Al-Nisa (The Women): Verse 92

Know that when the Almighty encouraged fighting the disbelievers and incited it, He subsequently mentioned some matters related to this warfare. Among these is that since Allah permitted the killing of disbelievers, it is inevitable that a situation might arise where a man sees someone he presumes to be a hostile disbeliever and kills him, only to later realize the victim was a Muslim. Allah the Exalted mentioned the ruling for this occurrence in this verse. Herein lie several issues:

Issue 1: Causes of Revelation (Asbab al-Nuzul)

There are several reported opinions regarding the cause of revelation:

1. The First Narration: 'Urwah ibn al-Zubayr narrated that Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman was with the Prophet (PBUH) on the day of Uhud. The Muslims mistakenly thought his father, Al-Yaman, was among the disbelievers, so they seized him and struck him with their swords. Hudhayfah cried out, "He is my father!" but they did not understand him until after they had killed him. Hudhayfah then said, "May Allah forgive you, for He is the Most Merciful of the merciful." When the Prophet (PBUH) heard this, his regard for Hudhayfah increased, and this verse was revealed.

2. The Second Narration: The verse was revealed concerning Abu Darda'. He was part of a raiding party and went to a valley for a need. He found a man with his sheep and attacked him with his sword. The man said, "There is no god but Allah (La ilaha illa Allah)," but Abu Darda' killed him and took his sheep. He later felt remorse, mentioned the incident to the Prophet (PBUH), who said, "Why did you not split open his heart [to check his sincerity]?" Abu Darda' regretted his action, and the verse was revealed.

3. The Third Narration: It is narrated that 'Ayyash ibn Abi Rabi'ah, who was the uterine brother of Abu Jahl, embraced Islam and migrated to Medina out of fear of his people, before the Prophet's (PBUH) migration. His mother swore she would neither eat nor drink nor sit under a roof until he returned. Abu Jahl went out with Al-Harith ibn Zayd ibn Abi Unaysah. They approached 'Ayyash and engaged in lengthy talk. Abu Jahl said, "Does not Muhammad command you to honor your mother? Go back, treat your mother kindly, and remain upon your religion." 'Ayyash returned. As they neared Mecca, they shackled his hands and feet. Abu Jahl flogged him one hundred lashes, and Al-Harith flogged him another hundred. 'Ayyash said to Al-Harith, "This is my brother; who are you, O Al-Harith?" He swore to Allah that if he found him to be his maternal uncle, he would kill him. It is narrated that Al-Harith told 'Ayyash upon his return, "If your former religion was guidance, you have abandoned it; but if it was misguidance, you have now entered it." This distressed 'Ayyash, and he swore to kill Al-Harith. When he went to his mother, she swore she would not remove the shackles until he returned to his first religion, so he did. Later, 'Ayyash migrated and embraced Islam. Al-Harith also embraced Islam and migrated. 'Ayyash met him alone, unaware of his conversion, and killed him. When informed that Al-Harith was a Muslim, 'Ayyash regretted his act and came to the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), saying, "I killed him without knowing he was a Muslim." This verse was then revealed.

Issue 2: The Meaning of "And it was not for a believer..."

There are two interpretations for the phrase: {And it was not for a believer}:

1. It means it was not fitting for him concerning what was revealed to him from his Lord and the covenant He made with him.
2. It means it was not fitting for him at any time, emphasizing that the sanctity of killing a believer was established from the beginning of accountability (Taklif).

Issue 3: The Exception {Except}

There are two main opinions regarding the word {Except} (إلا):

Opinion 1: It is an Attached Exception (Istithna' Muttasil)

Those who hold this view offer several arguments:

