Know that when the Almighty mentioned in the first verse that if those who commit indecency repent and reform, the harm is removed from them, and He also informed in an absolute sense that He is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful, He then mentioned the **time and condition of repentance**, encouraging them to hasten it lest death overtakes them while they persist, rendering repentance useless. In this verse, there are several issues:

We have already discussed the reality of repentance in Surah Al-Baqarah, in the exegesis of the verse: {Then He relented toward you, that you might be grateful. Indeed, He is the Acceptor of Repentance, the Merciful} (Al-Baqarah: 54).

Al-Qadi (Al-Hafiz) argued that accepting repentance is **intellectually obligatory** upon God based on this verse, from two perspectives: 1. The word **"على" (upon)** implies obligation. Thus, {Indeed, repentance is for God [i.e., incumbent upon Him] for those who...} indicates that accepting it is rationally obligatory upon God. 2. If we interpret {Indeed, repentance is for God} as merely signifying acceptance (occurrence), there would be no difference between this and {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness} (An-Nisa: 102), as the latter also reports an occurrence. However, if we interpret the first phrase as an obligation to accept, and the second as an occurrence, the difference between the two verses becomes clear, avoiding redundancy.

Know that the assertion of **obligation upon God is false**, supported by several arguments:

**First Argument:** The necessary consequence of obligation is deserving blame upon failure to perform it. This consequence must either be impossible for God or possible. 1. If it is impossible for God: Since abandoning the obligatory act implies deserving blame, and deserving blame is impossible for God, then abandoning that act must also be impossible for God. If abandonment is rationally impossible, then the act itself must be rationally necessary. In that case, God would be inherently necessitating (Wajib bi-dhātih) rather than an agent by choice, which is false. 2. If deserving blame is not impossible for God: If it is possible for God to deserve blame without implying an absurdity, then it would be permissible for God, while being God, to be described as deserving blame—an absurdity no rational person would assert. Since both possibilities lead to falsehood, the assertion of obligation upon God is proven false.

**Second Argument:** The servant's capacity regarding the act of repentance and its abandonment is either equal or unequal. 1. If the capacity is equal, the act of repentance is not favored over abandonment without a preponderant factor (murajjih). If this factor arises without an external causer, it necessitates denying the Creator. If it arises from the servant, the division recurs. If it arises from God, then the servant only undertook repentance through God's aid and strengthening. Thus, that repentance is a grace from God to His servant. A master's grace to his servant does not obligate him to bestow another grace. Therefore, the servant's repentance does not necessitate acceptance from God. 2. If the servant's capacity is not equal (i.e., compelled), then compulsion is more certain. In this case, the assertion of obligation is even more clearly false and corrupt.

**Third Argument:** Repentance is defined as regret for the past and resolve for the future. Regret and resolve are matters of aversion (karāhāt) and will (irādāt). Aversion and will cannot occur by the servant's choice, otherwise, achieving them would require another will, leading to infinite regress. If so, the occurrence of this regret and resolve is purely by God's creation. An act of God does not necessitate another act upon God. Thus, the assertion of obligation is false.

**Fourth Argument:** If repentance is an act occurring by the servant's choice (as they claim), and this act becomes the cause for an obligation upon God, then the servant's action would affect God's essence and attributes, which no rational person would assert.

**The Response to their Argument:** God promised to accept the repentance of believers. When God promises something, and breaking the promise is impossible, it becomes *similar* to the obligatory. It is through this interpretation that the use of the word **"على" (upon)** is correct, and this clarifies the difference between {Indeed, repentance is for God} and {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness}.

**If it is asked:** Since God informed about the acceptance of repentance, and everything God reports as occurring must occur, does this not imply that He is not an agent by choice? **We reply:** Reporting an occurrence follows the occurrence itself, and the occurrence follows the causing act (īqāʿ). The dependent does not change the original principle. Thus, He remains an agent by choice in that causing act. However, you claim that the occurrence of repentance *itself* necessitates acceptance upon God, which no rational person would assert. Hence, the difference is clear.

The Almighty stipulated two conditions for the acceptance of this repentance:

**Condition 1:** His statement: {for those who do evil out of ignorance}. This raises two questions: 1. If someone commits a sin without knowing it is a sin, they do not deserve punishment, as the error of this Ummah is lifted. Therefore, those who do evil out of ignorance have no need for repentance. 2. The word **"إنما" (Indeed/Only)** implies restriction. The apparent meaning of this verse suggests that one who commits evil *knowing* it is evil will have their repentance rejected, which is contrary to consensus (Ijmaʿ).

