Al-An'am (The Cattle): (103) Vision cannot encompass Him...

Issues in this Verse:

This is argued from several perspectives:

First Point: Establishing the Possibility of Vision

1. This verse proves that Allah's vision is permissible (jā'iz al-ru'yah).
2. If this is established, it necessitates affirming that the believers will see Him on the Day of Resurrection.

Establishing the Possibility of Vision (The First Stage):

1. Allah praises Himself by saying: {Vision cannot encompass Him} (لا تدركه الأبصار). The opponents agree on this statement, and they base their denial of the vision upon it.
2. If we accept this, we argue: If Allah were inherently impossible to be seen (mā'ni' al-ru'yah), then the praise in {Vision cannot encompass Him} would not be meaningful.
3. Consider: The non-existent cannot be seen. None of the concepts like knowledge, power, will, smells, or tastes can be seen, nor is there praise for them in being unseen.
4. Therefore, {Vision cannot encompass Him} implies that He is jā'iz al-ru'yah (permissible to be seen).
5. The full reasoning is: If a thing is inherently impossible to be seen, then its non-visibility does not constitute praise for it. However, if a thing is inherently permissible to be seen, yet He possesses the complete power to veil the eyes from perceiving and encompassing Him, this complete power indicates praise and majesty.
6. Thus, the verse proves that Allah is jā'iz al-ru'yah in His essence.

Affirming Vision on the Day of Judgment:

1. If His vision is permissible, then it must be affirmed that the believers will see Him on the Day of Resurrection.
2. There are two positions: one affirming the possibility of vision and that believers will see Him, and another denying both.
3. The position that vision is permissible but that no believer will see Him is a view held by no one in the Ummah, thus it is false.
4. Therefore, this verse proves that Allah is jā'iz al-ru'yah in His essence, and whenever this is the case, it necessitates that the believers will see Him. This is a subtle inference from the verse.

Second Way (Argument):

1. The term al-abṣār (visions/eyes) in {Vision cannot encompass Him} does not refer to the faculty of sight itself, as sight never perceives anything absolutely. The perceiver (al-mubṣir) is the one who perceives.
2. Therefore, the meaning must be that no perceivers can encompass Him.
3. If this is the case, then {And He perceives all visions} (وهو يدرك الأبصار) means He perceives the perceivers (وهو يدرك المبصرين).
4. The Mu'tazila of Basra agree that Allah perceives things, meaning He is among the perceivers.
5. Thus, {And He perceives all visions} implies that He perceives Himself. If this is true, He is jā'iz al-ru'yah in His essence, and He sees Himself.
6. Everyone who affirms His vision is permissible in essence affirms that the believers will see Him on the Day of Resurrection.
7. In summary: {And He perceives all visions} implies He perceives sight or the sighted. In either case, it necessitates that He perceives Himself. If this is established, the believers must see Him on the Day of Resurrection, as no one differentiates between these two points.

Third Way (Argument):

1. The word al-abṣār (visions) is a plural noun preceded by the definite article al- (الـ), implying totality (universal scope).
2. {Vision cannot encompass Him} means not all visions can encompass Him. This implies a negation of the universal (سلب العموم), not a universal negation (عموم السلب).
3. Restricting this negation to the collective whole implies that the ruling holds for some individuals within that collective. Just as saying, "No one struck Zayd," implies that some people struck him.
4. Similarly, saying, "Not all people believed in the Prophet (PBUH)," implies that some people believed in him.
5. Thus, {Vision cannot encompass Him} means not all visions can encompass Him, which necessitates that some visions can encompass Him.
6. At most, this relies on Dalīl al-Khitāb (Argument from the contrary implication). We accept this, as it is a valid argument, because if perception were impossible for anyone whatsoever, restricting the negation to the collective whole would be futile, and God's speech must be preserved from futility.

Fourth Way (Argument):

1. This argument relates to what was narrated about Ḍirār ibn 'Amr al-Kūfī, who claimed Allah cannot be seen by the eye, but only by a sixth sense created by Allah on the Day of Resurrection.
2. He used this verse: The verse specifically negates perception by the eye (البصر). Specifying the ruling for one thing implies the opposite ruling for others.
3. Therefore, perception of Allah by something other than the eye must be permissible in principle. Since the existing senses are inadequate, it necessitates the creation of a sixth sense for seeing Allah.
4. These four arguments can be relied upon to establish that the believers will see Allah on the Day of Resurrection.

