits adultery after the accusation but before the ḥadd is administered: The ḥadd is dropped from the accuser. This is because the subsequent commission of adultery creates a suspicion regarding the past, as God is too noble to expose His servant's sin on the very first transgression; his subsequent sin reveals he was characterized by it previously. (Al-Muzani and Abu Thawr held that subsequent adultery does not drop the ḥadd from the accuser.)

Al-Hasan Al-Basri held that the phrase "those who accuse chaste women (al-ladhīna yarūmūna al-muḥṣanāt)" includes men and women. The rest of the scholars rejected this because al-muḥṣanāt is the plural feminine form and does not include men. Consensus confirms that in this matter, there is no distinction between chaste men (al-muḥṣanīn) and chaste women (al-muḥṣanāt).

Accusing someone who is not chaste does not incur the ḥadd, but rather taʿzīr, unless the accused is already known for the act they are accused of, in which case neither ḥadd nor taʿzīr is due. This concludes the discussion on the interpretation of "And those who accuse chaste women."

Concerning the Phrase: "Then they did not bring four witnesses"

This phrase involves two inquiries.

God decreed three rulings for the accuser who fails to bring four witnesses:

1. Eighty lashes (ḥadd).
2. Invalidation of his testimony.
3. Being labeled a transgressor (fāsiq) until he repents.

Scholars differed on the timing of these rulings, though they agreed the ḥadd is due upon the act of accusation itself if the accuser fails to provide proof of adultery.

• Shafi'i and Al-Layth ibn Sa'd: His testimony is invalidated and he is labeled a fāsiq before the ḥadd is administered.
• Abu Hanifa, Malik, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, and Zufar: His testimony is accepted until he is flogged. Abu Bakr Al-Razi noted that this implies he is not labeled a fāsiq until the ḥadd is executed, because if he were already a fāsiq, his testimony would be invalid, as fisq invalidates testimony.

Abu Bakr Al-Razi's Arguments for Abu Hanifa's View:

1. Quranic Structure: The verse links the eighty lashes to the combination of accusation and the failure to bring witnesses. If the ruling were tied only to the accusation, it would contradict the structure linking it to both conditions. The penalty requires both elements, just as a conditional divorce ("If you enter the house and speak to so-and-so, you are divorced") requires both conditions to be met for the consequence to occur.
2. Accusation Does Not Imply Falsehood: The accuser is not judged a liar merely by making the accusation; therefore, his testimony should not be invalidated merely by the accusation.
   • Proof 1: If mere accusation implied falsehood, his testimony regarding adultery would not be accepted afterward (as falsehood invalidates testimony). Since his testimony is accepted (if he brings witnesses), it proves mere accusation does not imply falsehood.
   • Proof 2: The accuser of his own wife is not judged a liar merely by the accusation, otherwise liʿān would not be prescribed, nor would he be ordered to swear by God that he is truthful while simultaneously being judged a liar. The Prophet (PBUH) stated after liʿān, "Allah knows that one of you is lying; is there any repentant among you?"—indicating that one of them is the liar, but not specifying the accuser as such immediately.
   • Proof 3: God states: "Had they not brought four witnesses, then those, in the sight of Allah, are the liars" (Q 2:13). Lying is only attributed to them after failing to bring witnesses, not upon the mere accusation.
   • Conclusion: Since the accuser is not judged a liar by the accusation alone, he remains just and trustworthy, and his testimony must be accepted.
3. Hadith on Justice: The Prophet (PBUH) said: "Muslims are trustworthy towards one another, except for one who has been flogged for slander." This indicates the accuser retains his justice until he is flogged.
4. Hilal ibn Umayyah Story: The Prophet (PBUH) said: "Hilal will be flogged and his testimony invalidated among Muslims." This shows the invalidation of testimony is tied to the execution of the flogging, not the mere accusation.
5. Shafi'i's View on Scattered Witnesses: Al-Shafi'i held that if the four witnesses come separately, their testimony is accepted. If the accusation had already invalidated the testimony of the accuser, he should not be able to testify later, even if three others join him, as he is already a fāsiq. The acceptance of testimony when witnesses come separately implies that the testimony is not invalidated by the mere accusation.

