Yā-Sīn: (82) His command, when He intends a thing, is only that He says to it, "Be," and it is.

This verse demonstrates the falsehood of their analogy, comparison, and parable, as they set forth a likeness for God.

They said that no one can create like this, analogizing the unseen (God) with the seen (creation). In the seen world, creation requires physical instruments and spatial movements, and it only occurs in extended time periods. But God creates by saying, "Be, and it is" (Kun fa-yakūn). How can you draw the lowest analogy when God possesses the Highest Analogy, which is beyond comprehension?

There are several discussions within this verse:

The First Discussion:

The Mu'tazila claim that this verse proves that non-existent things (al-ma‘dūm) are actually things (substances). Their reasoning is that when God wills something, He says to it, "Be," implying that before the command "Be," it was not, yet it was still something in that state, as the verse states: "His command, when He intends a thing..."

The Response: This verse explains the non-deviation of the thing from the attachment of His Will to it. The word idhā (when) implies a specific time or moment. The verse indicates that the thing becomes a thing at the moment His Will attaches to it. It offers no evidence that it was a thing before He willed it. Therefore, their argument is invalid because the thing, at the moment the Will attaches to it, is an existing thing, not a non-existent one. It is not that He wills something that exists now in a future time, but rather it exists at the time the Will attaches to it. Thus, the thing is the existent, not the non-existent.

We do not need to address the objection: "How can He will something existent, resulting in the creation of an existent?" We address this logical issue elsewhere. Our goal here is to refute their reliance on the literal wording. It has become clear that the meaning conveyed by this statement is that He wills something, and then it becomes a thing, not that it was a thing before the Will attached.

The Second Discussion:

The Karāmiyya claim that God's Will is created (ḥādith), based on the verse: "when He intends" (idhā arāda). Their proof rests on two points:

1. The word idhā makes the Will temporally bound. Since everything temporal is created (ḥādith).
2. God linked His Will to the command "Be" (Kun). The command "Be" is immediately followed by the thing coming into existence, as God said, "it will be" (yakūn) with the fā’ of immediate succession. Since the resulting existence (kawn) is created, whatever immediately precedes a created thing must also be created.

The Philosophers agreed with them on this point, but from a different angle: they said His Will is connected to His Command, and His Command is connected to the existence, but His Will is eternal (qadīm). Therefore, the created things must also be eternal.

The Response to the Literalists: The linguistic meaning of "when He intends" (idhā arāda) is that when His Will attaches to a thing. The word arāda (intended) is a past tense verb. When idhā is prefixed to the past tense, it takes on a future meaning (i.e., "whenever He intends").

We maintain that the concepts expressed by "He intended" (arāda), "He intends" (yarīdu), "He knew" (‘alima), and "He knows" (ya‘lamu) may involve created aspects. We assert that God possesses an eternal attribute, which is Will (irāda). When that attribute attaches to something, we say, "He intended" or "He intends." Before the attachment, we do not say "He intended"; rather, we say, "He possesses Will," and by it, He is a Willer (murīd).

To clarify for weaker intellects: Consider the statement, "So-and-so is a tailor." This means he possesses the craft of tailoring. If we cannot say, "He sewed Zayd's garment" or "He is sewing Zayd's garment," it does not negate the validity of saying "He is a tailor," meaning he possesses the craft by which, when he applies it to Zayd's garment at a certain time, we say he sewed it, and when he applies it in the future, we say he will sew it.

God has the Highest Analogy. Understand that Will is a fixed reality. If it attaches to the coming-into-being of a thing, we say, "He intended its existence," meaning, "He wills its existence." Once you grasp this, the attachment of the Will is created (ḥādith), which resolves the arguments of both opposing groups.

The Third Discussion:

The Mu'tazila and Karāmiyya claim that God's Speech (kalām) is composed of letters and sound, and is created (ḥādith). Their proof: The command "Be" (Kun) is speech, and "Be" consists of two letters. Letters are sounds. Therefore, His Speech is composed of letters and sounds. Furthermore, it is created because it is temporal (as argued before) and because it is immediately connected to the existence (kawn), which is created.

The Response: This is answered by what we have already mentioned. Speech is an attribute. When it attaches to something, we say, "He said" or "He is saying." The attachment of the command is created, but the Speech itself is eternal.

The verse, "His command, when He intends a thing, is only that He says to it, 'Be,' and it is," involves attachment and attribution, as "He says to it" (yaqūlu lahu) explicitly indicates attribution. We maintain that the utterance directed toward a created thing is created because it involves this attachment. The eternal aspect is His Speech itself, without attachment.

When we consider the eternal and the created together, we do not find them both existing eternally in the past; rather, we find them both existing in the perpetual present (mā lā yazāl). Thus, the combination has a sense of being created (ḥādith), but the absolute term is misleading. Reflect deeply and do not simply state that the combination is created without explaining your meaning, lest it be understood that everything is created. Rather, clarify the reference: one part of the combination is eternal, and the other is created, and the created part was not co-eternal with the eternal part.

Regarding the claim that "Be" (Kun) is composed of letters: Speech (kalām) has two meanings: (1) What is with the speaker, and (2) What is with the listener. One can be attributed to the other. This reveals several benefits.

When a person tells another, "I have speech I intend to tell you tomorrow," and the listener comes the next day and asks about the speech the speaker had yesterday, the speaker might say, "I intend for you to come to me today." This utterance is attributed to the speaker as something he possessed yesterday, even though the listener did not possess it then. When the listener hears it today, it occurs with letters and sound, and it is attributed to the speaker as, "This is what I had." Every rational person knows that the sound and the letters were not with the speaker yesterday. The speech he possessed could have been delivered in Arabic (with certain letters) or in Persian (with other letters). The speech he possessed and promised was one thing, but the letters are numerous and different.

Therefore, the meaning of "This is what I had" is: "This is what I convey to you from what I possessed." This conveyance is also metaphorical, as what he possessed did not transfer. Rather, the listener acquired knowledge of it through hearing, sight (reading), or gesture.

Knowing this, the Speech that is with God, His attribute, is not composed of letters, as has been clarified. What occurs with the listener is letters and sound. The attribution of one to the other is due to the meaning explained and the extension of the term. When God says, "He says to it," a speaker and a listener are established. Consider this from the listener's perspective, as the existence of the action (the creation) originates from the listener's reception of that saying. Thus, it is expressed by the Kāf and Nūn (the letters of Kun), which occur with the listener and cause the intended thing to occur.

Then the Almighty said:

< { So glory be to Him, in Whose Hand is the dominion over all things, and to Him you will be returned. } >