They argue in two ways:

First Way:

1. They claim that perception by sight (الإدراك بالبصر) is synonymous with seeing (الرؤية). Proof: If someone said, "I perceived him with my sight but did not see him," or "I saw him but did not perceive him with my sight," their speech would be contradictory. Thus, perception by sight equals vision.
2. If this is established, then {Vision cannot encompass Him} implies that no vision can see Him in any state whatsoever.
3. The proof for this universal negation is twofold:
   • It is possible to make exceptions for all persons and all states (e.g., "Vision cannot encompass Him except the sight of so-and-so, or except in such-and-such a state"). An exception implies that what would have been included without it is indeed included. Thus, the verse implies a universal negation concerning all persons in all states, meaning no one sees Allah in any state.
   • 'Ā'ishah (RA) used this verse to refute Ibn 'Abbās's claim that the Prophet (PBUH) saw Allah on the Night of Ascension. If the verse did not imply universality regarding all persons and all states, her argument would not hold. She was certainly one of the most knowledgeable in Arabic. Thus, the verse implies negation for all persons.

Second Way:

1. The verses preceding this one, up to this point, contain praise and commendation. The verse following it, {And He perceives all visions}, is also praise and commendation.
2. Therefore, {Vision cannot encompass Him} must also be praise and commendation. Otherwise, non-praise would occur amidst praise, which implies awkwardness unsuitable for God's speech.
3. If this is established, then any absence whose non-existence is praise, and which is not an act (فعل), its existence would imply a defect (نقص) in Allah, which is impossible (citing verses like لا تأخذه سنة ولا نوم).
4. Therefore, Allah being seen (كونه تعالى مرئياً) must be impossible.
5. They restrict this to things that are not acts because Allah praises Himself by negating injustice (citing verses like وما الله يريد ظلماً للعالمين), even though they believe He is capable of injustice. They add this restriction to avoid refutation regarding His power over injustice. This is the extent of their argument.

Rebuttal to the First Way:

1. We do not concede that perception by sight (الإدراك بالبصر) is synonymous with vision (الرؤية).
2. Linguistically, idrāk (perception/attainment) means catching up or reaching. (Citing verses like إنا لمدركون - we will be overtaken/reached). It also means reaching puberty or fruit ripening. Thus, idrāk means reaching something.
3. If the seen object has limits and boundaries, and sight encompasses all its limits, this vision is called idrāk. If sight does not encompass all boundaries, it is not called idrāk.
4. Vision (الرؤية) is a general category containing two types: vision with encompassing, and vision without encompassing. Idrāk is the vision with encompassing.
5. Negating idrāk only negates one type of vision; negating a specific type does not necessitate negating the general category (vision). Therefore, negating idrāk of Allah does not necessitate negating His vision.

(Self-Correction/Refinement): Some might argue that idrāk is more specific than ru'yah, so affirming the specific implies affirming the general, but negating the specific does not imply negating the general. This confirms our rebuttal.

Rebuttal to the Second Way:

1. Even if perception by sight equals vision, why do you claim {Vision cannot encompass Him} implies universal negation concerning all persons, all states, and all times?
2. Your proof using the possibility of exception for all persons/states is countered by the possibility of exception for a small group (which does not imply universal negation).
3. We concede that the verse implies negation of the universal (نفي العموم), but negation of the universal is different from universal negation (عموم النفي). We have shown the verse implies the former, which necessitates the existence of the latter (i.e., some vision does occur), which is our position.
4. Regarding 'Ā'ishah (RA): Knowledge of linguistic specifics comes from linguists, but the method of inferential reasoning is not based on mere imitation. Rational proof indicates the verse implies negation of the universal, not universal negation. Since their goal requires universal negation, their argument fails.

Rebuttal to the Third Way:

1. The plural form (الأبصار) can refer to the customary or known group, not just the exhaustive universal.
2. If so, {Vision cannot encompass Him} means the known visions in this world cannot encompass Him. We agree: these eyes, as long as they remain in their worldly state, cannot see Allah. They will only see Him when their states change. Why do you assume that even after these changes, they still cannot see Him?

Rebuttal to the Fourth Way:

1. Even if eyes, as they are, cannot see Allah, why is it impossible for perception to occur via a sixth sense, as Ḍirār ibn 'Amr suggested? If this is possible, the verse offers no proof against vision.