Shafi'i's Argument for Immediate Invalidation: God linked the three consequences (flogging, invalidation of testimony, fisq) using the conjunction waw (and), which does not necessarily imply sequence. Therefore, the invalidation of testimony should not be dependent on the execution of the ḥadd; it should take effect whether the ḥadd is administered or not.

God commanded: "And those women who commit indecency from among your women, call to witness against them four from among you..." (Q 4:15), and "And those who accuse chaste women, then they did not bring four witnesses..." Sa'd ibn Mu'adh asked the Prophet (PBUH) if he should wait to bring four witnesses if he found a man with his wife. The Prophet replied, "Yes."

Issue 1: Does confession of adultery require four witnesses?

• View 1: No, only four witnesses are required, as in the act of adultery itself.
• View 2: Yes, it requires four, unlike the act of adultery, because observing the act is difficult, necessitating four witnesses for caution, whereas confession is apparent and easy to observe.

Issue 2: Requirements for Witnessing Adultery: Witnesses must specify who committed adultery with whom, as the husband might mistake a slave girl for a free woman. They must testify that they saw the male organ enter her private parts "like the entry of an awl into an kohl container." If they testify generally that adultery occurred, it is invalid, as they might mistake mere thigh-rubbing for adultery. This contrasts with slander, where if one says, "He committed adultery," the ḥadd is due without further inquiry.

• Confession: If one confesses adultery, is further inquiry required? Two views: Yes, like witnesses; or No, like in slander.

Issue 3: Timing of Witnesses (Simultaneous vs. Separate):

• Shafi'i: No difference; testimony is accepted whether they come together or separately.
• Abu Hanifa: If they come separately, the testimony is invalid, and they are subject to the ḥadd for slander.

Shafi'i's Arguments:

1. The requirement of "four witnesses" is a shared attribute whether they come together or separately; the wording does not imply distinction. Thus, those who come separately fulfill the text.
2. Any ruling established by witnesses coming together is also established when they come separately (like other rulings). Separate appearance is even better as it guards against collusion.
3. It is not required that they appear simultaneously; if they gather before the judge, and the judge hears them one by one, their testimony is accepted.

Abu Hanifa's Arguments:

1. When one witness testifies, he has slandered the accused but failed to bring four witnesses, thus incurring the ḥadd based on the verse. Allowing testimony based on the word "witness" would allow every slanderer to evade the ḥadd by simply using the term "witness."
2. The narration of Al-Mughirah ibn Al-Sha'bah, where three witnesses testified clearly and the fourth gave vague testimony, resulted in Umar flogging the three and not inquiring further. This shows caution is required in ḥudūd.

Issue 4: Fewer than Four Witnesses: If fewer than four testify, adultery is not proven. Is the ḥadd due on the witnesses?

• View 1: No, because they came in the manner of witnesses. If they were flogged, the door to witnessing adultery would close, as no one would dare testify fearing their companions might disagree.
• View 2 (More Correct, Abu Hanifa's view): Yes, the ḥadd is due, based on the arguments presented in Issue 3.

Issue 5: Accusation Followed by Four Fāsiq Witnesses: If a man accuses another, and four fāsiq men testify to the accused's adultery:

• Abu Hanifa: The ḥadd is dropped from the accuser, and the witnesses are not flogged. His argument: The verse requires four witnesses; this condition has been met. Furthermore, a fāsiq is generally considered a potential witness, and the conditions for adultery testimony were met (gathering before the judge), even if rejected due to suspicion.
• Shafi'i (One view): They are flogged. His argument: They do not meet the required conditions for accepted testimony, so they remain merely accusers, subject to the ḥadd.

Concerning the Phrase: "Then flog them eighty lashes"

The addressee is the Imam (ruler), as established in the verse on adultery, or the owner (according to Shafi'i), or a righteous man appointed by the people in the absence of the Imam.