**Response to Question 1:** The Jew chose Judaism, not knowing it was a sin, yet he deserves punishment for it.

**Response to Question 2:** The one who commits a transgression out of ignorance of its being a transgression is in a lesser state than one who commits it while knowing it is a transgression. Since the former case is graver, it is appropriate that the first group is specified with the **certainty** of acceptance as a promise and grace. As for the second group, since their sin is more severe, this emphasis on acceptance is not mentioned for them. Thus, this verse indicates, from this perspective, that the acceptance of repentance is **not obligatory** upon God.

Having addressed these two questions, let us mention the interpretations of **"ignorance" (Jahālah)** provided by the commentators:

**First View:** All who disobey God are termed ignorant, and their act is termed ignorance. This is supported by verses where prophets or others are called ignorant for committing acts that were sins (e.g., Prophet Yusuf, Prophet Nuh, and the command regarding the cow). The reason for labeling the disobedient as ignorant is that if they had utilized their knowledge of reward and punishment, they would not have committed the sin. Since they did not use that knowledge, they are treated as if they had no knowledge. Under this view, the sin is covered whether committed knowingly or unknowingly.

**Second View:** A person commits a sin while knowing it is a sin, but he is ignorant of the **degree of its punishment**. If someone undertakes what is improper while knowing it is improper, yet is unaware of the extent of the harm that will result, it is metaphorically correct to call him ignorant of his action.

**Third View (Preferred):** A person commits a sin without knowing it is a sin, **but he was capable of knowing** it was a sin. In this case, he deserves punishment. This is why we agree that the Jew deserves punishment for his Judaism, even if he did not know it was a sin, because he was capable of acquiring that knowledge. This view excludes the sleeping person or the forgetful one, as they committed the reprehensible act but were not capable of knowing its reprehensibility. This view is stronger because the term *Jahālah* is used metaphorically in the first two views, but literally here. However, under this view, only one who commits the reprehensible act while unaware of its reprehensibility is included. The intentional sinner is not included directly, but his case is understood by analogy: if repentance is necessary for this ignorant person, it is more fittingly necessary for the intentional sinner.

This concludes the discussion on the first condition.

**The Second Condition:** {then they repent shortly thereafter} (*min qarīb*). There is consensus that this "short time" refers to the **approach of death and witnessing its horrors**. God named this period "short" for several reasons: 1. The appointed term (Ajl) is coming, and everything coming is near. 2. To indicate that the lifespan of a human, however long, is brief and near, as it is bracketed by the eternity preceding and succeeding it. When divided by these two infinities, life span becomes like non-existence. 3. A person expects death at every moment; one in such a state is described as being near.

**If it is asked:** What is the meaning of **"min" (from)** in {from shortly thereafter}? **The Answer:** It denotes the **beginning of the limit (Ibtidā’ al-Ghāyah)**. Meaning, they should make the start of their repentance a time close to the commission of the sin, so they do not fall into the category of persistent sinners. As for one who repents a long time after the sin and long before death, they are outside the specific group favored by the certain acceptance of repentance mentioned in {Indeed, repentance is for God}. If repentance does not occur in this manner, it is sufficient for them to be among those promised by the word **"ʿasā" (perhaps)** in {Perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness} (At-Tawbah: 102). There is an undeniable difference between these two levels. Another view is that **"min"** means **partitive (Tabʿīḍ)**, meaning they repent during *some part* of a short time. God designated the period between the sin and the arrival of death as a short time, so repentance in any fraction of this time makes one a repenter "shortly thereafter"; otherwise, they are a repenter "from afar."

Know that after mentioning these two conditions, God said: {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness}.

**If it is asked:** What is the benefit of saying {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness} after {Indeed, repentance is for God}? **We reply:** There are two interpretations: 1. {Indeed, repentance is for God} informs that God is obligated to accept it out of **generosity, grace, and favor**, not out of deservingness. {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness} is a report that He **will** do that. 2. {Indeed, repentance is for God} means that the **guidance, direction, and assistance** toward repentance are incumbent upon God for one who commits sin out of ignorance, then repents shortly thereafter, ceases persistence, and seeks forgiveness. Then, {Then those - perhaps God will turn to them in forgiveness} means that God accepts the repentance of the servant who is in this state. Thus, the first phrase refers to **Divine facilitation toward repentance**, and the second refers to the **acceptance of repentance**.

Then He said: {And God is Knowing and Wise}. This means God is **Knowing** that the person committed the sin due to the overwhelming power of desire, anger, and ignorance. He is **Wise** because, since the servant is characterized by this, and then repents shortly thereafter, it is incumbent upon His generosity to accept the repentance.