| An-Nisa (The Women): (83) And when there comes to them a matter...

It is known that the Almighty here recounts another type of corrupt action committed by the hypocrites. When news of a matter reaches them—whether it pertains to security or fear—they spread and broadcast it. This causes harm in several ways:

1. First: Such alarming reports are invariably mixed with much falsehood.
2. Second: If the news concerns security, they exaggerate it significantly. When those exaggerations do not materialize, it casts doubt among the weak regarding the truthfulness of the Messenger (PBUH), because the hypocrites used to attribute these alarming reports to the Messenger. If the news concerns fear, it causes confusion among the weak Muslims, leading them into bewilderment and distress. Thus, these alarming reports become a source of sedition from this angle.
3. Third: Spreading rumors incites intense investigation and thorough scrutiny, which leads to the exposure of secrets, something detrimental to the city's welfare.
4. Fourth: There was intense enmity between the Muslims and the disbelievers. Each party was preparing war implements and seeking an opportunity against the other. Whatever brought security to one party meant fear for the other. If news of security for the Muslims—such as the arrival of troops and war materiel—occurred, the hypocrites would spread it, causing the news to reach the disbelievers quickly. They would then fortify themselves against the Muslims and guard against their domination. Conversely, if news of fear for the Muslims occurred, they would exaggerate it, spreading terror among the weak and destitute. It is clear, therefore, that this spreading of rumors was a source of sedition and affliction from every perspective. Because of this, God condemned this broadcasting and publicizing and forbade them from it.

Know that the phrase "أذاعه" (they spread it) has two linguistic forms (in recitation/usage).

Then the Almighty said: {But if they had referred it to the Messenger and to those in authority among them, those who can deduce it from them would have known it.}

There are several issues concerning this verse:

There are two opinions:

1. It refers to those possessing knowledge and sound judgment among them.
2. It refers to the commanders of military detachments (Saraya). Those who favor this second opinion argue that Uli al-Amr are those who have authority over people, whereas people of knowledge do not necessarily possess such authority; only commanders are described as having authority over people.

The Refutation: If scholars are knowledgeable about God's commands and prohibitions, and others are obligated to accept their word, it is not far-fetched for them to be named Uli al-Amr from this perspective. This is supported by the verse: {That they may gain sound understanding in religion and warn their people when they return to them, so that they may guard themselves} (At-Tawbah: 122). This verse mandates caution based on their warning and obligates the warners to accept their word, thus justifying applying the name Uli al-Amr to them.

Linguistically, Istinbāt means extraction. It is said that a jurist istambata when he extracts the hidden jurisprudence through his effort (Ijtihād) and understanding. Its root comes from Nabat, which is the water that first emerges from a well when dug. The people of Nabat were named so because they extracted water from the earth.

There are two opinions:

1. They are those hypocrites who spread the news. The meaning is: If these spreading hypocrites had referred the matter of security or fear to the Messenger and Uli al-Amr, and sought knowledge about the situation from them, those who can deduce it from them—meaning these very spreading hypocrites—would have known the reality, either from the Messenger's side or from the Uli al-Amr's side.
2. They are a group among Uli al-Amr. The meaning is: If the hypocrites had referred it to the Messenger and Uli al-Amr, knowledge of it would have been attained by those among Uli al-Amr who deduce these events. This is because Uli al-Amr are of two types: some are capable of deduction (mustanbiṭ), and some are not. Thus, {from them} means from the strata of Uli al-Amr who deduce hidden matters.

Objection Raised: If God commanded the hypocrites to refer these reports to the Messenger and Uli al-Amr, how can Uli al-Amr be included in the phrase {and to those in authority among them}?

Answer: They are included based on outward appearance, as the hypocrites pretend to believe. This is similar to God's saying: {And indeed, there is among you one who lags behind} and {except for a few of them who did it}. (And God knows best.)