Certain cases are excluded from the eighty lashes:

1. Parent Accusing Child: A father accusing his child (or vice versa) does not incur the ḥadd, just as he does not incur retaliation for killing him.
2. Slave Accuser: If the accuser is a slave, the punishment is forty lashes. This also applies to a mukatab (slave contracted for freedom) and an umm walad (concubine mother of the master's child). If a person is partially free and partially enslaved, the punishment is that of a slave.
3. Accusing a Non-Chaste Woman: Accusing a slave woman who is chaste, or a woman who committed adultery in the past but has since repented. Linguistically, she is chaste (muḥṣanah), but the ḥadd is not due for accusing her.

The most severe beating among the ḥudūd is for adultery, followed by drinking wine, followed by the flogging of the accuser. This is because the cause of the accuser's punishment (slander) is susceptible to truth or falsehood, yet he is punished to protect honor and deter its violation.

• Malik and Shafi'i: The ḥadd for slander is inheritable. If the accused dies before the full punishment is served or before pardoning, the right to the ḥadd passes to his heirs. This also applies to taʿzīr resulting from slander. If the accusation occurs after the death of the accused, the heirs have the right to demand the ḥadd.
• Abu Hanifa: The ḥadd for slander is not inheritable and lapses upon death.

Shafi'i's Argument: The ḥadd for slander is a right of the individual, evidenced by its lapse upon the victim's pardon and its requirement of the victim's demand and the defendant's oath if denying. Since it is an individual right, it must be inheritable based on the Hadith: "Whoever leaves behind a right, it belongs to his heirs."

Abu Hanifa's Argument: If it were inheritable, the spouse would have a share, which is not the case. Furthermore, it is a right lacking the quality of property or collateral, so it is not inheritable (like agency or partnership).

Rebuttal: The more correct view among Shafi'is is that all heirs inherit it like property, or alternatively, all heirs inherit it except the spouse, as marriage is dissolved by death, and the purpose of the punishment (protecting lineage honor) does not apply to the spouse in the same way.

If a man accuses another in the presence of the judge, or accuses his wife of adultery with a specific man who is absent, the judge must send word to the accused informing him that someone has accused him and that the ḥadd for slander is established against the accuser. This is analogous to informing someone that a debt is established against another person, even if the debtor is unaware. (The Prophet (PBUH) sent Anis to inform his wife that someone had accused her son, not to investigate her adultery.)

• Shafi'i: The Imam should not send to the accused to inquire about the matter, based on the verse: "And do not spy." This prohibition applies when the accuser is not specific (e.g., if someone says in the presence of the judge, "People say so-and-so committed adultery").

Concerning the Phrase: "And never accept testimony from them"

The jurists differed on this point.

• Majority of Companions and Successors (Shafi'i's view): If the flogged person repents, his testimony is accepted.
• Abu Hanifa, his companions, Ath-Thawri, and Al-Hasan ibn Salih: The testimony of one flogged for slander is not accepted, even if he repents.

This dispute hinges on whether the exception, "Except those who repent," applies to all preceding rulings or only the last one (being labeled fāsiq). Abu Hanifa holds it applies only to the last clause. Shafi'i holds it applies to all.

Shafi'i's Arguments for Universal Application of Repentance:

1. Hadith: "The one who repents from sin is like one who has no sin." One without sin has accepted testimony, so the repentant one must also have accepted testimony.
2. Analogy to Disbelief: A disbeliever who slanders and then repents from disbelief has his testimony accepted by consensus. Since Islam is a higher state than disbelief, the Muslim who repents from slander should also have his testimony accepted. (Counter-argument: Slander by a Muslim causes greater shame than slander by a known enemy (the disbeliever). Rebuttal: The Hadith states: "Inform them that they have what Muslims have and owe what Muslims owe.")
3. Consensus on Other Major Sins: Consensus exists that the testimony of one who repents from disbelief, murder, or adultery is accepted. Slander is not a greater sin than these.
4. Abu Hanifa's Concession: Abu Hanifa accepts the testimony if the person repents before the ḥadd is administered, even though the ḥadd is a right of the victim. If repentance is accepted before the ḥadd, it should certainly be accepted after the ḥadd is executed and the label of fisq is removed.
5. Grammar: The exception "Except those who repent" follows multiple clauses linked by waw (and), implying it refers to all of them. (Counter-argument regarding In shā’ Allāh vs. the explicit exception particle is addressed by noting that In shā’ Allāh can negate the entire statement, whereas the explicit exception cannot negate the entire statement.) The waw here signifies absolute conjunction, meaning all three consequences (flogging, rejection of testimony, fisq) are linked together as the penalty, and the exception applies to the whole set.