Rebuttal to the Fifth Way:

1. Even if the verse is general, the verses affirming the vision of Allah are specific (خاصة). The specific takes precedence over the general. The discussion then shifts to whether those affirming verses actually prove vision.

Rebuttal to the Sixth Way:

1. Based on the verse: We concede that eyes (الأبصار) cannot encompass Him. Why do you conclude that the perceivers (المبصرون) cannot perceive Him? This returns to the first point.

Rebuttal to the Second Way (Regarding Praise):

1. We already showed that negating vision would only be praise if Allah were inherently permissible to be seen, and He actively veils the eyes.
2. Furthermore, pure negation or mere absence cannot be a source of praise. Negation is only praiseworthy if it points to an established attribute of praise.
3. Example: {Nor slumber overtakes Him} (لا تأخذه سنة ولا نوم) is not praise in itself (as inanimate objects share this), but in Allah's case, it proves His eternal, unchanging knowledge. Similarly, {He feeds and is not fed} proves His self-subsistence.
4. Therefore, {Vision cannot encompass Him} can only be praise if it indicates an existing meaning worthy of praise—namely, His power to veil the eyes from perceiving Him. This turns the argument against the Mu'tazila entirely.

The Qāḍī mentioned other rational arguments outside the scope of this verse, which we will address before presenting our proofs for vision.

Qāḍī's Rational Arguments (Weak in our view):

1. Argument from Necessary Consequence: If the sense organ is sound, the object is present, and all necessary conditions are met (no extreme proximity/distance, no veil, object is opposite or in the position of opposition), then vision must occur. Otherwise, it would imply that drums and cymbals could be present without us hearing or seeing them, leading to sophistry.
   • Application: Since extreme proximity/distance, veiling, and opposition are impossible for Allah, if His vision were possible, the necessary conditions (sound sense, permissible object) would lead to vision occurring now. Since it does not occur now, His vision is impossible.
2. Argument from Opposition: Everything seen must be opposite or in the position of opposition. Allah is not so. Therefore, His vision is impossible.
3. Argument from Distinction (Heaven/Hell): How can the people of Paradise see Him while the people of the Fire do not? Either He approaches or opposes them, making their state different from the people of the Fire. This implies Allah is a body subject to proximity, distance, and veiling.
4. Argument from Consistency (Paradise): If you say the people of Paradise see Him always (even during intercourse), this is false. If they see Him sometimes and not others, this implies He is sometimes near and sometimes far. Furthermore, since vision is the greatest pleasure, they must desire it constantly. If they are deprived of it sometimes, they experience grief, which is unsuitable for the people of Paradise.

Rebuttal to the Qāḍī's Arguments:

1. Rebuttal to Argument 1: We accept that vision of bodies and accidents is necessary under those conditions. But why must vision of Allah, whose essence opposes all essences, follow the same rule? They failed to notice that their logic relies on analogy where the essence is fundamentally different.
2. Rebuttal to Argument 2: The dispute is whether an entity not confined to a place or direction can be seen. If you claim the impossibility of seeing such an entity is self-evident (بديهي), then arguing with proof is futile. If it is derived (استدلالي), then your premise ("Everything seen must be opposite or in the position of opposition") is merely restating the claim, offering no proof.
3. Rebuttal to Argument 3: Why can't we say Allah creates the vision in the eyes of the people of Paradise but not in the eyes of the people of the Fire? This is not due to proximity/distance. If you use the analogy of drums/cymbals to refute this, you revert to the first argument, which has already been answered.
4. Rebuttal to Argument 4: Why can't they see Him sometimes and not others? Your claim that this implies proximity/distance reverts to the first argument. Regarding the greatest pleasure: Just as other pleasures of Paradise occur sometimes and not others, the desire for vision might also be intermittent, or the greatest pleasure might not require constant fulfillment without grief.