This verse indicates that Qiyās is a valid proof in Sharia. This is because the phrase {Those who can deduce it from them} is a description of Uli al-Amr. God commanded those who receive news of security or fear to refer to them to ascertain the matter. This referral must be either in a case where a clear text (Naṣṣ) exists, or where no clear text exists. The first case is invalid, because if a clear text exists, deduction is not necessary; one who reports the text is not said to have deduced the ruling. Therefore, it is established that God commanded the accountable person to refer the event to one who deduces the ruling. If deduction were not a valid proof, God would not have commanded the accountable person to do so. Thus, deduction is established as a proof. Since Qiyās is either deduction itself or falls under it, Qiyās must be a proof.

If this is established, the verse indicates several things:

1. Some rulings concerning events are known not by explicit text (Naṣṣ) but by deduction (Istinbāṭ).
2. Deduction (Istinbāṭ) is a valid proof.
3. The common person (ʿĀmmī) is obligated to follow the scholars in the rulings of new events.
4. The Prophet (PBUH) was also obligated to deduce rulings, as God commanded referral to the Messenger and Uli al-Amr.

The Almighty said: {Those who can deduce it from them} and did not restrict Uli al-Amr from this, excluding the Messenger. This implies that the Messenger and Uli al-Amr are all obligated to engage in deduction.

Objection Raised: We do not accept that {Those who can deduce it from them} refers to Uli al-Amr; rather, it refers to the spreading hypocrites, as you mentioned in one interpretation. Even if we grant that it refers to Uli al-Amr, this verse was revealed concerning matters related to wars and Jihad. Suppose referring to deduction is permissible in these cases; why do you claim it must be permissible in general religious rulings? If one case is analogized to another, that would be establishing a religious Qiyās by means of a religious Qiyās, which is impermissible. Even if we concede that deduction in religious rulings falls under this verse, why do you claim that Qiyās must be a proof? The explanation is that deduction might mean extracting rulings from subtle texts, or from combinations of texts, or extracting rulings based on the original state of innocence (al-Barā’ah al-Aṣliyyah), or based on what is established by reason (as most say: the default for benefits is permissibility, and for harms is prohibition). Even if we concede that religious Qiyās is covered by the verse, it is conditional upon that Qiyās yielding certainty (ʿIlm), due to God's saying: {those who can deduce it from them}, implying that certainty is achieved through this deduction. We do not dispute such a Qiyās; the dispute is whether Qiyās that yields only probability (Ẓann) is a proof in Sharia or not.

The Answer:

1. Regarding the first question (referring to hypocrites): This is refuted because if the intended meaning of {Those who can deduce it from them} were the hypocrites, it would have been more appropriate to say: "...they would have known it," because connecting a pronoun (hum) to an explicit noun (al-ladhīna) following a pronoun (hum) is awkward.
2. Regarding the second question (restriction to war cases): This is refuted in two ways:
   • First: The phrase {And when there comes to them a matter of security or fear} (An-Nisa: 83) is general, covering everything related to wars and all other religious matters, because security and fear occur in every aspect of legal obligation. Thus, there is nothing in the verse that necessitates restricting it only to matters of war.
   • Second: Even if the matter is as you stated, the rulings of war are known through religious Qiyās. Since its permissibility is established, it must be permissible to rely on religious Qiyās in all other matters, as no one differentiates between them. Do you not see that whoever says Qiyās is a proof in the chapter of sales but not in the chapter of marriage is disregarded? The same applies here.
3. Regarding the third question (interpreting deduction as subtle texts or combinations): The answer is that all of these fall under what is already explicitly stated in the text (manṣūṣ), and relying on the text itself is not called deduction. As for interpreting it as relying on the original state of innocence, we say this is not deduction; rather, it is maintaining the status quo, which is never called deduction.
4. Regarding the fourth question (deduction requires certainty, while Qiyās yields only probability): The answer is twofold:
   • First: Religious Qiyās yields certainty for us. Once it is established that Qiyās is a proof, we are certain that whenever we strongly suspect (ghalaba Ẓannuk) that the ruling of God in the original case is due to a certain effective cause (ʿIllah), and we strongly suspect that this cause exists in the derivative case, then we become certain that the ruling of God in the derivative case is equal to the ruling in the original case. At this point of strong suspicion, we are certain that the accountable person is obligated to act according to this suspicion. Thus, the suspicion occurs on the path to the ruling, but the ruling itself is certain. This is like God saying: "Whenever you strongly suspect X, know that My ruling in situation Y is Z." Once suspicion occurs, we are certain of that ruling's establishment.
   • Second: The term ʿIlm (knowledge/certainty) is sometimes used idiomatically to mean Ẓann (strong probability). The Prophet (PBUH) said: "If you know something like the sun, then testify." He stipulated knowledge for the validity of testimony, yet we agree that testimony is valid based on strong probability (Ẓann). Thus, Ẓann is sometimes called ʿIlm. (And God knows best.)