Abu Hanifa's Arguments for Restriction to the Last Clause:

1. Exception to an Exception: An exception following an exception is restricted to the latter clause.
2. Sufficiency of Partial Application: Since the preceding clauses are established, the exception only needs to be attached to one clause to prevent it from being meaningless.
3. Contradiction with Consensus: If the exception applied to the flogging, repentance would negate the ḥadd, which is contrary to consensus. Therefore, it must be restricted to the last clause.

Rebuttal to Abu Hanifa's Arguments: (Addressed above regarding the waw not implying sequence.)

Abu Hanifa's Supporting Narrations:

1. The story of Hilal ibn Umayyah: The Prophet (PBUH) said, "Hilal will be flogged and his testimony invalidated," without mentioning repentance as a condition for invalidation.
2. The Hadith: "Muslims are trustworthy... except one flogged for slander," without stipulating repentance.
3. The Hadith: "The testimony of one flogged in Islam is not valid."

Shafi'i's Rebuttals to Abu Hanifa's Narrations:

1. The command "If you know [the truth], then testify" implies obligation. If the testimony of the flogged person were permanently invalid, the command to testify would be futile.
2. The Prophet (PBUH) judges by the apparent reality (al-ẓāhir). Repentance, piety, and good conduct establish the apparent reality of his truthfulness.
3. Umar ibn Al-Khattab flogged the witnesses against Al-Mughirah ibn Al-Sha'bah. He told them: "Whoever denies himself [i.e., admits he lied], I will accept his testimony; whoever does not, I will not." Naafi' and Nufay' admitted their falsehood and repented, and Umar accepted their testimony. Abu Bakrah refused, and his testimony was not accepted. No companion objected to Umar's ruling.

Concerning the Phrase: "And those are the defiantly wicked (al-fāsiqūn)"

This indicates two things:

1. Slander is considered one of the major sins (kabā'ir), as the term fisq is only applied to the perpetrator of a major sin.
2. It describes someone deserving of punishment. If fisq were merely a description derived from the act itself (like being a striker), repentance would not prevent its continuation, just as repentance does not prevent describing someone as a striker.

Concerning the Phrase: "Except those who repent"

Scholars differed on how repentance from slander is achieved:

• Shafi'i: Repentance is denying what he said (i.e., retracting the accusation).
  • Al-Istakhri's view: He must say, "I lied in what I said, and I will not return to it."
  • Abu Ishaq's view: He should not say "I lied," because he might have been truthful, making his retraction a lie, and committing a sin is not repentance for another sin. Rather, he should say, "I regret what I said and have retracted it, and I will not return to it."

Concerning the Phrase: "And reform" (Wa Aṣlaḥū)

Our companions (Shafi'is) state that after repentance, a period must pass during which he maintains good conduct so that his testimony and legal authority (wilāyah) are restored. They estimate this period as one year, allowing the passage of the four seasons, during which temperaments and conditions change, similar to the one-year waiting period set for the impotent (ʿannīn). The Law has tied rulings like zakāh and jizyah to the duration of one year.

Concerning the Phrase: "Then indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful"

This means that because He is Forgiving and Merciful, He accepts repentance. This indicates that accepting repentance is not rationally obligatory (wājib ʿaqlan). If it were obligatory, He would accept it out of necessity or compulsion, knowing that failure to accept it would render Him foolish and outside the realm of divinity. Acceptance when it is not obligatory truly manifests Mercy and Benevolence.

The Fourth Ruling: The Ruling on Mutual Cursing (Liʿān)