1. The exception is based on meaning. The phrase means a person is held accountable for killing unless the killing was a mistake (error), in which case he is not held accountable for the intentional sin.
2. The exception is valid based on the literal wording: A believer is absolutely not to kill a believer, except in the case of error, such as seeing him wearing the insignia of disbelievers or finding him in their camp, thus mistaking him for a polytheist. This is certainly an error, as he presumed the victim was a disbeliever when he was not.
3. There is a transposition of words: The meaning is, "A believer was not to kill a believer except by mistake." This is similar to: {It is not befitting for Allah that He should take a son} (Maryam: 35), meaning Allah would not take a son, as nothing is forbidden to Allah; rather, it negates what is unsuitable for Him. Similarly, {It was not for you to cause the trees to grow} (Al-Naml: 60) means you could not cause them to grow, as Allah alone is capable of that.
4. The apparent difficulty in treating this as an attached exception is that an exception from a negation implies an affirmation (The rule applies to the exception). This would imply that killing a believer is permissible in some circumstances, which is impossible. However, this difficulty only arises if one accepts that an exception from a negation implies affirmation, which is disputed among Usulists. The correct view is that it does not imply affirmation; the exception only serves to remove the ruling from the excepted item. Thus, the excepted item remains without a ruling of affirmation or negation, resolving the difficulty. Evidence that an exception from a negation does not imply affirmation includes the Prophet's saying: "There is no prayer without purification, and no marriage without a guardian," and similar statements like, "There is no dominion except through men," and "There are no men except through wealth." In all these cases, the exception does not affirm the ruling for the excepted item.
5. Abu Hashim (a leader of the Mu'tazila) said the meaning is: "A believer was not to kill a believer and remain a believer, except if he kills him by mistake, in which case he remains a believer." He meant that intentional killing of a believer removes one's faith, unless it is accidental, which does not remove faith. Know that this view is based on the principle that a grave sinner (Fasiq) is not a believer, which is a false foundation.

Opinion 2: It is a Disconnected Exception (Istithna' Munqati')

This means "but" or "however," and there are many examples in the Qur'an, such as: {Do not consume your wealth among yourselves unjustly, but by trade} (Al-Nisa: 29), and {Those who avoid the major sins and indecencies, except minor faults} (Al-Najm: 53).

Issue 4: Grammatical Status of {by mistake} (خطأ)

There are several views on the grammatical status of the word khat'an (by mistake):

1. It is the object of the verb (Maf'ul li-ajlih): Meaning, he should not kill him for any reason except for the reason of it being a mistake.
2. It is a circumstantial adverb (Hal): Meaning, he should not kill him except in the state of it being a mistake.
3. It is an adjective describing the verbal noun (Sifah li-al-Masdar): Meaning, except a killing by mistake (إلا قتلاً خطأ).

Issue 1: Classification of Killing

Imam Al-Shafi'i stated that killing is divided into three categories: Intentional (Amd), Mistaken (Khata'), and Quasi-Intentional (Shibh Amd).

• Intentional Killing (Amd): This is when one intends to kill using a means known to lead to death, whether it causes a wound or not. This is Al-Shafi'i's view.
• Mistaken Killing (Khata'): This has two types:
  1. Intending to shoot a disbeliever or a bird, but hitting a Muslim instead.
  2. Mistaking the victim for a disbeliever (e.g., by wearing their insignia). The first is an error in action, the second is an error in intention.
• Quasi-Intentional Killing (Shibh Amd): This is striking someone with a light stick that usually does not kill, but death results. Al-Shafi'i considered this a mistake in the outcome of the killing, even if the striking action was intentional.

Issue 2: Intentional Killing with a Heavy Object

Abu Hanifa argued that killing with a heavy object (Muthqal) is not pure intentional killing but rather quasi-intentional, thus falling under this verse, requiring Diyah and Kaffarah (expiation), but not Qisas (retaliation). Al-Shafi'i argued it is pure intentional killing requiring Qisas.

Evidence for it being Killing: The Qur'an and Sunnah confirm that a blow (like Moses's blow to the Egyptian) is termed killing. The Egyptian called it killing the next day. Moses referred to it as killing when he feared execution. The exegetes agree this blow was the killing referred to. Allah also referred to it as killing: {And you killed a man, so We saved you from distress...} (Taha: 40). Furthermore, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "The victim of intentional mistake killing (Qatil al-Khata' al-'Amd) is the victim of the whip and stick, for whom there is one hundred camels." This confirms the act is killing.

Evidence for it being Intentional: Anyone who strikes a person's head with a millstone, crucifies them, drowns them, or strangles them, and then claims, "I did not intend to kill him," is either lying or insane. It is undeniable aggression. Thus, it is intentional, aggressive killing, requiring Qisas by text and reason.

• Textual Evidence for Qisas: Verses like {Retaliation is prescribed for you in the case of the slain} (Al-Baqarah: 178), {We ordained therein for them: a life for a life} (Al-Ma'idah: 45), etc.
• Rational Evidence for Qisas: The purpose of legislating Qisas is to preserve lives. {And there is for you in retaliation [Qisas] preservation of life} (Al-Baqarah: 179). Since the purpose is preservation, and the destruction of life caused by a heavy object is the same as that caused by a sharp object, the need for deterrence is the same in both cases. The difference lies only in the instrument, which is not considered relevant.