Then the Almighty said: {But if it were not for the grace of God and His mercy upon you, a few of you would have followed Satan.}

There are two issues here:

The apparent meaning of this exception suggests that this "few" acted without the grace and mercy of God, which is impossible. Therefore, commentators have differed and offered several interpretations:

1. The exception refers to the spreading (Idhāʿah): The meaning is: "When news comes to them... they spread it, except for a few," meaning God excluded some hypocrites from this spreading, just as He excluded them in the verse: {A party of them was plotting other than what you say...} (An-Nisa: 81).
2. The exception refers to deduction (Istinbāṭ): The meaning is: "...those who can deduce it from them, except for a few." Al-Farrā’ and Al-Mubarrid preferred the first opinion, arguing that what is known through deduction is known by the majority, while the minority are ignorant. Applying the exception here would imply the opposite (that the majority know and the minority do not). Al-Zajjāj disagreed, saying this is incorrect because the deduction here is not about subtle reasoning but about recognizing rumors. In that case, the majority know, and only the extremely dull or ignorant would not know. However, Al-Zajjāj’s statement is only valid if we restrict Istinbāṭ to merely recognizing reports and rumors. If we take Istinbāṭ to mean deduction in all rulings (as we established through evidence), then the view of Al-Farrā’ and Al-Mubarrid is correct.
3. The exception relates to {But if it were not for the grace of God and His mercy upon you}: It is generally preferred to attach an exception to what immediately precedes it rather than something distant. However, this view only holds if Grace and Mercy are interpreted specifically. There are two ways to interpret this:
   • First View (A group of commentators): God's grace and mercy here refer to the revelation of the Qur'an and the mission of Muhammad (PBUH). The meaning is: "Had it not been for the mission of Muhammad (PBUH) and the revelation of the Qur'an, you would have followed Satan and disbelieved in God, except for a few among you." This few refers to those who believed in God before the mission of Muhammad (PBUH), such as Quss ibn Sa'idah, Waraqah ibn Nawfal, and Zayd ibn Amr ibn Nufayl.
   • Second View (Abu Muslim): God's grace and mercy refer to His victory and assistance, which the hypocrites alluded to when they said: {Then I shall achieve a great success} (An-Nisa: 73). God clarifies that had it not been for the successive victories and triumphs, they would have followed Satan and abandoned the religion, except for a few among them—those possessing sharp insight, strong intentions, and firm resolve among the best believers. These individuals know that the establishment of worldly dominion is not a condition for the truth being true. The succession of victories indicates truth, and the succession of defeats indicates falsehood, but the matter of truth and falsehood rests on evidence. This second view is the soundest and closest to verification.

The verse indicates that those who followed Satan were prevented from doing so by God's grace and mercy; otherwise, they would not have followed him. This refutes the Mu'tazila claim that God is obligated to ensure the most beneficial outcome (al-Aṣlaḥ) in religion for people.

The Refutation by Al-Ka'bi: He argued that God's grace and mercy are general for everyone, but the believers benefited from them while the disbelievers did not. Therefore, it is metaphorically correct to say that no grace or mercy reached the disbeliever in religion.

The Answer: Applying a word metaphorically goes against the fundamental principle (of literal interpretation).

{So fight in the cause of God; you are only responsible for yourself. And encourage the believers; perhaps God will restrain the might of those who disbelieve. And God is mightier in might and severer in punishment.}