We list proofs that will be detailed elsewhere:

1. Moses (PBUH) requested to see Allah, proving its permissibility.
2. Allah conditioned the vision on the mountain's stability: {If it remains in its place, then you will see Me} (فإن استقر مكانه فسوف ترانى). Since the mountain's stability is possible, the conditioned event (vision) is possible. (To be detailed in Sūrat al-A'rāf).
3. The arguments derived from {Vision cannot encompass Him} (as detailed in Issue 1).
4. The verse {For those who do good is the best [reward] and more} (للذين أحسنوا الحسنى وزيادة). The "more" (زيادة) is the vision of Allah (detailed in Sūrat Yūnus).
5. Verses mentioning the "meeting" (لقاء), such as {So whoever would hope for the meeting of his Lord} (فمن كان يرجو لقاء ربه). (Detailed repeatedly in this Tafsīr).
6. {And when you look there, you will see there pleasure and a great kingdom} (وإذا رأيت ثم رأيت نعيماً وملكاً كبيراً). One reading uses Mulkan (with fatḥa on Mīm and kasra on Lām), which the Muslims agree refers only to Allah. This is the strongest proof.
7. {No! Indeed, from their Lord, that Day, they will be veiled} (كلا إنهم عن ربهم يومئذ لمحجوبون). Specifying the veiling of the disbelievers implies the believers will not be veiled from seeing Allah.
8. {And he has already seen him another time, Near the Lote Tree of the Utmost Boundary} (ولقد رآه نزلة أخرى عند سدرة المنتهى). (To be detailed in Sūrat al-Najm).
9. Pure hearts are naturally inclined to know Allah in the most perfect way, and the most perfect way of knowledge is vision. Thus, vision must be sought by everyone, and since Allah promised {And you will have therein whatever your souls desire} (ولكم فيها ما تشتهى أنفسكم), vision must occur.
10. {Indeed, those who believed and did righteous deeds, theirs will be the Gardens of Paradise as a lodging} (إن الذين ءامنوا وعملوا الصالحات كانت لهم جنات الفردوس نزلاً). Since Paradise is established as their lodging, there must follow a greater honor than the lodging itself, which is vision.
11. {Some faces, that Day, will be radiant, Looking at their Lord} (وجوه يومئذ ناضرة إلى ربها ناظرة). (Each point will be detailed in its respective location).

Hadith Evidence:

• The famous Hadith: "You will see your Lord just as you see the full moon; you will have no difficulty in seeing Him." The comparison is in the clarity of the vision, not the seen object.
• The consensus that the Prophet (PBUH) recited {For those who do good is the best [reward] and more} (للذين أحسنوا الحسنى وزيادة), interpreting the "more" (الزيادة) as the sight of Allah's Face.
• The Companions disagreed on whether the Prophet (PBUH) saw Allah on the Night of Ascension, yet they did not excommunicate or declare each other misguided over this. This proves their consensus that the vision of Allah is not rationally impossible.

This verse proves that Allah sees, perceives, and comprehends things.

1. If al-abṣār means the faculty of sight itself, then Allah must be the Seer of the seers' sight and the perceiver of the perceivers' faculties. Whoever affirms this affirms that Allah sees all visible things.
2. If al-abṣār means the perceivers, then Allah must be the Seer of the perceivers.
3. In either case, the verse proves Allah is the Perceiver of the perceived things and the Seer of the visible things.

This implies exclusivity: Allah perceives visions, and nothing else perceives them.

1. The faculty that makes a living being a seer of the visible and a perceiver of the perceived is a wondrous, noble essence whose reality the intellect cannot grasp.
2. Yet, Allah perceives the reality of this faculty and is aware of its essence.
3. Thus, {Vision cannot encompass Him} means no perceptive faculty can encompass His reality, and no intellect can grasp the core of His self-subsistence.
4. The visions fail to encompass Him, and the intellects retreat from reaching the fields of His might. Just as nothing encompasses Him, His knowledge encompasses everything, and His perception reaches everything. This is the structure of the verse.

Al-Laṭīf (The Subtle) is the opposite of density; it means fineness. This is impossible for Allah in its literal sense, so interpretation is necessary in several ways:

1. Subtlety of Creation: It refers to the subtlety of His creation in structuring the bodies of living beings from minute particles, thin membranes, and narrow passages known only to Him.
2. Subtlety in Benevolence: He is subtle in granting favors, compassion, and mercy.
3. Subtlety toward Servants: He praises them for obedience, commands repentance for sin, and never cuts off the grace of His mercy, whether they are obedient or disobedient.
4. Subtlety in Burden: He does not command them beyond their capacity and grants them blessings beyond their due merit.

As for Al-Khabīr (The Acquainted): It derives from Khabar (knowledge). It means He is subtle toward His servants despite being fully aware of their commission of sins and perpetration of ugly deeds.

Al-Kashshāf's view: Al-Laṭīf means He is subtle beyond the reach of vision. Al-Khabīr means He is acquainted with everything subtle, and nothing is subtle beyond His perception. This is a good interpretation.