Refutation of the opposing argument (based on the Hadith about the stick/whip): They cite the Hadith: "The victim of intentional mistake killing is the victim of the whip and stick, for whom there is one hundred camels," arguing it is general, whether the stick is small or large. The Reply: The term "victim of mistake" (قتيل الخطأ) necessitates that the element of mistake must be present. As established, anyone who strangles someone or strikes their head with a millstone and claims no intent to kill is known to be lying. Therefore, this striking must be interpreted as striking with a small stick, preserving the element of mistake.

Issue 3: Kaffarah (Expiation) in Intentional Killing

Abu Hanifa held that intentional killing does not require Kaffarah, while Al-Shafi'i held that it does.

Abu Hanifa based his view on this verse: {And whoever kills a believer intentionally...} arguing that the condition for Kaffarah (killing a believer by mistake) is absent, so the consequence (Kaffarah) is not required. The Reply: We point to the verse: {And whoever among you cannot afford to marry free believing women, then [marry] from those whom your right hands possess of believing young women...} (Al-Nisa: 25). The inability to marry free women was not a condition for the permissibility of marrying a slave woman according to their view. Similarly here. Furthermore, Kaffarah in intentional killing is required by Hadith and Analogy.

• Hadith Evidence: Wathilah ibn al-Asqa' narrated that they came to the Prophet (PBUH) regarding a companion whose killing necessitated Hellfire. The Prophet (PBUH) said: "Free a slave for him, and Allah will free a limb of his for every limb [of the slave] from the Fire."
• Analogy Evidence: The purpose of freeing a slave is to free the person from the Fire. This need is even greater in intentional killing, so the requirement of Kaffarah should be stronger there.

Al-Shafi'i provided further analogy: Since Kaffarah is required for killing game while in the state of Ihram (even if intentional regarding the act), we equate the intentional and mistaken killer, except in sin. Similarly here: Allah explicitly mentioned Kaffarah for the mistaken killer; it is more appropriate to impose it on the intentional killer, especially since the intentional killer has a greater need for the freeing act that saves him from the Fire.

Issue 4: Validity of Freeing a Child Slave

Ibn Abbas, Al-Hasan, Al-Sha'bi, and Al-Nakha'i held that the slave freed must be one who fasts and prays. Al-Shafi'i, Malik, Al-Awza'i, and Abu Hanifa held that a child whose parents are Muslim suffices.

• Argument for Ibn Abbas's view: This verse requires freeing a believing slave (رقبة مؤمنة). A believer is one characterized by belief (Tasdiq, action, or both). A child lacks all these, so he is not a believer and does not suffice.
• Argument for the Jurists' view: The phrase {And whoever kills a believer} includes the child. Therefore, the phrase {then the freeing of a believing slave} must also include the child.

Issue 5: Classification of Diyah (Blood Money)

Al-Shafi'i held that Diyah for intentional killing and quasi-intentional killing is Aggravated (Mughallazah): 30 pregnant camels of three years old (Haqq), 30 pregnant camels of four years old (Jadh'ah), and 40 pregnant camels of five years old (Khalifah)—all carrying their young. For pure mistake, it is Mitigated (Mukhaffafah): 20 two-year-old female camels (Bint Makhad), 20 one-year-old female camels (Bint Labun), 20 two-year-old male camels (Ibn Labun), 20 Haqq, and 20 Jadh'ah.

Abu Hanifa agrees with this classification except he substitutes Bint Labun with Bani Makhad (male camels one year old).

• Al-Shafi'i's Argument: Allah mandated Diyah in the Qur'an but did not specify its form. We must refer to the Sunnah and Analogy. Since the Sunnah does not specify it, we use Analogy of Similarity (Qiyas al-Shabah). Since Diyah is due for a stronger cause than Zakat, and the Bint Makhad is excluded from Zakat, it should also be excluded from Diyah.
• Abu Hanifa's Argument: Original innocence (Bara'ah) was established. The principle is that what is established remains. Thus, original innocence remains, and one should not deviate from this unless there is a stronger proof.
• The Reply: The liability (Dhimmah) is occupied by the obligation of Diyah. Since there is consensus that the obligation is dropped upon paying the maximum prescribed amount, it must not be dropped when paying the minimum prescribed amount.

Issue 6: Value of Diyah in Currency

Al-Shafi'i held that if camels are unavailable, the Diyah is 1,000 Dinars or 12,000 Dirhams. Abu Hanifa held it is 10,000 Dirhams.

• Al-Shafi'i's Argument: 'Amr ibn Shu'ayb narrated from his father from his grandfather that the value of Diyah during the Prophet's (PBUH) time was 800 Dinars or 8,000 Dirhams. When 'Umar became Caliph, he addressed the people, stating that the price of camels had risen, and he fixed the Diyah for people of gold at 1,000 Dinars and for people of silver at 12,000 Dirhams. This was stated in a gathering of Companions, and no one objected, making it consensus (Ijma').
• Abu Hanifa's Argument: Taking the lesser amount is preferable (which was already refuted).

Issue 7: Who Pays the Diyah?

Abu Bakr Al-Asamm and the majority of the Khawarij held that the Diyah is due from the killer. Their evidence:

1. {then the freeing of a believing slave} is an obligation. This obligation must fall upon a specific person, and the preceding context identifies that person as the killer: {And whoever kills a believer...}. This sequence proves Allah obligated this freeing upon him, not others.
2. The injury originated from him. Reason dictates that liability falls only on the one who caused the damage. Even if the act was accidental, accidental acts still incur liability for damaged property or bodily harm, and that liability falls only on the perpetrator.
3. Allah obligated two things: freeing a slave and delivering the Diyah. Consensus exists that freeing the slave is obligatory upon the perpetrator; therefore, the Diyah must also be obligatory upon the killer, as the wording is identical for both.
4. The 'Aqilah (the killer's paternal relatives) did not commit any injury or anything resembling it, so nothing should be incumbent upon them, based on the Qur'an and Sunnah.
   • Qur'anic Evidence: {No bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another} (Al-An'am: 164), {And no soul earns [evil] except against itself} (Al-An'am: 29).
   • Sunnah Evidence: The Hadith where the Prophet (PBUH) told Abu Ramthah regarding his son: "He will not bear your crime, nor will you bear his crime." This clarifies that the effect of one's crime does not extend to one's offspring. This supports imposing Diyah on the killer rather than others.
5. Texts indicate that a person's wealth is inviolable. {Do not consume your wealth among yourselves unjustly...} (Al-Nisa: 29), and the Hadith: "Every man is most entitled to his earnings," and "The sanctity of a Muslim's wealth is like the sanctity of his blood." We suspend these general rules only where the Qur'an explicitly mandates payment (like Zakat or liability for damages). Imposing Diyah on the 'Aqilah relies on a solitary report (Khabar al-Wahid), and it is impermissible to restrict the general meaning of the Qur'an with a solitary report because the Qur'an is certain knowledge (Ma'lum) while the solitary report is presumptive (Madhnun).

The Jurists' Reliance (for 'Aqilah liability): They relied on Hadith and Athar (reports).

• Hadith: Al-Mughirah narrated that a woman struck another's abdomen, causing a stillbirth. The Prophet (PBUH) ruled that the Ghürrah (a specific compensation) was due from the striker's 'Aqilah. When Haml ibn Malik objected, saying, "How do we pay for one who neither drank, nor ate, nor cried, nor was born alive?" the Prophet (PBUH) dismissed this as the rhetoric of the Jahiliyyah.
• Athar: 'Umar ruled that 'Ali must pay the 'Aql (blood money) for the freed slave of Zaynab's niece, Safiyyah, when the slave committed an offense, even though 'Ali was Safiyyah's nephew. This indicates Diyah is due from the 'Aqilah.

Issue 8: Diyah of a Woman

The majority of jurists hold that a woman's Diyah is half that of a man. Al-Asamm and Ibn 'Atiyyah held that her Diyah is equal to a man's.

• Majority Argument: 'Ali, 'Umar, and Ibn Mas'ud ruled accordingly. Since a woman receives half a man's share in inheritance and testimony, she should receive half in Diyah.
• Al-Asamm's Argument: This verse states: {...then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation (Diyah) delivered to his family}. Since consensus holds this verse applies to both men and women, the ruling must apply equally to both.

Issue 9: Payment Schedule for Mistaken Killing Diyah

It is established that the Diyah for mistake killing is paid over three years: one-third in the first year, one-third in the second, and one-third in the third. This was widely reported from 'Umar and was not contradicted by any of the early Muslims, making it consensus.

Issue 10: Distribution of Diyah

There is no difference regarding paying debts or executing bequests from the Diyah before distributing the remainder to the heirs according to their shares. 'Umar initially ruled that a wife had no share in her husband's Diyah, stating it belonged only to the paternal relatives ('Asabah) who would pay the 'Aql. However, some Companions testified that the Prophet (PBUH) commanded that the wife inherit from her husband's Diyah, and 'Umar then ruled accordingly.

Returning to the Tafsir:

{then the freeing of a believing slave}: This means he must free a slave. Tahrir (freeing) means making him free (Hurr), which is pure/unrestricted. Since humans were created to own things (as Allah says: {He created for you all that is in the earth} [Al-Baqarah: 29]), being owned is a defect that clouds human nature. Thus, removing ownership is called Tahrir, meaning liberation from what mars one's humanity. Raqabah (neck/slave) refers to the soul/person, just as the head can refer to the person (e.g., "He owns X heads of slaves"). A believing slave means one who is under the rule of Islam according to the jurists, though Ibn Abbas required one who actually prayed and fasted.

{and a compensation (Diyah) delivered to his family}: Al-Wahidi said Diyah comes from Wadiy (like Shiyah from Washi). The original form was Wadiyah, with the waw dropped. To pay Wadiy to someone means paying their dues to their guardian. The Lawgiver specifically restricted this term to what is paid in exchange for a life, not for property damage or loss of limbs.

{unless they remit it}: The original form was yatassaddaqu (to give charity), where the ta' was assimilated into the sad. The meaning of Tasaddaq is giving. Allah says: {and bestow favor upon us; indeed, Allah rewards the charitable} (Yusuf: 88). The meaning here is: unless they give the Diyah as charity, forgiving it and waiving the payment.

Al-Kashshaf states the structure implies: "The Diyah must be delivered to his family until the time they give charity [waive it]." In this case, {that they give charity} is in the accusative case as an adverb of time (Zarf). Alternatively, it can be a circumstantial adverb (Hal) meaning "unless they are giving charity [while receiving it]."

Allah mentioned in the first verse that killing a Muslim by mistake requires freeing a slave and paying Diyah. In this verse, He mentions that killing a Muslim by mistake who belongs to a people hostile to you requires freeing a slave, but He remains silent about the Diyah. Later, He mentions that if the victim is from a people with whom you have a treaty, the Diyah is due. The silence regarding Diyah here, contrasted with its mention before and after, indicates that Diyah is not obligatory in this specific case.

If this is established, the word {from} (من) in {from a people hostile to you} either means the victim resided in the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb), or that he was related to them. The latter is false because consensus holds that if a Muslim resides in the Abode of Islam, even if all his relatives are disbelievers, Diyah is due if he is killed by mistake. Since the second option is void, the first must be intended: If the victim killed by mistake resides in the Abode of War but is a believer, the obligation is freeing the slave, but not the Diyah.

Al-Shafi'i argued that analogy supports this: If Diyah were obligatory for killing a Muslim residing in the Abode of War, those intending to raid the Abode of War would need to investigate every individual's status, which is difficult and leads to people avoiding raiding. Therefore, Diyah should be waived for the killer because the victim forfeited his own blood protection by choosing to reside in the Abode of War. As for the Kaffarah (freeing the slave), it is a right of Allah, because a person who was devoted to worshipping Allah has perished. Since a slave cannot maintain worship consistently, freeing one replaces the deceased in maintaining acts of worship. Thus, analogy dictates the waiver of Diyah and the retention of Kaffarah.

Issue 1: Meaning of "A People Between Whom and You There Is a Treaty"

There are two opinions:

1. It refers to a Muslim: This is because Allah first mentioned the ruling for a Muslim killed by mistake, then the case of a Muslim killed by mistake residing among the people of war, and now the case of a Muslim killed by mistake residing among the people of the covenant (Ahl al-Dhimmah). This sequence is orderly, making this interpretation plausible. Furthermore, {And if he was} must refer back to something previously mentioned, which is the Muslim killed by mistake.
2. It refers to a Dhimmi (protected non-Muslim): The meaning is: If the victim was from a people with whom you have a treaty, meaning he adhered to their religion/doctrine.

Those who hold the first opinion raise objections to the second:

1. A Muslim killed by mistake, whether in the Abode of War or among the Ahl al-Dhimmah, is covered by the general verse: {And whoever kills a believer intentionally, then [the penalty is] the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation (Diyah) delivered to his family...}. If this verse referred to a Muslim, it would be repeating the same ruling without benefit, unlike the case of the Muslim in the Abode of War, where Diyah was waived. Here, Diyah and Kaffarah are affirmed, suggesting a different category.
2. If it referred to a Muslim, the Diyah would not be delivered to his family, as his family members would be disbelievers who do not inherit from him.
3. The phrase {from a people between whom and you there is a treaty} implies he shares the characteristic mentioned—the existence of a treaty. If we interpret it as him being from them in that specific characteristic, the ambiguity is removed, which is preferable. This implies he must be a Dhimmi or a covenant-holder like them.

Rebuttal to these objections:

1. Reply to Objection 1: Allah mentioned the ruling for the Muslim killed by mistake generally. Then He mentioned one category: the Muslim killed by mistake residing in the Abode of War, clarifying that Diyah is waived. Then He mentioned the second category: the Muslim killed by mistake residing among the people of the covenant, clarifying that Diyah and Kaffarah are due. The purpose is to show the difference between this case and the preceding one.
2. Reply to Objection 2: His family refers to the Muslims to whom his Diyah is transferred.
3. Reply to Objection 3: The word {from} (من) in the previous verse was clarified by {in} (في) [i.e., in a people hostile to you]. Similarly, here it must carry that meaning.

Significance of this debate: This discussion is relevant to a legal matter: Abu Hanifa held that the Diyah of a Dhimmi is equal to that of a Muslim. Al-Shafi'i held that the Diyah of a Jew or Christian is one-third of a Magian's Diyah, and a Magian's Diyah is one-thirteenth of a Muslim's Diyah. Abu Hanifa used this verse (assuming it refers to the Dhimmi) to argue that Allah mandated the full Diyah ({a compensation delivered to his family}). The Reply: We have shown the verse concerns Muslims, not Ahl al-Dhimmah, invalidating his proof. Even if it applied to Ahl al-Dhimmah, it does not prove his point, as Allah only mandated Diyah (فدية مسلمة), meaning some payment called Diyah. Why must the Diyah for the Dhimmi be the same amount as for the Muslim? The Diyah simply means the money paid in exchange for a life; the amount for a Muslim and a Dhimmi being equal is precisely what is disputed.

Issue 2: Order of Obligations

Why is freeing the slave mentioned before the Diyah in the first verse, but the order is reversed here? If the order carried significance, it would invalidate one of the verses. This is like the difference in word order between two verses regarding entering the gate while saying "Hittah" (Forgive us).

Issue 3: Identity of Those with a Treaty

1. Ibn Abbas held they are the Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book) who are Ahl al-Dhimmah.
2. Al-Hasan held they are the covenant-holding disbelievers (Mu'ahadun).

This means he must fast for two consecutive months as a substitute for freeing the slave if he is poor. Masruq said it is a substitute for both the Kaffarah and the Diyah. Continuity is required; if he breaks the fast for a day, he must restart, unless the break is due to menstruation or post-natal bleeding.

{as a repentance from Allah} (توبة من الله): This is in the accusative case, functioning as a Maf'ul li-ajlih (reason/purpose). It is as if it means: "Perform what Allah has obligated upon you for the sake of receiving repentance from Allah," similar to saying, "I did X in fear of Y."

Objection: Mistaken killing is not a sin, so what is the meaning of {as a repentance from Allah}?

Replies:

1. There are two types of shortcomings involved. If the person had exercised extreme caution, the act would not have occurred (e.g., if one is extremely careful in checking identity before striking). The phrase {as a repentance from Allah} serves as a reminder that he was deficient in exercising caution.
2. The phrase refers to Allah permitting fasting as a substitute for freeing the slave when one is unable. Since lightening a burden is a consequence of Allah accepting repentance, the term Tawbah (repentance) is used to denote the lightening (by substituting the lesser act for the greater).
3. When such a mistake happens to a believer, he feels remorse and wishes it had not occurred. Allah named this remorse and wish Tawbah.

This means Allah knows that the killer did not intend or plan the act, and He is Wise in not punishing him for that mistaken action, as wisdom dictates that one should only be held accountable for what one chooses and intends.

Know that the People of the Sunnah, who believe Allah's actions are not conditioned upon realizing benefits, say the meaning of Him being Wise is that He is Knowing of the consequences of matters. The Mu'tazila argue this verse refutes that view because Wise (حكيما) is conjoined with Knowing (عليما). If Hakim meant Alim, it would be conjoining a thing with itself, which is impossible.

The Reply: In every instance in the Qur'an where Hakim is conjoined with Alim, the meaning of Hakim is that He is Perfect in His actions (Muhkim fi Af'alihi). Thus, both terms relate to the manner and knowledge of the action.